West Villagers for Responsible Government, Inc., Meisel v. City of North Port, Florida

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
WEST VILLAGERS FOR RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, INC.,
and JOHN MEISEL,
Petitioners,
v.
CITY OF NORTH PORT, FLORIDA,
Respondent.
No. 2D2023-2425
November 19, 2025
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Sarasota County;
sitting in its appellate capacity.
Luke Lirot of Luke Charles Lirot, P.A., Clearwater, for Petitioners.
Elizabeth W. Neiberger and Alan S. Zimmet of Bryant Miller Olive P.A.,
Tampa, for Respondent.
NORTHCUTT, Judge.
The City of North Port rejected a petition to contract the City's
boundaries, and the circuit court upheld the City's decision. The parties
who filed the contraction petition, West Villagers for Responsible
Government, Inc., and John Meisel (collectively West Villagers), here seek
a second-tier writ of certiorari to quash the circuit court's ruling. But
when the North Port City Commission elected to leave the City's

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boundaries unchanged, it was performing a legislative function.
Therefore, the circuit court had no authority to review its decision.
I. Procedural History
This is the second time we have considered this dispute. West
Villagers filed their petition to contract the City's boundaries in 2020,
pursuant to a provision in the Municipal Annexation or Contraction Act.
§§ 171.011, 171.051(2), Fla. Stat. (2020). The statute provides that a
contraction may be suggested by a petition of fifteen percent of the voters
in the area proposed to be excluded from the municipal boundaries,
whereupon the municipality "shall immediately undertake a study of the
feasibility of such proposal and shall, within 6 months, either initiate
proceedings under subsection (1) [to enact a contraction ordinance] or
reject the petition, specifically stating the facts upon which the rejection
is based." § 171.051(2).1
1 In 2023 the legislature made revisions to chapter 171. Ch. 2023-
305, Laws of Fla. Included were some textual amendments to the
contraction statute, section 171.051. Subsection (2) was amended to
remove the requirement that a municipality provide findings when
rejecting a contraction petition and to specify that such a rejection is a
legislative decision. Id. at § 5. New subsection (11) was added. As
described in the Senate Staff Analysis, this new provision
revises the contraction procedures in situations where more
than 70 percent of the acres proposed to be contracted are
owned by private entities that are not registered electors. The
bill requires in these instances that the owners of more than
50 percent of the acreage consent to such contraction. This
change, which mirrors requirements in current law for
municipal annexation, is intended to be prospective in nature
and applies only to petitions filed on or after July 1, 2023.
Staff Analysis, S.B. 718, 4/25/2023. Although the staff analysis
suggested that only the addition of subsection (11) was meant to be
prospective, the final version of the bill stated that all the amendments to
section 171.051 were prospective, to be applied only to contraction

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The City Commission held evidentiary hearings on West Villagers'
petition under a quasi-judicial decision-making process contained in
North Port's city code. It then denied the petition in 2021. West
Villagers sought review of the denial by filing a certiorari petition in the
circuit court. That court granted the petition and quashed the City's
decision. The City filed for second-tier certiorari review, which this court
denied while opining that the lower court had applied the correct law
when granting certiorari relief. City of North Port v. W. Villagers for
Responsible Gov't, Inc., 348 So. 3d 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022). The matter
returned to the City Commission, which conducted further proceedings.
In 2022 the City again rejected the contraction proposal. Once more,
West Villagers petitioned the circuit court for certiorari review. This time,
the court denied their petition, whereupon West Villagers filed the
instant second-tier certiorari proceeding.
Throughout the two circuit court cases and the prior proceeding in
this court, no one questioned the circuit court's authority to review the
City's disposition of the contraction issue. West Villagers' first petition to
the circuit court alleged that the court had both statutory review
jurisdiction under an appeal provision in section 171.081(1), Florida
Statutes (2020), and common law certiorari jurisdiction. The City
maintained that section 171.081(1) did not apply, but it ventured that
the court nevertheless could proceed by common law certiorari. The
circuit court agreed with the latter assertion, citing Broward County v.
G.B.V. International Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 2001), and for that reason
it did not address whether the City was entitled to appeal under section
171.081(1). In the initial second-tier certiorari proceeding in this court,
petitions filed on or after July 1, 2023. Ch. 2023-305, § 6, Laws of Fla.
Thus, the 2023 version of the contraction statute is inapplicable here.

