Kenneth Lindsey Mayfield v. State of Florida

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
KENNETH LINDSEY MAYFIELD,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 4D2025-0356
[January 21, 2026]
Appeal from the County Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.
Lucie County; Jeffrey Hendriks, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562023MM002487A.
Daniel 	Eisinger, 	Public 	Defender, 	and 	Benjamin 	Nathaniel 	Paley,
Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
James 	Uthmeier, 	Attorney 	General, 	Tallahassee, 	and 	Nathanial
Leblanc, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
PER CURIAM .
Affirmed.
M AY , CIKLIN, and L OTT , JJ., concur.
LOTT , J., concurs with separate opinion.
LOTT , J., concurring.
I fully join our summary affirmance in this case.
I write separately to address some of Appellant’s complaints regarding
the summary affirmance, otherwise known as the “per curiam affirmance”
or “PCA.” 	In particular, Appellant complains that “a PCA can give the
impression that this Court does not care about the issues presented.”
Appellant’s Brief at 17. 	Appellant is not alone in raising such concerns.1
1 See, e.g., Bennett H. Brummer, Independent, Professional Judgment: The
Essence of Freedom, 10 St. Thomas L. Rev. 607, 615 n.31 (1998) (“The current
PCA practice deprives litigants of an understanding of the basis on which their

2
In my view, one of the root causes for the proliferation of the PCA in
Florida appellate jurisprudence is the lack of any selective publication
mechanism.2 	A 	selective 	publication 	system 	could 	be 	a 	resource-
conscious means to address the complaints that Appellant and others like
him have made against the PCA. 	Let me explain.
cases 	are 	decided, 	increases 	the 	likelihood 	that 	arguable 	issues 	will 	be
overlooked, 	sometimes 	conceals 	inconsistent 	intradistrict 	and 	interdistrict
dispositions, 	detracts 	from 	the 	public’s 	confidence 	in 	the 	district 	courts’
accessibility and fairness, obstructs access to and review in the supreme court,
and generally diminishes the reliability of individual decisions and the appellate
process 	in 	general.”); 	District 	Court 	of 	Appeal 	Workload 	and 	Jurisdiction
Assessment Committee, Report and Recommendations, Appendix B (Minutes from
September 	7, 	2006 	Meeting) 	at 	9 	(2006), 	https://flcourts-
media.flcourts.gov/content/download/242828/file/2006_DCAReport.pdf (“[T]he
committee agreed that PCAs are an ongoing problem that is reaffirmed by the
information received by the Committee. 	It negatively affects public trust and
confidence.”); Steven Brannock & Sarah Weinzierl, Confronting A PCA: Finding a
Path around a Brick Wall, 32 Stetson L. Rev. 367, 369 (2003) (“[C]omplaints about
PCAs far surpass their praises.”); Ezequiel Lugo, The Conflict PCA: When an
Affirmance Without Opinion Conflicts with A Written Opinion, 85-APR Fla. B.J. 46
(2011), (“[Such] criticism [of PCAs] appears valid because similarly situated
appellants 	throughout the 	state 	sometimes 	receive 	disparate 	treatment by
different panels of the same court or different district courts.”); Adam Richardson,
Is the PCA Constitutional?, 99-JUN Fla. B.J. 32 (2025) (“Lawyers have complained
about [PCAs] for decades.”).
2 Plenty of others have, to be sure, considered such a system. 	See, e.g., Harry
Lee Anstead, Selective Publication: An Alternative to the PCA?, 34 U. Fla. L. Rev.
189 (1982), https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol34/iss2/2/ (considering and
recommending Florida courts adopt, in part, such a system); Stephen Krosschell,
DCAs, PCAs, and Government in the Darkness, 1 Fla. Coastal L.J. 13, 64 (1999)
(“[A] selective publication rule has significant advantages over Florida’s present
system.”); 	Florida 	Judicial 	Management 	Council, 	Final 	Report 	and
Recommendations, Committee on Per Curiam Affirmed Decisions, at 32 (May 2000),
https://flcourts-media.flcourts.gov/content/download/242834/file/pca-
report.pdf (considering whether present publication system should be modified
to include a system of unpublished opinions but ultimately declining to address
the issue as beyond the scope of its report given that such a system would have
only an “indirect effect” on the use of PCAs); Craig E. Leen, Without Explanation:
Judicial Restraint, Per Curiam Affirmances, and the Written Opinion Rule, 12 FIU
L. Rev. 309, 324 (2017) (“To the extent district appellate courts are concerned
about writing short explanations that could then become binding precedent with
unintended consequences, allowing issuance of short unpublished opinions may
solve this problem.”).

