Jeromee Saffold v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2023-1749
____________

JEROMEE SAFFOLD,
Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.

March 19, 2026

GROSSHANS, J.

Can a defendant whose sentence is vacated on direct appeal

withdraw his underlying plea for good cause prior to the imposition

of a new sentence on remand? The Fourth District Court of Appeal

answered this question in the negative, certifying conflict with the

Second District Court of Appeal’s contrary position. Saffold v. State

(Saffold II), 374 So. 3d 836, 840-41 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). As

detailed below, we agree with the Fourth District and hold that
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(f)’s good-cause standard

does not apply during post-appeal resentencing proceedings. 1

I

Early one morning, Jeromee Saffold picked up a young woman

and offered to drive her home. He instead drove her to a Wal-Mart

parking lot. There, while armed and threatening violence, Saffold

forced the victim to have vaginal, anal, and oral sex with him.

He then drove the victim, against her will, to a nearby

apartment complex, demanding that she perform oral sex on him

while in transit. Upon their arrival, Saffold demanded further

sexual acts from the victim and used her cell phone to record them.

He again coerced those acts by threatening violence—against both

the victim and her family—and bludgeoning her in the head with a

firearm. Eventually, the victim escaped. She then alerted law

enforcement, who arrested Saffold at the apartment complex.

Based on these events, the State charged Saffold with seven

crimes: five counts of armed sexual battery, one count of

kidnapping with intent to facilitate a felony, and one count of

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

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aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. Saffold II, 374 So. 3d at

837.

Saffold pled no contest to all seven crimes as charged. At

sentencing, Saffold requested a 25-year sentence—which, if

imposed, would have been a departure from his lowest permissible

sentence of roughly 51 years in prison. The prosecutor argued

against a downward departure and contended that a life sentence

was appropriate.

Ultimately, the trial court declined to sentence Saffold below

the presumptive statutory baseline, citing the horrific details of the

crimes he committed. Saffold was sentenced to six separate life

sentences (each with a minimum mandatory of 25 years) and one

15-year term of imprisonment.

Saffold appealed. Id. Crediting some of Saffold’s arguments,

the Fourth District found several sentencing errors. Saffold v. State

(Saffold I), 310 So. 3d 55, 57-58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).

Consequently, it directed the trial court to modify Saffold’s

scoresheet, remove certain designations and mandatory minimums

from a portion of his sentences, reconsider his request for

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downward departure, and resentence him on two of the five armed

sexual-battery counts. Id. at 57 & n.1, 58.

On remand, Saffold moved to withdraw his pleas to all seven

counts, arguing that he had good cause under Florida Rule of

Criminal Procedure 3.170(f). Saffold II, 374 So. 3d at 838. This

rule provides that “[t]he court . . . shall on good cause, at any time

before a sentence, permit a plea of guilty or no contest to be

withdrawn.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(f). The trial court denied the

motion and reimposed the same overall prison terms—albeit

structured differently and without certain designations and

mandatory minimums. Saffold II, 374 So. 3d at 838.

Saffold again appealed, but the Fourth District affirmed with a

lengthy discussion of the Second District’s contrary position. Id. at

838-39 (assessing rationale of Scott v. State, 331 So. 3d 297, 300-

01 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)). In Scott, the Second District held that

subdivision (f)’s good-cause standard could apply after sentencing

relief was granted because that subdivision uses the phrase “a

sentence.” Scott, 331 So. 3d at 300-01. In the Second District’s

view, the indefinite article “a” meant that subdivision (f) covers any

sentencing proceeding, “whether that be the initial sentencing or a

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subsequent resentencing.” Id. at 301. The Scott court also

emphasized the background legal principle that “when a defendant

is granted resentencing, the original sentence is rendered a nullity

and the sentencing process begins anew.” Id. Finally, the Second

District relied on cases holding that rule 3.170(l)’s post-sentencing

standard applies after a defendant has been resentenced. Id. (citing

Chipman v. State, 285 So. 3d 1005, 1006 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019), and

Passino v. State, 174 So. 3d 1055, 1056-57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015), as

examples of courts holding that “the completion of resentencing

starts a new thirty-day clock for a post[-]sentencing motion under

rule 3.170(l)”).

Disagreeing with Scott, the Fourth District held that

subdivision (f) only applies to a defendant’s original sentence.

Saffold II, 374 So. 3d at 839-40. It found the rule’s use of “a” to be

ambiguous, observing that the rule’s authors could have, but did

not, choose the word “any.” Id. at 839. And though the court

acknowledged that “resentencing is treated as a new sentencing

proceeding,” it found that this principle “does not negate the fact

that the defendant has already had a sentence imposed.” Id.

