Morgan v. Morgan

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
MONICA SUE MORGAN,
Appellant,
v.
RICHARD THOMAS MORGAN,
Appellee.
No. 2D2024-2115
January 7, 2026
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Christopher M.
LaBruzzo, Judge.
Jonathan E. Hackworth of Hackworth Law, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
No appearance for Appellee.
SILBERMAN, Judge.
Monica Sue Morgan, the Former Wife, appeals an Amended Final
Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage Resolving Issues on Remand. The
final judgment dissolving the parties' marriage was entered on April 17,
2020, and Richard Thomas Morgan, the Former Husband, appealed that
judgment. In Morgan v. Morgan, 327 So. 3d 898, 899 (Fla. 2d DCA
2021), this court reversed those portions of the final judgment involving
equitable distribution, alimony, and retroactive child support. On

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remand, the trial court entered the amended final judgment that
established a new equitable distribution schedule, awarded the Former
Wife retroactive child support, and awarded the Former Husband
permanent periodic alimony and retroactive alimony.
The Former Wife now appeals the amended judgment, challenging
the award of permanent alimony, the equitable distribution analysis, and
the calculation of retroactive child support. We agree with the Former
Wife that the trial court erred in awarding permanent alimony and
determining the valuation date of the parties' assets and remand for
reconsideration. Although we do not find merit in her argument
pertaining to retroactive child support, in light of our decision on
permanent alimony and the asset valuation date, we also remand the
award of retroactive child support for reconsideration.
I. PERMANENT ALIMONY
In the amended final judgment, the trial court awarded the Former
Husband $4,182 per month in permanent periodic alimony. The Former
Wife argues that the award of alimony was improper for three reasons.
First, the Former Wife argues that the elimination of permanent alimony
from section 61.08, Florida Statutes (2023), requires reversal of the
award.1 Second, she contends that the court erred in establishing the
Former Husband's need for alimony. Third, the Former Wife argues that
her ability to pay was erroneously calculated because the trial court
considered her bonus pay which was not a regular occurrence. Because
1 Although the Former Husband has not appeared in this appeal,
we note that he incorrectly argued to the trial court that this court's
earlier opinion remanded solely for reconsideration of the amount of the
award and that the trial court could not reconsider the type of alimony
that could be awarded. He also argued that the statutory change was
not applicable to this case because the original final judgment awarded
permanent alimony. As explained in this opinion, that argument fails.

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the trial court's award of permanent alimony was improper pursuant to
section 61.08, we reverse.
The legislature significantly amended Florida's alimony statute,
section 61.08, effective July 1, 2023, eliminating awards of permanent
alimony. See ch. 2023-315, § 1, Laws of Fla. The amended statute
restricts alimony to temporary, rehabilitative, bridge-the-gap, or
durational alimony. § 61.08(1)(a). Section 61.08(11) directs courts to
"apply this section to all initial petitions for dissolution of marriage or
support unconnected with dissolution of marriage pending or filed on or
after July 1, 2023." Because the application of the amended statute is a
question of law, this court reviews the issue using the de novo standard
of review. See Woodward v. Woodward, 400 So. 3d 861, 863 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2025).
In Woodward, this court addressed the application of section
61.08(11). Id. There, the final judgment of dissolution of marriage
awarding the former husband permanent alimony was entered in
February 2023, and the former wife timely appealed the judgment. Id.
This court held that the amended version of section 61.08 applied
because the initial petition for dissolution was still pending at the time of
the appeal. Id. at 864. As the court noted, "[t]he general rule is that an
action remains pending in the trial court until after a final judgment and
such time as an appeal is taken or time for an appeal expires. If an
appeal is taken, the action is still pending until final disposition." Id. at
863 (quoting Wilson v. Clark, 414 So. 2d 526, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)).
In the present case, the initial petition for dissolution of marriage
was pending before the trial court after this court reversed and remanded
the original final judgment. Morgan, 327 So. 3d at 901. The alimony
award in the original judgment was reversed, and the trial court was