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neither party's filings addressed whether the circuit court had properly
exercised jurisdiction in the matter.
In the second circuit court proceeding, West Villagers asserted the
same two bases for jurisdiction as it had in the first case, the City made
no argument on the topic, and the circuit court again wrote that it had
common law certiorari jurisdiction under the G.B.V. International Ltd.
case. In the instant second-tier proceeding, the subject was not
mentioned in the parties' initial briefing. Ultimately, however, we
directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the circuit
court's jurisdiction to review the City's decision to deny or reject the
contraction petition.2
II. Analysis
Having considered the supplemental briefs, we agree with the City's
position that section 171.081(1) did not authorize judicial review of the
City's resolution of the contraction issue. That statute provides in
relevant part that an affected party may challenge a municipality's
violation of the annexation or contraction procedures prescribed in
chapter 171 by filing a certiorari petition in circuit court "within 30 days
following the passage of the annexation or contraction ordinance." §
171.081(1). By its terms, then, this right of review applies only to the
passage of an ordinance in violation of the requirements of chapter 171.
As such, it did not authorize review of the City's election not to enact a
contraction ordinance.
2 This court originally issued a per curiam denial of West Villagers'
petition in this case. West Villagers then moved for a written opinion,
prompting this court to order the supplemental briefing on the
jurisdictional issue. Upon receiving the supplemental briefs, we granted
West Villagers' motion for a written opinion and withdrew the per curiam
denial, with an opinion to follow.

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Contrary to the assertions of the parties, we also conclude that the
circuit court lacked common law certiorari jurisdiction in the matter.
Florida courts have long recognized that the review authorized by section
171.081 is the "sole and exclusive procedure for challenging a municipal
government's failure to comply with Chapter 171, Florida Statutes." SCA
Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 418 So. 2d 1148, 1150 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1982) (emphasis added). The court in City of Lake Mary v. Seminole
County, 419 So. 2d 737, 739 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), observed that in
section 171.081 the legislature provided a limited right of circuit court
review in annexation proceedings "where none previously existed."3
Manifestly, the exclusiveness of that statutory review mechanism refutes
the notion that, alternatively, the City's refusal to enact a contraction
ordinance could be reviewed by common law certiorari. Were that the
case, there would be no purpose for section 171.081. Notably, the G.B.V.
3 SCA Services and City of Lake Mary were decided under a
substantively identical earlier version of section 171.081 enacted as part of
the Municipal Annexation or Contraction Act in 1974. Ch. 1974-190, § 1,
Laws of Fla. At that time the statute read:
Appeal on annexation or contraction.—
No later than 30 days following the passage of an
annexation or contraction ordinance, any party affected
who believes that he will suffer material injury by
reason of the failure of the municipal governing body to
comply with the procedures set forth in this chapter for
annexation or contraction or to meet the requirements
established for annexation or contraction as they apply
to his property may file a petition in the circuit court for
the county in which the municipality or municipalities
are located seeking review by certiorari. In any action
instituted pursuant to this section, the complainant,
should he prevail, shall be entitled to reasonable costs
and attorney's fees.

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International Ltd. decision, cited by the circuit court when it concluded
that it had common law certiorari jurisdiction in the instant case, did not
involve the adjustment of municipal boundaries.
The reason there is no right of review in these matters outside
section 171.081 is that establishing and modifying municipal boundaries
is exclusively a legislative power, which the legislature has shared with
municipalities by enacting chapter 171. See art. VIII, § 2(c), Fla. Const.;
N. Ridge Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. City of Oakland Park, 374 So. 2d 461, 464
(Fla. 1979); Pinellas County v. City of Largo, 964 So. 2d 847, 849 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2007). The courts' common law certiorari authority does not extend
to legislative acts. G.B.V. Int'l Ltd., 787 So. 2d at 843; Haines City Cmty.
Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 526 n.3 (Fla. 1995). Thus, judicial
recognition of section 171.081 as the sole method for reviewing
compliance with chapter 171 long predated the 2023 statutory
amendment clarifying that rejecting a contraction petition is a legislative
decision.4
4 Indeed, save for some minor copy editing, the version of the
contraction statute in effect when SCA Services and City of Lake Mary
were decided in 1982 was identical to the 2020 version. Both iterations
of section 171.051(2) required a municipality to specify the facts upon
which its rejection of a contraction petition was based. Thus, it is
apparent that the 2023 amendment deleting that requirement and
specifying that such a rejection is a legislative decision did not transform
proceedings under the statute from quasi-judicial to legislative. Rather,
it simply clarified that they are legislative, as they always have been.
Were it otherwise, the previous version of the statute, applicable here,
would have created an unworkable paradox in which the nature of the
statutory proceedings on a contraction petition could only be determined
after the fact. The proceedings would have been deemed legislative if the
body ultimately granted the petition, but those very same proceedings
would have been quasi-judicial had they resulted in the petition's denial.