(emphasis omitted). The court also found that the Second District’s

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reliance on post-resentencing precedent was misplaced. Id.

Rounding out its criticism of Scott, the court noted that the Second

District’s position was inconsistent with principles of finality and

would likely frustrate the State’s ability to secure convictions at a

trial many years after the crimes were committed. Id. at 839-40.

Consistent with that analysis, the Fourth District concluded

that Saffold was not entitled to withdraw his plea under subdivision

(f). Id. at 840. The court went on to certify conflict with Scott on

the appropriate plea-withdrawal standard where the original

sentence is vacated on appeal or in postconviction proceedings, but

the conviction remains intact. Id. at 841.

Relying on the certified conflict, Saffold asked us to review the

Fourth District’s decision. We have accepted review and now

resolve the certified-conflict issue.

II

Saffold argues that when a sentence is vacated on appeal, the

underlying plea may be withdrawn for good cause prior to

resentencing, pursuant to rule 3.170(f). 2 However, to grant Saffold

2. Determining the meaning and scope of rule 3.170(f) is a
legal matter, which we review de novo. See Born-Suniaga v. State,

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the remedy he seeks, we would be required to infer an independent

rules-based exception to longstanding principles of finality, scope of

remand, and conviction validity. We decline to do so.

A

We begin by briefly outlining the varying standards governing

plea withdrawal at different stages of a criminal case. A defendant

may withdraw his plea for any reason before the court formally

accepts it. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(g). Once the court accepts the

plea, a defendant may withdraw it “before a sentence” is imposed if

he can show “good cause.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(f).

However, following rendition of the sentence, the standard

becomes more stringent. At that point, a plea can only be

withdrawn for five specified reasons listed in rule 9.140 of the

256 So. 3d 783, 786 n.2 (Fla. 2018). Both parties point to various
grammatical components of rule 3.170(f) as support for their
positions. Consistent with what we have expressed about our
interpretative methods, we also consider the overall structure of the
rules, as well as the background legal principles against which the
rules operate as bearing on the proper meaning of the rule. E.g.,
Campbell v. State, 125 So. 3d 733, 742 (Fla. 2013) (considering
longstanding principle of finality in determining meaning of rule
3.172).

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Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. 3 See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(l).

We have used the terms “manifest injustice” or “prejudice” to

describe what a defendant must show to obtain relief in this post-

sentencing context. See Campbell v. State, 125 So. 3d 733, 735

(Fla. 2013). Finally, on collateral review, a defendant can only

challenge his plea on the basis that it was involuntary. Fla. R.

Crim. P. 3.850(a)(5).

These rules reflect that early in a criminal case, a defendant

has the most freedom in seeking to withdraw a plea—consistent

with a preference for trial on the merits. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(g);

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(f); Stewart v. State, 315 So. 3d 756, 758 (Fla.

4th DCA 2021). But as the case proceeds, the grounds for

3. Rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii) specifically provides:

A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may
otherwise directly appeal only:

a. the lower tribunal’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction;
b. a violation of the plea agreement, if preserved by a
motion to withdraw plea;
c. an involuntary plea, if preserved by a motion to
withdraw plea;
d. a sentencing error, if preserved; or
e. as otherwise provided by law.

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withdrawal narrow, and the required showing becomes more

demanding. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(l); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a)(5).

Notably, in postconviction proceedings—meaning those proceedings

instituted after the judgment achieves finality and an appellate

court has issued its mandate—only one limited ground for

withdrawal is authorized. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a)(5). This

progression illustrates that finality interests are built into the rules,

including rule 3.170(f) at issue here.

This makes sense because finality interests are essential to the

criminal justice system. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309

(1989) (“Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its

deterrent effect.”); Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980)

(“The importance of finality in any justice system, including the

criminal justice system, cannot be understated.”); Calderon v.

Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) (“Finality is essential to both

the retributive and the deterrent functions of criminal law.”); Prost

v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 582 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The principle of

finality, the idea that at some point a criminal conviction reaches an

end, a conclusion, a termination, ‘is essential to the operation of

our criminal justice system.’ ” (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 309)).

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Underscoring the importance of this principle, the Florida

Constitution guarantees victims the right to a “prompt and final

conclusion of the case and any related postjudgment proceedings.”

Art. I, § 16(b)(10), Fla. Const. And as noted by Justice John

Marshall Harlan II, “No one, not criminal defendants, not the

judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment

providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and

every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to

fresh litigation on issues already resolved.” Williams v. United

States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the

judgments in part and dissenting in part).

