Sharrod Christopher Dunston v. State of Florida

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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

SHARROD CHRISTOPHER DUNSTON,
Appellant,

Vv.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

No. 4D2025-0670
[March 4, 2026]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Daliah H. Weiss, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. 50-2012-CF-
005946-BXXXMB;_ 50-2012-CF-008040-AXXXMB; and 50-2012-CF-
008688-AXXXMB.

Sharrod Christopher Dunston, Wewahitchka, pro se.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Luke R.
Napodano, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for
appellee.

PER CURIAM.

After the appellant’s youthful offender probation term was revoked for
substantive violations, he was sentenced to a prison term, but the
sentencing court retained the youthful offender designation based solely
on case law erroneously holding that a youthful offender designation must
be retained even after probation is revoked and an adult sanction is
imposed. Subsequently, in the wake of a Florida Supreme Court opinion
clarifying the issue, our courts have recognized that “a defendant is not
entitled to retain his youthful offender status after his violation of
probation and adult sentencing.” Kendall v. State, 262 So. 3d 824, 825
(Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (citing Eustache v. State, 248 So. 3d 1097, 1102 (Fla.
2018)). Some years later, the appellant moved to correct an illegal
sentence, claiming his prison sentence was illegal because the court
retained his youthful offender designation yet exceeded the youthful
offender maximum permissible sentence. The lower court granted the
motion “insofar as the youthful offender designation must be stricken from
Defendant’s sentence,” and at a sentencing hearing where the appellant

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was present, it struck the youthful offender designation but otherwise
retained the sentence. 	On appeal, the appellant raises several purported
errors, all of which lack merit, and we affirm.
First, under the circumstances of this case, where the resentencing was
for the ministerial purpose of striking the youthful offender designation,
the appellant was not entitled to representation. See Burgess v. State, 182
So. 3d 841, 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (“[A] defendant is entitled to be
present and represented by counsel at any resentencing proceeding from
a motion to correct illegal sentence unless resentencing involves only a
ministerial act.”); Thompson v. State, 987 So. 2d 727, 729 (Fla. 4th DCA
2008) (“A defendant need not be present when a court simply deletes a
HFO designation without otherwise changing the sentence.”). 	This is not
a case like Burgess where upon striking of a designation, the sentencing
court was required to reconsider the sentences under the sentencing laws
in effect at the time of the offenses. 	Here, the original sentencing court
already did that and it imposed an adult sanction. 	The imposition of the
youthful offender designation was based purely on a reliance on the
erroneous case law.
Next, 	we 	reject 	the 	appellant’s 	double 	jeopardy 	argument. 	The
argument is not adequately briefed where the appellant merely requested
this court to “explain[,] if it can, why striking the youthful offender status
would not violate double jeopardy principles.” 	See Hammond v. State, 34
So. 3d 58, 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“Claims for which an appellant has not
presented 	any 	argument, 	or 	for 	which 	he 	provides 	only 	conclusory
argument, are insufficiently presented for review and are waived.”).
Finally, to the extent the appellant attempts to make an ex post facto
argument, the record does not reflect such an argument was preserved.
Additionally, he seems to rely on the removal of the youthful offender
designation based on a change in the case law. This does not implicate ex
post facto protections. 	See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191
(1977) (recognizing that the “Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the
powers of the Legislature . . . and does not of its own force apply to the
Judicial Branch of government”). 	Further, any potential due process
argument lacks merit, as the supreme court’s clarification of the issue of
retention of youthful offender designation after probation revocation was
foreseeable based on the plain language of the applicable statute. 	See
Eustache, 248 So. 3d at 1100-02.
Affirmed.
CIKLIN, L EVINE and S HAW , JJ., concur.

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.