City of Tampa v. Liberty Hospitality Management, LLC

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT

CITY OF TAMPA,

Appellant,

v.

LIBERTY HOSPITALITY MANAGEMENT, LLC,

Appellee.

No. 2D2025-0069

May 22, 2026

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Anne-Leigh
Gaylord Moe, Judge.

Chance Lyman and Hala Sandridge of Buchanan, Ingersoll & Rooney,
PC, Tampa; and Ursula D. Richardson and Toyin K. Aina-Hargrett of the
City Attorney's Office, Tampa, for Appellant.

Eleanor H. Sills of Banker Lopez Gassler P.A., Tallahassee; and Chris W.
Altenbernd of Banker Lopez Gassler P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.

SILBERMAN, Judge.
The City of Tampa (the City) appeals a partial final judgment
entered in favor of Liberty Hospitality Management, LLC, on Count III of
Liberty's amended complaint. We dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction because Count III is legally and factually interrelated with
Counts I and II, which remain pending.
In 2016, Liberty purchased property on Harbour Island after the
Tampa City Council approved a rezoning request allowing it to use the
property as a bank and as office space. Liberty later filed a second
rezoning request proposing to build a hotel on the property and
requesting modification of the Harbour Island Development of Regional
Impact. The City Council denied the applications after holding a public,
quasi-judicial hearing on the requests.
The denials led to two separate proceedings in the circuit court. In
case #22-CA-005055 (the 2022 case), Liberty petitioned the circuit court
for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the City Council's denials of its
rezoning requests. In case #23-CA-001082 (the 2023 case), Liberty filed
a complaint against the City seeking damages under section 70.001,
Florida Statutes (2020), and asserting a claim for declaratory judgment
based on reverse spot zoning.
The circuit court ultimately entered an order in the 2022 case
dismissing Liberty's petition for writ of certiorari. The court determined
that it lacked "subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari to
the Tampa City Council." The City then filed with our court a petition for
writ of mandamus seeking review of that dismissal order (the Mandamus
Proceeding). See City of Tampa v. Liberty Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, 51 Fla. L.
Weekly D419 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 6, 2026).
In the Mandamus Proceeding, the City argued that the circuit court
erroneously determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to review the actions of the City Council. Id. at D420. This court agreed
and concluded that the Tampa City Charter and section 166.041, Florida
Statutes (2020), "both expressly provide that the City Council, as a
legislative body, has the power to pass an ordinance on rezoning" and
"expressly allow the City Council to conduct hearings as part of its

2
process in passing an ordinance." Id. at D421. We also determined that
the circuit court's flawed reasoning led to the court's "misapplication of
articles V and VIII" of the Florida Constitution. Id. at D420. As a result,
we held that the circuit court improperly found that the City's quasi-
judicial actions were ultra vires and granted a writ of mandamus. Id. at
D421. We directed the circuit court to exercise its certiorari jurisdiction
to review the City Council's rezoning decisions. Id.
After the circuit court dismissed Liberty's petition for writ of
certiorari for lack of subject matter jurisdiction but prior to the initiation
of the Mandamus Proceeding with our court, Liberty filed an amended
complaint in the 2023 case adding another claim for declaratory relief.
In this new claim (Count III), Liberty requested that the court find all
actions of the City Council relating to the rezoning of the property void.
Liberty moved for summary judgment on Count III based on the circuit
court's prior order dismissing the 2022 case for lack of jurisdiction. The
circuit court granted the motion, and in the partial final judgment on
appeal in this case, the court fully incorporated its prior order dismissing
Liberty's petition for writ of certiorari. In pertinent part, the court held:
"As a matter of law, the Tampa Charter does not grant quasi-judicial
authority to the City Council," and therefore, "the City Council lacked
quasi-judicial power at the time any of these rezonings were resolved by
quasi-judicial hearing." Thus, the circuit court concluded that the City
Council's decisions on Liberty's rezoning applications were void as a
matter of law.
Because the partial final judgment as to Count III fully
incorporated and relied upon the findings and conclusions contained in
the order dismissing Liberty's petition for writ of certiorari, our resolution
of this appeal, if we were able to reach the merits, would necessarily turn

3
on the result reached in the Mandamus Proceeding. But, before reaching
the merits of an appeal, "appellate courts have an independent
responsibility in every case to determine whether we have jurisdiction."
DRJ Atl., LLC v. Babadi, 392 So. 3d 1114, 1117 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024).
And while the City and Liberty both argue that this court has jurisdiction
over the partial final judgment under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.110(k), "the parties cannot stipulate to jurisdiction over the subject
matter where none exists." Polk County v. Sofka, 702 So. 2d 1243, 1245
(Fla. 1997) (quoting Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d
179, 181 (Fla. 1994)); see also Page v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 308
So. 3d 953, 960 (Fla. 2020) ("Subject-matter jurisdiction is universally
acknowledged to never be waivable.").
Rule 9.110(k) allows for appellate review of partial final judgments
"either on appeal from the partial final judgment or on appeal from the
final judgment in the entire case." The rule provides that "[a] partial final
judgment, other than one that disposes of an entire case as to any party,
is one that disposes of a separate and distinct cause of action that is not
interdependent with other pleaded claims." Id. This rule prevents
piecemeal appeals "where claims are interrelated and involve the same
transaction and the same parties remain in the suit." S.L.T. Warehouse
Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974); see also Marinich v. Special
Edition Custom Homes, LLC, 1 So. 3d 1197, 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
("The test to determine whether counts of a multicount complaint are
interrelated, so as to preclude a piecemeal appeal, is whether the counts
arise from a set of common facts or a single transaction, not whether
different legal theories or additional facts are involved in separate
counts." (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mass. Life Ins. Co. v. Crapo, 918 So.
2d 393, 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006))). Thus, except for a partial final

4
judgment that disposes of an entire case as to any party, a partial final
judgment that disposes of a claim that is interrelated with other claims
that remain pending must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See
Marinich, 1 So. 3d at 1198, 1200.
The three counts in the amended complaint stem from the City's
allegedly improper rezoning determinations, and the circuit court's ruling
on Count III is interrelated with and impacts the remaining two counts.
We therefore dismiss this appeal from the partial final judgment on
Count III for lack of jurisdiction. We note, however, that because the
partial final judgment is not an appealable final order, the City shall be
"free to move for reconsideration of [this] order at any time prior to the
entry of final judgment." Proino Breakfast Club, II, Inc. v. OGI Cap., Inc.,
331 So. 3d 846, 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021); see also Gulf Power Co. v.
Harper, 940 So. 2d 535, 536-37 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (concluding that an
order resolving a declaratory judgment claim, involving the same factual
setting and parties, was "non-final and non-appealable" where other
interrelated claims remained outstanding).
Appeal dismissed.

MORRIS and SLEET, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

5