The Florida Bar v. Danielle Renee Watson

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC2023-0416
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THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,

vs.

DANIELLE RENEE WATSON,
Respondent.

March 13, 2025

PER CURIAM.

The Bar seeks review of an amended referee’s report

recommending that Respondent, attorney Danielle Renee Watson,

be found guilty of professional misconduct and receive an

admonishment for minor misconduct. 1 As discussed below, we

approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to

guilt. However, we disapprove in part the findings in aggravation

and mitigation, and we disapprove the referee’s finding that

Watson’s conduct constitutes minor misconduct and the

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
recommendation that she receive an admonishment. Instead, we

suspend Watson from the practice of law for 91 days.

I. BACKGROUND

The Florida Bar filed a one-count complaint against Watson,

alleging violations of Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 4-8.4(a) (“A

lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of

Professional Conduct . . . .”) and 4-8.4(d) (“A lawyer shall not engage

in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through

callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against

litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any

basis . . . .”). The complaint was based upon Watson’s conduct in a

federal employment discrimination case filed in the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Parish-Carter v.

Avossa, case number 9:16-CV-81623 (Parish-Carter). Watson was

co-counsel in that case on behalf of the plaintiff with her law

partner, Malik Leigh, whose related misconduct and other

misconduct was also referred to the Bar. See Fla. Bar v. Leigh, No.

SC2023-0518 (Fla. Mar. 13, 2025).

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Watson’s misconduct arose from interactions pertaining to a

pretrial stipulation the parties were required to submit. Leigh and

Lisa Kohring, opposing counsel for the School Board of Palm Beach

County—one of the defendants in Parish-Carter—were working on

the joint stipulation. On the day the stipulation was due, Leigh and

Kohring had exchanged numerous e-mails with several drafts of the

document. Watson was not involved in the drafting of the

stipulation but was copied on the e-mail exchanges. Ultimately,

Leigh replied to Kohring’s last e-mail, copying Watson, Ana Jordan

(paralegal to Kohring), and Shawntoyia Bernard (general counsel for

the School Board), attaching a copy of a pretrial stipulation with his

signature affixed and stating in the body of the e-mail: “Pretrial

Stipulation to sign and file.” Leigh did not explain in the e-mail that

he had made additional changes to the draft stipulation last sent by

Kohring or that he had signed the document. Shortly after receipt

and without reviewing Leigh’s attachment, Jordan filed a pretrial

stipulation that was not the version e-mailed by Leigh, and which

contained an electronic signature purportedly by Watson.

After Leigh realized the stipulation that was filed was different

from the version he had e-mailed, he contacted Watson and learned

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that she had not authorized the filed stipulation. Because it was

after normal business hours and Leigh knew Kohring had left the

office for the day, Leigh filed his own version of the stipulation in an

addendum with Watson’s name in the signature block, expressly

accusing Kohring of forging Watson’s electronic signature. This

filing, which was titled “Joint PreTrial Stipulation Addendum,”

contained the following statement:

[T]he Joint Pre-trial Stipulation [DE 71] by the
Defendant’s Counsel, Lisa Kohring, not only filed the
wrong Pre-trial Stipulation, but she forged Plaintiff
Counsel, Danielle Watson’s electronic signature and filed
it. The Actual “agreed” or “joint” stipulation which was
submitted with Attorney, Malik Leigh, Esq’s endorsement
and submitted to Defense counsel [f]or filing is attached
herein without Defense Counsel’s Signature. Counsel
will follow up with an official Motion regarding this
action.

The following morning, Watson and Leigh ignored Kohring’s

e-mails and calls. Kohring had reviewed the pretrial stipulation and

addendum and had requested by e-mail that Watson and Leigh

retract the statements in the addendum. After receiving no

response, Kohring again e-mailed Watson and Leigh, stating that

she had tried calling twice and warning that she may seek

sanctions. Leigh replied to Kohring’s last e-mail, claiming that

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Kohring “forged” Watson’s electronic signature and could be subject

to sanctions or criminal penalties based on her office affixing

Watson’s signature to the stipulation without authorization.

Kohring filed a motion for sanctions, naming only Leigh.

Shortly thereafter, Leigh, with Watson’s name in the signature

block, filed a motion for sanctions against defendants and their

counsel. Both motions were denied without prejudice. After the

federal district court entered summary judgment for the School

Board, the parties filed renewed motions for sanctions, as well as

responsive pleadings. The district court directed Watson to file a

personal response after co-counsel Leigh filed a response on behalf

of their client with both attorneys’ names in the signature block.