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directed to reconsider the alimony award on remand. Id. In doing so,
the trial court was necessarily required to follow the provisions set forth
in section 61.08, which by its terms applies to initial petitions that
remain pending.
We recognize that the Fourth District has taken a more restrictive
approach, holding that a petition for dissolution of marriage remains
pending until the trial court enters a final judgment of dissolution. In
Alfonso v. Alfonso, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D1043, D1043 (Fla. 4th DCA May 7,
2025), the trial court entered a final judgment on June 30, 2023, the day
before the new version of section 61.08 became effective. The former
husband then filed a motion for rehearing and motion for new trial on
July 14, 2023, arguing that permanent alimony was improper under the
amended version of section 61.08. Id. He asserted that the petition for
dissolution remained pending because the time for rehearing had not
expired when the law went into effect. Id. The Fourth District disagreed,
reasoning that the "final judgment disposed of all issues in the initial
dissolution petition," and therefore, the dissolution petition was no
longer pending on July 1, 2023. Id. at D1044. In arriving at its holding,
the court looked to "the Florida Senate Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact
Statement relating to the amendment stat[ing] that the changes to
alimony are 'applicable to any final judgment entered on or after July 1,
2023.' " Id. (quoting Fla. S. Comm. on Rules, CS/SB 1416 (2023) Staff
Analysis (April 4, 2023)).
We disagree with the Fourth District's approach because the
language of section 61.08(11) is clear and unambiguous. See Westpark
Pres. Homeowners Ass'n v. Pulte Home Corp., 365 So. 3d 391, 395 (Fla.
2d DCA 2023) ("If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the
court must recognize the statute's plain meaning and, therefore, need

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not employ any other rules of statutory construction." (quoting State v.
Lewars, 259 So. 3d 793, 797 (Fla. 2018))). Section 61.08(11) clearly
states that a "court shall apply this section to all initial petitions for
dissolution of marriage . . . pending or filed on or after July 1, 2023."
Further, we note that in Alfonso, all aspects of the final judgment were
affirmed on appeal except for the provision regarding life insurance. 50
Fla. L. Weekly at D1044. Here, unlike in Alfonso, the award of alimony
was reversed on appeal and remanded for reconsideration. In the
present case, we conclude that the petition for dissolution and related
alimony issue remain pending on remand.
We also recognize that the First and Fifth Districts have held that a
petition for dissolution of marriage remains pending until the trial court
enters a final judgment of dissolution. However, the holdings in those
courts were based on different facts than we have here. In Stockdale v.
Stockdale, 409 So. 3d 163, 167 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025), the court held that
the petition for dissolution of marriage remained pending where,
although a general magistrate had conducted a hearing on the petition,
the magistrate had not submitted a recommended order, and the trial
court had not entered a final judgment. In so holding, the court rejected
the former wife's argument that her substantive right to permanent
alimony had vested at the hearing before the magistrate. Id. at 168. The
court noted that a trial court cannot "apply a statute retroactively if the
statute impairs vested rights, creates new obligations, or imposes new
penalties." Id. (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So.
2d 55, 61 (Fla. 1995)). But the court found that the former wife did not
have a vested right in alimony:
The right to alimony becomes vested only when a final
judgment is "rendered for alimony and is made payable in
future installments." Montell v. Montell, 46 So. 2d 715, 716