With this background in mind, we consider Saffold’s argument

that focuses on the use of “a” in rule 3.170(f)’s description of the

sentence. According to Saffold, nothing in the text limits

application of the rule to the original sentence. Thus, as he sees it,

rule 3.170(f) broadly applies to any sentence, including one imposed

at resentencing following appellate or collateral proceedings. But as

our discussion above demonstrates, the hyper-technical position

Saffold advances is at odds with the principles of law against which

rule 3.170 was adopted. In fact, the very structure and context of

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the plea-withdrawal rules, and the interests of finality served by

them, strongly cut against the interpretation urged by Saffold.

Notwithstanding this, Saffold points to our precedent that speaks to

the effect of vacatur of a sentence. But as we explain below, those

cases do not support his position.

B

As Saffold correctly observes, we have recognized that

resentencing is a de novo proceeding. See, e.g., State v. Manago,

375 So. 3d 190, 202 (Fla. 2023); State v. Fleming, 61 So. 3d 399,

405-08 (Fla. 2011); Preston v. State, 607 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla.

1992). Indeed, we recently stated that a sentence vacatur

“nulli[fies]” the “prior sentence,” State v. Okafor, 306 So. 3d 930,

933 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Teffeteller v. State, 495 So. 2d 744, 745

(Fla. 1986)), or “wipe[s] the slate clean” as to the vacated sentence.

Id. (quoting Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 507 (2011)).

In light of that legal effect, de novo resentencing thus means

that the parties may present new evidence and new arguments

about the proper sentence to be imposed. Fleming, 61 So. 3d at

406 (“[B]oth parties may present new evidence bearing on the

sentence.”); Shine v. State, 273 So. 3d 935, 937 (Fla. 2019)

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(defendant permitted to assert new grounds for downward

departure sentence at resentencing). Not surprisingly, then, the

resentencing judge is not bound by the prior sentencing judge’s

findings or rationale. Preston, 607 So. 2d at 409; State v. Collins,

985 So. 2d 985, 990 (Fla. 2008). And where the law has changed,

the resentencing judge applies the new law. Fleming, 61 So. 3d at

407.

Critically, these de novo resentencing principles say nothing

about the validity of the convictions upon which the sentences are

based. We made this very point in Okafor. There, we noted that the

concept of de novo resentencing does not extend to the conviction—

that is, the conviction remains completely intact. See Okafor, 306

So. 3d at 933 (“[A]s to Okafor’s death sentence (though not his

murder conviction), our judgment ‘wiped the slate clean.’ ”

(emphasis added) (quoting Pepper, 562 U.S. at 507)). And this

makes sense because any post-appeal alteration to the conviction

itself would be beyond the scope of the remand instruction. Mosley

v. State, 397 So. 3d 1001, 1005 (Fla. 2024) (noting that defendant’s

attack on his conviction was beyond the scope of remand that

pertained solely to the penalty for the relevant offense).

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Accordingly, these prior cases do not support Saffold’s position

that the resentencing process operates as an indirect way of

attacking final convictions and circumventing the stringent

requirements of the rules governing postconviction proceedings.

C

Having rejected Saffold’s effect-of-vacatur argument, we

underscore a rule of construction that further weakens Saffold’s

argument. Specifically, rule 3.020 requires that all rules of criminal

procedure be construed “to secure simplicity in procedure and

fairness in administration.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.020. Saffold’s

interpretation would accomplish neither of these directives and

would instead hinder the administration of justice.

Consider, for example, defendants who obtain vacatur of their

sentences years after their pleas. If such defendants can get the

benefit of a liberal plea-withdrawal rule, then those defendants

would essentially have two bites at the apple. They could seek plea

withdrawal before the initial sentence is imposed and, if

unsuccessful, rely on the same ground (or a new one) in seeking

withdrawal prior to a resentencing and without any procedural

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bars. 4 Alternatively, under Saffold’s reasoning, a defendant could

(upon sentence vacatur) seek plea withdrawal for the first time

years after his plea was entered and still rely on the more lenient

good-cause standard.

However, regardless of the reason offered for the post-appeal

plea withdrawal (and whether it was or could have been raised

earlier), embracing Saffold’s interpretation of rule 3.170(f) would

result in the vacatur of convictions previously affirmed on appeal.

This, in turn, would require the State to prove its case many years

after the fact—when memories have faded, potential witnesses have

died or otherwise become unavailable, and physical evidence has

been lost. Campbell, 125 So. 3d at 742 (noting such factors in

rejecting an expansive interpretation of a plea rule).

Besides these concerns, Saffold’s position creates an anomaly.

