Jesse Bell v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2024-1264
____________

JESSE BELL,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

____________

No. SC2024-1556
____________

JESSE BELL,
Petitioner,

vs.

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.

August 28, 2025

COURIEL, J.

Jesse Bell, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the

circuit court’s order summarily denying his motion for

postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have

jurisdiction. See art. V, §§ 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons

explained below, we affirm the circuit court’s order denying Bell’s

rule 3.851 motion and deny Bell’s habeas petition.

I

While serving a forty-year sentence at Mayo Correctional

Institution (Mayo), Bell and his cellmate, Barry A. Noetzel,1 devised

a plan to murder Correctional Officer James Newman and one of

their fellow inmates, Donald H. Eastwood Jr. Bell v. State, 336 So.

3d 211, 212-13 (Fla. 2022). As we have recounted elsewhere, Bell

and Noetzel sharpened pieces of metal into weapons, adopted a

vegan diet to gain closer proximity to the area of the kitchen where

Officer Newman worked, and chose to kill Eastwood as a rehearsal

for their planned murder of Officer Newman. Id. at 213; Noetzel v.

State, 328 So. 3d 933, 936 (Fla. 2021).

On the day they had chosen, June 26, 2019, Bell and Noetzel

succeeded in killing Eastwood. They lured him into their cell,

1. See Noetzel v. State, 328 So. 3d 933 (Fla. 2021) (affirming
codefendant Noetzel’s first-degree murder conviction and sentence
of death).

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stabbed his eyes, strangled him until his face turned purple, and

hid his body between the bunks in their cell. Bell, 336 So. 3d at

213. Correctional officers foiled their attack on Officer Newman

later that day, but only after Bell and Noetzel grievously injured

him. Id.; Noetzel, 328 So. 3d at 937.

Bell confessed to the crimes and was transferred from Mayo to

Florida State Prison (FSP). On October 29, 2019, a grand jury

returned an indictment charging him and Noetzel with first-degree

murder, attempted murder of a correctional officer with a deadly

weapon, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and two counts

of possession of contraband in a prison. Bell, 336 So. 3d at 213.

The trial court appointed counsel at Bell’s first appearance,

which occurred on December 5, 2019. Six days later, the State

provided discovery exhibits, including an audio-recorded interview

between Bell and an investigator for the Lafayette County State

Attorney’s Office.

During the recorded interview, the investigator and Bell

reviewed video footage, among other evidence, and discussed

Eastwood’s murder and the attack on Officer Newman. Bell said

that, while he was being apprehended, Mayo correctional officers

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told Bell that they were “going to beat the s**t out of [Bell and

Noetzel]” and “probably kill [them].” Chuckling, Bell told the

investigator that he expected as much. When the investigator

asked whether in fact that ever happened, Bell said it hadn’t, but

said, “[w]hen we got [to FSP], I mean, that’s between me and you

cause I, I earned that a** whoopin’ you know and so I’m not mad

about that . . . .” This exchange comprised less than one minute of

the forty-five-minute interview; Bell spoke about the abuse for six

seconds.

On December 13, 2019—eight days after the court appointed

Bell’s counsel and two days after the State provided discovery

exhibits—Bell waived his right to counsel, entered a no-contest plea

to all charges in the indictment, and waived his right to a penalty-

phase jury trial. Id. at 214. During all required colloquies, Bell

consistently and unequivocally affirmed that he understood the

rights at issue and was acting of his own volition.

At Bell and Noetzel’s joint penalty-phase proceeding, after the

court renewed the required colloquies, Bell again unequivocally

chose to represent himself. The court appointed standby counsel,

and the State called several witnesses to prove five aggravating

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factors. Id. After the State rested, Bell took the stand and offered

brief mitigation testimony highlighting his history of depression,

good courtroom and prison behavior, family support, honesty, and

decision to take responsibility by voluntarily entering a no-contest

plea. Id. at 215. He admitted his competency report into evidence

but did not call any other witnesses or present additional mitigation

evidence. Id. In closing, Bell argued against three of the

aggravating factors the State had advanced. Id.

Upon the State’s suggestion, the court ordered a presentence

investigation (PSI) out of an abundance of caution. Id. Bell

objected, expressing concerns about prolonging his sentencing and

arguing that a PSI was unnecessary under Muhammad2 since he

did not waive mitigation. Bell, 336 So. 3d at 215. The court

overruled Bell’s objection and reassured him that the PSI would not

cause a delay. Nevertheless, Bell refused to sign a release of

information for a more thorough PSI.3 The circuit court ultimately

2. Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 363 (Fla. 2001)
(requiring certain mitigation-investigation procedures to be followed
when a defendant waives mitigation).

