DAWSON v. STATE OF FLORIDA

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
RODNEY ALLEN DAWSON,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 2D2023-1231
February 11, 2026
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Michael Williams,
Judge.
Blair Allen, Public Defender, and Joanna Beth Conner, Assistant Public
Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Analise V. Walker,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Rodney Allen Dawson appeals his judgment and sentence for one
count of sexual battery and one count of kidnapping for events that took
place in August 1994. Following a jury trial, the trial court sentenced
Mr. Dawson to 126 months' imprisonment followed by fifteen years'
probation on the kidnapping charge and 126 months' imprisonment

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followed by fifty-four months' probation on the sexual battery count, to
run concurrently.
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Dawson moved for a downward departure
contending that he required specialized treatment for addiction, mental
disorder, or physical disability. See § 921.0016(4)(d), Fla. Stat. (1994).
He also argued for a youthful offender sentence under section
921.0016(4)(l) and section 958.04(2), Florida Statutes (1994), on the
basis that he was nineteen at the time of the offenses. At the sentencing
hearing, Mr. Dawson presented testimony from a licensed mental health
counselor who had previously evaluated Mr. Dawson.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court noted that the case
was a "different situation in that it's a 1994 case, different guidelines,
different statutes in effect at the time" and that because the case was
twenty-six years old, the trial court could "look at [Mr. Dawson's] body of
work" since the time of the offenses. The trial court then went on to
pronounce, without further explanation, Mr. Dawson's sentence as
follows:
I'm going to start with count two, which is the
kidnapping charge. I'm going to adjudicate you guilty,
sentence you to 126 months' prison, followed by 15 years of
probation.
On count one, I'm going to sentence you to 126 months'
Florida State Prison, followed by 54 months of probation.
Mr. Dawson now appeals that judgment and sentence, arguing that
the trial court erred by denying his motion for downward departure.
When ruling on a motion for downward departure, the trial court must
engage in a two-step process:
First, the court must determine whether it can depart,
i.e., whether there is a valid legal ground and adequate
factual support for that ground in the case pending before it
(step 1). Legal grounds are set forth in case law and statute,

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and facts supporting the ground must be proved at trial by "a
preponderance of the evidence." This aspect of the court's
decision to depart is a mixed question of law and fact and will
be sustained on review if the court applied the right rule of
law and if competent substantial evidence supports its ruling.
Competent substantial evidence is tantamount to legally
sufficient evidence, and the appellate court will assess the
record evidence for its sufficiency only, not its weight.
Second, where the step 1 requirements are met, the trial
court further must determine whether it should depart, i.e.,
whether departure is indeed the best sentencing option for
the defendant in the pending case. In making this
determination (step 2), the court must weigh the totality of
the circumstances in the case, including aggravating and
mitigating factors. This second aspect of the decision to
depart is a judgment call within the sound discretion of the
court and will be sustained on review absent an abuse of
discretion. Discretion is abused only where no reasonable
person would agree with the trial court's decision.
Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065, 1067–68 (Fla. 1999) (footnotes omitted).
In the instant case, the trial court did not address Mr. Dawson's
downward departure motion during its oral pronouncement, and it is
otherwise unclear from the pronouncement whether the trial court
rejected Mr. Dawson's motion because it believed it did not have the
authority to depart, or if the trial court rejected any of the expert's
opinions and found the evidence insufficient to support a departure, or
whether the trial court determined a legal basis for departure had been
established but exercised its discretion not to depart. "This court and
others have reversed where a trial court's statements are unclear as to
whether it was rejecting a defendant's factual basis or whether the
defendant had established a factual basis but the trial court was
exercising its discretion not to depart." Geske v. State, 378 So. 3d 1199,
1205 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). And the record in this case is not one that
otherwise provides the necessary clarity to conclude that the trial court

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would have imposed the same sentence even if it had understood that it
the authority to depart. See Butner v. State, 217 So. 3d 1162, 1164 (Fla.
2d DCA 2017) ("When it is unclear from the record whether the trial
court would have imposed the same sentence if the trial court had
known it had discretion, we must vacate the defendant's sentence and
remand the case for resentencing.").
Accordingly, we reverse Mr. Dawson's sentences and remand for
the trial court to apply the Banks two-step analysis and make any
necessary findings. See Williams v. State, 286 So. 3d 892, 898 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2019) ("It is possible that the trial court, instead of determining that
it could not depart, determined that it could depart but decided in its
discretion not to depart and simply stated it unclearly. Because of this
uncertainty, we are compelled to reverse the sentences."); Camacho v.
State, 164 So. 3d 45, 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("[W]e are unable to
determine from the record whether the circuit court would have imposed
the same sentence if it had understood that it had authority to depart.
We must therefore vacate Mr. Camacho's sentences and remand for
resentencing."). As our court has done on previous occasions, we note
that providing findings as to each step of the Banks analysis would assist
in our appellate review. See, e.g., Manyak v. State, 414 So. 3d 263, 265
(Fla. 2d DCA 2025), reh'g denied (Apr. 7, 2025); Williams, 286 So. 3d at
898 ("If the trial court is rejecting evidence as not credible or reliable and
finding insufficient factual support for a valid legal ground for departure
when it at the same time praises the witness, additional findings
indicating what evidence was rejected would assist in our appellate
review."); Camacho, 164 So. 3d at 46 ("[I]t is very helpful for the trial
court to explain on the record the precise basis for a decision to depart or
not to depart from the guidelines when sentencing.").

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The record in this case is likely sufficient for the trial court to
resolve these issues on remand. However, "[w]e leave it to the discretion
of the trial court, after consulting with counsel, to decide whether it
should conduct a completely new sentencing hearing or whether it can
rule on the record already before it." Manyak, 414 So. 3d at 265 (quoting
Camacho, 164 So. 3d at 49). Because Mr. Dawson has not challenged
his convictions, they are not affected by this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
LUCAS, C.J., and VILLANTI and SMITH, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.