CourtListener 10845986

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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: March 17, 2026

S26A0399. RAINEY v. THE STATE.

COLVIN, Justice.

Shadreen Rainey appeals from her convictions for felony

murder, home invasion, and related offenses, in connection with the

shooting death of Joshua Ellison and the shootings of Aldean Clark

Kinsey and Elante Jose Elias Medina. 1 On appeal, Rainey argues

1 The crimes occurred on February 4, 2021. On November 18, 2021, a

Fulton County grand jury indicted Appellant for the felony murder of Ellison
(Counts 1 and 2), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of Kinsey and
Medina (Counts 3 and 4), home invasion in the first degree (Count 5), false
statement (Count 6), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony (Count 7). A jury trial was held from November 15 through 18, 2022,
and the jury found Appellant guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced
Appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for felony murder
(Count 1). The court also imposed ten-year consecutive terms in prison for each
count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Counts 3 and 4), a five-year
consecutive prison term for possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony (Count 7), and concurrent prison terms of ten years and five years,
respectively, for home invasion in the first degree (Count 5) and false
statement (Count 6). The other felony-murder count (Count 2) was vacated by
that the trial evidence was not constitutionally sufficient to prove

the “without authority” element of home invasion, that the trial

court plainly erred in admitting testimony about what Rainey said

during the shooting incident because the identifications of her voice

were insufficiently authenticated, and that the trial court plainly

erred in failing to instruct the jury on conspiracy as a lesser-included

offense. As explained below, Rainey’s arguments fail. We therefore

affirm her convictions.

1. The trial evidence showed the following. The crimes occurred

in a 12-room, two-story rooming house in Atlanta. At the time of the

shooting, Appellant and her mother had lived in the rooming house

for about a year, Kinsey had lived there for about seven months, and

Medina had lived there for about five months.

Appellant and her mother rented separate bedrooms upstairs

operation of law. Appellant timely filed a motion for new trial on January 10,
2023, and amended the motion through new counsel on April 16, 2024, October
7, 2024, and May 26, 2025. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the
motion for new trial, as amended, on July 14, 2025. Appellant timely filed a
notice of appeal directed to this Court. The appeal was docketed to this Court’s
term beginning in December 2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
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in the rooming house. Kinsey rented a ground-floor bedroom

adjacent to the front door. Medina rented a ground-floor bedroom

connected to the kitchen. And the layout of the house allowed a

resident standing at Medina’s bedroom door to see through the

kitchen, down a hallway containing Kinsey’s bedroom door, and to

the front door of the house.

About a month before the shooting, Kinsey’s ex-girlfriend,

Mayah Persons, moved into Kinsey’s bedroom in the rooming house.

Kinsey testified that, in the six months prior to Persons moving in

with him, he and Appellant “were flirting and stuff.” Kinsey said,

“We talked. We kicked it. We smoked a couple.” And according to

Kinsey, the day before Persons moved in, he and Appellant were

“going to her room,” but he told Appellant that “we can’t even do

that” because Persons “was coming the next day.”

Around that time, tension rose in the house. Medina testified

that Appellant took issue with him after he ate some food that he

believed Appellant’s mother had given him, resulting in a verbal

altercation. And Kinsey testified that, as soon as Persons moved in,

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Appellant started “sizing her up” and “threatening” her, saying

things like, “I’ll beat any b up,” and “I’ll beat [any] ho a** up.”

About a week before the shooting, Appellant’s verbal threats

prompted a physical fight between Appellant and Persons. Persons,

who was winning the fight, ended up on top of Appellant. And

Kinsey testified that he and Appellant’s mother both intervened,

with Kinsey grabbing Persons and Appellant’s mother grabbing

Appellant. According to Kinsey, Appellant’s mother stumbled and

fell down as she tried to pull Appellant away from Persons. But

Appellant’s mother testified that Kinsey “pushed [her] hard.” And

although Kinsey denied pushing Appellant’s mother, Appellant

accused him of doing so. Kinsey testified that, as Appellant was

walking away from the fight, Appellant turned around and said,

“Oh, I got you. I got you. I promise you, I got you.”

