Brittany Cordero, et al. v. Martin Memorial Medical Center, Inc. a/k/a Cleveland Clinic Martin Health, etc., et al.

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
BRITTANY CORDERO, et al.,
Appellants,
v.
MARTIN MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., a/k/a CLEVELAND
CLINIC MARTIN HEALTH, et al.,
Appellees.
No. 4D2024-2444
[February 25, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.
Lucie 	County; 	Brett 	Michael 	Waronicki, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
562021CA000263.
Christy M. Penton of Penton Law Center, Pensacola, for appellants.
Marc J. Schleier and James D. DeChurch of Fowler White Burnett, P.A.,
Miami, for appellees.
L OTT , J.
Appellants, Plaintiffs below, appeal the circuit court’s dismissal of their
medical 	malpractice 	claim 	for 	failure 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	presuit
investigation requirements of section 766.203(2), Florida Statutes (2021).
Section 766.203(2) requires:
Presuit investigation by claimant.--Prior to issuing notification
of intent to initiate medical negligence litigation pursuant to
s. 766.106, the claimant shall conduct an investigation to
ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to believe that:
(a) 	Any named defendant in the litigation was negligent in the
care or treatment of the claimant; and
(b) 	Such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant.

2
Corroboration 	of 	reasonable 	grounds 	to 	initiate 	medical
negligence 	litigation 	shall 	be 	provided 	by 	the 	claimant’s
submission of a verified written medical expert opinion from a
medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(6), at the time the
notice of intent to initiate litigation is mailed, which statement
shall corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of
medical negligence.
Here, 	the 	issue 	was 	the 	“verified 	written 	medical 	expert 	opinion”
contemplated by section 766.203(2). 	Plaintiffs’ expert opinion, submitted
by a medical doctor, read:
Based 	on 	my 	education, 	training 	and 	experience 	as 	an
obstetrician and gynecologist, and based upon my careful
review of the aforementioned materials, I am of the opinion
that 	within 	reasonable 	medical 	probability, 	the 	care 	and
treatment rendered by the nurses, including but not limited
to Kimberly Mallon, RN working on behalf of Martin Health
System 	breached 	the 	accepted 	standards 	of 	care 	and
prevailing professional practice owed to Brittany Cordero and
her 	unborn 	child M.P. 	by 	failing to appropriately 	assess,
monitor, 	recognize, 	and 	respond 	to 	Brittany 	Cordero’s
condition 	on 	the 	morning 	of 	September 	21, 	2018 	which
resulted in the injuries sustained to [the minor child].1
We agree with the circuit judge that such vague, conclusory, and
boilerplate language failed to comply with section 766.203(2)’s presuit
investigation requirements.2
Plaintiffs primarily argue that the language “failing to appropriately
assess, monitor, recognize, and respond to Brittany Cordero’s condition,”
1 A registered nurse also provided an expert affidavit with substantially identical
language.
2 “Generally, a dismissal of a medical malpractice action for failure to comply with
the presuit requirements is reviewed for abuse of discretion. But the trial court’s
ruling that the appellants’ corroborating affidavit failed to comply with the
statutory requirements is reviewed de novo.” Tomas v. Sandler, 406 So. 3d 1089,
1093 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (quoting Oliveros v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc.,
45 So. 3d 873, 876 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)).

3
put forth by an expert, is sufficient to meet the definition of the word
“corroborate.”3
There are two problems with this argument. 	First, these words do not
meet the definition of “corroborate” in a vacuum. 	See Duffy v. Brooker,
614 So. 2d 539, 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), abrogated on other grounds as
recognized in Archer v. Maddux, 645 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
(adopting definition of “corroborate” that requires that the “statement
contain additional or supplemental information which strengthens the
conclusions offered by the medical expert,” and finding a statement that
“contained no additional facts or circumstances to confirm his ‘conclusory
allegations’” was deficient).
Second, even if the words met the definition of “corroborate,” the
argument 	ignores 	the 	rest 	of 	the 	words 	in 	section 	766.203(2).
“Corroborate” is a transitive verb. It must be read in conjunction with its
object, “reasonable grounds for medical negligence.” As we recently stated,
“the notice of intent to initiate litigation and the corroborating medical
expert opinion, taken together, must sufficiently indicate the manner in
which the defendant doctor allegedly deviated from the standard of care,
and must provide adequate information for the defendants to evaluate the
merits of the claim.” 	Potparic v. Barnes, 419 So. 3d 1100, 1103 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2025) (citation and quotations omitted).
The report here is boilerplate and ipse dixit; it does not “corroborate”
anything. 	After reading the report, we are left without any meaningful
indication that a presuit investigation was actually conducted; we are left
scratching 	our 	heads 	as 	to 	what 	“reasonable 	grounds 	for 	medical
negligence” any presuit investigation unearthed. The plain language of the
statute requires more than Plaintiffs provided.
We reached a similar result in Rafferty v. Martin Memorial Medical
Center, Inc., 335 So. 3d 144 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). 	There, we affirmed
dismissal against a hospital and its nursing staff where “nothing in the
statements addressed any deficiencies in the care provided by the hospital
and its nursing staff.” 	Id.
3 Plaintiffs also argue that reversal would serve section 766.203(2)’s purposes of
the statute, citing much discussion of such purposes. 	But “statutory purpose,
while undoubtedly relevant to legal interpretation, cannot trump the clear
requirements of the applicable text.” Krol v. FCA US, LLC, 310 So. 3d 1270, 1274
(Fla. 2021).

