Suzanne Revah v. Cecile Revah, etc., et al.

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
SUZANNE REVAH,
Appellant,
v.
CECILE REVAH, individually and as Successor Trustee of THE
SALOMON REVAH REVOCABLE TRUST DATED DECEMBER 9, 1999,
and as Trustee of THE SUZANNE REVAH REVOCABLE TRUST DATED
DECEMBER 9, 1999,
Appellee.
No. 4D2024-1992
[November 12, 2025]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Charles E. Burton, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502022CP004158.
Robert J. Hauser of Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., West Palm Beach, for
appellant.
John J. Shahady of Shahady & Wurtenberger P.A., Fort Lauderdale,
and Samantha Tesser Haimo of Feigeles & Haimo LLP, Fort Lauderdale,
for appellee.
GROSS, J.
This case involves an unhappy family dynamic involving a mother who
has sued her daughter over the daughter’s performance as the trustee of
trusts where the mother was the beneficiary. The case is an object lesson
that loose, informal recordkeeping common to family finances is contrary
to the requirements imposed on trustees by Florida statutes.
With the exception of a single count, we reverse the final judgments
and orders entered in favor of the daughter and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Background Facts
This 	case 	arises 	from 	a 	dispute 	between 	Suzanne 	Revah, 	a 	trust
beneficiary who was around 90 years old when the litigation began in

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2022, and one of her children, Cecile Revah, concerning actions Cecile had
taken during her tenure as trustee of two trusts.
Suzanne’s husband, Salomon Revah, died in April 2012. 	His estate
was administered in Palm Beach County. 	According to the petition for
administration, his estate’s assets consisted of two parcels of real property,
having a total value of $714,000. His pour-over will directed that his estate
assets be transferred to his trust (the “Salomon Trust”). The two properties
were the only assets in his probate estate.
Cecile became the successor trustee of the Salomon Trust upon her
father’s death. 	The Salomon Trust’s two parcels were both sold—one in
2014 and the other in 2017.
Meanwhile, in December 2012, Suzanne and Cecile became co-owners
of a house in the Woodfield Country Club in Boca Raton (the “Woodfield
House”). 	The purchase price was $510,000 plus settlement charges, and
there was no mortgage on the property. 	The Woodfield House was titled
in the names of Suzanne and Cecile as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship. 	The property is worth about $2.2 million today.
At the bench trial in this case, Cecile admitted that she purchased the
Woodfield 	House 	and 	then 	reimbursed 	herself 	with 	funds 	from 	the
Salomon Trust, which she characterized as “dad’s money.”
In April 2014, Suzanne executed a quitclaim deed transferring her
entire interest in the Woodfield House to Cecile, leaving Cecile as sole
owner. Throughout this litigation, Suzanne took the position that she did
not understand the significance of this transaction. 	Suzanne is illiterate
and speaks “French, not English.”
In February 2021, Cecile executed a deed transferring a 50% interest
in the Woodfield House to Suzanne, as Trustee of the Suzanne Revah
Revocable Living Trust (the “Suzanne Trust”). 	The summary judgment
record contains no explanation for this transaction.1
1 At the bench trial which took place after the order granting her motion for
summary judgment, Cecile testified that she made the February 2021 transfer
because Suzanne was ill with Covid-19 and Cecile wanted to honor a promise
that Suzanne’s share of the house could pass to her heirs. Cecile explained, “So
that’s why I transferred it back to her, because I made her that promise, but not
because she was entitled to it.” Cecile testified that her agreement with Suzanne
was that “anything that I paid [on behalf of Suzanne], I would be able to get it
back from the value of the house.”