Under his view, plea-based convictions that become final after an

appeal are less durable than comparable convictions obtained

through a trial. See Love v. State, 559 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. 1990)

4. At oral argument, Saffold’s counsel conceded that under
his view, a convicted defendant could assert good cause based on
something that happened before the original sentence. Oral Arg. at
5:20-25.

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(convictions obtained at trial remained intact despite sentence-

related reversal). But we can think of no principled reason for that

difference. An interpretation that treats similarly situated convicted

defendants differently would not promote “fairness” in the

administration of justice. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.020. Moreover,

Saffold’s reading of the rule also creates tension with other rules,

such as rule 3.170(b) which contemplates multi-case, multi-

jurisdictional plea agreements. Saffold’s theory of rule 3.170(f)

raises questions about whether the withdrawal of any one plea

would unravel an entire bargain.

These potentially anomalous and illogical outcomes weigh

against the interpretation advanced by Saffold. See Campbell, 125

So. 3d at 741 (favoring a construction in plea-withdrawal context

that did not produce absurd result).

We acknowledge the cases marshalled by Saffold on this topic.

Certainly, some state and federal courts have accepted positions

comparable to the one Saffold advocates for here. Though we are

not convinced that these courts are correct, we think that our plea-

withdrawal rules and our emphasis on certain background

principles (such as finality) distinguish us from these other courts.

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Thus, we do not rely on Saffold’s cited cases in determining the

scope and meaning of our rules.5

III

Given the background principles of law against which the

rules were adopted, as well as the overall structure of the criminal

rules of procedure and the method of construction dictated by

them, we reject Saffold’s interpretation of rule 3.170(f). In doing so,

we approve the Fourth District’s decision below and disapprove the

Second District’s decision in Scott to the extent it is inconsistent

with our opinion today.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and COURIEL, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.
TANENBAUM, J., concurs with an opinion.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

TANENBAUM, J., concurring.

This case stems from a district-court conflict over a procedural

5. Following the Scott decision’s lead, Saffold also cites Florida
cases stating that subdivision (l) applies after a new sentence is
imposed on resentencing. The meaning of that rule is not
something we must resolve in this case. Accordingly, we offer no
comment on the correctness of those cases.

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rule’s meaning. A close textual treatment is not necessary to

resolve it. It is our rule, after all; and as such it is our statement of

extant judicial policy. See Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. (giving this

court the authority to “adopt rules for the practice and procedure in

all courts,” including “administrative supervision”). Though it

cannot itself be the source of a substantive right, the rule has the

force of “law” procedurally in court proceedings. See DeLisle v.

Crane Co., 258 So. 3d 1219, 1224–25 (Fla. 2018) (explaining the

difference between “procedural law”—this court’s domain—and

“substantive law”—the Legislature’s domain).

The rule being procedural law adopted by this court, we can

modify, create, or repeal it at any time, even sua sponte as part of a

court decision or otherwise. See generally In re Amends. to Fla.

Evidence Code, 278 So. 3d 551 (Fla. 2019) (adopting sua sponte the

Daubert standard for admissible expert opinion testimony via

amendments to evidentiary rules in an opinion); see also id. at 554–

55 & n.8 (Lawson, J., concurring) (cataloging instances when the

court has “adopt[ed] or amend[ed] rules on our own motion . . .

without following the general procedure outlined in rule 2.140”);

DeLisle, 258 So. 3d at 1229 (noting that this court may pronounce

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a procedural rule as part of an opinion). If that is the case, our

approach to a dispute over the meaning of a rule necessarily will

differ from our approach regarding the meaning of a statute. Unlike

statutes, with court rules, we are the policymaker, so there are no

separation-of-powers concerns that would warrant a textualist (or

originalist) approach. 6 Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF

INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 9–14 (1997) (railing

against “judge-made law” as a “usurpation” of legislative power); id.

at 23 (“To be a textualist in good standing . . . [o]ne need only hold

the belief that judges have no authority to pursue [] broader [social]

purposes or write [] new laws [that the times require].”); ANTONIN

SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL

TEXTS xxvii–xxx, 3–28 (2012) (explaining why a textualist approach

is necessary to guard against “judicial lawmaking”). We have the

6. Our being the policymaker also means we happen to know
what our intent was when the rule was promulgated (or at least
have access to that thinking if we care to look). Cf. In re Amends.,
278 So. 3d at 555 n.8 (Lawson, J., concurring) (looking to “our
internal court records” to understand “the internal court process
that” produced the rule provision in question).

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authority unabashedly to announce or clarify our policy embodied

in a rule and to apply it to the case at hand.

