Hector Negron-Espada v. State of Florida

1 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

HECTOR NEGRON-ESPADA,
Appellant,

Vv.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

No. 4D2025-2727
[November 26, 2025]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for the
Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Indian River County; Rebecca White, Judge; L.T.
Case No. 312010CF000621A.

Hector Negron-Espada, Lake City, pro se.
No appearance required for appellee.
PER CURIAM.

Hector Negron-Espada appeals the denial of a motion to correct an illegal
sentence. We affirm without prejudice for Appellant to file a timely rule 3.850
motion raising the alleged sentencing error as a claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel.

Background

Appellant was convicted under section 800.04(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2009),
of lewd or lascivious molestation against a person less than 12 years of age for
an offense committed between March 2009 and April 2010. The trial court
sentenced him to life in prison, and his conviction and sentence became final on
February 14, 2024. In August 2025, he moved to correct his sentence, alleging
the law in effect at the time did not permit a mandatory life sentence.

Analysis

The current and 2009 version of the statutes are the same. A life sentence
is required if this was Appellant’s second or subsequent violation of section
800.04(5)(b) and this offense was committed on or after July 1, 2008.
§§ 775.082(3)(a)(4)(b), 800.04(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009). The record in this appeal

2
does not indicate whether Appellant has a prior conviction that would qualify
him for a mandatory life sentence. Construed liberally, Appellant is alleging that
the trial court had discretion and was not required to impose a life sentence. In
denying Appellant’s motion, the postconviction court reasoned that at sentencing
his attorney was the only one who said the sentence was mandatory, the trial
court was not bound by counsel’s statement, and a life sentence is legal for this
offense.
We affirm the denial of rule 3.800(a) relief because the sentence is not illegal
within the meaning of rule 3.800(a). See Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173, 1180–
81 (Fla. 2001) (agreeing an illegal sentence is correctable under rule 3.800(a)
only if it imposes a “kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of
sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances”
(quoting Blakley v. State, 746 So. 2d 1182, 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999))). 	Even if
the trial court mistakenly believed it did not have sentencing discretion, a life
sentence is still permissible for a conviction under section 800.04(5)(b). 	See
Johnson v. State, 9 So. 3d 640, 640–41 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (recognizing a trial
court’s misunderstanding that a life sentence was permissible, not mandatory,
did not result in an illegal sentence under rule 3.800(a) because the life sentence
was technically legal).
Contrary to the postconviction court’s reasoning, the sentencing transcript
strongly 	suggests 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	also 	believed 	the 	life 	sentence 	was
mandatory. 	Defense counsel told the court the sentence was mandatory, the
court did not hear any argument from either party regarding an appropriate
sentence in this case, and the court pronounced that it was imposing life “per
the statute,” not because of the facts in this case. 	As noted above, the record
does not show whether Appellant has a prior conviction that would qualify him
for a mandatory life sentence.
Conclusion
Because Appellant may have a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, we
affirm without prejudice for him to file a timely rule 3.850 motion. The trial court
may consider appointing postconviction counsel if it appears this issue may
involve substantial legal research. 	See Graham v. State, 372 So. 2d 1363, 1366
(Fla.1979); Wheeler v. State, 807 So. 2d 94, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (recognizing
a court “may consider the need for postconviction counsel on its own”).
Affirmed without prejudice.
G ROSS, F ORST and K LINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.