Sheik Island Farm, Inc., Cypress Ridge Farm, Inc., et al v. Covington Farm, Inc., Stalnaker, Jr., et al

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
SHEIK ISLAND FARM, INC.; CYPRESS RIDGE
FARM, INC.; J. PATRICK MICHAELS, JR.; and
LISA LEVATINO,
Appellants,
v.
COVINGTON FARM, INC.; JAMES S. STALNAKER, JR.;
and BARBARA STALNAKER,
Appellees.
No. 2D2025-0151
ISSUE DATE
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Kimberly Sharpe Byrd,
Judge.
Gary Ragnar von Stange and Guy M. Burns of Johnson, Pope, Bokor,
Ruppel & Burns, LLP, St. Petersburg; Sharon E. Krick of Johnson, Pope,
Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, LLP, Clearwater, for Appellants.
Duane A. Daiker and Matthew E. Maggard of Shumaker, Loop &
Kendrick, Tampa; David S. Johnson of Johnson Litigation Group,
Tampa, for Appellees.
LUCAS, Chief Judge.
In this case, we confront an existential question: is renting out a
barn for weddings the same thing as operating a farm? The circuit court

2
effectively ruled that it was. Construing the various statutes implicated
in this dispute, we must disagree with the court's ruling.
I.
Sheik Island Farm, Inc., Cypress Ridge Farm, Inc., J. Patrick
Michaels, Jr., and Lisa Levatino (collectively, Sheik Farm) board horses
in Dade City. Sheik Farm's property is situated on a dirt road called
Covington Road. In 2016, Barbara and James Stalnaker purchased the
property immediately south of Sheik Farm from J. Patrick Michaels, Jr.,
and Lisa Levatino. This property would ultimately be the locus of
Covington Farm's operation. In 2017, Covington Farm applied for a
building permit to construct a barn. The permit gave no indication what
the barn would be used for.
According to the summary judgment evidence presented below, the
barn Covington Farm eventually built was a wedding venue. Indeed,
Covington Farm advertised it as an "Elegant Barn Venue." Covington
Farm hosted its first wedding in 2017, and since then it has built a
successful event business around the barn and its surroundings.
Covington Farm's wedding barn features air conditioning, restrooms, a
fireplace, a bar, a catering kitchen, separate bride and groom dressing
areas, and a lounge.
Ms. Stalnaker testified that she works full-time coordinating
weddings and events at Covington Farm. The business has done well
enough that she had to hire a full-time employee to assist her.
Covington Farm's 2021 tax return lists "Facilities Rentals" as its sole
business activity. And all of Covington Farm's revenues for that year
came from weddings and similar events. Sheik Farm submitted
printouts from a website featuring Covington Farm as a wedding

3
destination, which included several favorable reviews from past
customers.
Covington Farm's property, however, was designated agricultural
by the Pasco County Property Appraiser. Although there appears to have
been a prior dispute between the Property Appraiser and Covington Farm
about the property's greenbelt designation, Covington Farm's property
has consistently remained classified as agricultural pursuant to section
193.461, Florida Statutes, since 2018.
Sheik Farm claims that Covington Farm's event venue has caused
a variety of problems for its business. It alleges that increased road
traffic and speeding cars coming and going to Covington Farm generate
excessive noise, garbage, and dust from the dirt road. All of which, it
claims, has adversely affected the horses on its property.
On April 17, 2019, Sheik Farm filed an initial complaint against
Covington Farm in the circuit court. As amended, Sheik Farm's
complaint asserted four causes of action—two counts for private
nuisance, one count asserting a public nuisance, and one count for
violation of section 108.3 of the Pasco County Land Development Code
(the Code). Covington Farm answered, generally denying Sheik Farm's
allegations, and further asserted several affirmative defenses.
Covington Farm filed a motion for summary judgment, which the
circuit court heard on November 6, 2024. The circuit court entered an
order granting Covington Farm's motion and entering final judgment in
its favor against Sheik Farm on December 19, 2024. Essentially, the
court determined that the agricultural classification of Covington Farm's
property was fatal to every one of Sheik Farm's claims because of several
statutes. We can summarize the court's detailed findings and
conclusions as follows: (1) since 2018, the Pasco County Property

