Winston Towers 100 Association, Inc. v. Jorge Antonioli, et al.

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed November 26, 2025.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D24-1077
Lower Tribunal No. 21-17854-CC-05
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Winston Towers 100 Association, Inc.,
Appellant,
vs.
Jorge Antonioli, et al.,
Appellees.
An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Diana
Gonzalez-Whyte, Judge.
Law Offices of Victor K. Rones, P.A., and Victor K. Rones, for
appellant.
Jorge Antonioli, in proper person.
Before EMAS, LOGUE, and GORDO, JJ.
LOGUE, J.
This appeal stems from the final judgment entered against Winston

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Towers 100 Association, Inc., a condominium association, and for Jorge
Antonioli, a unit owner, on the Association’s complaint to foreclose a
recorded claim of lien (Count I) and for collection of sums due (Count II).
Based on the following analysis, we affirm the portion of the final judgment
as to Count I, but reverse the portion of the final judgment as to Count II and
remand for entry of an amended final judgment for the Association and
against Antonioli as to Count II.
Background
Antonioli owns Unit 1809 in the Winston Towers 100 Condominium. In
its two-count operative complaint, the Association asserted a count for
foreclosure of a claim of lien (Count I) and for collection of sums due (Count
II). As to Count II, the Association asserted it was seeking to collect a specific
amount for unpaid assessments plus interest and costs. In addition, the
Association also sought to collect any unpaid amount that accrued after a
specific date plus interest, costs, administrative fees, and attorney’s fees.
At the bench trial on the Association’s operative complaint, the
Association called as a witness the secretary of its board, Felix Kizhner, who
testified as the Association’s corporate representative. Several exhibits were
introduced into evidence during his testimony, including the claim of lien and
the Association’s payment records. The payment records included both

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ledgers and spreadsheets, which had different functions, but basically,
between both, they tracked all payments made by Antonioli for regular
maintenance fees and special assessments and any assessed late fees.
They also kept track of the unpaid balance due by Antonioli to the
Association.
Kizhner testified that despite not preparing the payment records
himself, he was familiar with the manner in which the Association’s payment
records were prepared and the manner in which the late fees were assessed.
He further explained the payment records were prepared by someone with
knowledge, in the ordinary scope of the Association’s business, and each
payment was entered at or about the time when payments were made. He
also testified the payment records were saved electronically and the
Association also maintained hard copies. Kizhner’s testimony about the
amounts allegedly owed by Antonioli was consistent with the exhibits
introduced into evidence.
During Kizhner’s testimony, the Association introduced into evidence
the claim of lien and the notice it sent to Antonioli before filing the claim of
lien. Kizhner’s testimony reflects he was familiar with the rate of interest
referenced in the claim of lien. Moreover, he testified about the notices sent
to Antonioli, but his testimony reflected he was unfamiliar with the

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Association’s mailing system.
The Association then called Antonioli as a witness. During Antonioli’s
testimony, the Association’s counsel asked if he was affiliated with several
P.O. boxes or lived at certain addresses where the required notices were
sent. Antonioli either denied being associated with the P.O. boxes, denied
living at the addresses, or claimed he had not lived at the address for quite
a while.
Following the testimony, the trial court heard closing arguments. The
Association then moved for a directed verdict, which the court denied. The
trial court adjourned without ruling and requested the Association’s counsel
to transmit the transcript of a prior hearing conducted before another trial
judge.
The trial court entered the final order on appeal, ruling for Antonioli and
against the Association and dissolving the lis pendens. The trial court found
that the Association failed to meet its burden to foreclose the claim of lien. In
doing so, the trial court found, among other things, that Antonioli testified that
he never received notice from the Association. The trial court also found that
Kizhner did not understand the payment records entered into evidence and
that, basically, the Association failed to establish the amounts owed by
Antonioli.