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Just prior to Cecile’s resignation as trustee of the Suzanne Trust in
January 2022, Suzanne asked Cecile for an accounting. Cecile refused in
no uncertain terms. This chain of events, including Suzanne learning that
her name was not on the title to her own home, led Suzanne to suspect
that Cecile had mismanaged trust assets of both trusts. Suzanne attested
in her affidavit that Cecile “did not keep accurate accounting records, and
reconstructed accounting records many years after the fact . . . .”
Suzanne’s 	affidavit 	stated 	that 	the 	Woodfield 	House 	had 	“never
belonged to Cecile” and that “Cecile’s name should have never been on the
title, 	at 	least 	not 	for 	any 	permanent 	purposes.” 	When 	asked 	at 	a
deposition about the joint titling of the Woodfield House, Suzanne testified
that this was done behind her back. 	Suzanne further testified that Cecile
put 	herself 	on 	the 	title 	to 	the 	house 	without 	Suzanne’s 	knowledge.
Suzanne elaborated that Cecile put “half of the house under her name and
. . . half of the house under my name. 	For what? I didn’t know about
that.”2
Suzanne’s Complaint
In August 2022, Suzanne filed a complaint against Cecile, asserting
four counts: (I) a claim for trust accounting; (II) a claim for damages arising
under 	accounting, 	which 	sought 	damages 	“to 	the 	extent 	of 	any
defalcations or breaches of fiduciary duty arising out of such accounting
(and any objections to the accounting)”; (III) a claim for removal of Cecile
as trustee of the Salomon Trust and the Suzanne Trust; and (IV) a claim
for imposition of a constructive trust over Cecile’s interest in the Woodfield
House on the grounds of undue influence and abuse of fiduciary duties.
The trial court granted Cecile’s motion to dismiss Count II without
prejudice, ruling that Suzanne “may move to amend at a later date if
damages can be alleged with more specificity.”
2 Especially when viewed in the light most favorable to Suzanne, the record
contains much that demonstrates Suzanne’s concern that the house had been
placed in Cecile’s name alone. At one point, Suzanne questioned, “Why did she
put 50 percent in her name? For what reason? 	The house was paid for in cash
in my name. 	For what reason did she do this?” 	Suzanne added: “But she
shouldn’t have that 50 percent. Never.” Suzanne reiterated that she “never asked
[Cecile] to put the house in her name. This was done behind my back.” Suzanne
also remarked: “This is not normal.”

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Cecile’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and
Counterclaim and Suzanne’s Reply
Cecile filed an answer, affirmative defenses, and counterclaim.
In her operative counterclaim, Cecile sued for unjust enrichment and
partition of the Woodfield House. 	Cecile alleged that Suzanne had been
unjustly enriched because Cecile had spent over $900,000 on behalf of
Suzanne or the property. 	Cecile alleged that “it was the intent that Cecile
own the Property as a 50% owner to 	secure all payments made on
Suzanne’s behalf and to maintain the Property.” Based on her allegations
that she was a 50% owner of the Woodfield House and that she was
entitled 	to 	credit 	for 	payments 	she 	made 	toward 	the 	purchase 	or
maintenance of the property, Cecile brought a partition claim to declare
the parties’ interests in the property and to order its sale.
In her amended affirmative defenses, Cecile contended that “Suzanne’s
claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and laches,”
arguing that “any and all claims relating to alleged improper ownership,
undue influence, fraud, or breach of fiduciary duty, accrued in or around
2012 or, at the latest, April 2014, when the property was transferred to
Cecile’s name only.”
Suzanne’s reply to Cecile’s affirmative defenses asserted that Cecile’s
fraudulent conduct tolled the running of the statute of limitations.
Summary Judgment Proceedings
Cecile moved for summary judgment on Suzanne’s Counts I, III, and
IV. Cecile argued that the constructive trust claim was barred by the four-
year statute of limitations, and that the public recording of the deeds in
2012 and 2014 precluded any claim of fraudulent concealment. Regarding
the accounting claim, Cecile asserted that she had “provided accountings
for all assets of her parents that she had knowledge of in mid-2022” when
she produced thousands of pages of documents to Suzanne’s counsel.
Finally, Cecile argued that “Count III is moot under the terms of the
Suzanne Trust as Suzanne can remove Cecile as trustee at any time.”
Forty days before the summary judgment hearing, Cecile filed three
bank account ledgers that she characterized as “accountings” related to
the “only bank trust accounts at issue in this case.” 	Each of the ledgers
begins in either 2014 or 2015 and shows deposits and withdrawals from
the account.