4
Appraiser classified the Covington Farm Property as agricultural
pursuant to section 193.461, Florida Statutes (2018); (2) the Property
Appraiser's agricultural classification was "dispositive of Plaintiffs' claim
that Defendants are violating the Code because Plaintiffs' claim is
expressly preempted by Fla. Stat. § 570.85 and because the property and
barn are exempt from the Code pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 604.50(1)"; and
(3) as to the nuisance claims, Florida's Right to Farm Act applied to the
Covington Farm property and "[t]he language, intent and stated purpose
of the Right to Farm Act convince[d] the Court that the Property
Appraiser's classification determination is the key to whether the Act's
limitations on nuisance lawsuits applies." The court further determined
that because none of the allegations or summary judgment evidence
concerned compliance with state or federal environmental laws,
regulations, or best management practices, those three counts failed as a
matter of law. Sheik Farm has initiated this appeal asking us to review
the court's summary judgment.
II.
Our review of a summary judgment is de novo. Cordero v. Fla. Ins.
Guar. Ass'n, 354 So. 3d 1150, 1153 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (citing LoBello v.
State Farm Fla. Ins., 152 So. 3d 595, 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)). In
deciding an issue on summary judgment, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.510 applies the "federal summary judgment standard," which
essentially mirrors the standard for a motion for a directed verdict. See
In re Amends. to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021).
Issues of statutory interpretation are also subject to de novo review. See
Steak N Shake, Inc. v. Ramos, 415 So. 3d 107, 111 (Fla. 2025) (citing
Ripple v. CBS Corp., 385 So. 3d 1021, 1027 (Fla. 2024)).

5
III.
The resolution of this appeal requires us to delve into several
statutes. Whenever we interpret statutes, "we follow the 'supremacy-of-
text principle'—namely, the principle that '[t]he words of a governing text
are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is
what the text means.' " Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 308 So. 3d
942, 946 (Fla. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Antonin Scalia &
Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)).
"[O]ur first (and often only) step . . . is to ask what the Legislature
actually said in the statute, based upon the common meaning of the
words used." Shepard v. State, 259 So. 3d 701, 705 (Fla. 2018) (quoting
Schoeff v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 232 So. 3d 294, 313 (Fla. 2017)
(Lawson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Traditional
canons of statutory interpretation, "[v]iewed properly as rules of thumb,"
can "aid the interpretive process." Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d
594, 598 (Fla. 2022). Because the Right to Farm Act curtails common
law nuisance claims, we must also be mindful that "[s]tatutes that alter
the common law are narrowly construed." Hardee County v. FINR II, Inc.,
221 So. 3d 1162, 1165 (Fla. 2017).
A.
We will begin with the circuit court's ruling that the Florida Right
to Farm Act, section 823.14, Florida Statutes, barred Sheik Farm's
nuisance claims. The Florida Right to Farm Act provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
(2) Legislative findings and purpose.—The Legislature finds
that agricultural production is a major contributor to the
economy of the state; that agricultural lands constitute
unique and irreplaceable resources of statewide importance;
that the continuation of agricultural activities preserves the
landscape and environmental resources of the state,

