Cedric Cilien v. State of Florida, et al.

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed November 12, 2025.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D25-1911
Lower Tribunal No. B25-6620
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Cedric Cilien,
Petitioner,
vs.
State of Florida, et. al.,
Respondents.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Habeas Corpus.
Carlos Martinez, Public Defender, and Jennifer Rose Thornton,
Assistant Public Defender, for petitioner.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Camilo Montoya, Assistant
Attorney General; Geraldine Bonzon Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney,
and Shankia A. Graves, Assistant County Attorney, for respondents.
Before EMAS, MILLER and LOBREE, JJ.
EMAS, J.

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On October 6, 2025, Petitioner, Cedric Cilien, filed a petition requesting
this court to issue a writ of habeas corpus quashing a bench warrant issued
for the arrest of petitioner for his failure to appear at arraignment.1 For the
reasons that follow, we grant the petition.
Petitioner asserts the bench warrant was improperly issued because
his attorney had previously filed a written plea of not guilty and waiver of
petitioner’s presence at arraignment, which pleadings were in the court file
at the time of arraignment. The pleading stated that “the Defendant, through
undersigned counsel, hereby . . . [f]iles this Written Plea of Not Guilty
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.160(a). . . and thereby
waives arraignment, and waives the defendant’s presence at the
1 At the time petitioner filed the petition, the bench warrant had been issued
but had not yet been executed. Later that same day, however, petitioner
was arrested and taken into custody on the bench warrant. Petitioner has
since been released from custody, but we exercise our discretion to address
the merits notwithstanding any mootness claim, because the issue is
capable of repetition, yet evading review. See State v. Blair, 39 So. 3d 1190,
1191 n.1 (Fla. 2010) (reaching the merits of the issue, even though the
defendant had been released from custody, noting: “By the time this case
reached this Court, the issue was moot . . . . However, the mootness doctrine
does not destroy our jurisdiction in this case. Because this issue is capable
of repetition, yet may evade review, we have the authority to retain
jurisdiction and decide the issue on the merits under the public exception
doctrine.”); see also Romero v. Green, 394 So. 3d 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024);
Thourtman v. Junior, 275 So. 3d 726 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).

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arraignment pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.180(a)(2).” (Emphasis added).
The trial court issued a bench warrant upon the apparent
misconception that a defendant’s signature was required on a waiver of
presence at arraignment, and that the waiver was required to be a separate,
stand-alone document rather than a single document consolidated with the
written plea of not guilty. Because the pleading did not contain a signature
of the defendant, the trial court deemed the waiver of presence at
arraignment insufficient.
Defense counsel objected and attempted to explain that, as expressly
provided in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180(a)(2), the filing of a
written plea of not guilty waives a defendant’s presence at arraignment and
does not require a defendant’s signature. The trial court disagreed, and
issued a bench warrant for petitioner’s non-appearance. Petitioner was later
arrested on that bench warrant.
The State filed a response to the petition for writ of habeas corpus, and
has commendably conceded that the trial court erred in issuing the bench
warrant.2 Specifically, the State acknowledged that there is no requirement
2 The remaining respondent, Miami-Dade County Corrections &
Rehabilitation Department, filed a response taking no position on the merits
of the petition.

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that the waiver of presence at arraignment contain a defendant’s signature
to be valid. The State also acknowledged there is no requirement that the
written plea of not guilty and waiver of presence at arraignment be filed as
separate, stand-alone documents.
Rule 3.180(a)(2) provides in pertinent part:
(a) In all prosecutions for crimes the defendant must be present:
. . .
(2) when a plea is made, unless a written plea of not guilty has been
made in writing under the provisions of rule 3.170(a).
(Emphasis added).
In other words, a defendant’s presence at arraignment is deemed
waived by the filing of a written plea of not guilty, even if it is not accompanied
by a waiver of presence. Indeed, the filing of a written plea of not guilty
waives not only the defendant’s presence at arraignment, but waives the
arraignment proceeding itself, as provided in rule 3.160(a):
Nature of Arraignment. The arraignment must be conducted
in open court or by audio-video communication technology in
the discretion of the court and must consist of the judge or
clerk or prosecuting attorney reading the indictment or
information on which the defendant will be tried to the
defendant or stating orally to the defendant the substance of
the charge or charges and calling on the defendant to plead
thereto. The reading or statement as to the charge or charges
may be waived by the defendant. If the defendant is
represented by counsel, counsel may file a written plea

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of not guilty at or before arraignment and thereupon
arraignment must be deemed waived.
(Emphasis added).
In the instant case, the proceeding at issue was an arraignment.
Counsel had filed a written plea of not guilty and waiver of defendant’s
presence. This pleading did not require petitioner’s signature, and by
operation of rule 3.160(a), the arraignment was deemed waived by the filing
of the written plea of not guilty. Independently, and by operation of rule
3.180(a)(2), petitioner was not required to be present at arraignment. The
trial court’s issuance of a bench warrant for petitioner’s failure to appear,
resulting in the arrest of petitioner on that warrant, was plainly erroneous.
We therefore grant the petition, issue the writ, and quash the bench
warrant issued by the trial court.