Both responses repeated the allegation that Kohring had forged

Watson’s electronic signature. The district court, in reviewing the

dueling motions and responses, stated in pertinent part as follows:

The Court concludes that Ms. Kohring and Ms. Jordan:
(i) acted with no improper purpose, (ii) acted honestly,
professionally, and fairly, and (iii) are not liable for any of
the charges and allegations levied against them by
Plaintiff’s counsel.
....
. . . Plaintiff’s counsel’s behavior was completely
unfounded and in contravention of all of the tenets of
professionalism encapsulated in the Federal and Local

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Rules. The pretrial stipulation issue could have been
resolved quickly between the parties if Mr. Leigh or Ms.
Watson had simply called or e-mailed Defendants. . . .
....
Instead of working with Defendants to clear up a
simple communication which resulted in no prejudice to
their client, Mr. Leigh and Ms. Watson, acting in concert,
purposefully chose not to communicate with Defendants
and instead filed a unilateral pretrial stipulation, a bar
complaint, a motion to strike for sanctions, and called
law enforcement in connection with their allegations of
the crime of forgery.

The trial judge thus found that Watson and her co-counsel acted in

bad faith and granted Kohring’s motion for sanctions, providing

that both Watson and Leigh were jointly responsible for paying the

defendants’ attorneys’ fees.

Before the referee in these proceedings, Kohring testified at the

final hearing that she was “very upset” about the addendum and

the e-mail in which Leigh advised that he and Watson had called

the court and the Marshal’s Service. Kohring further testified that

“it was just outrageous and very upsetting, very scary.” She also

characterized the allegation of committing a crime as “traumatizing”

and that it caused her “significant distress.”

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II. ANALYSIS

A. Findings of Fact and Recommendations as to Guilt

If the referee’s findings of fact are supported by competent,

substantial evidence in the record, this Court will not reweigh the

evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the referee. Fla.

Bar v. Rush, 361 So. 3d 796, 801 (Fla. 2023). Regarding the

referee’s recommendations as to guilt, “the referee’s factual findings

must be sufficient under the applicable rules to support the

recommendations.” Fla. Bar v. Mirabal, 390 So. 3d 1172, 1181 (Fla.

2024) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Patterson, 257 So. 3d 56, 61 (Fla. 2018)).

Here, neither party sought review of the referee’s findings of fact or

recommendation as to guilt of the charged rule violations.

Therefore, the referee’s findings of fact are approved along with the

referee’s recommendation that Watson be found guilty of violating

rules 4-8.4(a) and 4-8.4(d). See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Schwartz, 382 So.

3d 600, 608 (Fla. 2024).

Based upon the above-described conduct, however, the Bar

challenges the referee’s finding that Watson’s conduct constituted

“minor misconduct.” Rule 3-5.1(b) expressly addresses the issue

and provides in pertinent part as follows:

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(b) Minor Misconduct. Minor misconduct is the only
type of misconduct for which an admonishment is an
appropriate disciplinary sanction.

(1) Criteria. In the absence of unusual
circumstances misconduct will not be regarded as minor
if any of the following conditions exist:
....
(B) the misconduct resulted in or is likely to
result in actual prejudice (loss of money, legal
rights, or valuable property rights) to a client or
other person;
(C) the misconduct resulted in or is likely to
result in actual or potential injury to the public or
the legal system[.] . . .

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1(b).

The evidence underlying the rule violations informs the

recommendation of whether that misconduct is minor. Here,

Watson was involved with her co-counsel/law partner’s conduct in

accusing opposing counsel of having committed a criminal offense

and disparaging her reputation in a public filing. Moreover, as well

as being prejudicial toward Kohring, Watson’s conduct was

prejudicial to the administration of justice as it resulted in motions

for sanctions and the need for an evidentiary hearing after the

underlying lawsuit had been decided. And though the referee found

that Watson was inattentive to the case because she had full-time

employment with another firm, that fact does not excuse her failure

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to independently inquire into the circumstances behind the filing of

the stipulation and her conduct in labeling Kohring’s actions as

criminal, contacting law enforcement, threatening prosecution,

filing a Bar complaint, and seeking sanctions. Watson’s reliance

upon her co-counsel rather than investigating the matter herself

does not negate the egregious nature of the misconduct, and on

these facts, we find that Watson’s misconduct does not qualify as

minor misconduct under rule 3-5.1(b). See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Head,

84 So. 3d 292, 302 (Fla. 2012) (disapproving the finding that the

lawyer’s dishonest acts constituted minor misconduct, based on the

filing of a false affidavit and untruthful testimony during the

disciplinary hearing); Fla. Bar v. Ticktin, 14 So. 3d 928, 939-40 (Fla.

2009) (disapproving a referee’s recommendation of admonishment

on the basis that the misconduct caused actual prejudice based on

a conflict of interest resulting in a loss of a valuable property

ownership); Fla. Bar v. Kirkpatrick, 567 So. 2d 1377, 1378-79 (Fla.