3. As we previously stated, “[t]hough the PSI was not
particularly thorough, it included the type of information a

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sentenced Bell to death for the murder of Eastwood. Id.4

On direct appeal, Bell raised two issues. He argued that the

circuit court abused its discretion, specifically by failing to order a

comprehensive PSI, not requiring the State to present all mitigating

evidence in its possession, and neglecting to appoint counsel to

further investigate his potentially mitigating circumstances. He

also argued that the circuit court committed fundamental error by

not determining beyond a reasonable doubt whether the

comprehensive PSI requires.” Bell, 336 So. 3d at 215 n.7 (citing
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.710(b)).

4. The circuit court found four aggravating factors: (1) Bell
was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of
violence to a person (great weight); (2) the capital felony was
committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and under
sentence of imprisonment (great weight); (3) the capital felony was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (very great weight); and (4)
the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal
justification (very great weight). The court found no statutory
mitigators and five nonstatutory mitigators: (1) Bell took
responsibility for his conduct and cooperated during the
investigation and prosecution (little weight); (2) Bell exhibited
appropriate courtroom behavior (little weight); (3) Bell had been
previously diagnosed with and treated for depression (little weight);
(4) Bell had never assaulted any correctional officers until the
attack on Officer Newman (no weight); and (5) Bell’s family loves
him (slight weight). Bell, 336 So. 3d at 215.

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aggravating factors justified a death sentence and outweighed the

mitigating circumstances.

This Court affirmed Bell’s first-degree murder conviction and

sentence of death and found that Bell’s no-contest plea was

voluntarily and knowingly entered. Id. at 218. Finding that

Muhammad was not applicable (since Bell did not waive mitigation),

we rejected Bell’s claim that he was deprived of an individualized

sentencing when the trial court declined to employ additional

mitigation-investigation procedures. See, e.g., Muhammad, 782 So.

2d at 363; Marquardt v. State, 156 So. 3d 464, 490 (Fla. 2015)

(modifying Muhammad’s procedures to give trial courts discretion to

appoint independent, special counsel to present mitigation when

the PSI and the State’s mitigation evidence point to the probability

of significant mitigation).

Bell timely filed his initial rule 3.851 motion for postconviction

relief. Following a Huff5 hearing, the circuit court summarily denied

5. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993) (requiring the
opportunity to appear before the court on initial postconviction
motions “for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary
hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the
motion”).

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Bell’s motion, finding that each of his claims was procedurally

barred and otherwise conclusively refuted by the record. Appealing

that order, Bell now argues that the circuit court erred in

summarily denying three claims which allege: his waivers of counsel

and a penalty-phase jury were involuntary due to prison abuse;

counsel was ineffective for failing to discover and present evidence

of the prison abuse to challenge the voluntariness of his waivers;

and he was deprived of an individualized sentencing determination

due to the involuntary waivers.

II

The circuit court did not err in denying Bell’s postconviction

motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing. Each of Bell’s

postconviction claims is predicated on his waivers of counsel and a

penalty-phase jury, which he entered voluntarily and knowingly

and did not challenge on direct appeal. The claims are therefore

barred.

“[This Court] review[s] a circuit court’s summary rejection of a

postconviction claim de novo, ‘accepting the movant’s factual

allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record,

and affirming the ruling if the record conclusively shows that the

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movant is entitled to no relief.’ ” Harvey v. State, 318 So. 3d 1238,

1239 n.2 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Dailey v. State, 279 So. 3d 1208, 1215

(Fla. 2019)). We have said that “[a] circuit court should hold an

evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion ‘whenever the movant

makes a facially sufficient claim that requires a factual

determination.’ ” Rogers v. State, 327 So. 3d 784, 787 (Fla. 2021)

(quoting Pardo v. State, 108 So. 3d 558, 560 (Fla. 2012)). Further,

claims that could have been raised on direct appeal “are not

cognizable through collateral attack.” Smith v. State, 445 So. 2d

323, 325 (Fla. 1983); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(1)

(prohibiting claims that could or should have been raised on direct

appeal).

A

Bell says his waivers of counsel and a penalty-phase jury were

involuntary because he had been abused while incarcerated. A

claim like this is barred if it is not first raised on direct appeal. See

Knight v. State, 211 So. 3d 1, 17 (Fla. 2016) (claims that waivers of

guilt- and penalty-phase juries were not knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary were procedurally barred in postconviction because they

should have been raised on direct appeal (citing Muhammad v.

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State, 603 So. 2d 488, 489 (Fla. 1992))). The circuit court was

therefore correct to deny these claims.