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(Fla. 1950) (quoting Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 30, 30 S.
Ct. 682, 54 L. Ed. 905 (1910)). And even then, Florida courts
may modify or terminate future alimony payments because a
former spouse has no absolute right to those future
payments. See § 61.14, Fla. Stat. (allowing for the
modification or termination of alimony); Canakaris v.
Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980) (explaining that
permanent alimony terminates "upon the death of either
spouse or the remarriage of the receiving spouse" and is
"subject to modification upon a substantial change of
circumstances").
Id. at 169.
In Secrist v. Secrist, 421 So. 3d 781, 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025), the
court was asked to decide whether a petition for dissolution remained
pending where the trial court had orally pronounced its findings and
rulings but had not yet entered a written final judgment. The court
concluded that the petition remained pending until the trial court
entered the written final judgment and agreed with the Stockdale court
that a spouse has no vested right to alimony until the judgment is
entered. Id. at 785-86.
Here, the Former Husband had no vested right to alimony because
the original award of alimony was reversed and the trial court was
required to reconsider alimony on remand. Thus, the trial court should
have applied the new version of section 61.08, which became effective
over a year before the filing of the Amended Final Judgment of
Dissolution of Marriage Resolving Issues on Remand. Accordingly, we
reverse the alimony award and remand for the trial court to reconsider
any such award under the amended statute.
Because they may impact the proceedings on remand, we briefly
address the remaining alimony issues raised by the Former Wife.
The Former Wife argues that the trial court erred when assessing
the Former Husband's need for alimony and establishing an award of

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$4,182 per month. She contends that the trial court erred in failing to
consider its initial findings that the Former Husband understated his
income and overstated his expenses. The Former Wife's argument is not
supported by the record. In the original final judgment, the trial court
found that the Former Husband's gross monthly salary was $4,333.33
and his net monthly salary was $3,287. The trial court made the same
findings as to the Former Husband's income in the amended final
judgment. Further, the Former Wife does not point to any error the trial
court made in calculating the Former Husband's income or expenses.
Next, she argues the trial court incorrectly weighed the standard of
living factor in section 61.08. We do not find merit in this argument
because in this court's opinion reversing the alimony award, this court
held that the trial court improperly gave the Former Husband a nominal
amount of alimony "[g]iven the standard of living established during the
marriage and the disparity between the parties' incomes." Morgan, 327
So. 3d at 900. This court reversed the alimony award because it was not
commensurate with the parties' marital standard of living. Id. Therefore,
the trial court did not err on remand when it considered the parties'
standard of living in determining alimony.
The Former Wife also argues that the trial court erroneously
included the yearly bonus she receives from work when determining her
ability to pay. We disagree. As this court has noted, a party's bonus
income must be included when calculating alimony "when it is regular
and continuous." Barlow v. Barlow, 224 So. 3d 868, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA
2017). In determining the Former Wife's income, the trial court
examined the significant bonuses she had received, and because the
bonuses were regular and continuous, they were properly included in the
Former Wife's income.

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II. DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS
The Former Wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion
when evaluating the parties' marital assets. She notes that the Amended
Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage Resolving Issues on Remand
used different valuation dates than the original final judgment. She
points out that the amended final judgment changed the valuation dates
of the marital assets and debts from March 2016, the date the parties
separated, to April 2018, the date the petition for dissolution of marriage
was filed. She contends that the trial court may have misinterpreted this
court's opinion, believing it did not have the discretion to keep the March
2016 valuation dates. The Former Wife argues that the trial court was
only ordered to identify the marital assets and debts at the time the
dissolution action was filed, and it had the discretion to establish an
equitable valuation date. See Donahue v. Donahue, 398 So. 3d 1052,
1054 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024) ("The standard of review for a trial court's
selection of a valuation date for a marital asset is abuse of discretion."
(quoting Leonardis v. Leonardis, 30 So. 3d 568, 571 (Fla. 4th DCA
2010))).
The Former Wife is correct. In reversing the final judgment, this
court held:
Section 61.075(7), Florida Statutes (2017), requires that the
date for determining which assets and liabilities can be
classified as marital assets or liabilities is the earliest of the
date the parties entered into a valid separation agreement or
the date the petition for dissolution of marriage was filed.
Because there was no separation agreement in this case, the
parties' assets and liabilities had to be identified as of the
date the former wife filed her petition.
. . . On remand, once the trial court has identified all
the marital assets and liabilities in existence when the
petition for dissolution was filed, it may then proceed to value
them as of the date or dates the court deems equitable.