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As to the accounting claim, Suzanne’s response to the motion for
summary judgment argued that “trustees are required to give annual
accountings” under section 736.08135, Florida Statutes, which requires a
“reasonably understandable report.” 	Instead, Suzanne contended that
Cecile had never prepared an accounting and had provided a “virtual
records 	dump” 	in 	this 	case, 	which 	was 	“anything 	but 	a 	‘reasonably
understandable report.’” 	Suzanne maintained that she “was never kept
informed of her financial situation.”
As to the constructive trust claim, Suzanne argued that the statute of
limitations was tolled due to fraudulent concealment, as she was “kept in
the dark about the ownership of [the Woodfield] property until questions
began to arise concerning” Cecile’s management of trust assets. 	Suzanne
claimed that she “had no idea that Cecile owned part of the property in
2012,” 	and 	that 	she 	was 	“horrified” 	to 	learn 	that 	she 	had 	held 	no
ownership interest in her home for seven years.
Suzanne also filed an electronic “dropbox” link to a report from her
forensic CPA. Based on that report, Suzanne argued that Cecile had made
“extravagant payments to family members,” disbursed funds to herself,
and conveyed “to herself interests in [Suzanne’s] property.”
Shortly before the summary judgment hearing, Cecile filed a reply that
included the new argument that Suzanne’s accounting claim was barred
by statutory laches under Corya v. Sanders, 155 So. 3d 1279 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2015). 	In Corya, this court held: “We thus conclude, on the facts of
this case, that statutory laches under section 95.11(6) limits the right to
an accounting, where no accounting has been done, to no more than four
years before filing an action for an accounting against the trustee of an
irrevocable trust.” 	Id. at 1286.
Order Granting Summary Judgment
The trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in Cecile’s
favor.
Based 	upon 	Corya, 	the 	court 	ruled 	that 	“Suzanne’s 	claim 	for
accounting must be limited to the period no earlier than four years prior
to filing her Complaint (i.e., August 5, 2018).” 	The court found that “the
documents presented in support of summary judgment demonstrate that
Cecile accounted for the Salomon Trust assets,” adding that Suzanne had
“failed to demonstrate that these accountings do not conform to Section
736.08135, Florida Statutes.”

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As to the claim for removal of Cecile as trustee, the trial court ruled
that Count III was “moot under the terms of the Suzanne Trust as Suzanne
can remove Cecile as trustee at any time without Court intervention.”
As to the claim for a constructive trust, the trial court ruled that Count
IV was time barred because Cecile’s alleged actions in convincing Suzanne
to execute the April 2014 quitclaim deed “took place over nine (9) years
ago and are beyond the four-year statute of limitations for both fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty.” In response to Suzanne’s argument that she did
not know title to the Woodfield House had been taken out of her 50%
interest 	and 	put 	in 	Cecile’s 	name 	only, 	the 	court 	ruled 	that 	“said
information was public record as of April 2014, and, nonetheless, the deed
was changed back to 50% ownership in February 2021,” such that “the
ownership of the Property is currently the same as it was when the
Property was first purchased in 2012 . . . .”
The trial court rejected Suzanne’s fraudulent concealment argument,
ruling 	that 	“[n]o 	evidence 	was 	presented 	to 	demonstrate 	that 	Cecile
fraudulently concealed anything from Suzanne.” 	The court emphasized
that “[t]he public record made clear that Cecile and Suzanne were co-
owners of the subject Property in 2012, the ownership was changed to
Cecile, only, in 2014, and by 2021, ownership returned” to both women.
Suzanne filed a detailed motion for rehearing that the trial court denied.
Denial of Leave to Amend and Ruling in Limine
In March 2024, about three months after the summary judgment order,
Suzanne moved for leave to amend her complaint to add claims for
conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. Suzanne sought to amend based
upon 	newly 	discovered 	evidence 	that 	“was 	discovered 	by 	way 	of 	the
forensic accounting commissioned in this litigation.” Suzanne alleged that
the amendment was not futile, that the privilege to amend had not been
abused, and that neither party would suffer any undue prejudice.
The proposed conversion count alleged that between 2011 and 2022,
Cecile converted to her own use over $431,000 of trust assets. 	The
proposed count for breach of fiduciary duty concerned payments Cecile
made to a contractor.
Cecile opposed the motion for leave to amend, arguing that Suzanne’s
“initial claims were already denied by summary judgment and any alleged
‘new’ claims are based on the same facts and circumstances as initially