Bell’s claims are, in any event, conclusively refuted by the

record. Waivers of counsel and a penalty-phase jury “must be

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Boatman v. State, 402 So. 3d

900, 922 (Fla. 2024) (quoting Knight, 211 So. 3d at 17). “[T]he law

ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently

aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and

how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances.”

Figueroa-Sanabria v. State, 366 So. 3d 1035, 1054 (Fla. 2023)

(alteration in original) (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,

629 (2002)).

Here, the record shows that Bell’s waivers were knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary. Bell testified during his waiver colloquies

that he had not been threatened or forced to enter his waivers, and

that he was doing so of his own accord. See Hutchinson v. State,

243 So. 3d 880, 883 (Fla. 2018) (“[Defendant]’s colloquy supported

the conclusion that his waiver was knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary.”). Bell never hesitated. He repeatedly expressed his

desire for a speedy resolution and explained his decision to waive a

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penalty-phase jury: he felt that the circuit judge was in a better

position to consider his mitigation than twelve strangers. Bell also

testified during his mitigation presentation as to the reasons he

entered his waivers, referencing his acceptance of responsibility and

desire not to cost “the taxpayers extra money.” Even after the

circuit court accepted his waivers, Bell repeatedly declined the

court’s renewed offers of counsel.

The circuit court did not err in summarily denying his claims.

B

Bell next raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for

counsel’s failure to investigate and discover the fact that he had

been abused while incarcerated, and to present such evidence to

refute the voluntariness of Bell’s counsel and penalty-phase jury

waivers. He does not challenge his guilty plea. The circuit court

also correctly denied this claim.

“This Court has consistently held that to be entitled to an

evidentiary hearing on a motion claiming ineffective assistance of

counsel, the defendant must allege specific facts establishing both

deficient performance of counsel and prejudice to the defendant.”

Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573, 587 (Fla. 2008) (collecting cases).

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For the first prong, “the defendant must establish ‘that counsel

made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the

“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’ ”

Covington v. State, 348 So. 3d 456, 466 (Fla. 2022) (quoting

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). This means

that counsel’s representation must have fallen “ ‘below an objective

standard of reasonableness’ under ‘prevailing professional norms.’ ”

Morris v. State, 931 So. 2d 821, 828 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 688). And when assessing reasonableness, we take

careful care “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and

to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”

King v. State, 260 So. 3d 985, 994 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 689).

The second prong requires the showing of “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” Morris, 931 So. 2d at

828 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In the penalty-phase

context, “the question is whether there is a reasonable probability

that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded

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that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did

not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.

The most Bell can muster as to counsel’s deficient

performance is to assert that counsel failed to adequately discover,

investigate, and act upon a six-second statement in a forty-five-

minute recorded interview. According to Bell, his counsel should

have: (1) reviewed the interview footage and determined that the

described mistreatment could have rendered Bell’s waivers

involuntary; (2) investigated the abuse by interviewing corroborating

inmate-witnesses and obtaining their statements; and (3) presented

that evidence to the trial court to prevent it from accepting Bell’s

waivers.

This theory rests on a speculative and attenuated chain of

reasoning that fails to establish deficient performance or prejudice.

Bell’s statements during the interview contain no indication that

prison abuse was influencing his decision-making, nor does he

signal distress. To the contrary, Bell laughed with the interviewer

while discussing his mistreatment and described it as something he

“expected” and “earned” from having attacked a correctional officer.

Nothing in the recording suggests that he was intimidated or

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coerced, or that he planned to enter waivers due to the isolated

incident discussed during the interview or any other alleged

mistreatment while incarcerated.

The corroborating affidavits also fail to support his theory.

During postconviction proceedings, Bell submitted affidavits from

two corroborating inmate-witnesses, Mitchell Womack and Leo L.

Boatman, neither of whom were contacted prior to postconviction

counsel’s representation. Each affidavit discusses generally the

type of mistreatment that inmates receive at FSP when they have a

violent charge against a correctional officer. As applicable to Bell,

Womack states that he spoke directly with Bell, who told him about

threats from FSP staff about “mess[ing] [Bell] up” and that Bell was

denied meals when staff served him “ghost trays.” Womack’s

affidavit, however, makes no reference to any of these threats or

actions as having influenced Bell’s waivers.