That, in essence, is what we are called upon to do here. The

Second District and the Fourth District disagree on how to apply

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(f). The question we

answer to resolve that conflict is whether, through that rule, we

intended to authorize the trial court to consider a plea-withdrawal

motion—one necessarily directed at the judgment of conviction, not

the sentence—once the judgment has become absolutely final and

the only appellate remand is for resentencing. The question nearly

answers itself. At all events, it truly is a matter of judicial policy,

and we can speak to it directly without resort to construction

canons.

At bottom, there are two implicit policy points essential to this

court’s approval of the Fourth District’s analysis, both of which I

agree with. First, the Fourth District’s judgment in Saffold I7—

addressing only the sentencing order and remanding to address

several sentencing errors—had no effect on the judgment of

7. Saffold v. State, 310 So. 3d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).

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conviction, which had not been appealed and became final.

Second, rule 3.170(f) fully reflects this court’s policy choice to

imbue an un-appealed or affirmed judgment of conviction with

absolute finality—such that a defendant is “not entitled to bring a

motion to withdraw a plea pursuant to rule 3.170(f) upon court-

ordered resentencing.” Saffold v. State (“Saffold II”), 374 So. 3d 836,

840 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).

I write to expand on both these points. But first, I address an

oddity behind the Fourth District’s disposition of this case.

I

A

In 2019 Jeromee Saffold pleaded no contest to the charges

against him in the underlying case. The trial court then rendered a

judgment that conclusively determined his guilt for armed sexual

battery, aggravated battery, and kidnapping. Though Saffold

appealed the sentence the trial court later imposed, he never

appealed the judgment of conviction. The Fourth District considered

that original appeal as one seeking review only of “his sentences,”

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which it purportedly affirmed in part and vacated in part. Saffold I,

310 So. 3d at 56–57.8

Following Saffold’s resentencing on remand, he once again

appealed only the new sentences imposed.9 Saffold nevertheless

challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea

using the rule interpretation set out in Scott v. State, 331 So. 3d

297 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021), in which the Second District held that rule

3.170(f) entitled a criminal defendant to consideration of a motion

to withdraw his plea on resentencing. 10

8. I characterize the Fourth District’s disposition this way
because it is remarkably unclear. In the body of the opinion, the
Fourth District “affirm[s] the sentence” on appeal (but remanding
for correction of the scoresheet) as to one count; “reverse[s] the
inclusion of the sexual penetration points on counts IV and V” and
remanding for resentencing (without vacating the sentence itself);
and “reverse[s] the court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration
of the downward departure motion” (without any indication whether
the sentence on appeal that might have been affected by that
departure had been vacated). Saffold I, 310 So. 3d at 57–58. What
is clear is that the Fourth District’s remand had nothing to do with
the judgment of conviction, which was left intact as final.

9. Saffold’s notice stated he was appealing the “final order
imposing sentence.”

10. In that decision, with which the Fourth District has
certified conflict, the Second District also considered only a newly
imposed sentence on appeal—not the judgment of conviction.

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As I just mentioned, the final order on appeal was the

sentence. Yet one of Saffold’s primary claims was that the trial

court’s ruling on his motion should be reversed. The Fourth

District, unfortunately, took him up on this invitation, analyzing

and rejecting Saffold’s argument for doing so and affirming the order

(rather than the sentencing order on appeal). 11 The Fourth District

disagreed in an opinion that is in direct conflict with Scott.

B

A district court of appeal has jurisdiction to consider only two

types of appeal: 1) “from final judgments or orders of trial courts”;

and 2) “interlocutory orders in such cases to the extent provided by

rules adopted by” this court. Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. The order

denying Saffold’s plea motion was neither of these, so it could not

independently have been subject to appellate review the way the

Fourth District suggested.

Take the second type first. As the court recently stated, “there

are very few circumstances where interlocutory appeals are

11. In doing this, the Fourth District made a dispositional
mistake similar to the one that I described regarding Saffold I.

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authorized in criminal proceedings.” In re Amends. to Fla. R. of App.

Proc., 405 So. 3d 332, 333 (Fla. 2025). This order is not one of

them. Cf. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(2) (“Appeals of nonfinal orders in

criminal cases are prescribed by rule 9.140.”); Fla. R. App. P.

9.140(b)(1)(C), (D) (listing as appealable certain arguably non-final

“orders” pertaining to imposition, modification, and revocation of

probation); Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1) (listing, among others, non-

final “orders” that the State may appeal).

For plea cases like this one, we list by rule the only issues that

can be raised as part of an appeal from the judgment and sentence;

we do not list non-final orders that are separately appealable. See

Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i) (identifying a reserved “prior

dispositive order” that may be considered on appeal from a final

order but otherwise identifying the only issues that may be raised in

an appeal from a final judgment rendered following a plea); cf.