6
contributes to the increase of tourism, including agritourism,
and furthers the economic self-sufficiency of the people of the
state; and that the encouragement, development,
improvement, and preservation of agriculture will result in a
general benefit to the health and welfare of the people of the
state. The Legislature further finds that agricultural activities
conducted on farm land in urbanizing areas are potentially
subject to lawsuits based on the theory of nuisance and that
these suits encourage and even force the premature removal
of the farm land from agricultural use. It is the purpose of
this act to protect reasonable agricultural and complementary
agritourism activities conducted on farm land from nuisance
suits and other similar lawsuits.
(3) Definitions.—As used in this section:
(a) "Agritourism activity" has the same meaning as provided
in s. 570.86.
. . . .
(c) "Farm" means the land, buildings, support facilities,
machinery, and other appurtenances used in the production
of farm or aquaculture products.
(d) "Farm operation" means all conditions or activities by the
owner, lessee, agent, independent contractor, or supplier
which occur on a farm in connection with the production of
farm, honeybee, or apiculture products or in connection with
complementary agritourism activities. These conditions and
activities include, but are not limited to, the marketing of
farm products at roadside stands or farm markets; the
operation of machinery and irrigation pumps; the generation
of noise, odors, dust, fumes, and particle emissions; ground
or aerial seeding and spraying; the placement and operation
of an apiary; the application of chemical fertilizers,
conditioners, insecticides, pesticides, and herbicides;
agritourism activities; and the employment and use of labor.
(e) "Farm product" means any plant, as defined in s. 581.011,
or animal or insect useful to humans and includes, but is not
limited to, any product derived therefrom.
(f) "Nuisance" means any interference with reasonable use
and enjoyment of land, including, but not limited to, noise,
smoke, odors, dust, fumes, particle emissions, or

7
vibration. The term also includes all claims that meet the
requirements of this definition, regardless of whether the
plaintiff designates those claims as brought in nuisance,
negligence, trespass, personal injury, strict liability, or other
tort.
(4) Farm operations; nuisance.—
(a) No farm operation which has been in operation for 1 year
or more since its established date of operation and which was
not a nuisance at the time of its established date of operation
shall be a public or private nuisance if the farm operation
conforms to generally accepted agricultural and management
practices, except that the following conditions shall constitute
evidence of a nuisance:
1. The presence of untreated or improperly treated human
waste, garbage, offal, dead animals, dangerous waste
materials, or gases which are harmful to human or animal
life.
2. The presence of improperly built or improperly maintained
septic tanks, water closets, or privies.
3. The keeping of diseased animals which are dangerous to
human health, unless such animals are kept in accordance
with a current state or federal disease control program.
4. The presence of unsanitary places where animals are
slaughtered, which may give rise to diseases which are
harmful to human or animal life.
. . . .
(c) A farm may not be held liable for nuisance unless the
plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the
claim arises out of conduct that did not comply with state or
federal environmental laws, regulations, or best management
practices.
Subsection (3)(a) of the Act1 references section 570.86, Florida
Statutes (2019), which, in turn, defines "Agritourism activity" to mean:
1 We note that at the time the claims at issue in this case would
have accrued and when this action was filed, a prior version of section
823.14 was in effect, one which did not include the references to
"Agritourism activity" or section 570.86 (which were added later in a

8
[A]ny agricultural related activity consistent with a bona fide
farm, livestock operation, or ranch or in a working forest
which allows members of the general public, for recreational,
entertainment, or educational purposes, to view or enjoy
activities, including farming, ranching, historical, cultural,
civic, ceremonial, training and exhibition, or harvest-your-
own activities and attractions. An agritourism activity does
not include the construction of new or additional structures
or facilities intended primarily to house, shelter, transport, or
otherwise accommodate members of the general public.
§ 570.86(1).
Although there are a few provisions for us to work through, the
operative terms we need to construe are fairly limited. In fact, as we will
show, a proper construction of the Florida Right to Farm Act in this case
boils down to the meaning of a single word.
2021 revision to the statute). See § 823.14, Fla. Stat. (2019); R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Sheffield, 266 So. 3d 1230, 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA
2019) ("In the absence of express statutory language to the contrary,
Florida law generally holds that the applicable version of a statute is the
version in effect at the time a cause of action accrues." (citing collected
cases)); see also 2021 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2021-7 (C.S.C.S.C.S.S.B.
88) (West). Nevertheless, the parties' respective arguments, both below
and on appeal, invoked the current version of section 823.14. We will
similarly proceed with our analysis under the version of the statute
currently in effect. See Sunset Harbour Condo. Ass'n v. Robbins, 914 So.
2d 925, 928 (Fla. 2005) ("In order to be preserved for further review by a
higher court, an issue must be presented to the lower court and the
specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or review must
be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved." (quoting
Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985))); Janelle v. Veterans Villas
II Homeowners Ass'n, 413 So. 3d 211, 212 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025)
("When points, positions, facts and supporting authorities are omitted
from the brief, a court is entitled to believe that such are waived,
abandoned, or deemed by counsel to be unworthy." (quoting Polyglycoat
Corp. v. Hirsch Distribs., Inc., 442 So. 2d 958, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)));
see also Polyglycoat Corp., 442 So. 2d at 960 ("[I]t is not the function of
the Court to rebrief an appeal.").