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raised which would be subject to the same statute of limitations (which
was the basis of granting summary judgment).”
The trial court denied Suzanne’s motion for leave to amend.
The trial court granted Cecile’s motion in limine, which had sought to
prohibit evidence relating to Suzanne’s claims in her initial complaint and
any new claims in her motion for leave to amend. The court thus excluded
most of the anticipated testimony of Suzanne’s forensic CPA.
Bench Trial
Cecile’s counterclaims for unjust enrichment and partition proceeded
to a two-day bench trial in late May 2024. 	The trial court admitted
numerous exhibits, including Cecile’s records supporting her claimed
expenditures. 	At trial, Cecile testified that Suzanne had orally agreed to
reimburse 	her 	for 	all 	expenditures 	and 	that 	Suzanne 	reiterated 	this
agreement in 2021. 	Cecile denied that she was “looking to double-dip.”
Cecile also offered excerpts from Suzanne’s two depositions that were
favorable to Cecile’s position at trial.
The Final Judgment
Based on the evidence presented, the court found that Cecile was owed
$975,776.57 from Suzanne, with $588,142.56 relating to the Woodfield
House and $387,634.01 relating to personal expenses incurred by Cecile
for Suzanne’s benefit. The court found that Suzanne’s affirmative defenses
based on the statute of limitations and laches failed with respect to Cecile’s
claims for partition and unjust enrichment. 	The court ruled that Cecile
was entitled to judgment in her favor for $387,634.01 on her claim for
unjust 	enrichment, 	plus 	prejudgment 	interest 	of 	$175,632.90 	and
$1,782.50 for a prior sanctions order, for a grand total of $564,849.41.
As to the count for partition, the court determined that Cecile was
entitled 	to 	a 	credit 	against 	Suzanne’s 	equity 	for 	the 	$588,142.56 	in
expenses Cecile contributed to the property. However, the court also ruled
that Suzanne was entitled to a credit for the purchase price of the property
in the amount of $579,902.66. 	Accordingly, the court ordered the sale of
the property, with 	the proceeds distributed in the following order of
priority: 	(1) 	brokerage 	fees; 	(2) 	Cecile’s 	attorney’s 	fees; 	(3) 	Cecile’s
$588,142.56 	credit 	and 	Suzanne’s 	$579,902.66 	credit; 	and 	(4) 	any
remaining funds being divided equally between the parties. 	This split of

