Hi-Land Properties, LLC v. Tilla L. Gantt

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
HI-LAND PROPERTIES, LLC,
Appellant,
v.
TILLA GANTT,
Appellee.
No. 4D2025-1354
[February 18, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; William W. Haury, Jr., Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE-22-
008808.
Shawn 	Gordon 	Rader 	and 	Michael 	Piccolo 	of 	Lowndes, 	Drosdick,
Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A., Orlando, for appellant.
Edward 	Michael 	Shahady 	of 	The 	Shahady 	Law 	Firm, 	PLLC, 	Fort
Lauderdale, for appellee.
G ROSS, J.
Hi-Land Properties, LLC (“Hi-Land”) appeals a final judgment in its
partition action, challenging that portion of a summary judgment order
determining that it was a 50% owner of a parcel of real property, and not
a 75% owner. As we explain in detail below, we reverse the final judgment
and 	remand 	for 	the 	entry 	of 	a 	judgment 	confirming 	Hi-Land’s 	75%
ownership of the real property at issue.
Background Facts
The property at issue (the “Property”) was conveyed in a series of deeds
eventually 	resulting 	in 	a 	1996 	quit 	claim 	deed 	(“1996 	Deed”) 	that
purported to convey the Property. 	Henrietta Osborne and appellee Tilla
Gantt owned the property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship
under a 1990 deed. In the 1996 Deed, they conveyed the property to four
grantees: (1) Appellee Gantt; (2) Mary Robbins; (3) Quinnie Osborne; and
(4) Emma Williams. Henrietta Osborne was Gantt’s mother, and the 1996
Deed conveyed the Property to Gantt and her three siblings.

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The 1996 Deed lacked two subscribing witnesses as required by section
689.01, Florida Statutes (1996).
After 	the 	deaths 	of 	Mary 	Robbins 	and 	Quinnie 	Osborne, 	Hi-Land
eventually became the successor in interest to each of their 25% interests
in the Property. 	Those transfers to Hi-Land are undisputed, and Gantt
conceded below that Hi-Land owned 50% of the Property. 	The parties
stipulated that Gantt held at least a 25% interest in the Property.
The dispute before us concerns the ownership of the 25% interest
conveyed to Emma Williams by the 1996 Deed. 	Hi-Land attempted to
prove that it owned Emma Williams’s 25% interest through a chain of title
dating back to 1961, including the 1996 Deed and instruments that were
recorded after the 1996 Deed.
Emma Williams died in 2006. 	The personal representative of Emma
Williams’s estate, Larry E. Williams, executed two documents entitled
Personal Representative’s Release and Certificate of Distribution of Real
Property (“PR Release”). 	Both PR Releases included the Property’s legal
description, 	were 	recorded 	in 	the 	public 	records, 	and 	contained 	the
statutory formalities of section 689.01, as the PR Releases (1) were written
instruments, (2) had two subscribing witnesses, and (3) were signed by the
Personal Representative.
The first PR Release acknowledged that title to an undivided 1/8
interest in the Property was owned by the decedent at the time of death,
and that the title vested in Larry E. Williams “by operation of law as of the
date of the decedent’s death pursuant to Florida law as will more fully
appear from the proceedings in the Circuit Court . . . Probate Division, in
File No. 05-3901, subject to the rights of the Personal Representative”
under the Florida Probate Code “to take possession or control of the
Property, or to use, sell, encumber or otherwise exercise control over the
Property” 	(1) 	for 	the 	payment 	of 	estate 	obligations, 	(2) 	to 	enforce
contribution and equalize advancement, or (3) for distribution. 	Having
determined that “the Property is not needed for any of the foregoing
purposes, except distribution,” the Personal Representative stated in the
PR Release that he “hereby releases the Property from all rights and powers
of the Personal Representative” and “acknowledges that the Property is
vested in, free of all rights of the Personal Representative.”
The second PR Release was substantively identical to the first except
that it referred to a 1/8 interest in the Property being vested in Anita D.
Middleton.