As to Boatman’s affidavit, he recalls that Bell and Noetzel

complained about abuse and mistreatment during the first several

months at FSP, though he concedes that Bell did not tell him

directly. Boatman goes on to offer his personal beliefs formed from

this secondhand knowledge. He speculates that Bell could not take

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the abuse, oppression, and delays in his CM6 review and that he

“burned out.” The only portion of the affidavit that comes close to

suggesting firsthand knowledge, or a causal link between the abuse

and Bell’s decision to enter his waivers, is a sentence stating: “Bell

was just so disheartened and said the only way to make it stop was

to ‘tap out.’ ” Although purportedly a direct quote from Bell

embedded in a paragraph full of Boatman’s own inferences, there is

no indication that this statement was tied to the timing or

substance of Bell’s legal decisions, or what exactly he meant by “tap

out.” Without such context, the statement does not provide reliable

or direct evidence that Bell’s waivers were influenced by his

mistreatment or entered involuntary.

Considered in the context of the record we have, counsel’s

performance does not fall below an objective standard of

6. CM refers to “Close Management,” which involves “the
separation of an inmate apart from the general population, for
reasons of security or the order and effective management of the
institution, when the inmate, through his or her behavior, has
demonstrated an inability to live in the general population without
abusing the rights and privileges of others.” Fla. Admin. Code R.
33-601.800(1)(a). The Code provides the procedures for CM
classifications and reviews. See id. R. 33-601.800(2), (16).

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reasonableness. As we have recognized, Strickland requires us to

evaluate “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering

all the circumstances.” 466 U.S. at 688; see, e.g., Hayward v.

State, 183 So. 3d 286, 297 (Fla. 2015) (“A fair assessment of

attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate

the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances

of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from

counsel’s perspective at the time.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689)). Here, counsel had two days with the State’s discovery

materials before Bell entered his waivers. In that time, even if

counsel did review the discovery in full, the nature of the available

evidence, namely the recorded interview, does not provide a basis to

challenge the voluntariness of Bell’s waivers. And while the

affidavits both generally paint a troubling picture of the conditions

for inmates with pending capital charges who are housed at FSP,

they fail to provide a sufficient connection between the alleged

abuse and the voluntariness of Bell’s waivers. Ultimately, neither

piece of evidence that Bell points to on postconviction is sufficient

to establish deficient performance.

Similarly, Bell fails to show prejudice. Even if counsel had

- 16 -
uncovered and presented evidence of abuse, there is no reasonable

probability that the trial court would have prevented Bell from

waiving counsel or a penalty-phase jury, given his unequivocal

responses during the waiver colloquies. See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629

(“[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and

sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of

the right and how it would likely apply in general in the

circumstances.” (emphasis omitted)). Bell’s subsequent claim that

his waivers were influenced by abuse does not undermine the

evidence of Bell’s ability to understand or appreciate the legal

consequences of waiving counsel and a penalty-phase jury at the

time of his waiver colloquies. His retrospective rationalization is

insufficient. See Caylor v. State, 407 So. 3d 379, 384 (Fla. 2025)

(holding that a defendant’s internal motivations or subsequent

realizations do not retroactively negate the understanding of the

right to a penalty-phase jury at the time of the waiver), petition for

cert. filed, No. 25-5184 (U.S. July 16, 2025).

Bell also cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that he

would have received a life sentence if the court had rejected his

waivers. Even when represented by counsel, a “defendant has the

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right to choose what evidence, if any, the defense will present

during the penalty phase.” Figueroa-Sanabria, 366 So. 3d at 1054

(quoting Bell, 336 So. 3d at 217). And Bell could not have been

compelled to introduce any additional mitigation beyond what he

already offered. Id. (“Put plainly, ‘a defendant cannot be forced to

present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial.’ ”

(quoting Grim v. State, 841 So. 2d 455, 461 (Fla. 2003))). Any

speculation to the contrary fails to establish prejudice. See

Johnston v. State, 70 So. 3d 472, 477 (Fla. 2011) (“Mere speculation

that counsel’s error affected the outcome of the proceeding is

insufficient.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693)).

Since Bell did not allege specific facts establishing both

deficient performance and prejudice, he failed to make a facially

sufficient claim. The postconviction court’s summary denial was

appropriate.

C

Bell’s claim that he was deprived of an individualized

sentencing due to his waiver of counsel is procedurally barred. A

variation of this claim was raised and rejected on direct appeal

when Bell unsuccessfully raised several arguments related to the

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trial court’s handling of mitigating evidence. Bell, 336 So. 3d at

216-17. One of which was that he was deprived of an

individualized sentencing determination due to the minimal

mitigation presented and the trial court’s failure to employ the

procedures established in Muhammad. Id. This Court has already

determined that Bell received all that was required for an

individualized sentencing determination, and a defendant cannot

revive a rejected direct appeal claim by repackaging it under a

different label in postconviction. Id. at 217; see Barwick v. State,

361 So. 3d 785, 792-95 (Fla. 2023) (finding that variations of claims

that were raised and rejected in prior proceedings are procedurally

barred).