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Finally, the trial court cited to Pash, Tr. of Herbert & Minnie Pasch Fam.
Tr. dated May 12, 1996 v. Mahogany Way Homeowners Ass’n, 310 So. 3d
430 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), for the proposition that a trial court errs in ruling for
the homeowners’ association where the association failed to establish that it
submitted certain items, such as the relevant budget and notices, to the
residents as required by the homeowners’ association’s governing
declaration. Further, the trial court quoted the following language from
section 720.3085(1)(a), Florida Statutes: “To be valid, a claim of lien must
state the description of the parcel, the name of the record owner, the name
and address of the association, the assessment amount due, and the due
date.”
The Association filed a motion for rehearing, reconsideration,
clarification, and new trial. The trial court denied the motion. The
Association’s timely appeal followed.
Analysis
I. Claim to Foreclose Claim of Lien—Count I
The Association argues reversal is warranted based on the trial court’s
reliance on Pash and section 720.3085(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Although
Pash and section 720.3085(1) apply to homeowners’ associations, not
condominium associations, we disagree.

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Condominium associations are governed by chapter 718, not chapter
720. In Pash, the court held that notice (and other documents such as the
budget) must be provided to the property owner as required by the
homeowners’ association’s governing declaration, which constitutes a
contract between the property owner and the homeowners’ association. This
principle also pertains to a condominium association. Pash, 310 So. 3d at
432. See also Bal Harbour Tower Condo. Ass’n v. Bellorin, 351 So. 3d 96,
99-100 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (providing that a declaration of condominium
“operates as a contract among unit owners and the association, outlining
their respective rights and responsibilities” (quoting Williams v. Salt Springs
Resort Ass’n, 298 So. 3d 1255, 1260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020))). Further, the
requirements for a valid claim of lien are materially the same regardless of
whether the property is in a homeowners’ association or a condominium
association. The language quoted from section 720.3085(1)(a) is materially
similar to the language in section 718.116(5)(b), Florida Statutes, except that
rather than stating, “description of the parcel” and “the assessment amount
due” as set forth in section 720.3085(1)(a), section 718.116(5)(b) provides
“description of the condominium parcel” and “the amount due.” As such,
reversal is not warranted on this basis.
Next, the Association incorrectly argues Antonioli failed to plead as an

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affirmative defense that the Association allegedly failed to provide him with
required notice. Although Antonioli’s pro se pleadings and arguments made
below were not models of clarity, Antonioli sufficiently informed the
Association that he was asserting that he did not receive required notices
from the Association.
Under section 718.121(4), Florida Statutes (2020), before filing a claim
of lien, a condominium association is required to send a notice of its intent to
do so to the unit owner:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, no lien
may be filed by the association against a
condominium unit until 30 days after the date on
which a notice of intent to file a lien has been
delivered to the owner by registered or certified mail,
return receipt requested, and by first-class United
States mail to the owner at his or her last address as
reflected in the records of the association, if the
address is within the United States, and delivered to
the owner at the address of the unit if the owner's
address as reflected in the records of the association
is not the unit address. If the address reflected in the
records is outside the United States, sending the
notice to that address and to the unit address by first-
class United States mail is sufficient. Delivery of the
notice shall be deemed given upon mailing as
required by this subsection.
§ 718.121(4), Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphasis added).
Here, the Association sent the notice of intent to file lien addressed to
Antonioli more than thirty days before it recorded the claim of lien by the

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required mailing system. This notice, however, was sent to two addresses
that are not the address of the Unit at issue. During trial, as to one of the
addresses on the notice, Antonioli testified that he lived there at one point,
but did not testify about when he lived there. As to the other listed address,
the Association did not ask Antonioli if he had lived at that address.
Moreover, Kizhner testified that he had no knowledge as to the Association’s
mailing of the notice.
We recognize that section 718.121(4) provides that “[d]elivery of the
notice shall be deemed given upon mailing as required by this subsection.”
§ 718.121(4), Fla. Stat. (2020). The mailing, however, was not “as required
by this subsection” because the Association failed to establish that Antonioli
lived at the addresses on the notice of intent to file claim of lien when mailed
or that the notice was sent to “the last address as reflected in the records of
the association.” Id. “The requirement that a[] [condominium] association
give notice before attaching a lien to property ‘is no mere technicality.’”
Rajabi v. Villas at Lakeside Condo. Ass’n, 306 So. 3d 400, 402 (Fla. 5th DCA
2020) (quoting Dwork v. Exec. Ests. of Boynton Beach Homeowners Ass’n,
219 So. 3d 858, 860 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)). Thus, the Association failed to
establish it complied with the notice requirement before filing the claim of
lien. Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the trial court’s order as to Count I

