Ekaterina Zakharova v. Shemuel Maya, et al.

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed November 19, 2025.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D25-0559
Lower Tribunal No. 21-11079-CA-01
________________
Ekaterina Zakharova,
Petitioner,
vs.
Shemuel Maya, et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Lourdes Simon, Judge.
Law Guard, and Mark W. Rickard (Plantation), for petitioner.
Lowy and Cook, P.A., and Jonathan Smulevich, for respondents.
Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY and MILLER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

1
Ekaterina 	Zakharova, 	defendant 	below, 	petitions 	this 	Court 	for
issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash three orders: (1) a February 17, 2023,
order granting the plaintiffs’, Shemuel Maya and Diana Daniel (the “Mayas”),
emergency motion to enforce settlement agreement; (2) a May 31, 2023,
order granting the Mayas’ second motion to enforce settlement agreement;
and (3) a March 13, 2025, order denying her motion for judgment on the
pleadings as to Count II of the Second Amended Complaint. We dismiss the
Petition in part, and we grant the Petition in part.
Because Zakharova failed to seek certiorari review of the February 17,
2023, and May 31, 2023, enforcement orders within thirty days of their
rendition, this Court lacks certiorari jurisdiction to review those orders. See
Fla. R. App. P. 9.100(c)(1) (providing that a petition for certiorari must be
filed within thirty days of rendition of the order to be reviewed).1 Accordingly,
1 Zakharova suggests we have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.040(a), which states that “[i]n all proceedings a court
will have such jurisdiction as may be necessary for a complete determination
of the cause.” Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(a). However, the rule does not appear
to provide certiorari jurisdiction when the jurisdiction of this Court was not
timely invoked. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(a) committee notes to 1977
amendment 	(“This 	provision 	is 	intended 	to 	guarantee 	that 	once 	the
jurisdiction of any court is properly invoked, the court may determine the
entire case to the extent permitted by substantive law. This rule does not
extend or limit the constitutional or statutory jurisdiction of any court.”
(emphasis added)).

2
we dismiss the petition as to the two enforcement orders for lack 	of
jurisdiction. As to the March 13, 2025, order, however, the Petition is timely.
“Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is available only in limited
circumstances.” Avatar Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 314 So. 3d 640,
641 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (quoting Charles v. State, 193 So. 3d 31, 32 (Fla.
3d DCA 2016)). “To prevail in its petition for a writ of certiorari, a party must
demonstrate that the contested order constitutes (1) a departure from the
essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the
remainder of the case, (3) that cannot be corrected on post-judgment
appeal.” 	Greater 	Miami 	Expressway 	Agency 	v. 	Miami-Dade 	Cnty.
Expressway Auth., 393 So. 3d 794, 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (quoting Damsky
v. Univ. of Miami, 152 So. 3d 789, 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)). “The last two
elements are jurisdictional and must be analyzed before the court may even
consider the first element.” Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1132 (Fla.
2011).
In the Petition, Zakharova asserts that the trial court departed from the
essential requirements of the law in denying her motion for judgment on the
pleadings based upon the absolute litigation immunity privilege, causing her
irreparable harm. We agree.

3
In Florida, the litigation privilege provides “absolute immunity ‘to any
act occurring during the course of a judicial proceeding . . . so long as the
act has some relation to the proceeding.’” Arko Plumbing Corp. v. Rudd, 230
So. 3d 520, 523 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (emphasis added) (citing Echevarria,
McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380, 384 (Fla.
2007)). This privilege has been extended to claims of tortious behavior where
the alleged tortious behavior occurred during a judicial proceeding and had
some relation to the proceeding. See Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas,
Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994)
(“[A]bsolute immunity must be afforded to any act occurring during the course
of a judicial proceeding, regardless of whether the act involves a defamatory
statement or other tortious behavior . . . so long as the act has some relation
to the proceeding.”); Boca Invs. Grp., Inc. v. Potash, 835 So. 2d 273, 274-75
(Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (affirming the trial court’s granting of defendants’ motion
for judgment on the pleadings based on absolute litigation privilege because
“all of the acts alleged in support of the tortious interference claim bear a
relationship to the proceedings instituted by defendants.”).
Here, Count II of the Second Amended Complaint alleged Zakharova
tortiously interfered with the property sales contract between the Mayas and
Zakharova’s former husband, Sergey Slastikhin, by entering an agreed final

4
judgment with Slastikhin in a separate action for fraud.2 Because the agreed
final judgment is related to a judicial proceeding and occurred during a
judicial proceeding, we find the absolute litigation immunity applies,3 and the
trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law in denying
Zakharova’s motion, causing irreparable harm. See Bank of America, N.A.
v. De Morales, 314 So. 3d 528, 531 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“Although the
expense of continued litigation is ordinarily not a harm that warrants certiorari
relief, it may lie in cases where the immunity asserted is from litigation
altogether, and not just from liability.”); see also O’Brien v. Exposito, 824 So.
2d 954, 955 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (finding the party “will effectively lose his
2 Zakharova’s 	action 	against 	Slastikhin, 	his 	company, 	Innovative
Technologies & Consulting Limited Corp. (“IT&C”), and Great Ocean, alleged
the property was fraudulently transferred from IT&C to Slastikhin (the “Fraud
Action”).
3 The Mayas’ reliance on Ingalsbe v. Stewart Agency, Inc., 869 So. 2d 30
(Fla. 4th DCA 2004), to argue the litigation privilege does not apply, fails. In
Ingalsbe, 	the 	appellants 	had 	been retained 	by 	their client 	to 	sue 	the
appellees, and they had a written fee contract with the client. 869 So. 2d at
31. The appellees then settled with the client, without the appellants, and the
appellees included a provision for fees in the settlement. Id. The appellants
then sued the appellees for interference with its fees contract. Id. The court
held that the appellees were “not privileged to use the right to settle in such
a way as to interfere with the obligation of [the client] arising from the clear
language of the fee contract.” Id. at 32-33 (finding appellants’ action was not
barred by absolute immunity because “there is nothing inherent in the right
to settle lawsuits that would compel a corollary right to interfere with a fee
contract between one of the settling parties and his lawyer.”). Here, the
Mayas are not arguing interference with a fee contract.

5
entitlement to . . . immunity if the case proceeds to trial, thereby causing
irreparable injury to [the party]”); Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido
Ass’n, Inc., 104 So. 3d 344, 353 (Fla. 2012) (noting “absolute immunity . . .
is 	intended 	to 	prevent 	a 	party 	from 	becoming 	involved 	in 	a 	lawsuit
altogether”). Thus, we grant the Petition and quash the March 13, 2025
order.
Petition dismissed in part; granted in part. Order quashed.