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Subsequently, in 2021, Larry Williams and Anita Middleton executed
warranty deeds conveying their respective 12.5% interests in the Property
to Hi-Land.
The Lawsuit
In 	2022, 	Hi-Land 	sued 	Gantt 	for 	partition, 	seeking 	a 	judgment
partitioning the Property, among other things. 	Hi-Land alleged that it
owned 75% of the Property and Gantt owned 25%.
Gantt 	answered 	the 	complaint 	and 	admitted 	several 	material
allegations, but denied the allegation that Hi-Land owned 75% of the
Property. 	Gantt did not assert any affirmative defenses.
The Bench Trials and
Hi-Land’s Motion for Summary Judgment
The first bench trial culminated in a dismissal of the case without
prejudice—due to Hi-Land’s failure to introduce certified copies of the
recorded instruments—but the trial court later vacated the dismissal. The
second bench trial did not result in a final adjudication of the disputed
25% ownership in the property.
At the second bench trial, Hi-Land introduced multiple exhibits into
evidence without objection, including the 1996 Deed, the PR Releases, and
the warranty deeds from Larry Williams and Anita Middleton to Hi-Land.
Gantt 	raised 	two 	arguments 	challenging 	the 	sufficiency 	of 	Hi-Land’s
evidence: (1) the 1996 Deed did not have any subscribing witnesses and
was thus ineffective; and (2) Hi-Land’s evidence did not establish the
validity of a transfer of Emma Williams’s 25% interest because Hi-Land
had not produced a court order confirming the sale of the property, which
Gantt argued was required by section 733.613(1), Florida Statutes, nor
had Hi-Land produced a court order establishing the identity of the heirs
or beneficiaries. Elaborating on her second argument, Gantt asserted that
the 	PR 	Releases 	did 	not 	convey 	or 	vest 	title, 	and 	that 	the 	Personal
Representative’s statements therein constituted hearsay and an improper
legal opinion by a person not qualified as an expert.
Before 	the 	second 	trial 	adjourned, 	the 	trial 	judge 	told 	Hi-Land’s
counsel, “I guess the only issue is whether or not you’re going to find . . .
an order authorizing your sale out of the estate of Emma Lou Williams.”

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Post-Trial Proceedings
Following 	the 	trial, 	Hi-Land 	did 	not 	produce 	the 	probate 	order
referenced by the trial court.
Instead, Hi-Land moved for summary judgment, arguing in relevant
part that it owned 75% of the Property, including Emma Williams’s 25%
interest. 	Hi-Land’s argument for ownership of the disputed 25% interest
relied upon the recorded chain of title, including the 1996 Deed, the PR
Releases, and the warranty deeds from Larry Williams and Anita Middleton
to Hi-Land, which were all attached as exhibits to its operative motion.
Gantt 	responded 	in 	opposition 	to 	Hi-Land’s 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment and renewed her motion for involuntary dismissal as to Hi-
Land’s claim to the 25% interest of Emma Williams. On the merits, Gantt
argued that Hi-Land, despite its implicit promise to do so, had failed to
produce a court order authorizing the sale of the Property in the Emma
Williams probate action, and thus had failed to present any cognizable
evidence to establish a chain of title from Emma Williams to Hi-Land.
Order on Hi-Land’s Motion for Summary Judgment
The trial court granted in part and denied in part Hi-Land’s motion for
summary judgment.
Although 	the 	court 	granted 	partition, 	the 	court 	denied 	Hi-Land’s
“demand that the court determine that it is a 75% owner” of the Property.
The court ruled that because Hi-Land had “failed to prove the validity of
the transfer from the estate of Emma Williams to Larry E. Williams and
Anita D. Middleton, [Gantt] is deemed to be a 50% owner and [Hi-Land] is
deemed to be a 50% owner.” 	The trial court thus implicitly accepted
Gantt’s arguments that “the transfers to Larry E. Williams and Anita D.
Middleton were never ratified by court order” and that Hi-Land thus “did
not have standing to use the curative statute because [Hi-Land] had failed
to prove the conveyances to Larry E. Williams and Anita D. Middleton
during the probate were valid.” 	The court also implicitly agreed with
defense counsel’s argument that Emma Williams’s 25% interest “should
revert to Tilla Gantt because the curative statute was ineffective as to that
portion because [Hi-Land] lacked standing to raise it.”
Final Judgment and Motion for Rehearing
The trial court later entered a final judgment determining that Hi-Land
and Gantt each own an undivided one-half interest in the Property as