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proceeds 	does 	not 	account 	for 	Cecile’s 	separate 	unjust 	enrichment
judgment of $564,849.41.
The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment
on Suzanne’s Accounting Claim Because Cecile Failed to
Meet Her Burden of Proving that She Had Served
Statutorily-Compliant Accountings
Suzanne challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on her
accounting claim. We reverse that portion of the summary judgment order
because Cecile failed to meet her burden of showing that her disclosures
in this case complied with the applicable provisions of the Florida Statutes.
An order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Gromann v.
Avatar Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 345 So. 3d 298, 300 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).
Florida’s summary judgment rule, which is to be applied in accordance
with the federal standard, states that summary judgment is appropriate
where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a). A party
seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility” of
demonstrating “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 	Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A genuine factual dispute exists
“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986).
Under Florida law, a trustee of an irrevocable trust has a statutory duty
to “provide a trust accounting . . . to each qualified beneficiary at least
annually and on termination of the trust or on change of the trustee.” 	§
736.0813(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2022).3
Chapter 736 does not permit a trust accounting to be an instrument of
obfuscation. 	“A trust accounting must be a reasonably understandable
report from the date of the last accounting or, if none, from the date on
which the trustee became accountable, that adequately discloses the
information required in subsection (2).” § 736.08135(1), Fla. Stat. (2022).
The 	statute 	describes 	the 	required 	contents 	of 	an 	accounting,
including: (a) a statement identifying the trust, the trustee furnishing the
accounting, and the time period covered; (b) a report of all cash and
property 	transactions, 	significant 	administrative 	transactions, 	and
3 Although we are citing the 2022 version of the statute, we recognize that the
duty to provide an accounting had spanned multiple years.

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receipts and disbursements; (c) identification and valuation of trust assets
on hand at the close of the period, including acquisition and estimated
current values; (d) disclosure of significant non-financial transactions; (e)
allocation 	details 	of 	income 	and 	principal 	affecting 	any 	beneficiary’s
interest; and (f) a plan of distribution for any undistributed assets in the
final accounting. 	§ 736.08135(2), Fla. Stat. (2022).
“A violation by a trustee of a duty the trustee owes to a beneficiary is a
breach of trust.” § 736.1001(1), Fla. Stat. (2022). “A fiduciary is obligated
not only to make prudent decisions, but also to file the annual accountings
to keep the beneficiaries informed of income, expenses, and fluctuations
in value of the trust assets.” 	McCormick v. Cox, 118 So. 3d 980, 986 (Fla.
3d DCA 2013). 	A beneficiary has “an enforceable right to receive an
accounting from the trustee.” 	Id. at 986–87.
Given these statutory requirements, a trustee’s failure to prepare an
accounting is itself a breach of fiduciary duty. 	See Corya, 155 So. 3d at
1285 (noting that a trustee’s “[f]ailure to prepare an accounting is a . . .
breach of fiduciary duty,” and is “the equivalent of at least a negligent tort,
and, under certain facts . . . an intentional tort”) (citing McCormick, 118
So. 3d at 986–87). “The breach may result in an award of damages against
the trustee personally.” 	Id. (citing §§ 736.1002(1), 736.1013(2), Fla. Stat.
(2008)).
Under Florida law, the burden is on fiduciaries to adequately account
for their use of a beneficiary’s funds. Rasmussen v. Cent. Fla. Council Boy
Scouts of Am., Inc., No. 6:07-CV-1091-ORL19GJK, 2009 WL 320855, at
*10 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2009). 	It is clear that “[t]he burden of accounting
for trust assets . . . is on the trustee.” George G. Bogert et al., Bogert’s The
Law of Trusts and Trustees § 961 (May 2025 updated).
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Suzanne’s
accounting claim because Cecile failed to meet her burden of establishing
that she had served statutorily compliant accountings. 	Suzanne made a
prima facie case that Cecile was a trustee, and that Suzanne did not
receive accountings. 	At that point, the ultimate burden of proof rested
with Cecile to account for the property held by her in trust consistent with
Chapter 736.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Suzanne, the record shows that
Cecile failed to serve any statutorily compliant accountings as required by
Chapter 736. 	The only documents Cecile produced were (1) a 2022
“document dump” of third-party financial records and (2) unsworn ledgers
filed on October 5, 2023, which was over a year after litigation commenced.