ABRAHAM CLARK FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS 46–47

(EDWARD W. TUTTLE REV., 5TH ED. 1925). This limitation on issues

reflects our recognition that, though a defendant has a

constitutional right to appeal his judgment of conviction, he has

waived by plea most of the appellate claims he could otherwise

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make in favor of reversing that judgment. See Robinson v. State,

373 So. 2d 898, 902–03 (Fla. 1979) (construing section 924.06,

Florida Statutes, to be constitutional and holding that a defendant

who has pleaded guilty is limited in his appeal “to a class of issues

which occur contemporaneously with the entry of the plea”);

Leonard v. State, 760 So. 2d 114, 116 (Fla. 2000) (“As with

defendants who went to trial, defendants who plead guilty have a

constitutional right to appeal, although the issues that they can

raise on appeal are limited.”).

If an order denying a plea-withdrawal motion is not an

appealable non-final order, the only way it separately would be

reviewable is in the first type of appeal—from “final judgments or

orders of trial courts.” The order on the plea-withdrawal motion is

not that type of order.

In the criminal context, the two original final orders a criminal

defendant can appeal are the judgment of conviction and a

sentence, and he can seek appellate review of either or both. See

Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(h) (providing that multiple final orders may be

reviewed upon the filing of one timely notice of appeal); Fla. R. App.

P. 9.140(b)(1)(A), (F) (distinguishing a criminal defendant’s ability to

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appeal “a final judgment” and “a sentence”); Fla. R. App. P.

9.140(b)(3) (directing a criminal defendant to file the notice of

appeal “any time between rendition of a final judgment and 30 days

following rendition of a written order imposing sentence”); Fla. R.

Crim. P. 3.670 (distinguishing “a final judgment of conviction” from

the imposition of a sentence); cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a), (c)

(distinguishing a collateral attack on a “judgment” and on a

“sentence”). The order denying Saffold’s motion directed to his plea

is neither type of original final order. Cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.650

(defining “judgment” as “the adjudication by the court that the

defendant is guilty or not guilty”); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.700(a) (defining

“sentence” to be “the pronouncement by the court of the penalty

imposed on a defendant for the offense of which the defendant has

been adjudged guilty”).

The district court’s judicial power—affirm, reverse, set aside—

ultimately operates against the final order on review, that final

order being the trial court’s exercise of judicial power. As part of

that review, the district court considers whether that final order is

the product of some harmful error that the trial court committed in

the proceeding leading to that final order. Cf. Fla. R. App. P.

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9.110(h), (k). A procedural error underlying an interim order might

be violative of a substantive right that calls into question the

validity of the final order (i.e., undermining the fairness of the trial).

Cf. Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 774 (Fla. 1971) (explaining

that “the violation of a rule of procedure prescribed by this Court

does not call for a reversal of a conviction unless the record

discloses that non-compliance with the rule resulted in prejudice or

harm to the defendant”). If there is such a prejudicial error, then

the district court would reverse or vacate that final order (not the

offending interim order or ruling) and reopen the proceeding. If

there is no prejudicial error, the district court would affirm the final

order (not the order or ruling that had been challenged).

The only order under review by the Fourth District in Saffold II

was the new sentencing order—not the order on Saffold’s plea-

withdrawal request. And the only relief available to Saffold would

have been directed to the sentencing order, provided he could

demonstrate some error in the sentencing process leading to the

order (or in the order itself) that infringed a substantive right. Cf.

Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 572–74 (Fla. 2008) (distinguishing

between “errors in sentence-related orders” that result from the

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“sentencing process,” on the one hand; and an “error in the

sentencing process” itself, on the other).

Saffold’s initial brief in the Fourth District nevertheless failed

to explain how denial of his change-of-plea motion in any way

related to the new sentencing or how the denial infringed a right

related to the sentencing process. Nor could he. The motion

obviously was directed to the judgment of conviction in the trial

court proceeding, yet that judgment was not (and could not be) on

appeal. The motion simply had nothing to do with the only final

order on review—the new sentence. The Fourth District could have

just summarily affirmed the sentence. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.315(a)

(allowing the appellate court to “summarily affirm the order to be

reviewed if the court finds that no preliminary basis for reversal has

been demonstrated”). 12

II

Notwithstanding any jurisdictional questions, we are obliged to

state with clarity that rule 3.170(l) does not authorize a trial court

12. I put off for another day whether our certified-conflict
jurisdiction can be rooted in a district court’s analysis explaining its
purported affirmance of a non-appealable (and non-appealed) order.