Even if not procedurally barred, Bell’s claim is without merit.

Bell did not waive mitigation, and the sentencing court considered

the mitigation evidence offered by Bell. Bell, 336 So. 3d at 217. His

argument that additional mitigation could have been presented by

counsel, had he not entered his waiver, is speculative given this

Court’s deference to a competent capital defendant’s “great control

over the objectives and content of [their] mitigation.” Boyd v. State,

910 So. 2d 167, 189-90 (Fla. 2005) (“Whether a defendant is

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represented by counsel or is proceeding pro se, the defendant has

the right to choose what evidence, if any, the defense will present

during the penalty phase.” (citation omitted)). The postconviction

court’s summary denial was warranted.

III

In his habeas petition, Bell argues that appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise Bell’s untimely first appearance under

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.130 as an unpreserved claim

of fundamental error. We disagree.

“While the failure to raise unpreserved claims on appeal is not

normally a basis for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the

failure to raise unpreserved claims of fundamental error may be.”

Davis v. State, 383 So. 3d 717, 742 (Fla.) (citing Wickham v. State,

124 So. 3d 841, 863 (Fla. 2013)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 248

(2024). Fundamental error is error that “reaches down into the

validity of the trial itself to the extent that [a death sentence] could

not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.”

Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 212 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Card v.

State, 803 So. 2d 613, 622 (Fla. 2001)). Considering all the facts,

we cannot conclude that appellate counsel was ineffective in not

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raising Bell’s untimely first appearance as a matter of fundamental

error.

Bell—who was of course incarcerated for other crimes

throughout the proceedings relevant here—made his first

appearance approximately five weeks after the grand jury had

returned an indictment. Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure

3.130, every arrested person must be taken before a judge for a first

appearance within twenty-four hours of arrest. Fla. R. Crim. P.

3.130(a). And we have “remind[ed] the State of its obligation under

rule 3.130 to take every arrested person, including those already in

custody on other grounds, before a magistrate within twenty-four

hours of arrest.” Globe v. State, 877 So. 2d 663, 672 (Fla. 2004).

The purpose of a first appearance is to inform the defendant of

the charges and their rights, and to determine conditions for

release. Chavez v. State, 832 So. 2d 730, 752 (Fla. 2002). Rule

3.130 does not prescribe what ought to happen if a defendant is not

brought before a judge within twenty-four hours. A delay in the

first appearance does not automatically lead to release, dismissal of

charges, or the suppression of evidence. See, e.g., id. at 754

(concluding that a delayed first appearance did not compel

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defendant’s confession and, thus, the trial court properly denied his

motion to suppress); Globe, 877 So. 2d at 672 (holding that a delay

in following the first-appearance procedures of rule 3.130 must be

shown to have induced a confession in order for the confession to

be inadmissible, and finding that the delay did not induce the

already incarcerated defendant’s confession when he was not

subject to release, was repeatedly advised of his Miranda rights, and

made incriminating statements less than twenty-four hours after

his arrest); Keen v. State, 504 So. 2d 396, 399-400 (Fla. 1987)

(holding that the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress was

proper in the absence of a showing that the first-appearance delay

induced an otherwise voluntary statement), disapproved in part on

other grounds, Owen v. State, 596 So. 2d 985, 990 (Fla. 1992).

While it is undisputed that the State failed to comply with rule

3.130, it is also undisputed that Bell’s trial counsel did not preserve

an objection. We therefore assess whether the delay, standing

alone, amounts to fundamental error. As Bell does not allege that

the delay in his first appearance resulted in any prejudice, we are

hard-pressed to do so. Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 951-52 (Fla.

2003) (instructing that prejudice due to a delay of an initial

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appearance must be “proven on a case-by-case basis”). The State’s

delay is regrettable, but it does not call into question the

fundamental legitimacy of Bell’s trial, and neither trial counsel’s

failure to object, nor appellate counsel’s having declined to raise the

delay as an unpreserved error, undermines confidence in the result

of his case. See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1070 (Fla.

2000) (“Appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise an

issue which is without merit.”).

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order summarily

denying Bell’s postconviction motion and deny habeas relief.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS,
and SASSO, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Lafayette County,
David W. Fina, Judge – Case No. 342019CF000055CFBXMX
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus

Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ali Shakoor,
Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Adrienne Joy
Shepherd, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle
Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,

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for Appellant/Petitioner

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee/Respondent

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