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327 So. 3d at 899-900 (citation omitted).
In the original final judgment, the trial court valued the parties'
marital assets that were subject to equitable distribution at $82,984.
This amount included $796 for the sale of the parties' Arizona property
and the Former Wife's Fidelity retirement account, which was valued at
$82,188 on March 1, 2016.
The amended final judgment valued the parties' marital assets that
were subject to equitable distribution at $309,006. The assets were
valued as of April 23, 2018, the date the petition for dissolution of
marriage was filed. This new figure included assets that were omitted
from the original final judgment. It added the parties' vehicles, their
son's car, and the Former Wife's Fidelity HSA April 2018 Statement. It
also added the Former Wife's Redstone savings and checking accounts
and the Former Husband's Bank of America checking account. In
addition, the amended final judgment increased the value of the Former
Wife's Fidelity retirement account to $191,712, which was the account's
value on March 31, 2018. The trial court did not explain why it changed
the valuation date for the retirement account or added the previously
omitted assets.
Although a trial court has discretion in determining the valuation
date of the parties' assets, the valuation date used in the amended final
judgment contradicts the findings made by the trial court in the original
final judgment. As to the Former Wife's retirement account, the trial
court found as follows in the original judgment:
Wife's BASF Retirement Savings Plan - This is a marital
asset for purposes of equitable distribution. There is a loan
against this asset, which is also marital. This asset, and the
loan against the account, will be valued as of March 2016.
After the parties separated, the Husband contributed nothing
toward the Wife's expenses. He deposited the entirety of his

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annual salary, which at that time was in excess of $70,000,
into his individual Bank of America account. Although the
Wife's retirement account has since increased in value, it is
due solely to the efforts of the Wife and passive market
appreciation. It would be different if the parties continued to
share in expenses, thus allowing the Wife additional income
to contribute toward retirement, but that is not the case here.
For these reasons, the Court is using the date of separation
for purposes of valuing this asset and the liability associated
with it.
In the original final judgment, the trial court made the following
findings about the parties' bank accounts:
Parties' Checking and Savings Accounts - The parties
opened separate accounts after their separation in March
2016, with the Wife utilizing her Redstone checking and
savings accounts and the Husband utilizing his Bank of
America account. They continued to maintain these accounts
through the date of filing of the Petition and the trial in this
cause. As is often the case with checking accounts, the
values varied from day to day for each party as income was
deposited and expenses were paid. This is also true of the
Wife's savings account, which was used more like a
traditional checking account. It was unrebutted that the Wife
historically relied upon receipt of her employment bonus to
pay off credit card debt accrued in the preceding months.
The employment bonus was deposited into the Savings
Account but, unlike a typical savings account which would
remain static and/or increase in value, the Wife's savings was
used as a vehicle to pay off accrued expenses that were
"fronted" by the use of credit cards. After paying of the debts
the account balance was nearly exhausted.
It would be contrary to the law to ignore the fact that
any funds sitting in the Wife's account were expended shortly
thereafter to pay off the accrued credit card debt. Because of
the fluid nature of the bank accounts and because there was
no argument made nor evidence provided suggesting the Wife
intentionally depleted her account, no value is being assigned
to either party's checking or savings accounts.

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It was proper for the trial court, in the original judgment, to use the
date of the parties' separation to value the retirement and bank
accounts. See Roth v. Roth, 312 So. 3d 1021, 1027-28 (Fla. 2d DCA
2021) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
selecting the date of separation as the valuation date of the marital home
where the court found "that the parties had been separated for three
years and that since the separation, the Former Husband had continued
to live in the marital home and make improvements to it without
assistance from the Former Wife"). However, because no new evidence
was considered by the court before entering the amended final judgment
and the court did not explain why it changed its previous findings, we
direct the trial court to either use the date of separation in valuing the
retirement and bank accounts or make findings as to why that date is no
longer appropriate.
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the alimony and equitable distribution awards, and
because those awards must be revisited, we also remand the award of
retroactive child support for reconsideration, taking into account any
changes in the alimony or equitable distribution awards.
Reversed and remanded.
NORTHCUTT and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.