1990) (disapproving a private reprimand in favor of a public

reprimand based on the gravity of the misconduct that included the

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lawyer’s arrest and failure to appear in court on several occasions

and failure to complete probationary obligations2).

B. Discipline

As we have determined that Watson’s violation of rules 4-8.4(a)

and 4-8.4(d) does not constitute “minor misconduct,” we disapprove

the recommendation of admonishment for minor misconduct. R.

Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1(b) (“Minor misconduct is the only type of

misconduct for which an admonishment is an appropriate

disciplinary sanction.”). Moreover, “[o]ur review of a referee’s

recommended discipline is broader than that afforded to the

referee’s findings of fact because, ultimately, it is our responsibility

to order the appropriate sanction.” Fla. Bar v. Mirabel, 390 So. 3d

1172, 1186 (Fla. 2024); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.

Considering the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the

aggravating and mitigating factors supported in this case, and

relevant case law, we agree with the Bar that a 91-day rehabilitative

suspension is appropriate.

2. “A private reprimand is now termed an
admonishment . . . .” Fla. Bar v. Committe, 916 So. 2d 741, 748 n.3
(Fla. 2005).

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The Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions discuss the

presumptive sanctions in relation to the misconduct established

and are subject to aggravating and mitigating factors and this

Court’s case law. See Fla. Bar v. Strems, 357 So. 3d 77, 90 (Fla.

2022). The referee considered the following Standards: 4.5(b), (c),

and (d) (Lack of Competence–Suspension; Public Reprimand;

Admonishment, respectively); and 6.3(b), (c), and (d) (Improper

Communications with Individuals in the Legal System –

Suspension; Public Reprimand; Admonishment, respectively).

Because the misconduct at issue is not minor, Standards 4.5(d) and

6.3(d) providing for admonishment are not applicable.

Rather, we find that Standards 6.3(b) and 7.1(b) (Deceptive

Conduct or Statements and Unreasonable or Improper

Fees - Suspension) apply and that suspension is the presumptive

sanction.

Standard 6.3(b) provides that “[s]uspension is appropriate

when a lawyer engages in communication with an individual in the

legal system when the lawyer knows that the communication is

improper and causes injury or potential injury to a party or causes

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interference or potential interference with the outcome of the legal

proceeding.”

Standard 7.1(b) provides that “[s]uspension is appropriate

when a lawyer knowingly engages in [deceptive] conduct that is a

violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or

potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”

Here, the record reflects that Watson knowingly accused

Kohring, in a public pleading, of committing a felony by forging her

signature in the pretrial stipulation that was filed. Watson did not

seek to discuss the matter with Kohring to determine the

circumstances behind Watson’s electronic signature being included

in the filing, and she ignored Kohring’s attempts to communicate

after the addendum was filed. Further, Kohring testified to the

emotional harm caused by the accusation, as well as having to

waste time and judicial resources to seek sanctions against Watson

and Leigh. Thus, suspension is the presumptive sanction in this

case.

We next consider the relevant aggravating and mitigating

factors. “Like other factual findings, a referee’s findings of

mitigation and aggravation carry a presumption of correctness and

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will be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the

record. A referee’s failure to find that an aggravating factor or

mitigating factor applies is due the same deference.” Fla. Bar v.

Scheinberg, 129 So. 3d 315, 319 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Fla. Bar v.

Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 621 (Fla. 2007)). In addition, “[t]o

succeed in challenging a referee’s findings of fact, the challenging

party must establish there is a lack of evidence in the record to

support such findings or that the record clearly contradicts the

referee’s conclusions.” Fla. Bar v. Horton, 332 So. 3d 943, 949 (Fla.

2019) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Glueck, 985 So. 2d 1052, 1056 (Fla.

2008)). Moreover, “[t]he fact that there is some evidence in the

record to support a finding that a[n aggravating] factor might apply

does not mean that the referee should have necessarily found it

applicable.” Cf. Fla. Bar v. Herman, 8 So. 3d 1100, 1106 (Fla. 2009)

(as applied to the referee not finding a particular mitigating factor).

The referee found three of the aggravators suggested by the

Bar, including a pattern of misconduct (Standard 3.2(b)(3)),

multiple violations (Standard 3.2(b)(4)), and indifference to making

restitution (Standard 3.2(b)(10)). Those findings are not clearly

erroneous. In addition, misconduct solely attributable to

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co-counsel Leigh was properly found not to be an aggravating factor

applicable to Watson. However, the referee clearly erred in not

finding the aggravator of substantial experience in the practice of

law (Standard 3.2(b)(9)). Contrary to the referee’s belief, that factor

“is not parsed by expertise in specific areas of the law, but instead

applies to experience related to the capability of determining

whether conduct is violative of the rules.” Fla. Bar v. Bander, 361

So. 3d 808, 817 (Fla. 2023). Thus, the fact that this was Watson’s

first federal civil trial is not determinative. Rather, Watson had

been practicing law for six years when the misconduct occurred.