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tenants in common. The court ordered that the Property “shall be sold by
private sale,” with the proceeds held in escrow pending the entry of an
order as to attorney’s fees, costs, and reimbursements.
Hi-Land moved for rehearing, arguing that no court order was required
to approve a conveyance or transfer from Emma Williams’s estate because
Emma Williams’s devisees took title the moment Emma Williams died. Hi-
Land maintained that the PR Releases “did not constitute a transfer or
conveyance,” but were “merely a formalization of the fact of the devise.”
Importantly, Hi-Land argued that section 733.613(1) did not apply
because “title to Emma Williams’ portion had already passed, so there was
no ‘sale’ for the probate court to authorize.” 	Hi-Land contended that the
PR Releases “did NOT constitute sales or transfers” and that defense
counsel was “wrong” when he argued “that an order of the probate court
was necessary regarding the ‘conveyance’ of the devised property to Larry
Williams and Anita Middleton,” as “title passed immediately upon Emma
Williams’ death.”
The trial court denied the motion for rehearing.
The Instruments Presented at the Second Bench Trial and
Attached to Hi-Land’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Were Sufficient to Establish that Hi-Land Owned a
75% Interest in the Property, Including
Emma Williams’s 25% Interest in the Property
A. The Cure Statute
Section 95.231(1), Florida Statutes (2024), provides in pertinent part:
Five years after the recording of an instrument required to be
executed in accordance with s. 689.01; . . . the instrument, .
. . shall be held to have its purported effect to convey, affect,
or devise, the title to the real property of the person signing
the instrument, as if there had been no lack of seal or seals,
witness 	or 	witnesses, 	defect 	in, 	failure 	of, 	or 	absence 	of
acknowledgment or relinquishment of dower, in the absence
of 	fraud, 	adverse 	possession, 	or 	pending 	litigation. 	The
instrument is admissible in evidence.

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§ 95.231(1), Fla. Stat. (2024).1
Section 	95.231(1)’s 	curative 	provisions 	are 	automatic 	and 	self-
executing. Saccullo v. United States of Am., 913 F.3d 1010, 1015–16 (11th
Cir. 2019) (collecting Florida cases). “[A]fter five years, the statute not only
shields a once-defective deed from judicial attack, but also—of its own
force—affirmatively mends it back to health.” Id. at 1016. An adjudication
is unnecessary “to enforce § 95.231(1)’s curative provision,” as a defective
deed is considered “to have its purported effect” by operation of law five
years after it was initially recorded. 	Id.
Here, section 95.231(1) automatically cured the 1996 Deed’s lack of
subscribing witnesses after five years. 	Gantt never raised or established
any of the statutory exceptions for fraud, adverse possession, or pending
litigation. 	Thus, the 1996 Deed is considered to have its purported effect
by operation of law five years after it was initially recorded.
B. The PR Releases
Florida law recognizes “a strong presumption in favor of the correctness
of deeds and other instruments as written and executed.” Barr v. Schlarb,
314 So. 2d 609, 610 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (cleaned up). 	“No proposition
could be more logical than that an instrument is what it says it is and
appears to be.” 	Id.
Exceptions to the rule against hearsay apply to the contents of certain
documents relating to property.
Section 	90.803(14), 	Florida 	Statutes 	(2024), 	provides 	a 	hearsay
exception for the record of a documents “purporting to establish or affect
an interest in property,” allowing the record to serve “as proof of the
contents of the original recorded or filed document and its execution and
delivery . . . .” 	Furthermore, section 90.803(15), Florida Statutes (2024),
allows 	the 	admission 	of 	a 	statement 	contained 	within 	a 	document
“purporting to establish or affect an interest in property” if the statement
is “relevant to the purpose of the document,” unless subsequent dealings
with the property “have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement
or the purport of the document.” 	Here, the subsequent dealings with the
property—namely, the warranty deeds from Larry Williams and Anita
Middleton to Hi-Land—were consistent with the truth of the statements in
the PR Releases.
1 Section 95.231(1)’s 1996 version has the same substantive effect as the 2024
version.

