Michael Ramos v. Amy Michelle Hunter

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
MICHAEL RAMOS,
Appellant,
v.
AMY MICHELLE HUNTER,
Appellee.
No. 4D2025-0369
[March 11, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach 	County; 	Cheryl 	A. 	Carazo, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
502023DR010438XXXANB.
Caryn A. Stevens, Diana M. Minnocci, and Eddie Stephens of Stephens
& Stevens, PLLC, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
David 	Lloyd 	Merrill 	of 	The 	Associates, 	Palm 	Beach 	Gardens, 	for
appellee.
PER CURIAM .
Michael 	Ramos 	appeals 	an 	amended 	judgment 	of 	paternity 	and
parenting 	plan. 	The 	amended 	judgment 	established 	a 	long-distance
parenting plan that awarded Amy Michelle Hunter majority timesharing
with the parties’ two minor children. 	Ramos raises two issues on appeal.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
First, Ramos argues the circuit court incorrectly concluded the Florida
Parental Relocation Act, Section 61.13001, Florida Statutes (2025), did not
apply. 	On that issue, we affirm. 	The circuit court correctly applied
controlling precedent and concluded that section 61.13001 does not apply
to this case because Hunter moved the child before Ramos filed the
paternity action. 	See Essex v. Davis, 116 So. 3d 445 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)
(explaining 	that 	under 	Section 	61.13001, 	Florida 	Statutes, 	the 	2009
amendment changed the definition of “relocation” from a change in the
child’s residence to the parent’s principal residence, and holding the
statute inapplicable where the parent moved prior to the filing of the
action). 	As a result, the circuit court correctly treated Ramos’ request as

part 	of 	an 	initial 	timesharing 	determination 	under 	Section 	61.13(3),
Florida Statutes (2025).
While we agree with the circuit court’s statutory conclusion, we still
must reverse. 	For his second issue, Ramos argues the circuit court erred
when it granted Hunter majority timesharing, relief that Hunter neither
requested nor noticed for hearing. 	It was not until opening statement at
the hearing that Hunter’s counsel stated Hunter was seeking majority
timesharing. At that time, Ramos’ counsel objected and noted that Hunter
had not requested majority timesharing prior to the hearing. 	In fact,
Hunter 	had 	requested 	equal 	timesharing 	prior 	to 	the 	hearing. 	We
acknowledge 	the 	circuit 	court 	was 	attempting 	to 	fulfill 	its 	statutory
obligation to act in the best interest of the child. 	However, Ramos was
entitled to notice that Hunter intended to seek majority timesharing at the
scheduled 	hearing. 	Without 	notice 	that 	the 	issue 	was 	going 	to 	be
addressed at the hearing, Ramos was not prepared to present evidence in
support of majority timesharing.
As a result, we reverse. 	We express no opinion on the merits of any
timesharing award that is rendered after both parties are afforded notice
and an opportunity to be heard.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
K UNTZ , C.J., C IKLIN and SHAW , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.