A few days later, Appellant came into the house with a man

who had a gun. Kinsey testified that Appellant took the gun from

the man and said, “Talk s**t now.” Kinsey told Appellant she was

not going to shoot and walked back to his bedroom. But afterward,

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Kinsey obtained a gun to protect himself.

Around 1:00 a.m. on the night of the shooting, Appellant

arrived at the rooming house with two or three other people, one of

whom was Appellant’s ex-boyfriend, Ellison. 2 At the time, Kinsey

was “having sexual relations” with Persons in his bedroom, and

Medina was in the kitchen. Kinsey testified that he looked over to

his window facing the front porch and saw the silhouettes of four

people on the blinds. Kinsey testified that he heard more than one

person enter the house through the locked front door, walk to the

back of the house, and then return to his bedroom door. Medina

testified that the people who entered the house included Appellant

and a man with a gun, who walked together past him toward the

back of the house and then walked back to the front of the house,

where they stood outside Kinsey’s bedroom door.

Kinsey said he “knew what [Appellant’s] voice sounded like”

because they “had been talking.” And he testified that he heard

Appellant say in a “very subtle” but audible “whisper,” “His room is

2 The other person or two people were never definitively identified.

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right here, and the other one is in the kitchen.” Persons testified that

Kinsey “immediately got up and started putting on his pants,” and

that while he was doing so, there was a knock at Kinsey’s bedroom

door. According to Kinsey, the man at the door addressed Kinsey by

his nickname, “Twin,” saying something along the lines of, “Hey,

Twin, so, what’s all this s**t I heard about … my sister getting a

black eye, and you putting your hands on my mama?” Appellant

responded, “Nah, bro. That ain’t what happened.” Before Kinsey

could open the door, shots rang out and bullets that passed through

the door hit him in the leg, causing him to fall backward.

After hearing the gunshots, Medina retreated to his bedroom

and sat on his bed. Medina then heard a man ask, “Where’s the other

dude at?” And Medina testified that Appellant, whose voice he

recognized from having “spoken to her … every other two or three

days,” said, “He’s over there in that room right there.”

Meanwhile, with Persons’s assistance, Kinsey grabbed his gun

and fired back “a couple times.” Medina then heard footsteps

approaching his room, and a man “came in the room” and “shot at

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[him],” striking him twice in the leg. 3 Kinsey heard someone “bust

into” Medina’s room and shoot at him. And when Kinsey “hear[d]

footsteps” coming back in his direction, Kinsey fired several more

shots from inside his bedroom. Multiple bullet holes were later found

in Kinsey’s door, wall, and window. And Kinsey testified that the

man who was later identified as Ellison walked through a glass door

on the porch and collapsed in front of the house, where he died.4

Kinsey said that the other people “ran and jumped in [a] car,” and

Appellant drove them away from the scene.

Appellant’s aunt testified that Appellant, who went to live with

her for a few weeks after leaving the rooming house, told her that

Appellant’s boyfriend (Ellison) went into the rooming house with a

gun, that he harmed people, that someone shot him as he was

leaving the house, and that Appellant then left the scene.

3 A detective testified that Medina identified Ellison as the person who

shot him. At trial, however, Medina testified that Ellison was not the man who
shot him, and that the shooter also was not the man he had previously seen
walk past him with Appellant.
4 The medical examiner testified that Ellison died from a gunshot wound

of the chest.
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Appellant’s mother similarly testified that “about 10 or 15” minutes

after the shooting, Appellant called her, saying that Appellant had

been “in the house.” According to Appellant’s mother, Appellant

further said that “it [was]n’t supposed to go that way,” that Ellison

“was supposed to stay in the car,” and that Ellison was the one who

asked, “Who pushed my mama[?]” A detective, who interviewed

Appellant’s mother on the day of the shooting, testified that

Appellant’s mother called Appellant on speakerphone in his

presence. According to the detective, after Appellant’s mother

repeated what Appellant had told her about the crime, Appellant

“scream[ed] at her mother, cuss[ed] her mother out,” and said

something to the effect of, “You just put in a murder. How could you

do this?”