Cf. Fla. Bar v. Nicnick, 963 So. 2d 219, 222 (Fla. 2007) (aggravating

factor of substantial experience in the practice of law applied where

misconduct occurred in 2001 and lawyer had been practicing since

1992).

The referee also found the following mitigating factors: absence

of a disciplinary record (Standard 3.3(b)(1)); absence of a dishonest

or selfish motive (Standard 3.3(b)(2)); character or reputation

(Standard 3.3(b)(7)); unreasonable delay in the disciplinary process

(Standard 3.3(b)(9)); interim rehabilitation (Standard 3.3(b)(10));

and remorse (Standard 3.3(b)(12)). However, this Court has

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disapproved the mitigator of unreasonable delay in the disciplinary

process when the referee does not find specific prejudice against the

respondent. See Fla. Bar v. Alters, 260 So. 3d 72, 83 (Fla. 2018).

Because the referee expressly found no prejudice, stating that “no

witness was unavailable due to the delay,” the finding of the

mitigating factor of unreasonable delay is clearly erroneous.

Last, we consider relevant case law on the issue of appropriate

discipline, as the sanction must also have a reasonable basis in

existing case law. Fla. Bar v. Grieco, 389 So. 3d 1257, 1264, (Fla.

2024); Fla. Bar v. Lecznar, 690 So. 2d 1284, 1288 (Fla. 1997)

(stating that the Court will generally not second-guess a referee’s

recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in

existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer

Sanctions).

The following cases, each involving similar misconduct to

various degrees, support a sanction more severe than that

recommended by the referee in this case.

In Florida Bar v. Patterson, 257 So. 3d 56 (Fla. 2018), the

Court imposed a one-year suspension for a violation of rule

4-8.4(d), where the lawyer pursued his own interests in a client’s

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appeal and made disparaging statements in court filings and in a

letter about opposing counsel and judges in the client’s case.

A three-year suspension was imposed in Florida Bar v.

Committe, 136 So. 3d 1111 (Fla. 2014), where the lawyer filed a

frivolous complaint asserting slander and tortious interference with

a business relationship and then sought criminal prosecution by

the United States Attorney in a letter accusing the defendant of

attempting to extort money after the defendant requested payment

of the awarded attorney’s fees. The lawyer’s prior disciplinary

history as well as misconduct before the referee supported a long

rehabilitative suspension.

And in Florida Bar v. Norkin, 132 So. 3d 77 (Fla. 2013), the

Court imposed a two-year suspension rather than the

recommended 90-day suspension, based on the lawyer’s

disparaging comments against the presiding judge and opposing

counsel, and threatened legal action in a correspondence against a

senior circuit judge appointed to serve as a provisional director of a

corporation that Norkin was representing. The longer suspension

was warranted due to the lawyer’s repeated misconduct. See id. at

91-92.

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Further, we reject the referee’s reliance on Florida Bar v.

Buckle, 771 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 2000), where we reduced a 30-day

suspension to a public reprimand for three rule violations

pertaining to a disparaging letter sent to a party opponent. Buckle

was decided more than two decades ago, and involved a private

letter, rather than the public filing at issue in this case.

Considering Watson’s conduct where she was aware of and

co-signed the addendum accusing Kohring of committing forgery,

her contact with law enforcement and participation in filing a Bar

complaint against Kohring pertaining to the use of Watson’s

electronic signature, and her responsive pleading before the federal

district court repeating the accusation of forgery, we determine that

a 91-day suspension is warranted.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we approve the referee’s findings of fact and

recommendations as to guilt and disapprove in part the referee’s

findings of aggravating and mitigating factors. We disapprove the

referee’s finding that the conduct involved was minor misconduct

and the recommended sanction and instead suspend Watson for 91

days. The suspension will be effective 30 days from the filing of this

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opinion so that Watson can close out her practice and protect the

interests of existing clients. If Watson notifies this Court in writing

that she is no longer practicing and does not need the 30 days to

protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order making the

suspension effective immediately. Watson shall fully comply with

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-5.1(h) and Rule Regulating The

Florida Bar 3-6.1, if applicable. Further, Watson shall accept no

new business from the date this opinion is filed until she is

reinstated.

Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson

Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from

Danielle Renee Watson in the amount of $3,404.67, for which sum

let execution issue.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.

Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar

Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff
Counsel, Mark Lugo Mason, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar,
Tallahassee, Florida,

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for Complainant

Scott K. Tozian and Gwendolyn H. Daniel of Smith, Tozian, Daniel
& Davis, P.A., Tampa, Florida,

for Respondent

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