Edwin Ricardo, et al. v. Typtap Insurance Company

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed December 31, 2025.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D24-0448
Lower Tribunal No. 22-20577-CA-01
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Edwin Ricardo, et al.,
Appellants,
vs.
Typtap Insurance Company,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Valerie R.
Manno Schurr, Judge.
Carey Rodriguez, LLP, and Juan J. Rodriguez and Helia Dehghani, for
appellants.
Salmon, Salmon, Labbe & Dehne P.A., and Andrew A. Labbe (Tampa),
for appellee.
Before SCALES, C.J., and LINDSEY and BOKOR, JJ.
BOKOR, J.

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Appellants Edwin and Connie Ricardo appeal the trial court’s
enforcement of a settlement agreement and imposition of sanctions, alleging
that their acceptance was revoked before communication and that no
contract was formed due to a lack of mutual assent. The Ricardos claim that
under the circumstances an evidentiary hearing was required before the trial
court could determine the existence of a binding agreement. For the reasons
explained below, we agree and reverse.
I. Background
The Ricardos brought an action for breach of contract and declaratory
judgment against their home insurer based on damages sustained to their
property in 2021. After the parties mediated the case on January 17, 2024,
the insurer claimed that the parties reached a settlement and moved to
enforce it. During the nonevidentiary hearing on the motion to enforce the
settlement agreement, the insurer claimed that the parties reached an oral
settlement during the mediation and proffered a written settlement
agreement that the Ricardos signed the day after mediation. The insurer also
noted that the mediator’s post-mediation report included a checked box
indicating that “the parties reached an agreement.” The Ricardos filed an
affidavit in opposition attesting that they did not reach an agreement during
mediation and that although they signed the agreement sent by the insurer,

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they instructed their counsel to “hold off” on transmitting it. The trial court
granted the insurer’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement, and this
appeal followed.
II. Analysis
Settlement agreements are governed by principles of contract law.
See, e.g., Lorenzo v. Homeowners Choice Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 400 So. 3d
89, 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). On a motion to enforce a settlement, the moving
party bears the burden of proving that the acceptance was “(1) absolute and
unconditional; (2) identical with the terms of the offer; and (3) in the mode, at
the place, and within the time expressly or impliedly stated within the offer.”
Id. at 91 (quoting Trout v. Apicella, 78 So. 3d 681, 684 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)).
“A trial court’s finding of mutual assent must be supported by competent
substantial evidence.” Id. at 90 (quotations omitted).
So the insurer, as the party seeking to enforce the settlement, bears
the initial burden of proof.1 Here, the Ricardos dispute, among other issues,
the existence of essential terms and mutual assent, and that the offer was
accepted by the insurer before being revoked. The Ricardos properly alerted
1 We recognize that some of the Ricardos’ arguments against enforcement
are better characterized as avoidances or affirmative defenses for which the
Ricardos would have the burden of proof, e.g., duress. See Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.110(d) (setting forth duress as an affirmative defense).

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the trial court to disputed issues of fact regarding the formation of the
mediated settlement agreement.2 See Gollobith v. Ferrell, 84 So. 3d 1095,
1096–97 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (reversing and remanding for evidentiary
hearing to decide disputed issues of fact regarding purported settlement
agreement); see also Vision Palm Springs, LLLP v. Michael Anthony Co.,
272 So. 3d 441, 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (explaining that “[c]ontract formation
requires a manifestation of mutual assent” which “must be supported by
competent substantial evidence,” and that “[t]o be judicially enforceable, a
settlement must be sufficiently specific and mutually agreeable as to every
essential element” (quotations omitted)).
2 Although our standard of review here is de novo, we note neither party
raised in the trial court below nor briefed on appeal whether the
memorandum of mediated settlement, signed by one party, constitutes a
valid and enforceable settlement agreement. A settlement agreement
reached during mediation must be “reduced to writing and signed by each
party or the party’s representative having full authority to settle under rule
1.720(c).” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.730(b); see also Parkland Condo. Ass’n v.
Henderson, 350 So. 3d 484, 486–87 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (“[I]n light of rule
1.730(b), we are constrained to conclude that any settlement agreement is
unenforceable because it resulted from mediation yet lacked the parties’
signatures.”); Gordon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, 641 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla.
3d DCA 1994) (citing same rule and noting that “an attorney’s signature
alone, albeit in the presence of the client, is wholly insufficient”). Because
the issue was not presented, we decline to address whether the settlement
agreement is valid under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.730(b). We
emphasize, however, that nothing in this opinion should be construed as
impacting the well-established body of law on this point.

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III. Conclusion
It is appropriate to reverse and remand for further proceedings,
including, where necessary, an evidentiary hearing, where the formation of
the settlement agreement depended on disputed issues of material fact. And
because we reverse for further proceedings regarding the validity of the
settlement agreement, we necessarily vacate the order awarding sanctions.
Reversed and remanded.