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These documents lack the essential elements of a statutory accounting
under section 736.08135, as they are not “reasonably understandable”
reports 	and 	do 	not 	include 	the 	information 	required 	by 	section
736.08135(2). 	In addition to not being organized in a report format, the
documents were not provided annually as required.
Nonetheless, the trial court granted summary judgment in Cecile’s
favor, improperly shifting the burden to Suzanne—a 90-something year
old woman who lacks English proficiency and cannot read—to prove that
no proper accountings were served. This shifting of the burden was error.
The trial court improperly relied on the unsworn, post-litigation ledgers
as satisfying Cecile’s statutory duty. Mere bank statements or transaction
logs do not constitute a statutory accounting. 	The absence of sufficient
annual accountings for over a decade establishes a per se breach of trust
under section 736.1001(1), Florida Statutes.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the
accounting claim. 	Cecile failed to meet her burden of proving that she
served accountings in compliance with 736.08135, and at minimum, a
genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact 	exists 	as 	to 	whether 	she 	fulfilled 	her
statutory duty. 	Even under Cecile’s own cited case law, Suzanne had the
right to seek accountings going back to at least 2018.
Suzanne Failed to Preserve Her Argument that There is
No Statutory Laches to Demand Accountings, But She
Should be Granted Leave to Amend her Pleadings to
Raise that Argument on Remand
“In order to be preserved for further review by a higher court, an issue
must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or
ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that presentation
if it is to be considered preserved.” 	Sunset Harbour Condo. Ass’n v.
Robbins, 914 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Tillman v. State, 471 So.
2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985)). 	Moreover, a failure to object to a procedural
irregularity in the summary judgment proceedings waives the issue. Wong
v. Crown Equip. Corp., 676 So. 2d 981, 982 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
Suzanne failed to preserve her argument that statutory laches does not
apply to her accounting claim. 	Although Cecile improperly raised the
statutory laches issue for the first time in a reply memorandum filed seven
days before the summary judgment hearing, Suzanne did not object to this
procedural irregularity. More importantly, Suzanne offered no substantive
argument below as to why the Corya limitations period did not apply to

11
the accounting claim. Therefore, Suzanne failed to preserve her challenge
to the application of statutory laches to her accounting claim, and we
cannot reverse on this ground.
Although this issue was not preserved, we are compelled to reverse for
other reasons. 	On remand, therefore, Suzanne shall be given leave to
amend her pleadings to raise the issue of whether the legislature abrogated
Corya by amending section 736.1008, Florida Statutes, in 2018. 	See Ch.
2018-35, § 8, Laws of Fla.
The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary
Judgment on Suzanne’s Constructive Trust Claim as
Issues of Fact Remained
Chapter 736 provides the legal framework for a beneficiary to challenge
self-dealing by a trustee. 	A “transaction involving the investment or
management of trust property entered into by the trustee for the trustee’s
own personal account or which is otherwise affected by a conflict between
the trustee’s fiduciary and personal interests is voidable by a beneficiary
affected by the transaction” unless, among other things, the transaction
was 	authorized 	by 	the 	trust’s 	terms 	or 	approved 	by 	the 	court. 	§
736.0802(2), Fla. Stat. (2012).
A constructive trust is an appropriate remedy for a trustee’s breach of
fiduciary duty toward a beneficiary. 	See Williams v. Stanford, 977 So. 2d
722, 730 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (noting that “[a] constructive trust is an
equitable remedy available in cases dealing with breaches of fiduciary
duty”). 	A party may establish a constructive trust as an independent
cause of action by showing: “(1) a promise, express or implied, (2) transfer
of the property and reliance thereon, (3) a confidential relationship and (4)
unjust enrichment.” Brown v. Regan, 368 So. 3d 3, 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).
Another 	method 	of 	establishing 	a 	constructive 	trust 	is 	to 	“prove 	an
independent cause of action that would support a constructive trust as a
remedy, such as unjust enrichment resulting from fraud, undue influence,
or breaches of fiduciary duty.” 	Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A “breach of fiduciary duty is an intentional tort subject to a four-year
statute of limitations.” 	Patten v. Winderman, 965 So. 2d 1222, 1224 n.1
(Fla. 4th DCA 2007). “An action for the declaration of a constructive trust
may be barred if the events giving rise to the necessity for the imposition
of this equitable remedy transpired beyond the period permitted by the
applicable statute of limitations, usually expressed in terms of laches.”
Palmland Villas I Condo. Ass’n v. Taylor, 390 So. 2d 123, 125 (Fla. 4th DCA
1980). Under section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (2022), “[l]aches shall bar