9
1.
Two subsections of the Florida Right to Farm Act provide
limitations on common law nuisance claims, and they both turn on the
definition of a "farm." First, subsection (4)(c) protects "farms" as follows:
"A farm may not be held liable for nuisance unless . . . ." § 823.14(4)(c)
(emphasis added). Second, subsection (4)(a) declares that a "farm
operation" shall not be a public or private nuisance subject to certain
conditions and limitations. Here as well, however, the statutory
definition of "farm operation" under subsection (3)(d) hinges on there
being a farm: " 'Farm operation' means all conditions or activities . . .
which occur on a farm in connection with the production of farm,
honeybee, or apiculture products or in connection with complementary
agritourism activities." § 823.14(3)(d) (emphasis added).
True, "agritourism activities" has a fairly broad sweep of
"agricultural related activity" (which include those that would invite the
general public "to view or enjoy activities, including farming, ranching,
historical, cultural, civic, [and] ceremonial . . . activities and attractions"),
see § 570.86(1), but the term "agritourism activities" is limited to those
that are "complementary" and "consistent with a bona fide farm, livestock
operation, or ranch."2 See § 823.14(3)(d). And under section
823.14(3)(d)'s definition of "farm operation," any consideration of
complementary agritourism activities must first be predicated on there
being "a farm" that the activities take place upon. See § 823.14(3)(d); see
also Scherer v. Volusia Cnty. Dep't of Corr., 171 So. 3d 135, 139 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2015) ("No part of a statute, not even a single word, should be
2 No one has ever suggested that Covington Farm could constitute
a "working forest" under section 570.86(1).

10
ignored, read out of the text, or rendered meaningless, in construing the
provision.").
What is a farm, then? The Act defines the term for us, so we must
apply that definition. See State v. Crose, 378 So. 3d 1217, 1237 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2024) (en banc) (observing that "we would expect to find the
boundaries" of a statute's defined term "within the boundaries of the
section that defines that term"); Deloatch v. State, 360 So. 3d 1165, 1169
(Fla. 4th DCA 2023) ("When a statute includes an explicit definition,
[courts] must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's
ordinary meaning." (alteration in original) (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000))); Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, v. Bernard, 140 So. 3d
1023, 1030 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ("[T]he definition of a term in the
definitional section of a statute controls the construction of that term
wherever it appears in the statute.").
Under section 823.14(3)(c), "Farm" means "the land, buildings,
support facilities, machinery, and other appurtenances used in the
production of farm or aquaculture products." No one has suggested this
case implicates aquaculture, so we must ask whether Covington Farm's
operation could be said to have been "used in the production" of "farm
products." Here as well, we have a statutory definition to apply.
Subsection (3)(e) of the Florida Right to Farm Act defines "Farm product"
to mean "any plant, as defined under section 581.011, or animal or
insect useful to humans." Finally, under section 581.011(27), "Plants
and plant products" has a comprehensive definition of "trees, shrubs,
vines, forage and cereal plants, and all other plants and plant parts,
including cuttings, grafts, scions, buds, fruit, vegetables, roots, bulbs,
seeds, wood, lumber, and all products made from them, unless