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to consider a change-of-plea motion on a remand for a new

sentencing. I join the majority’s decision to do this and the policy

rationale behind it—to ensure finality in the judgment.

Saffold’s no-contest plea indeed had relevant legal significance.

“Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the

court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence.”

Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). The plea “is

itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and

determine punishment.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242

(1969). By his no-contest plea, Saffold “consent[ed] to the judgment

of conviction.” Williams v. State, 316 So. 2d 267, 270–71 (Fla.

1975).

When Saffold did not appeal that judgment originally, it

became final and absolute, and the trial court lost procedural

jurisdiction to modify or vacate it. See Einstein v. Davidson, 17 So.

563, 564–65 (Fla. 1895) (noting how a trial court “loses control of its

judgment[]” after an authorized time period passes so that it cannot

modify or vacate that judgment outside that period, except by

appellate mandate or authorized motion); Davidson v. Stringer, 147

So. 228, 229 (Fla. 1933) (noting that once a trial court renders a

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final judgment and the time has passed for the court to reconsider

it, the trial court’s jurisdiction is “exhausted” except either to

enforce it, or when authorized, to correct or vacate it); Shelby Mut.

Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio v. Pearson, 236 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1970)

(explaining that one of our goals “is that litigation be finally

terminated as quickly as due process and necessary reflection

allows . . . [so u]nless a proper motion or petition [directed at

correcting error in a final judgment] is filed within the allotted time

[as set out by rule], the judgment or order of the trial court becomes

absolute” and “the trial court has no authority to alter, modify or

vacate [it]”); see also FREEMAN, supra, at 392, 399–400; cf. Baskin v.

Klemm, 160 So. 509, 509 (Fla. 1935) (explaining that once an

appellate court’s review of a trial court’s judgment becomes final,

the trial court is “without jurisdiction to change that judgment

without first having permission . . . to so change or modify its

judgment”); State ex rel. Budd v. Williams, 11 So. 2d 341, 341 (Fla.

1943) (“After affirmance of the decree by this court the circuit court

was without jurisdiction to alter or change the decree as so affirmed

without first having authority from this court to so act.”); cf.

Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U.S. 141, 149 (1907) (“The general principle

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is that judgments cannot be disturbed after the term at which they

are rendered, and can only be corrected, if at all, by writ of error, or

appeal, or relieved against in equity in certain cases.”); In re Metro.

Tr. Co. of City of New York, 218 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1910) (holding

that a trial court loses the authority to vacate a final decree “[a]fter

the term had expired, and after the complainant had exercised his

right of appeal to procure a review of the errors of which he desired

to complain”).

By rule, we authorize trial courts to open their already

rendered (and otherwise final) judgments in at least two different

ways. One is to establish a time period, after rendition but before

appeal, during which the trial court retains jurisdiction over the

judgment; the other is to authorize consideration of a collateral

attack on the judgment, even after the judgment has been affirmed

on appeal and the trial court has lost jurisdiction over its judgment.

Cf. FREEMAN, supra, at 377 (distinguishing between trial court’s

control over its own judgment “during the term” and its power to

modify or vacate the judgment after the term); id. at 272, 278, 381–

384.

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Rules authorizing rehearing motions in civil and family-law

proceedings fall into the first category. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(a)

(requiring that a motion for rehearing be used to preserve certain

errors in the judgment and authorizing the trial court to “open the

judgment” to “take additional testimony” and “enter a new

judgment”); Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.530(a) (same).

And subdivisions (f) and (l) of rule 3.170 operate the same

way. 13 Subdivision (f) authorizes the trial court to retain control

over the “judgment of conviction” and “set [it] aside,” either “in its

discretion” or “on good cause,” up until pronouncement of sentence.

Subdivision (l) then authorizes the trial court to retain jurisdiction

over the judgment for thirty days following rendition of the

sentencing order, but to consider only a narrow set of challenges to

that plea judgment. 14

These provisions stand in stark contrast to those rules that

fall into the second category of authorization for a trial court to

13. Rule 3.800’s subdivisions (b) and (c) give similar retention
authorization to trial courts regarding their sentencing orders.

14. Subdivision (l) essentially allows the trial court to retain
jurisdiction over its judgment to address, pre-appeal, what later
would be collateral attacks on the judgment.

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open its judgment—to consider the collateral attack post-appeal

(i.e., once the time has passed for taking an appeal or a mandate of

affirmance has issued; in either event, the trial court then losing

control over the judgment). Cf. FREEMAN, supra, at 381–84. Under

the civil and family-law rules, we do this by authorizing trial courts

to consider motions for relief from judgment. See Fla. R. Civ. P.

