Amber Miller a/k/a Amber Velleff v. Jason Velleff, et al.,

D ISTRICT COURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
AMBER MILLER f/k/a AMBER VELLEFF,
Appellant,
v.
JASON VELLEFF,
Appellee.
No. 4D2024-1579
[January 7, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.
Lucie 	County; 	Anastasia 	M. 	Norman, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
562013DR001643.
June G. Hoffman of Fowler White Burnett, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for
appellant.
L. Lisa Batts of Stuart Law Group, P.A., Stuart, for appellee.
L EVINE , J.
Amber Miller (“former wife”) claims the trial court erred in (1) enjoining
her current husband, a non-party, from attending public events involving
the child of the former wife and former husband, (2) denying modification
of child support, (3) denying modification of timesharing, (4) awarding
Jason Velleff (“former husband”) forty-nine days of makeup timesharing,
and (5) modifying the former wife’s ultimate decision-making authority.
We reverse on the first issue, finding that, under the facts of this case, the
trial court lacked authority to restrict the current husband, a non-party,
from attending public events involving the child. We affirm the remaining
issues without further comment.
In 2016, the trial court entered a final judgment of dissolution of
marriage. 	One child was born during the parties’ marriage. 	In 2019, the
former husband filed a supplemental petition for modification, accusing
the current husband of the former wife of physically attacking him. 	The
former husband requested a prohibition on the former wife bringing the
current husband to activities involving the child.

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The case proceeded to an evidentiary hearing in 2024. 	At the hearing,
the former husband requested that the current husband not be present
during 	timesharing 	exchanges, 	extracurricular 	activities, 	and 	school
events. 	The 	former 	husband 	testified 	that 	at 	the 	child’s first 	grade
graduation in 2019, the current husband hit, threatened, and yelled at the
former husband. 	The former husband published a video of the incident.
The former husband had previously obtained a temporary injunction as a
result of the incident, but a final injunction was never entered. The former
husband testified that the current husband was hostile, aggressive, and
threatening during the child exchanges. 	The former husband published
an audio recording of an exchange in support of his testimony.
The 	trial 	court 	entered 	a 	supplemental 	final 	judgment, 	finding 	a
material, substantial, and unanticipated change in circumstances in that
the current husband had engaged in 	aggressive, violent, and hostile
behavior toward the former husband. 	The trial court prohibited the
current husband from attending the child’s public events when the former
husband will be present:
When the child has a school, extracurricular or religious
event, 	both 	parties 	may 	attend 	regardless 	of 	whose
timesharing 	day 	it 	is. 	However, 	if 	the 	Former 	Husband
communicates to the Former Wife that he will be attending the
event at least 5 days before the event (or as soon as possible
in the event there is less than five days, however in no event
less than 24 hours prior to), then [the current husband] is not
permitted to attend 	the event. 	Additionally, [the current
husband] may not attend any child exchanges. This is due to
[the 	current 	husband’s] 	aggressive 	and 	inappropriate
behavior with the Former Husband in front of the minor child.
If the Former Husband does not communicate to the Former
Wife at least five days prior to the event that he will be
attending the [e]vent then [the current husband] is permitted
to attend. 	[The current husband] is not permitted to attend
any medical, dental or mental health appointments relating to
the minor child.
The former wife moved for rehearing, arguing that the trial court lacked
authority to enjoin a non-party, the current husband, from attending
public events involving the child. 	The trial court denied the motion for
rehearing, 	finding 	no 	error 	in 	restricting 	the 	current 	husband 	from
attending 	the 	child’s 	public 	events 	based 	on 	evidence 	that 	he 	had
physically and verbally assaulted the former husband. 	The trial court
relied on Wilcoxon v. Moller, 132 So. 3d 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), which

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involved, 	in 	part, 	a 	similar 	restriction. 	However, 	the 	trial 	court
acknowledged that “the propriety of this provision was not specifically
addressed in the opinion.” 	This appeal follows.
The former wife argues the trial court reversibly erred by restricting her
current husband, a non-party, from attending the child’s public events
without appropriate pleading, notice, and opportunity to be heard. 	The
former wife further argues that the trial court lacked authority to enter an
injunction under these circumstances.1 	The former husband does not
respond to the issue of notice, but rather argues that the prohibition is in
the best interests of the child.
A trial court’s order modifying a parenting plan is reviewed for abuse of
discretion and will be affirmed on appeal when supported by competent
substantial evidence. Seith v. Seith, 337 So. 3d 21, 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).
Further, an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 	St. Lucie Cnty.
Radiation Oncology, Ltd. v. Woody, 766 So. 2d 301, 301-02 (Fla. 4th DCA
2000). 	Where “it rests on purely legal matters, an order imposing an
injunction is subject to full, or de novo, review on appeal.” 	Id. at 302
(citation omitted). Finally, a claim of deprivation of procedural due process
is reviewed de novo. Spencer v. Kelner, 357 So. 3d 166, 168 (Fla. 4th DCA
2023).
The main issue for our determination is whether the trial court had the
authority to restrict the current husband from attending the child’s public
events, where the current husband was not a party to the proceedings and
received no notice. 	We find that, under the facts of this case, the trial
court erred. Initially, the current husband did not receive notice, nor was
he a party to this case and, as such, the challenged restriction violated his
procedural due process rights. 	See id. (“Procedural due process requires
both 	reasonable 	notice 	and 	a 	meaningful 	opportunity 	to 	be 	heard.”)
(citation omitted); Trans Health Mgmt. Inc. v. Nunziata, 159 So. 3d 850 (Fla.
2d DCA 2014) (finding the trial court violated due process by entering an
injunction against a non-party without notice or an opportunity to be
heard).
Additionally, the trial court’s order was effectively an injunction. 	“An
injunction cannot bind parties who are not before the court.” 	Leighton v.
First Universal Lending, LLC, 925 So. 2d 462, 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). “A
court is without jurisdiction to issue an injunction which would interfere
1 On appeal, the former wife does not challenge that portion of the order
restricting 	her 	current 	husband 	from 	attending 	private 	events 	such 	as
timesharing exchanges or the child’s medical appointments.