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any action unless it is commenced within the time provided for legal
actions 	concerning 	the 	same 	subject 	matter 	regardless 	of 	lack 	of
knowledge by the person sought to be held liable . . . .”
For the equitable principle of fraudulent concealment to toll the statute
of limitations, the “plaintiff must show both successful concealment of the
cause of action and fraudulent means to [achieve] that concealment.” 	W.
Brook Isles Partner’s 1, LLC v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 163 So.
3d 635, 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
But fraudulent concealment is easier to establish in the context of a
fiduciary relationship that exists between a trustee and a beneficiary. 	“A
fiduciary’s deliberate withholding of material information the fiduciary has
a duty to disclose constitutes fraudulent concealment.” 	First Union Nat’l
Bank v. Turney, 824 So. 2d 172, 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). At common law,
“[w]here the trustee by fraud or deception, or even by keeping quiet when
he should speak and account to his cestui, causes the cestui to be ignorant
of the rights of the cestui and of the duties of the trustee, laches will not
be imputed to the cestui until discovery of the true condition.” 	Sewell v.
Sewell Props., 30 So. 2d 361, 362–63 (Fla. 1947) (emphasis added).
Florida’s Trust Code contains specific provisions addressing limitations
on proceedings against trustees, which are similar to the common law rule.
See § 736.1008, Fla. Stat. (2022).
Even before the 2018 statutory change to section 736.1008, this court
held that statutory laches did not bar an action alleging a breach of
fiduciary duty against a trustee for removing trust assets where the
beneficiary timely filed suit after receiving an accounting. 	See Woodward
v. Woodward, 192 So. 3d 528, 531 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). 	The four-year
statute of limitations for breach of trust “does not begin to run until a
beneficiary receives an adequate trust disclosure document issued by the
trustee.”4 	Id. (citing § 736.1008(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012)). 	When a trustee
has not adequately disclosed a matter and has not issued a final trust
accounting, “a claim against the trustee for breach of trust does not begin
to accrue until the beneficiary has actual knowledge of the ‘facts upon
which the claim is based if such actual knowledge is established by clear
and convincing evidence.’” 	Id. (quoting § 736.1008(3), Fla. Stat. (2012)).
4 By contrast, “[w]hen a matter is adequately disclosed in a trust disclosure
document, a beneficiary must bring an action against a trustee for breach of trust
within six months after receipt.” 	Woodward, 192 So. 3d at 531 (citing §
736.1008(2), Fla. Stat. (2012)).