Cell phone records introduced into evidence at trial showed

that, on the day of the shooting, Appellant’s cell phone was in the

sector of a cell phone tower covering the rooming house at 1:05 and

1:13 a.m., shortly before a different phone called 911 to report the

shooting at 1:32 a.m. Appellant’s cell phone records further showed

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that, shortly before and shortly after that time period, Appellant’s

cell phone was in areas to the east of the rooming house covered by

different cell phone towers. Finally, the cell phone records showed

that cell service to Appellant’s phone was terminated at 4:35 p.m. on

the day of the shooting.

Officers who arrived at the crime scene found a total of ten

cartridge cases, which had been fired from three different guns, one

of which was Kinsey’s and another of which was found near Ellison’s

body. The third gun was never recovered.

2. On appeal, Rainey argues that the trial evidence was

constitutionally insufficient to prove the “without authority”

element of home invasion in the first degree. See OCGA § 16-7-5(b)

(“A person commits the offense of home invasion in the first degree

when, without authority and with intent to commit a forcible felony

therein and while in possession of a deadly weapon or instrument

which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually

does result in serious bodily injury, he or she enters the dwelling

house of another while such dwelling house is occupied by any

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person with authority to be present therein.” (emphasis added)).

According to Appellant, she could not be found guilty of being a party

to the crime of invading Medina’s home because she was a resident

of the rooming house with a key and had authority to enter it. See

OCGA § 16-2-20(b)(3), (4) (providing that a person is a party to a

crime if, among other things, the person “[i]ntentionally aids or

abets in the commission of the crime” or “[i]ntentionally advises,

encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to commit the

crime”). As explained below, however, Appellant’s argument fails.

“Evidence is sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process

if a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pierce v. State, 319 Ga. 846, 849 (2024)

(quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict, with deference to the jury’s assessment of the weight and

credibility of the evidence.” Id. at 849–50 (cleaned up). And “[o]n

appeal, it is the defendant’s burden to show that the trial evidence

was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process.” Charles

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v. State, 315 Ga. 651, 653 (2023).

In relevant part, Count 5 of the indictment charged Appellant

with committing home invasion in the first degree by “enter[ing] the

dwelling house of” Medina “without authority.” Although Appellant

argues that the evidence showed that she had authority to enter the

rooming house, the State’s theory of the case (which it stated clearly

in opening statements, in response to Appellant’s motion for a

directed verdict, and in closing arguments) was that Appellant had

committed home invasion by being a party to the entry of Medina’s

bedroom — that is, Medina’s specific dwelling — not the rooming

house as a whole. And although Appellant argued below that

Medina’s bedroom did not constitute a “dwelling house” for purposes

of the home-invasion statute, OCGA § 16-7-5(b), she has not raised

that argument before us or otherwise made any effort to address

that theory of the case on appeal.5

5 In denying Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict, the trial court

rejected Appellant’s argument that Medina’s bedroom could not constitute a
“dwelling house” for purposes of applying OCGA § 16-7-5(b). Because Appellant
has not challenged that statutory-construction conclusion on appeal, we do not
address it here.
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Here, the trial evidence showed that Medina rented his own

bedroom, and that neither Appellant, who rented a separate

bedroom in the house, nor the man who Appellant directed to

Medina’s bedroom had authority to enter the bedroom for which

Medina paid for exclusive use. The trial evidence was therefore

constitutionally sufficient to prove that Appellant was a party to the

entry of Medina’s bedroom “without authority.” OCGA § 16-7-5(b).