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with the rights of those who are not parties to the action. 	An injunction
can lie only when its scope is limited in effect to the rights of parties before
the court.” 	L&K Creation, LLC v. White Feather Mgmt., LLC, 389 So. 3d
607, 608 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (citation omitted); see also Sheoah Highlands,
Inc. v. Daugherty, 837 So. 2d 579, 583 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (recognizing
that a court is without jurisdiction to issue an injunction which would
interfere with the rights of those who are not parties to the action).
In Trisotto v. Trisotto, 966 So. 2d 986, 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), the Fifth
District found that the trial court erred by entering a restraining order
against the former husband’s current wife, who was not a party to the
litigation or served with process. 	The Fifth District recognized that “[a]
court is without jurisdiction to issue an injunction that interferes with the
rights of those who are not parties to the action.” 	Id. Similarly, in Silvers
v. Silvers, 504 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), the Second District found
that the trial court had no jurisdiction in a dissolution of marriage case to
order the parties’ current spouses to attend classes and counseling. 	See
also Hastings v. Rigsbee, 875 So. 2d 772, 779-80 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
(finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order a non-party to
undergo counseling and follow the counselors’ recommendations). Like in
Trisotto and Silvers, here, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter an
order prohibiting the current husband, a non-party, from attending the
child’s events, which were specifically open to the public.
The trial court relied on Wilcoxon, which involved a provision stating:
The 	Former 	Wife’s current 	husband 	shall 	not 	be 	present
anywhere that the Former Husband is, particularly in the
presence of the children. In the event that there are events or
activities 	of 	any 	sort 	involving 	the 	minor 	children, 	if 	the
Former Husband is in attendance, the Former Wife’s current
husband shall not be.
132 So. 3d at 284-85. The trial court’s reliance on Wilcoxon was misplaced
because that provision was not the subject of the appeal. Wilcoxon did not
address 	whether 	the 	enjoined 	current 	spouse 	was 	a 	party 	to 	the
proceedings and had received notice, or whether the elements of injunctive
relief 	were 	met. 	Indeed, 	the 	trial 	court 	in 	the 	instant 	case 	even
acknowledged that “the propriety of this provision was not specifically
addressed in the opinion.”
On 	appeal, 	the 	former 	husband 	also 	relies 	on 	Lewandowski 	v.
Langston, 969 So. 2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), where the former
husband moved for modification of custody due to the former wife’s

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marriage to a registered sex offender. The trial court found no substantial
change of circumstances, but ordered that the former wife could not allow
the child to reside in the same household as her current husband and that
her current husband could not be in the child’s presence without constant,
direct supervision. Id. at 1169. After finding there was a material change
in circumstances, the Fifth District reversed the order denying the petition
for a change in custody and remanded for further proceedings to determine
the best interests of the child. 	Id.
Lewandowski 	is 	initially 	distinguishable 	because 	it 	involves
circumstances not present in the instant case, that being the former wife’s
current marriage to a registered sex offender. Moreover, Lewandowski did
not specifically address the trial court’s authority to prohibit the former
wife’s 	current 	husband 	from 	being 	in 	the 	child’s 	presence 	without
constant, direct supervision. 	Rather, the Fifth District reversed the trial
court’s order, which found no substantial change of circumstances. 	The
Fifth District determined that the former wife’s actions in exposing the
child to a registered sex offender on a regular basis did constitute a
material 	change 	in 	circumstances 	and, 	consequently, 	remanded 	for
further proceedings.
We also note that, in the present case, the former husband previously
attempted to obtain a permanent injunction against the current husband.
Having failed to obtain such relief through the proper procedure, the
former husband cannot now avail himself of the modification proceedings
as an alternate, or “backdoor,” means of obtaining a permanent injunction.
In summary, we find that, under the facts of this case, the trial court
erred in restricting the current husband from attending the child’s public
events. 	Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to strike
that portion of the supplemental final judgment.2
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
G ERBER and K LINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.
2 We do not address, as it is not before us, whether the trial court could impose
conditions on the former wife as a means of restricting the conduct of the current
husband.