11
specifically excluded by the rules of the department [of agriculture and
consumer services]."
So, if Covington Farm's property is being used to produce plants,
animals, or insects useful to humans, then it can be considered a farm.
And if it can be considered a farm, then it has statutory protection from
nuisance claims under section 823.14(4)(c). Similarly, if its farming
activities are part of a "farm operation" then section (4)(b)'s protection
applies.3 But as we discussed earlier, section 823.14(3)(d) tethers farm
operations to there being a farm. Under either subsection of section
823.14(4), then, the pertinent question the circuit court should have
addressed on Sheik Farm's nuisance claims was whether there was any
genuine dispute of any material fact that Covington Farm was, indeed, a
"farm." See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a).
From our de novo review, we conclude that there were genuine
disputes over that material fact. Sheik Farm presented evidence—
testimony from Covington Farm's employees, tax returns, and marketing
materials—from which a jury could reasonably conclude that this
property was not being run as a farm, but rather as a commercial
wedding venue. See In re Amends. to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510, 317 So. 3d at
75 ("[T]he correct test for the existence of a genuine factual dispute is
whether 'the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.' " (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986))). A jury could also conclude that the air-
3 Neither party has argued what, if any, distinction there may be in
this case between the nuisance liability limitations under subsection
(4)(c) versus subsection (4)(b). Because of our construction of the
operative term "farm," which spans both subsections, and since the
summary judgment evidence in this case did not support the finding that
there was no material fact in dispute that Covington Farm was operating
as such, we need not resolve that issue now.

12
conditioned wedding barn with its fireplace, bar, lounge, and changing
rooms was not "consistent with a bona fide farm, livestock operation or
ranch" under section 570.86's definition of agritourism activity. See §
570.86(1) (emphasis added); Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gallo,
246 So. 3d 560, 563 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (defining "bona fide" as
"[m]ade in good faith; without fraud or deceit . . . [s]incere; genuine"
(quoting Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014))).
2.
Two points appear to have led the court below into error on this
issue. First, the circuit court's ruling placed considerable emphasis on
the legislative findings found in the Florida Right to Farm Act. Section
823.14(2) does include an expression of legislative intent to protect
"agricultural activities conducted on farm land" from nuisance lawsuits.
That subsection concludes with the pronouncement: "It is the purpose of
this act to protect reasonable agricultural and complementary
agritourism activities conducted on farm land from nuisance suits and
other similar lawsuits."
Nothing within section 823.14(2)'s statement, however, alters the
operative text that appears later in the Act, certainly not in the manner
the circuit court applied. When construing a statutory act, legislative
statements of purpose adopted contemporaneously with the act's
enactment warrant a court's consideration; after all, these enacted
statements are part of the enactment's text and the overall statutory
context. Cf. Vericker v. Powell, 406 So. 3d 939, 944–45 (Fla. 2025)
(acknowledging Florida's Anti-SLAPP statute's stated purpose of
safeguarding the exercise of free speech rights by expeditiously disposing
of prohibited lawsuits but holding that a denial of an anti-SLAPP motion
to dismiss did not, in itself, justify certiorari relief); Coates v. R.J.

