State of Florida v. Raymond Reese

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant,
v.
RAYMOND REESE,
Appellee.
No. 4D2025-1445
[April 8, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward 	County; 	Lorena 	Mastrarrigo, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No. 	22-
000058CF10A.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mary Elizabeth
Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Summer Ivy Hill, Assistant Public
Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
SHEPHERD, J.
The State appeals a nonfinal order granting in part Raymond Reese’s
motion to suppress statements made during custodial interrogation. 	We
reverse.
Background
The defendant, Raymond Reese, is charged with first degree murder
with a firearm. 	Following his arrest, a detective spoke with the defendant
while the defendant sat in the back of a patrol vehicle. 	Another officer
recorded the interaction on his cell phone. After being advised of his rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, the defendant agreed to speak with detectives.
384 U.S. 436 (1966). 	A detective then asked the defendant where the
firearms used in the alleged murder were, and the defendant provided their
location. 	The detective also asked the defendant if he knew the woman
who was shot. 	The defendant’s response, according to both parties, was
unintelligible. The detective testified that the defendant did not invoke his

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right to counsel and that, if the defendant had done so, he would have
terminated questioning.
Officers then transported the defendant to a nearby police station
where the detective and another officer conducted a recorded interview in
an interrogation room. During the interview, the defendant acknowledged
that he had called 9-1-1 and stated: “Everything’s going bad at once. And
this lady put me to the edge, and I’m a good person. 	But this is on her,
man.” 	The defendant further explained that he called 9-1-1 because he
shot someone in Coral Springs but claimed he did not know the victim’s
identity.
Throughout the interview, the defendant stated that he was going to
need some sort of advice. 	At 16:35:031 in the recorded interview, the
defendant stated, “I know, you know, I don’t want this to go south, but I’m
telling you, I’m going to need some advice because I’m – I am too fucking
stupid.” 	Detectives continued questioning briefly until the defendant
specifically stated that he needed to speak with a lawyer.
The 	defendant 	subsequently 	moved 	to 	suppress 	his 	post-Miranda
statements, arguing that his Miranda rights had been violated during the
interrogation. 	After hearing testimony from the detective and reviewing
the 	recordings 	from 	both 	the 	patrol 	vehicle 	and 	the 	police 	station
interrogations, the trial court found that the defendant had been properly
advised of and had waived his Miranda rights. 	The trial court also
concluded, however, that the defendant had unequivocally invoked his
right to counsel at 16:35:03 in the recorded station interview and therefore
suppressed 	all 	statements 	made 	after 	that 	point. 	For 	the 	reasons
discussed 	below, 	we 	disagree 	with 	the 	trial 	court’s 	ruling 	that 	the
defendant unequivocally invoked his right to counsel.
Discussion
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of law and fact. Lowery v. State, 201 So. 3d 791, 792 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
While we defer to factual findings supported by competent, substantial
evidence, we review de novo the application of the law to those facts,
particularly where the evidence consists of recorded interviews equally
available to the appellate court. 	Scotsman v. State, 238 So. 3d 300, 303
(Fla. 4th DCA 2018).
1 The Court rejects Reese’s argument that the trial court was referring to a
different portion of the recording.

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“A reviewing court must consider the totality of the circumstances in
determining 	whether 	a 	suspect’s 	statement 	unequivocally 	invoked 	a
Miranda right.” 	Langel v. State, 298 So. 3d 87, 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)
(citation omitted). To be unequivocal, a suspect must articulate a request
for an attorney with sufficient clarity that a reasonable officer would
understand the statement to be a request for counsel to invoke the right
to counsel. 	Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (quoting
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991)). 	Ambiguous or equivocal
references to counsel do not require officers to cease questioning. State v.
Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla. 1997).
The defendant’s statement that he would “need some advice” did not
mention 	an 	attorney 	and 	was 	reasonably 	susceptible 	to 	multiple
interpretations. 	Police in Florida need not ask clarifying questions if a
defendant who has received proper Miranda warnings makes only an
equivocal or ambiguous request to terminate an interrogation after having
validly waived his or her Miranda rights. 	Owen, 696 So. 2d at 719; see
also State v. Craig, 237 So. 2d 737, 739–40 (Fla.1970) (holding that where
the defendant stated, “Well, I would like to have one [lawyer] in a way, but
I don[’]t see how it can help me,” the defendant had not invoked his right
to counsel); McKenzie v. State, 125 So. 3d 906, 910 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
(explaining that the statement, “I think I’d like a lawyer,” followed by the
defendant’s reinitiation of conversation with the interrogating officers was
an equivocal invocation of right to counsel). 	Notably, here the defendant
continued 	speaking 	with 	detectives 	after 	the 	statement, 	expressly
indicating that he did not mind continuing the conversation.
A generalized request for “advice” is not an unequivocal invocation of
the right to counsel under the objective standard governing Miranda
inquiries. See Washington v. State, 253 So. 3d 64, 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)
(holding that a defendant’s question to officers as to whether he needed an
attorney amounted to a request for advice about his rights and therefore
was not an unequivocal request for counsel); State v. Perez, 179 P.3d 346,
348-50 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008) (“His statement to the officers was, ‘Yeah, I
think I need advice, man.’ As Perez did not directly refer to a desire to see
to an attorney, he may have been expressing a wish for advice from family,
friends, a clergyman, or other advisor. Viewed objectively, Perez’ statement
would not necessarily be understood by a reasonable police officer as a
present request for an attorney.”).
Throughout 	the 	interview, 	any 	hesitation 	about 	talking 	with 	the
detectives appeared to be more related to not wanting to hear details of the
alleged crime, rather than a desire for an attorney. 	The defendant turned

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himself 	into 	the 	police, 	freely 	admitted 	to 	shooting 	the 	victim, 	and
volunteered information such as the murder weapon’s location.
Later in the interview, the defendant clearly stated that he would like
to speak with a lawyer, at which point detectives immediately terminated
the interrogation. 	Because the defendant’s earlier reference to needing
“advice” was not an unambiguous request for counsel, the trial court erred
in suppressing the statements that followed that ambiguous comment.
Accordingly, 	we 	reverse 	the 	order 	granting 	in 	part 	the 	motion 	to
suppress and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
M AY and C ONNER , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.