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The City's election to employ a quasi-judicial procedure when
considering West Villagers' contraction petition did not morph its
exercise of legislative power into a quasi-judicial decision. To be sure,
the supreme court has observed that "[i]t is the character of the hearing
that determines whether or not board action is legislative or quasi-
judicial." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Brevard Cnty. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d
469, 474 (Fla. 1993) (citations omitted). But the Snyder court went on to
explain that quasi-legislative and quasi-executive orders may "have a
quasi-judicial attribute if capable of being arrived at and provided by law
to be declared . . . only after statutory notice, hearing, and consideration
of evidence to be adduced as a basis for the making thereof." Id.
(emphasis added) (quoting W. Flagler Amusement Co. v. State Racing
Comm'n, 165 So. 64, 65 (1935)).
In other words, whether a government agency's decision is quasi-
judicial does not turn on the agency's choice of hearing format; rather
the determinant is the character of the hearing that is required by law.
Id. Notably, North Port's own city code defines quasi-judicial matters as
involving actions of public officials that "are required to investigate facts,
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence and
draw conclusions from such facts, as a basis for their official action."
Art. III, sec. 2-82(a), City of North Port City Code (emphasis added).
Thus, the question is begged: What law required the North Port City
Commission to hear and weigh evidence and draw conclusions from that
evidence as the basis of its decision? The answer is none. The
contraction statute requires only that a municipality "undertake a study
of the feasibility" of a proposed contraction and within six months either
begin the process of enacting a contraction ordinance or reject the
proposal and state the facts on which the rejection is based. §

8
171.051(2). The statute does not require those facts to be adduced at an
evidentiary hearing. To the contrary, in a provision of the 2023
amendment to chapter 171 that was not made prospective, the
legislature defined a feasibility study as "an analysis conducted by
qualified staff or consultants of the economic, market, technical,
financial, and management feasibility of the proposed annexation or
contraction, as applicable." § 171.031(6), Fla. Stat. (2023) (emphasis
added); ch. 2023-305, §§ 2, 6, Laws of Fla.
Finally, the parties point to a list of characteristics of quasi-judicial
decisions that were gleaned from the supreme court's opinion in Snyder,
627 So. 2d at 474. See Miami-Dade County v. City of Miami, 315 So. 3d
115, 120 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (citing D.R. Horton, Inc.—Jacksonville v.
Peyton, 959 So. 2d 390, 398-99 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)). Properly analyzed
and applied, they confirm that the City's rejection of the contraction
petition in this case was a legislative decision, not a quasi-judicial one.
As outlined in D.R. Horton and City of Miami, those characteristics are:
(1) Quasi-judicial action results in the application of a general rule of
policy, whereas legislative action formulates policy.
There was no general rule of policy to be applied by the City when
deciding whether to enact a contraction ordinance. Section 171.052
restricts contractions to areas that do not meet the statutory criteria for
annexation, and it otherwise prohibits contractions that would cause
areas of the municipality to be rendered noncontiguous. Outside of
those limitations, however, no statute or case authority prescribes rules
to determine when a contraction petition must or must not, or should or
should not, be granted or denied.
(2) A quasi-judicial decision has an impact on a limited number of
persons or property owners and on identifiable parties and interests, while