13
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 365 So. 3d 353, 354 (Fla. 2023) (" '[T]he words of a
governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their
context, is what the text means.' . . . [W]e do not add words to a statute
in the guise of interpreting it." (first quoting Levy v. Levy, 326 So. 3d 678,
681 (Fla. 2021); and then citing Statler v. State, 349 So. 3d 873, 879 (Fla.
2022))); Gordon v. Fishman, 253 So. 3d 1218, 1220 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)
("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that a statute should be
construed so as to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
Legislature as expressed in the statute." (quoting Gaulden v. State, 195
So. 3d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 2016))). But statements of legislative intent are
not a kind of über-text in the process of statutory construction.
Whatever their role in the interpretive process, they cannot be used to
subtract operative provisions or subvert operative text in a statute.
Section 823.14(2)'s expressions of intent align with the Florida
Right to Farm Act's operative text. Subsection (2)'s statements of
legislative purpose pertain to "agricultural production," "agricultural
lands," "agricultural activities," and "agriculture" more broadly. The
legislature was concerned about the effect nuisance lawsuits could have
on "agricultural activities conducted on farm land in urbanizing areas."
Thus, this prefatory subsection simply summarizes what the subsequent,
operative text in the Act accomplishes—protecting farms from neighbors'
nuisance claims when surrounding rural properties become more
urban.4 As we discussed in the prior section, whether Covington Farm is
4 There is perhaps a bit of irony here, insofar as the plaintiffs in
this case include a farm suing a neighbor for allegedly utilizing their
property for a more "urbanized" use. That, too, however, has no effect on
how a court should construe the Florida Right to Farm Act. The statute
says what it says, and it applies to what it says it applies to.

14
indeed operating a farm or engaged in agriculture is very much a
disputed issue of fact.
Second, the circuit court treated the Pasco County Property
Appraiser's agricultural classification of Covington Farm's property as if
that were dispositive of Sheik Farm's claims. But nothing within the
Florida Right to Farm Act states that a greenbelt designation under
section 193.461, Florida Statutes (2018), ipso facto satisfies the
definitions of "farm" or "farm operation" under the Act. Indeed, those
definitional sections do not mention the Property Appraiser or the ad
valorem taxation statutes at all. Conversely, section 193.461(1)'s
direction to property appraisers to classify property as either agricultural
or nonagricultural does not reference the Florida Right to Farm Act but is
instead tied to the purpose of ad valorem tax assessment. See §
193.461(1) ("The property appraiser shall, on an annual basis, classify
for assessment purposes all lands within the county as either
agricultural or nonagricultural." (emphasis added)). Simply put, while
the operative provisions in these different statutes do address property
used for agriculture and farming, they do not directly interact with, or
even reference, each other. A county property appraiser's agricultural
designation of property is not necessarily irrelevant to the question of
whether property is or isn't a farm under the Florida Right to Farm Act;
but it's certainly not dispositive. If the legislature had intended to imbue
such importance to a county property appraiser's determination, it could
have easily expressed that intention somewhere in the text of the
definitions it enacted. Because the legislature did not do so, it was error
for the circuit court to defer to the property appraiser's designation in the
manner that it did.
B.

15
Sheik Farm's claim for injunctive relief based on alleged violations
of the Pasco County Code presents a slightly closer question, but the
court's summary judgment on this count must also be reversed for much
the same reason as the other counts: the record reflects a genuine
dispute of material fact over whether Covington Farm's operation fits
within a statutory term.
The legislature enacted a separate statute that limits the scope of
building code regulation on agricultural lands, section 604.50, Florida
Statutes (2021). Section 604.50(1) provides:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, any
nonresidential farm building, farm fence, or farm sign that is
located on lands used for bona fide agricultural purposes . . .
is exempt from the Florida Building Code and any county or
municipal code or fee, except for code provisions
implementing local, state, or federal floodplain management
regulations.
(Emphasis added.)
Subsection (2) then gives definitions to the following pertinent
terms:
(a) "Bona fide agricultural purposes" has the same meaning
as provided in s. 193.461(3)(b).
(b) "Farm" has the same meaning as provided in s. 823.14.
. . . .
(d) "Nonresidential farm building" means any temporary or
permanent building or support structure that is classified as
a nonresidential farm building on a farm under 553.73(10)(c)
or that is used primarily for agricultural purposes, is located
on land that is an integral part of a farm operation or is
classified as agricultural land under s. 193.461, and is not
intended to be used as a residential dwelling. The term may
include, but is not limited to, a barn, greenhouse, shade
house, farm office, storage building, or poultry house.
§ 604.50(2).