1.540; Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.540. And in the criminal context, we

give this authorization in rule 3.850, in which we allow the trial

court to consider enumerated “grounds [] for relief from judgment or

release from custody.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a); see also id. (b)

(setting a limitation period running from when “the judgment and

sentence become final”); id. (c) (noting that the “rule does not

authorize relief based on grounds that could have or should have

been raised . . . if properly preserved, on direct appeal of the

judgment and sentence”); cf. Morgan v. State, 350 So. 3d 712, 716

(Fla. 2022) (highlighting the structural and operational difference

between rule 3.800(a) and rule 3.850; the former authorizing

sentence correction as “an extended part of the sentencing process,”

the latter authorizing vacatur of the sentence and starting anew as

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truly collateral relief). 15 Indeed, to say that rule 3.170(f) authorized

the trial court to consider a collateral attack on Saffold’s then-

absolutely final judgment would be for us to render certain

provisions of rule 3.850 superfluous.

Another telltale of our intent that rule 3.170 operate only pre-

appeal and not as collateral authorization: Both provisions appear

in the “Arraignments and Pleas” section of the rules, rather than in

the “Postconviction Relief” section. Cf. Morgan, 350 So. 3d at 716

(observing that “rule 3.800 proceedings” are an “extended part of

the sentencing process in the underlying criminal case,” and are not

“postconviction proceedings,” based in part on the rule’s

appearance in the “Sentence” portion of the rules rather than the

“Postconviction Relief” portion).

15. Rule 3.800(a) in a way is a hybrid because it continues to
authorize the trial court to correct its order “at any time,” even after
completion of an appeal, to address an illegal sentence; yet
typically, a rule 3.800(a) proceeding would not commence until after
the appellate process became final. Cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)
(allowing a motion to correct sentence, “including an illegal
sentence,” to be filed before or during an appeal of the sentencing
order); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b) (“A motion to vacate a
sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any
time.”).

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Finally, as I already have mentioned, an order on a motion

filed under rule 3.170 is not a separately appealable, final order.

Instead, denial of the motion is a preserved issue that then may be

raised on direct appellate review of the judgment of conviction. See

Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)c.; cf. Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(1)(I)

(tolling rendition for a motion filed under rule 3.170(l)).

An order on a motion under rule 3.850, by contrast, is a final

order—just as an order on a relief-from-judgment motion under rule

1.540 is. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b); cf. Clearwater Fed. Sav. &

Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976) (describing a

“final post decretal order” as one that is “dispositive of any

question,” constituting a “final and distinct adjudication of rights

which have not been adjudicated in the original final judgment”);

Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(5) (treating an order “entered on an

authorized and timely motion for relief from judgment” as a

“specified final order”).

Orders on motions under rules like these are treated as final

and separately appealable because of their unique, historical

function. Rules like 1.540, 3.850, and 12.540 serve as procedural

substitutes for various ancient writs and equity claims that served

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the same purpose. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540 (abolishing “writs of

coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review” and

directing that “relief from a judgment or decree shall be by

motion . . . or by independent action”); Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d

1236, 1239 (Fla. 2004) (explaining that rule 3.850 was intended as

a procedural substitute for raising “collateral postconviction

challenges to the legality of criminal judgments that were

traditionally cognizable in petitions for writs of habeas corpus”).

The same cannot be said for a rule like 3.170, the function of which

has been described above.

* * *

Saffold basically asks that we pronounce rule 3.170(f) to be

the procedural equivalent of rule 3.850. That approach, as a policy

matter, makes no sense. Rule 3.170(f) is structurally and

operationally different—it has a different purpose—when compared

to rule 3.850. Once Saffold’s judgment of conviction became

absolutely final (when he failed to appeal it), there was no

authorization under rule 3.170 for the trial court to consider setting

it aside on remand, making Saffold’s plea-withdrawal motion—

effectively directed at the judgment—a nullity.

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Saffold’s only pathway for seeking relief from the judgment of

conviction at that point was rule 3.850. The Fourth District, then,

technically was correct in its conclusion that Saffold was not

entitled to submit his plea-withdrawal motion on a remand strictly

for resentencing (albeit because the trial court did not have the

authority to consider it under rule 3.170(f) in the first place). I

concur in the majority’s approval of that conclusion and in its

disapproval of the Second District’s conclusion to the contrary.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions

Fourth District - Case No. 4D2022-2399

(Broward County)

Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Timothy Wang, Assistant
Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial
Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida,

for Petitioner

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia
Terenzio, Bureau Chief, West Palm Beach, Florida, and Melynda L.
Melear, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach,
Florida,

for Respondent

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