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a legislative action is open-ended and affects a broad class of individuals
or situations.
The impact of a contraction under section 171.051 is not confined
to the residents and property owners in the contraction area. To the
contrary, altering municipal boundaries affects at least the entire
municipality and affected county. Thus, for example, the right to appeal
under section 171.081 is given to any party affected, which is defined in
section 171.031 as "any persons or firms owning property in, or residing
in . . . a municipality or any governmental unit with jurisdiction over
such area."5
The statutes themselves reflect some, but not all, of the ways that a
contraction affects interests beyond those who live or own property in the
contraction area. Under section 171.052(2), for instance, a contraction
ordinance must provide for the apportionment of prior existing debt and
property. Certainly, this would affect all taxpayers and residents in both
the city and the county, as would the requirement in section 171.061(2)
that in the event of a contraction the municipality must reach an
agreement with the county to determine what portion of existing debt or
property is to be assumed by the county, its valuation, and the manner
of its transfer or financing.
And, of course, the mandated feasibility study must consider
applicable economic, market, technical, financial, and management
factors which are certain to affect a "broad class of individuals or
5 The 2020 version of section 171.031(5) defines parties affected as
"any persons or firms owning property in, or residing in, either a
municipality proposing annexation or contraction or owning property
that is proposed for annexation to a municipality or any governmental
unit with jurisdiction over such area." This definition was moved to
subsection (9) in the 2023 version.

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situations" extending well beyond the "limited number of persons or
property owners" and "identifiable parties and interests" within the
proposed contraction area. The deletion of property from the municipal
tax rolls would necessarily affect all taxpayers in the city. The expense of
exercising police powers and furnishing services in the contraction area
would shift from the municipality's taxpayers to the county's. Local
ordinances and codes governing the area—applicable to residents,
property owners, and nonresident passers-through—would change.
See § 171.062(3). Other examples would include, but would not be
limited to, the necessary alteration of governing representative districts
in both the city and county, the adjustment or assumption of utility
franchise agreements, and so forth. See § 171.062. Essentially, the
effect of a municipal contraction on persons and interests is open-ended.
(3) A quasi-judicial decision is contingent on facts arrived at from
distinct alternatives presented at a hearing, while legislative action
requires no basis in fact finding at a hearing.
As mentioned previously, section 171.051 has never required a
municipality to take evidence on the contraction issue or base its
decision on such evidence. And aside from statutory restrictions
prohibiting contractions in specific circumstances, there are no
standards or rules prescribing when contractions must or must not be
undertaken.
(4) A quasi-judicial act determines the rules of law applicable, and
the rights affected by them, in relation to past transactions, while a
legislative act prescribes what the rule or requirement shall be with respect
to future acts.
When considering the contraction petition, the City Commission
was not compelled to consider past transactions or any rules of law

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applicable to them. Rather, its focus was entirely on the future impact of
its decision whether to alter its municipal boundaries. See § 171.031(6),
Fla. Stat. (2023) (defining a feasibility study as an analysis of "the
economic, market, technical, financial, and management feasibility of the
proposed annexation or contraction, as applicable"(emphasis added)).
In sum, the criteria and principles discussed above disprove the
parties' assertion that enacting or declining to enact a contraction
ordinance under section 171.051(2) is a quasi-judicial function. Rather,
annexations and contractions are legislative acts, and for that reason the
courts have long recognized that the sole procedure for challenging an
alleged failure to comply with chapter 171 is pursuant to section
171.081—and not by common law certiorari.
III. Conclusion
When, as here, a petition in the lower court "wholly fails to present
a case authorizing the relief prayed for," the appellate court has a duty to
raise the defect. Smith v. Pattishall, 176 So. 568, 575 (Fla. 1937). Such
is the case even if the parties have ignored the deficiency. Id. Of course,
this principle applies to appellate review of an order rendered by a court
that lacked jurisdiction. See Sims Crane & Equip. Co. v. Preciado, 351
So. 3d 50, 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) ("[A]n appellate court may raise subject
matter jurisdiction concerns sua sponte even where neither party raises
the issue."). Thus, in Romero v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 209 So. 3d 633,
634 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), wherein the appellant challenged the denial
of her motion to vacate a foreclosure judgment, this court sua sponte
observed that the lower court had lacked jurisdiction to consider the
motion because it was untimely. Therefore, the Romero court vacated
the order denying the motion on its merits. Id. at 635.

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Because Romero was a direct appeal, this court was empowered to
direct the dismissal of the case on remand, and it did so. Id. However,
on second-tier certiorari we lack authority to instruct the lower court to
proceed in a particular way. Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings,
Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 198 n.2 (Fla. 2003); G.B.V. Int'l Ltd., 787 So. 2d at
845. Accordingly, we simply quash the order that ruled on the merits of
West Villagers' petition, fully confident that the circuit court will take
appropriate action.
Quashed.
KHOUZAM and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.