16
Here as well, the circuit court deemed the county property
appraiser's agricultural designation as dispositively foreclosing Sheik
Farm's claim. In essence, the court found that since Covington Farm's
property was classified as agricultural, it was not subject to the Pasco
County Code pursuant to section 604.50(1), and as such, Sheik Farm
could not seek injunctive relief for an alleged violation of that code.5 A
close reading of the statute, however, does not support that construction.
The property appraiser's agricultural designation would bear on the
determination of whether Covington Farm's property was being "used for
bona fide agricultural purposes," but that is only part of the inquiry here.
What kinds of buildings on greenbelt lands are exempt from local
government building codes? Section 604.50(1)'s exemption applies to a
"nonresidential farm building." That term is also defined by agricultural
classification under section 193.461, but only partly. Section
604.50(2)(d)'s definition of a nonresidential farm building includes the
conjunctive "and" followed by a final qualification, so that a
nonresidential farm building is one that is "located on land that is . . .
classified as agricultural land under s. 193.461, and is not intended to
be used as a residential building." See City of New Port Richey v. Lamko,
359 So. 3d 840, 844 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) ("Because the statute is written
in the conjunctive, all three requirements must be met . . . ."); United
States v. Garcon, 54 F.4th 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2022) (" 'And' means
5 The circuit court construed this statute as a form of "express
preemption," but that is inaccurate. Section 604.50 does not state that it
preempts anything; and it doesn't purport to prohibit all local regulation
over a particular subject matter. See Sarasota All. for Fair Elections, Inc.
v. Browning, 28 So. 3d 880, 886 (Fla. 2010) ("Express preemption of a
field by the Legislature must be accomplished by clear language stating
that intent."). At most, section 604.50 simply provides an exemption
from certain code regulations.

17
'along with or together with.' So when 'and' is used to connect a list of
requirements, the word ordinarily has a 'conjunctive' sense, meaning
that all the requirements must be met." (citation omitted) (citing United
States v. Palomar-Santiago, 593 U.S. 321, 326 (2021))), abrogated on
other grounds by Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124 (2024).
"Residential" is not defined in the statute, but we can discern its
plain, ordinary meaning in this context. See State v. Woodson, 349 So.
3d 510, 511 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) ("Statutory interpretation begins with
consideration of the plain meaning of the words as used in the relevant
statutes." (citing Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So. 3d
362, 367 (Fla. 2013))). A building meant primarily for human habitation
or dwelling could be said to be "residential" for purposes of section
604.50(2)(d), as opposed to one that is intended primarily for farming or
"bona fide agricultural purposes." We can check that meaning against
the non-exhaustive list of examples subsection (2)(d) concludes with—a
barn, greenhouse, shade house, farm office, storage building, or poultry
house—all of which connote a use devoted to some type of agricultural
production. Cf. Dep't of Child. & Fams. v. Herstein, 399 So. 3d 384, 391
(Fla. 1st DCA 2025) ("And 'the commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis
. . . counsels that a word is given more precise content by the
neighboring words with which it is associated.' " (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008))). Finally,
subsection (2)(b) further instructs us that the word "farm," as used
throughout section 604.50, means the same thing that it does under the
Florida Right to Farm Act, section 823.14(3)(c), a definition we've already
thoroughly covered.
The same conclusion we reached in the prior section obtains here.
A reasonable jury could have concluded that Covington Farm's wedding

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barn was not, in fact, a "nonresidential farm building" of a piece with a
barn or office one might find on a farm devoted to producing plants,
animals, or insects useful to humans. Accord § 823.14(3)(e). The circuit
court's summary judgment as to count IV of Sheik Farm's complaint
was, therefore, improper.
IV.
Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment entered below in
favor of Covington Farm. We remand this case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Reversed; remanded.
SLEET and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.