Patrick Omar Puertas v. Jennifer Ann Ruiz

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed November 26, 2025.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D25-0305
Lower Tribunal No. 20-16263-FC-04
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Patrick Omar Puertas ,
Appellant,
vs.
Jennifer Ann Ruiz ,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Spencer
Multack, Judge.
Law Offices of Maria del Carmen Calzon, P.A., and Maria Del Carmen
Calzon, for appellant.
Patricia Mesa, P.A., and Patricia Mesa, for appellee.
Before LOGUE, LINDSEY, and GOODEN, JJ.
LINDSEY, J.

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Appellant, Patrick Omar Puertas, appeals the trial court’s Final Order
of Relocation and Amended Court Ordered Parenting Plan.1 Puertas makes
several arguments asserting the trial court erred in granting a petition for
relocation by misapplying the facts and law presented below. Puertas also
argues the trial court abridged his due process rights by not allowing him to
present rebuttal evidence. We affirm the trial court’s decision because
Puertas failed to attach the transcript of the final hearing, there is no error
apparent on the face of the order, and nothing in the record shows the trial
court prevented Puertas from introducing rebuttal evidence.
BACKGROUND
In 	February 	2024, 	Ruiz 	filed 	her 	Petition 	to 	Relocate 	and 	for
Modification and a Motion for Temporary Relocation. According to the
motion, Ruiz, who formerly lived in Miami, Florida, moved to Gainesville,
Florida, because Ruiz had to “vacate the home that she is residing in . . . and
cannot 	find 	affordable 	and 	adequate 	housing 	in 	Miami-Dade 	County,
Florida.”
Indeed, a week earlier, Ruiz signed a lease for a townhouse in
Gainesville, Florida. But at the final hearing, for which we have no transcript,
1 We 	have 	jurisdiction 	under 	Florida 	Rule 	of 	Appellate 	Procedure
9.030(b)(1)(A).

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the trial court 	heard 	evidence that Ruiz 	intended to move to another
neighborhood 	in 	Gainesville. 	Unlike 	the 	previous 	neighborhood, 	this
neighborhood has several safety concerns, including its remoteness and
dense sexual predator population. The trial court also heard evidence on
how to serve the child’s best interest should relocation be granted.
After the final hearing, but before the trial court rendered a final order,
Ruiz filed her Motion to Reopen Evidence Based on Newly Discovered
Evidence. That motion argued that the trial court should consider new
evidence that Ruiz would remain in the original and safer Gainesville
residence because the sale of Ruiz’s original residence “did not go through.”
In December 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion.
At the hearing, Puertas argued that it had no objection to Ruiz’s motion, so
long as Puertas is “allowed to address what is being reopened in terms of
timeshare.” In response, the trial court clarified that it had no problem with
allowing Puertas to introduce evidence rebutting Ruiz’s newly discovered
evidence. But for a “separate issue, [the trial court would] need a motion.”
The trial court stated that Puertas “would be able to address timesharing at
the location where she will be residing.” Puertas agreed to those terms,
stating, “I understand, Your Honor. These are things that -- that are occurring
now at that location.”

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A week later, the trial court rendered its final order. Based on the
factors outlined in section 61.13001(7), Florida Statutes (2025), the trial court
granted Ruiz’s petition and ordered a new parenting plan, where Puertas
received majority timesharing with the minor child and Ruiz was expected to
incur much of the labor and costs that would come with having the minor
child go back and forth from Miami to Gainesville.
Puertas 	responded 	with 	his 	Emergency 	Motion 	for 	Rehearing,
Reconsideration, Correction, and Other Relief. That motion argued that the
trial court made several misapplications of fact and law, but failed to raise
that Puertas’s due process rights were denied by granting Ruiz’s Motion to
Reopen Evidence. The trial court granted Puertas’ motion in part, only to the
extent that the trial court would amend some clerical errors and factual
inconsistencies in the original final order. Puertas now appeals that final
order.
ANALYSIS
Puertas makes several arguments asserting that Ruiz failed to meet
her burden to prove that relocation was in the best interest of the child and
that modification would have been proper.
That may be so, but we cannot confirm. We have no transcript of the
final hearing—where almost all the evidence was presented—which the trial

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court relied on in rendering its final order.2 See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of
Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) (“Without a record of the
trial proceedings, the appellate court can not properly resolve the underlying
factual issues so as to conclude that the trial court’s judgment is not
supported by the evidence or by an alternative theory. Without knowing the
factual context, neither can an appellate court reasonably conclude that the
trial judge so misconceived the law 	as to 	require reversal.”). We 	are
compelled to affirm.
Further, there is no reversible error apparent on the face of the record.
Puertas argues that the trial court erred by only considering the relocation
factors outlined in section 61.13001(7), Florida Statutes, thus ignoring the
factors for modification of a parenting plan outlined in section 61.13(3),
Florida Statutes (2025). We disagree. When granting a petition for relocation
2 We reiterate the importance of providing a complete record. In appellate
proceedings, 	the 	trial 	court’s 	decision 	is 	clothed 	in 	a 	presumption 	of
correctness. See Applegate, 377 So. 2d at 1152; Saenz v. Diaz, 416 So. 3d
352, 353-54 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025). So, “[a]n appellant has the burden to
present a record that will overcome the presumption of the correctness of the
trial court's findings.” Zarate v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 81 So. 3d 556,
557 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); Joseph v. Henry, 367 So. 3d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2023). We cannot say that the trial court’s decision misapplies the law
or evidence produced at the final hearing here if we have no transcript to
review the setting and context in which the parties presented the evidence
and law to the trial court. See Applegate, 377 So. 2d at 1152. Because of
this, appellant has not met its burden. We are constrained to affirm.