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Thus, in Woodward, we held that the trial court erred in applying laches
to claim for breach of fiduciary duty against a trustee for removing trust
assets, as the limitations period did not begin to run until the trustee
provided an accounting. 	Id. at 531–32.
Here, the trial court erred in granting Cecile’s motion for summary
judgment 	on 	Suzanne’s 	constructive 	trust 	claim. 	In 	the 	light 	most
favorable to Suzanne, the evidence showed that Cecile, as trustee of the
Salomon Trust, effectively used trust assets to purchase the Woodfield
House in 2012 and then added her own name to the title as a joint tenant.
The property was acquired with trust assets that were to be used for
Suzanne’s benefit, yet Cecile made herself a co-owner of the property. This
self-dealing transaction was voidable under the Trust Code because it was
neither authorized by the trust instrument nor approved by any court. 	A
claim 	for 	constructive 	trust 	to 	restore 	ownership 	of 	the 	property 	to
Suzanne was proper as a remedy for this breach of trust.
Cecile’s argument that the constructive trust claim was time barred
fails because the limitations period did not begin to run until Suzanne had
actual 	knowledge 	of 	the 	facts, 	established 	by 	clear 	and 	convincing
evidence. § 736.1008(3), Fla. Stat.; Woodward, 192 So. 3d at 531. Viewed
in the light most favorable to Suzanne as the non-moving party, the
evidence showed that Suzanne, who was elderly, illiterate, and entirely
dependent on Cecile for financial and legal matters, was unaware of the
2012 titling transaction until shortly before this litigation commenced.
The 	trial 	court 	also 	incorrectly 	concluded 	that 	Cecile 	overcame
Suzanne’s “fraudulent concealment” avoidance. 	Cecile, as trustee, had a
duty to disclose the titling and retitling of the property that was purchased
with trust assets. 	Viewed in the light most favorable to Suzanne, the
evidence 	of 	Cecile’s 	deliberate 	withholding 	of 	material 	information
regarding the titling of the property—information Cecile had a duty to
disclose as the trustee—constitutes fraudulent concealment.
For similar reasons, the trial court’s reliance on public records is
misplaced in the context of a trustee’s obligations to a beneficiary under
Chapter 736. 	The public recording of the deeds in 2012 and 2014 could
not have commenced the running of any limitations period. 	Constructive
notice through public records was insufficient to establish the “actual
knowledge” required by Chapter 736.5
5 We also reject the argument that Suzanne’s answer to Cecile’s counterclaim
necessarily admitted Suzanne’s actual knowledge of the 2012 titling transaction.

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The Remaining Issues
We affirm the trial court’s summary judgment on Count III as Suzanne
has not demonstrated error.
We reverse the final judgment on Cecile’s counterclaims for partition
and unjust enrichment because the bench trial was impacted by the
erroneous summary judgment favoring Cecile. 	The erroneous summary
judgment on Suzanne’s claim for a constructive trust could have affected
the outcome of Cecile’s counterclaim for partition. If Suzanne were to
prevail on her claim that Cecile had improperly titled the property to
herself as a joint owner in 2012, then this alleged self-dealing transaction
would be voidable. As such, Cecile would not be a legitimate titleholder to
the property and thus would not have standing to assert a partition claim.
See Dietrich v. Winters, 798 So. 2d 864, 866 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (stating
that to maintain a claim for partition, “the plaintiff must show title or a
right to partition,” and “[w]here title is not established in the plaintiff,
partition is not available even if the plaintiff might have an equitable
interest 	in 	the 	land”). 	The 	trial 	court’s 	erroneous 	conclusion 	that
Suzanne’s claim for a constructive trust was time barred was also harmful
error with respect to Cecile’s counterclaim for partition. 	See Special v. W.
Boca Med. Ctr., 160 So. 3d 1251, 1256 (Fla. 2014) (“To test for harmless
error, the beneficiary of the error has the burden to prove that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict.”).
The trial court’s financial award to Cecile was also the product of error
because the court disallowed Suzanne’s damage claims and excluded
Suzanne’s forensic CPA’s report about Cecile’s alleged defalcation of trust
funds. 	The error was not harmless because the case turned on Cecile’s
credibility as a trustee, which the trial court failed to fully scrutinize, thus
depriving Suzanne of a fair trial on transactions between the parties dating
back to 2012.
Finally, on remand, Suzanne should be given leave to file an amended
complaint. 	The denial of leave to amend was premised on the erroneous
summary judgment rather than an exercise of the court’s discretion. 	The
The admitted allegation at issue was written in the passive voice and was too
ambiguous to support the conclusion that Suzanne had contemporaneous actual
knowledge of how the property was titled. 	Suzanne may have admitted the
allegation because it accurately described Cecile’s reason for arranging to have
the property titled jointly.

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complaint had not previously been amended, so it cannot be said that the
privilege to amend had been abused.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
SHEPHERD and S HAW , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.