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A detour into probate law is necessary to understand why the PR
Releases were sufficient to prove the transfer of Emma Williams’s 25%
interest to Larry Williams and Anita Middleton.
Generally, a decedent’s interest in non-homestead real property vests
in a devisee or heir by operation of law immediately upon the decedent’s
death, subject to the administration of the estate. See § 732.514, Fla. Stat.
(2005) (“The death of the testator is the event that vests the right to devises
unless the testator in the will has provided that some other event must
happen before a devise vests.”); § 732.101(2), Fla. Stat. (2005) (“The
decedent’s death is the event that vests the heirs’ right to the decedent’s
intestate property.”); Jones v. Fed. Farm Mortg. Corp., 182 So. 226, 227
(Fla. 1938) (“Except as to the homestead, the title to real estate, at the
death of the owner intestate, vests in his heirs at law; and, upon his death
testate, the title vests in the devisees.”); In re Est. of Slater, 437 So. 2d
1110, 1112 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (“The title to real property owned by an
intestate decedent descends at death directly to the heirs subject to the
administration of the estate.”).
“All real and personal property of the decedent, except the protected
homestead, . . . shall be assets in the hands of the personal representative”
for three purposes: (a) paying estate obligations; (b) enforcing contribution
and equalizing advancement; and (c) distribution. § 733.608(1), Fla. Stat.
(2005). However, a personal representative generally does not need a court
order to “[m]ake partial distribution to the beneficiaries of any part of the
estate not necessary to satisfy claims, expenses of administration, taxes,
family allowance, exempt property, and an elective share, in accordance
with 	the 	decedent’s 	will 	or 	as 	authorized 	by 	operation 	of 	law.” 	§
733.612(26), Fla. Stat. (2005).
As one treatise has explained, a personal representative’s recorded
release 	and 	certificate 	of 	distribution 	is 	an 	instrument 	that 	formally
evinces the transfer of real property from the decedent to the heir or
devisee:
Because title is vested in the heir or devisee from the date of
death of the decedent, it is unnecessary for the personal
representative to execute a deed conveying the property at the
time of distribution. 	Instead, the transfer of real property to
an heir or devisee is evinced by a personal representative’s
release and certificate of distribution, filed in the public records
of the county where the property is located, and specifically
identifying 	the 	subject 	property. 	From 	a 	record-title

8
standpoint, this certificate suffices to formally acknowledge the
transfer of property from the decedent to the heir or devisee.
Jeffrey S. Goethe, Practice Under Florida Probate Code § 14.3 (12th ed.
2025) (emphasis added). Moreover, a “personal representative never holds
title to estate real property (unless purchased during administration) and
the estate is not an entity holding title.” 	Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the PR Releases were competent, substantial evidence to prove
the transfer of Emma Williams’s 25% interest in the Property to Larry
Williams and Anita Middleton. 	A presumption of correctness applied to
the PR Releases as written and executed. 	Absent any evidence to the
contrary, the law presumes that each PR Release is exactly “what it says
it is and appears to be.” 	Barr, 314 So. 2d at 610. 	The PR Releases were
recorded instruments purporting to affect an interest in real property and
were admissible as proof of their contents and execution. The statements
contained within the PR Releases were admissible as proof that Emma
Williams’s title to a 25% share of the Property had vested by operation of
law to Larry Williams and Anita Middleton, and that Larry Williams, as the
Personal Representative, had released and distributed the Property to
those beneficiaries free of all rights of the Personal Representative.
We reject Gantt’s arguments that attempt to undermine the probative
force of the PR Releases.
Gantt argues that Larry Williams’s assertion in the PR Release that he
was the Personal Representative was insufficient proof of this fact. 	Gantt
relies on the proposition that “[a]gency may not be proved by a declaration
of the putative agent in the absence of the principal.” 	Standley v. White,
326 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). 	But the analogy to agency law is
unconvincing. 	Standley 	does 	not 	apply 	here 	because 	a 	personal
representative is not an agent of the decedent or of the estate in the
common-law 	principal-agent 	sense. 	Standley’s 	proposition—that 	an
agent’s authority cannot be proven solely by their own declaration—is
inapplicable 	here 	because 	the 	Personal 	Representative 	derived 	his
authority from a court appointment, not a self-declaration. Moreover, the
PR Release incorporated the probate case by reference, and the PR Release
itself is a recorded instrument affecting an interest in property, which is
admissible as substantive evidence of the execution and delivery of the
instrument, as well as the truth of its recitals.
Similarly, Gantt’s evidentiary objections below regarding hearsay and
“improper legal opinion” were unpersuasive and foreclosed by the Florida
Evidence 	Code. 	Because 	a 	PR 	Release’s 	purpose 	is 	to 	release 	and