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of the operative complaint.
II. Collection of Sums Due—Count II
We agree with the Association’s argument that the trial court’s ruling
that the Association failed to comply with the notice requirements does not
affect its claim for recovery of sums due in Count II. In addressing Count II,
the Association makes several arguments.
First, the Association argues the trial court’s order does not address its
claim asserted in Count II for collection of amounts due. A review of the trial
court’s order reflects the trial court did not explicitly reference Count II. The
order, however, also reflects that the trial court implicitly found for Antonioli
based on its finding that the Association failed to establish the amounts owed
by Antonioli.
Second, the Association argues that Antonioli did not object when the
Association introduced several exhibits under the business records
exception to the hearsay rule,1 such as the payment records, and therefore,
the trial court improperly determined that Kizhner’s testimony was
insufficient. This argument lacks merit. Although the payments records were
1 The records were properly admitted under the business records exception
to the hearsay rule, section 90.803(6), Florida Statutes. Kizhner’s testimony
provided a proper foundation for the admission of the payment records for
both the special assessments and maintenance fees.

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admitted without challenge, the trial court was nonetheless permitted to
determine the sufficiency of Kizhner’s testimony.
Finally, the Association argues the trial court improperly concluded that
the Association failed to establish the amount Antonioli owed the
Association. As the findings in support of this conclusion are not supported
by competent evidence, we agree.
In the order on appeal, the trial court concluded the Association
presented insufficient evidence, and therefore, found for Antonioli. In so
concluding, the trial court determined, among other things, that Kizhner “did
not understand the [Association’s] full recording system or the itemization of
the charges in question” and “[Kizhner] claims the assessment and fees were
recorded procedurally within the office but lacked sufficient knowledge about
what any of the columns in the ledgers represented, when or how payments
were collected from [Antonioli].” These findings are not supported by the
competent, substantial evidence.
Although Kizhner did not actually prepare the payment records, “it is
not necessary to call the person who actually prepared the document in order
to lay the foundation for the business record exception; rather, any person
who has the requisite knowledge as to how the record was made can testify.”
Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Nacimiento, 388 So. 3d 1048, 1051-52

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(Fla. 3d DCA 2024). Further, the Association’s records are computer
records, and therefore, Kizhner was required to demonstrate that he had
“knowledge of the recordkeeping system.” Jackson v. Household Fin. Corp.
III, 236 So. 3d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).
Here, as to the payment records that were ultimately introduced into
evidence, Kizhner testified that he works in the Association’s main office as
the Association’s secretary; was familiar with the payment records; the
payment records were prepared in the Association’s ordinary scope of
business; the payment records were prepared by someone with knowledge;
each entry in the payment records were prepared at or about the time that
the payments were made; the payment records were stored on electronic
drives, in the cloud, and in the physical form; and the payment records are
kept under the Association’s care, custody, and control.
After the trial court admitted the payment records into evidence,
Kizhner testified about the procedure for keeping track of the special
assessments for each phase, the charging of late fees, and payments
received from Antonioli. He explained that the records reflect the payments,
accrual of interest, and late fees, and that the computer program accurately
applies each payment to the principal balance, late fees, and interest. His
testimony also reflected that the grand total for the assessments was

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$39,158.78 and for maintenance was $6,207.21. Kizhner also testified that
the Association agreed to pay a reasonable attorney’s fee.
The trial court then questioned Kizhner as to the admitted records, and
Kizhner was able to answer the trial court’s questions. The Association’s
counsel then asked follow-up questions relating to the payment records,
which Kizhner sufficiently answered. Thus, based on Kizhner’s testimony,
the trial court’s determination as to his lack of knowledge is not supported by
competent, substantial evidence.
Thus, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the order under review
and remand for the entry of a final order that (1) finds for Antonioli and against
the Association as to Count I to foreclose the claim of lien and dissolves the
lis pendens; and (2) finds for the Association and against Antonioli as to
Count II for collection of amounts due, consistent with the payment records
admitted at trial, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed, in part, reversed, in part, and remanded.