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there is no need to conduct an independent analysis of the standards for
modification outlined in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, because trial
courts have discretion to amend prior and untenable parenting plans once
relocation is granted. Ward v. Waters, 389 So. 3d 652, 656 (Fla. 3d DCA
2024).
A trial court has discretion to modify aspects of a parenting plan so that
relocation is executed in the best interest of the child. The plain text of section
61.13001(9)(a), Florida Statutes, states that if relocation is granted, a trial
court has discretion to order “contact with the nonrelocating parent . . . ,
including access [and] time-sharing . . . to ensure that the child has frequent,
continuing, and meaningful contact with the nonrelocating parent.” The trial
court found Puertas and Ruiz “were operating under a [previous] time-
sharing plan that contemplated [Ruiz] living in Miami.” So because Ruiz
moved to Gainesville, the trial court found that the “previous time-sharing
plan 	is 	untenable 	for 	these 	parents.” 	In 	granting 	Ruiz’s 	Petition 	for
Relocation, the trial court “crafted a parenting plan consistent with” its
findings for relocation. By a significant margin, Puertas remains the majority
time-sharing parent under trial court’s parenting plan and the new parenting
plan properly reflects a desire for the child to have “frequent, continuing, and

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meaningful contact with the nonrelocating parent.” § 61.13001(9)(a), Fla.
Stat.
It is for this reason the “trial court is not required to independently
address the applicable timesharing factors set forth in section 61.13, Florida
Statutes” when rendering a final order on relocation. Ward, 389 So. 3d at
656. Instead, the trial court is “required to render the ultimate finding that the
timesharing schedule comports with the best interests of the child.” Id. (citing
Kelly v. Colston, 32 So. 3d 186, 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)). So when a prior
time-sharing schedule is untenable, as it was here, the trial court may modify
that schedule based 	on its findings 	for 	relocation. 	These findings 	are
apparent on the face of the final order and the parenting plan.3
Finally, Puertas also argues that the trial court wrongly abridged his
right to due process by barring him from presenting evidence after the trial
court granted Ruiz’s Motion to Reopen Evidence. We are not convinced. At
the hearing on Ruiz’s Motion to Reopen Evidence, Puertas stated he had no
3 Although Ruiz’s petition is titled Petition for Relocation and for Modification,
it is substantively a petition for relocation only, in which Ruiz notes that
modification of a parenting plan would be necessary if her petition was
granted. See Golubtsova v. Budaev, 418 So. 3d 329, 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025)
(“[T]he title of a count in a complaint is not controlling—we must look to the
substance of what is being sought.”); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g) (“All
pleadings must be construed so as to do substantial justice.”).

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objection to the motion so long as he was “allowed to address what is being
reopened 	in 	terms 	of 	timeshare.” 	The 	trial 	court 	accepted 	Puertas’s
condition, but warned Puertas that it would not hear additional evidence on
a separate issue without a motion. The trial court stated that Puertas “would
be able to address timesharing at the location where she will be residing.”
Puertas agreed and said, “I understand, Your Honor. These are things that—
that are occurring now at that location.”
So the trial court granted Puertas’s request to introduce rebuttal
evidence, but Puertas never took advantage of that opportunity; nothing in
the record shows Puertas ever attempted to introduce rebuttal evidence. The
trial court did not violate Puertas’s due process rights. Cf. Cole v. Cole, 159
So. 3d 124, 125 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (“We conclude that in ruling, without
giving the Father an opportunity to present evidence, the trial court abused
its discretion and violated the Father's right to procedural due process. The
constitutional guarantee of due process dictates a full and fair opportunity to
be heard in judicial proceedings.”); Garcia-Mathies Interiors, Inc. v. Pere, 259
So. 3d 213, 215 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“While the trial court has discretion

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in 	how 	it 	gives 	the 	sanctioned 	party 	an 	opportunity 	to 	be heard, 	the
opportunity must be given.”).4
For these reasons, we affirm.
Affirmed.
4 Puertas also made no contemporaneous objection to granting Ruiz’s
motion, so, on this point, we review for fundamental error. See State v. Clark,
373 So. 3d 1128, 1132 (Fla. 2023); see also Philip J. Padovano, 2 Fla. Prac.,
Appellate Practice § 8:1 (2025 ed.) (“In the absence of fundamental error,
the appellate courts will not consider an issue that has been raised for the
first time on appeal.”). It is true though that the denial of due process
constitutes fundamental error that may be raised for the first time on appeal.
See I.T. v. Dep’t. of Child. and Fams., 338 So. 3d 6, 9 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA
2022). But as discussed, there is nothing on the recording showing the trial
court denied Puertas’s due process rights, so there is no fundamental error.