9
distribute the real property to the rightful beneficiaries free of the personal
representative’s administrative powers, the PR Release’s recital that the
property “vested in [the beneficiary] by operation of law” is admissible as
substantive evidence of that fact over a hearsay objection. 	Gantt’s claim
that the PR Releases contained an improper expert legal opinion fails
because the recital that title vested “by operation of law” is not expert
testimony or improper legal opinion. 	Rather, the recital is a factual
assertion in a probate instrument, serving to memorialize the fact of the
automatic vesting of title in the devisee, consistent with the Florida Probate
Code, and to explain the circumstances of the distribution.
We 	also 	reject 	Gantt’s 	argument 	that 	section 	733.613(1), 	Florida
Statutes (2005), required the transfers by the personal representative to
Larry Williams and Anita Middleton to be ratified by court order. 	Gantt’s
reliance upon section 733.613(1) conflated a personal representative’s sale
of real property with a release or distribution, which are legally distinct
events.
Section 	733.613 	governs 	a 	personal 	representative’s 	sale 	of 	real
property and provides in relevant part:
733.613. 	Personal 	representative’s 	right 	to 	sell 	real
property
(1) 	When a personal representative of an intestate estate, or
whose testator has not conferred a power of sale or whose
testator has granted a power of sale but the power is so limited
by the will or by operation of law that it cannot be conveniently
exercised, shall consider that it is for the best interest of the
estate and of those interested in it that real property be sold,
the personal representative may sell it at public or private
sale. No title shall pass until the court authorizes or confirms
the sale. No bona fide purchaser shall be required to examine
any proceedings before the order of sale.
(2) 	When a decedent’s will confers specific power to sell or
mortgage real property or a general power to sell any asset of
the estate, the personal representative may sell, mortgage, or
lease, without authorization or confirmation of court, any real
property of the estate or any interest therein for cash or credit,
or for part cash and part credit, and with or without security
for unpaid balances. The sale, mortgage, or lease need not be
justified by a showing of necessity, and the sale pursuant to
power of sale shall be valid.

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§ 733.613(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (2005).
Here, section 733.613(1) is inapplicable because the PR Release did not
involve a “sale” of Emma Williams’s interest in the Property. 	Section
733.613(1)’s statutory language that “[n]o title shall pass until the court
authorizes or confirms the sale” does not apply because the Personal
Representative did not sell the Property at public or private sale. 	In fact,
the PR Release did not cause title to “pass” at all. 	Rather, the PR Release
merely 	released 	the 	Property 	from 	the 	Personal 	Representative’s
administrative powers and acknowledged that title had already vested by
operation of law at Emma Williams’s death, so no “sale” had occurred for
the court to authorize or confirm.
Gantt cited no authority that would have required the probate court to
ratify the operation-of-law transfers to Larry Williams and Anita Middleton
or to ratify the PR Releases. Contrary to Gantt’s argument below, no court
order 	was 	required 	to 	ratify 	the 	PR 	Releases 	because 	a 	personal
representative 	may 	generally, 	without 	court 	order, 	distribute 	to 	the
beneficiaries 	any 	part 	of 	the 	estate 	not 	necessary 	to 	satisfy 	estate
obligations. 	§ 733.612(26), Fla. Stat. (2005).
Once 	Hi-Land 	introduced 	the 	recorded 	PR 	Releases 	evincing 	the
transfer and distribution of Emma Williams’s 25% interest to the devisees,
along with the chain of title to Emma Williams and the undisputed deeds
from Emma Williams’s devisees to Hi-Land, Hi-Land established a facially
valid chain of title. 	Hi-Land thus satisfied its burden to establish a prima
facie case of its ownership of Emma Williams’s 25% through the chain of
title. 	This shifted the burden to Gantt to rebut the accuracy of the
information contained in the PR Releases by presenting extrinsic evidence
to 	show 	that 	either 	Larry 	Williams 	was 	not 	truly 	the 	Personal
Representative or Emma Williams’s 25% interest had not vested in Larry
Williams and Anita Middleton at the moment of Emma Williams’s death.
Gantt 	never 	presented 	any 	such 	evidence 	at 	the 	bench 	trials 	or 	in
opposition to summary judgment.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the final judgment and remand to
the circuit court to enter a final partition judgment ruling that Hi-Land
owns a 75% interest in the Property and Gantt owns 25%.
Reversed and remanded.

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KUNTZ , C.J., and GERBER , J., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.