4
The Third District likewise recently reached a similar result in Tomas
v. Sandler, 406 So. 3d 1089, 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025). There, the plaintiffs
sued a hospital alleging negligent credentialing of a physician. Id. at 1091.
The court affirmed dismissal based on a deficient section 766.203(2)
affidavit. Id. at 1093–94. The court found that the corroborating affidavit
“devoid of detail as to the administrative standard of care relating to
credentialing or any supporting facts,” and thus the hospital “was left with
no information to evaluate the merits of the negligent credentialing claim.”
Id. at 1094.
Other 	courts 	have 	reached 	the 	same 	conclusion 	when 	faced 	with
similarly conclusory affidavits. 	See also, e.g., Duffy, 614 So. 2d at 545
(requiring 	more 	than 	“merely 	a 	reiteration 	of 	the 	statement 	to 	be
corroborated” and rejecting as insufficient “conclusory allegations” that
did not “sufficiently indicate the manner in which the [medical provider]
allegedly deviated from the standard of care”); Univ. of S. Fla. Bd. of Trs v.
Mann, 159 So. 3d 283, 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (finding “affidavit is plainly
insufficient as a statement to corroborate reasonable grounds to support
a claim of medical malpractice” where “nothing in the affidavit addresses
any deficiencies in the care provided by the nursing staff or supervisors”).
Courts have also found affidavits deficient where the affidavits fail to
articulate any opinion or factual basis supporting negligence by the named
defendant. 	Wells v. Quintero, 2026 WL 179234, at *4 (Fla. 5th DCA Jan.
23, 	2026) 	(“The 	affidavit 	contains 	no 	opinion 	whatsoever 	as 	to 	any
negligence by North Florida OBGYN or its medical support staff. As such,
North Florida OBGYN as a named defendant received no advance notice of
the impending litigation concerning its alleged negligence and was thereby
deprived of the statutorily granted ability to investigate the claim(s) and
resolve any meritorious claim without the need for adversarial litigation.
As a result, dismissal of count III should have been granted.”); Rell v.
McCulla, 101 So. 3d 878, 881 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (“[T]he issue here is
whether the McCullas’ corroborating affidavit sufficiently indicated that
the McCullas had a legitimate claim for medical malpractice.”); Largie v.
Gregorian, 913 So. 2d 635, 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (affidavit deficient
where “it makes no reference to the standard of care applicable to a
certified 	registered 	nurse 	practitioner 	or 	to 	any 	deviation 	from 	that
standard of care; and, it does not suggest, much less corroborate, that any
investigation took place with regard to Nurse Wang or that any reasonable
grounds exist to support the Largies’ claim against her . . . ”); cf. Michael
v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 947 So. 2d 614, 620 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (“[A]
medical expert affidavit must sufficiently demonstrate that a reasonable
investigation into the claim was undertaken.”).

5
Section 	766.203(2), 	of 	course, 	does not 	require 	“strict 	specificity.”
Michael, 947 So. 2d at 620–21. 	As Plaintiffs point out, section 766.203(2)
is not about providing notice to a defendant of the details of the claim.
Rather, section 766.203(2) concerns the plaintiffs’ obligation to investigate
the merit of their claims before filing suit.4 	Section 766.203(2) requires,
in connection with that investigation, an expert affidavit which “shall
corroborate 	reasonable 	grounds 	to 	support 	the 	claim 	of 	medical
negligence.” 	§ 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. (2023).
This statutory language does not permit “shoot first and ask questions
later” litigation—file the claim, supported by the conclusory ipse dixit of an
expert, and figure out later in the litigation what the purported negligence
was.
On this point, our decision in Potparic is instructive. There, we affirmed
dismissal where the “expert’s affidavit did not tend to corroborate the
negligence claim in [the plaintiff’s] second amended complaint,” because
“[t]he only theory of negligence described in the expert’s affidavit proved
unfounded and was abandoned.” 419 So. 3d at 1104. In other words, the
expert’s affidavit was insufficient even though he did sign a statement
saying that he believed the plaintiff’s claim for medical negligence had
merit (which is what Plaintiffs here argue is all that is required). 	That
expert said a certain theory had merit, but that theory in fact had no merit.
The plaintiff, after realizing that theory had no merit, tried to pivot to a
new theory. 	We held that the plaintiff could not assert a new theory
because she never investigated the new theory which she was trying to
plead.
Here, Plaintiffs’ conclusory affidavit contains no theory. 	Allowing this
to be sufficient would allow Plaintiffs to pivot to any theory which they
wished later in the litigation, regardless of whether they had investigated
such theory presuit. 	Potparic rightly held section 766.203(2) does not
allow this.
4 Plaintiffs cite dicta from Stebilla v. Mussallem, 595 So. 2d 136, 139 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1992), which has been repeated by other Florida courts, in which the court
quoted the appellant’s brief in that case for the proposition that the report
required by the statute “merely assures the Defendants, and the court, that a
medical expert has determined that there is justification for the Plaintiffs’ claim,
i.e., that it is not a frivolous medical malpractice claim. 	The purpose of the
medical expert opinion is to corroborate that the claim is legitimate, not to give
notice of it.”

6
We are not unsympathetic to our holding’s consequences, which may
effectively prevent Plaintiffs from further pursuing on the merits their
claims for catastrophic medical negligence. 	But the legislature left us
without 	discretion 	when 	the 	presuit 	investigation 	and 	affidavit
requirements are not met. 	In such case, “the court shall dismiss the
claim.” 	§ 766.206, Fla. Stat. (2021). 	The circuit court correctly did so
here.
Affirmed.5
MAY and CONNER , JJ., concur.
5 We summarily affirm on all other grounds raised by Plaintiffs.