And because Appellant argues on appeal only that the trial evidence

was insufficient to prove the “without authority” element of home

invasion, she has failed to carry her burden on appeal of showing

that the trial evidence was insufficient as a matter of constitutional

due process to support her conviction. See Charles, 315 Ga. at 653.

3. Appellant challenges the trial court’s admission of Kinsey’s

and Medina’s testimony identifying Appellant as the speaker who

directed the shooters to their bedrooms. According to Appellant,

Kinsey’s and Medina’s voice-identification testimony was

insufficiently authenticated under OCGA § 24-9-901(a), which

provides, “The requirement of authentication or identification as a

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condition precedent to admissibility shall be satisfied by evidence

sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its

proponent claims.”

Appellant did not object to the admission of Kinsey’s and

Medina’s voice-identification testimony at trial, so we review this

claim only for plain error. See Render v. State, 320 Ga. 890, 899

(2025). To establish plain error, an appellant

must point to an error that was not affirmatively waived,
the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable
dispute, the error must have affected his substantial
rights, and the error must have seriously affected the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.

Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Here, Appellant’s plain-error claim fails because she has not

shown any error in admitting the identifications of Appellant’s voice.

The Evidence Code provides that one way a person’s voice can be

identified is “by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time

under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker.” OCGA

§ 24-9-901(b)(5). Here, testimony from Kinsey and Medina satisfied

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that standard. As explained above, Kinsey and Medina, who both

lived in the same house as Appellant, had frequent interactions with

Appellant before the crimes occurred. According to Kinsey, he and

Appellant were “flirting” over the course of several months, and he

knew what her voice sounded like because they “had been talking.”

Medina similarly testified that he had talked to Appellant every two

or three days, and that he had previously had a verbal altercation

with her. Moreover, although Medina did not observe Appellant

when she told someone where Medina’s bedroom was located, he

testified that he heard Appellant do so just after seeing her outside

Kinsey’s room. Accordingly, the evidence was more than “sufficient

to support a finding that the matter in question [was] what its

proponent[s] claim[ed],” namely, Appellant’s voice. OCGA § 24-9-

901(a). See Edwards v. State, 308 Ga. 176, 182 (2020) (holding that

the evidence was sufficient to authenticate the appellant’s voice

where witnesses testified that they were familiar with the

appellant’s voice “from working with him” and from “in person

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conversations with [him]”). 6

4. Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court plainly erred

in failing to charge the jury that conspiracy is a lesser-included

offense when a defendant is charged as a party to a crime. However,

assuming without deciding that conspiracy was a lesser-included

offense of any of the crimes charged here, this claim fails the plain-

error test because Appellant did not request a jury instruction on

conspiracy as a lesser-included offense. And as we have made clear,

“the failure to charge on a lesser crime than the crime included in

the indictment, without a written request by the State or the

accused, is not error.” Lewis v. State, 322 Ga. 683, 687 (2025)

(quoting Wipfel v. State, 320 Ga. 84, 91 (2024)). Accordingly, this

6 To the extent that Appellant contends that the identifications of
Appellant’s voice were insufficient because Kinsey and Medina had not
previously heard Appellant’s voice under the precise conditions present during
the shooting incident, that argument goes to the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility. See Henderson v. State, 317 Ga. 66, 87 (2023) (“When
authenticating evidence, the proponent must present sufficient evidence to
make out a prima facie case that the proffered evidence is what it purports to
be. Once that prima facie case is established, the evidence is admitted, and the
ultimate question of authenticity is decided by the jury.” (cleaned up)).
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claim fails.7

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

7 To the extent that Appellant raises a claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request a jury charge on conspiracy, that claim is
“procedurally barred” because she “failed to raise that claim at the motion-for-
new-trial stage,” when she had the assistance of new counsel. Hardy v. State,
317 Ga. 736, 741 n.10 (2023).
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