3
* 	* 	*
Federal appellate courts, and many other states’ appellate courts, have
a “selective publication” system in which panels may select which opinions
are to be published and accordingly afforded precedential effect, and which
opinions are not to be published and thus not afforded precedential effect.3
For federal courts, published opinions are published into the Federal
Reporter, whereas unpublished opinions are published into the Federal
Appendix. 	Unpublished opinions may, depending on a court’s rules, be
cited as persuasive authority, but need not be followed as precedent by
any other panel or court.
Florida, by contrast, has no selective publication regime. 	To the
contrary, 	rule 	9.040(i) 	provides 	that 	“the 	court 	must 	make 	publicly
available on the court’s website all written opinions entered on an appeal
or petition,” and our precedent holds that “the decisions of the district
courts of appeal represent the law of Florida unless and until they are
overruled by this Court.” 	Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(i); Pardo v. State, 596 So.
2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992) (cleaned up). 	Written appellate decisions are
binding not only on subsequent panels of that appellate court4 but also on
3 See, e.g., 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding
precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority”); U.S.Ct. of App. 11th
Cir. R. 36-3 (“At any time before the mandate has issued, the panel, on its own
motion or upon the motion of a party, may by unanimous vote order a previously
unpublished opinion to be published”); 11th Cir. R. 36-2, I.O.P. 2 (“Under the law
of this circuit, published opinions are binding precedent.”) see also Jennings v.
Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 108 F.4th 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2024) (“Under this
Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule, [a] holding is binding on all subsequent
panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation
by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc.”) (cleaned up); Rodemaker
v. City of Valdosta Bd. of Educ., 110 F.4th 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2024) (“We must
follow precedent embodied in published opinions.”); Patterson v. Georgia Pac.,
LLC, 38 F.4th 1336, 1346 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Our unpublished opinions are not
precedential, so they do not bind us or district courts to any degree.”).
4 See Fox v. Fox, 262 So. 3d 789, 792 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (“A panel of our court
has no authority to overrule or recede from our precedent on the same legal
issue.”); see also BAM Trading Services, Inc. v. Office of Fin. Regulation, 395 So.
3d 687, 694 n.* (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (Bilbrey, J., concurring) (“Except the
relatively new Sixth District, which has apparently not addressed the issue, the
prior panel precedent doctrine is followed by all Florida district courts.”); but see
id. at 694–98. (Tanenbaum, J., concurring) (advocating departure from prior
panel precedent rule).

4
every 	trial 	court 	in the 	state 	(absent a 	conflict 	among 	the 	appellate
courts).5
The PCA, and its cousin the “citation PCA,” are the lone exceptions to
the precedent rule. 	“[A] per curiam affirmance decision without written
opinion has no precedential value and should not be relied on for anything
other than res judicata.” 	State v. Swartz, 734 So. 2d 448, 448 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1999) (citation omitted).6 	Indeed, PCAs inherently cannot be of
precedential value because “[w]ithout a written opinion, the trial court
could only speculate regarding the rationale underlying this court’s per
curiam affirmance decision.” 	Id.7
Thus, the PCA is the only option available to panels of appellate judges
who do not wish for their opinion in a particular case to be “the law of
Florida.”
There 	are 	many 	reasons 	why 	a 	panel 	would 	not 	want 	to 	create
precedent in a case. 	The most pressing is judicial economy, for at least
two reasons. First, given the impact of a precedential opinion, a published
opinion needs to accurately reflect existing precedent and the law, even if
the parties’ briefs do not thoroughly or accurately discuss it. 	It takes
enormous court resources to do a good job of this.8 Second, not every case
merits a publication-quality opinion that is binding on future courts.
5 See Nader v. Fla. Dep’t. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 87 So. 3d 712, 724
(Fla. 2012) (“[T]here is a judicially imposed requirement that a circuit court must
abide by precedent from another district court of appeal if no precedent exists
from its own district.”).
6 Citation PCAs are not reviewable by the Florida Supreme Court so long as the
cited cases are good law and not under review. See Persaud v. State, 838 So. 2d
529, 532 (Fla. 2003); see also Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418, 422 (Fla. 1981)
(Boyd, J., dissenting) (“A citation of authority is not an opinion.”).
7 Accord State Comm’n on Ethics v. Sullivan, 430 So. 2d 928, 932 (Fla. 1st DCA
1983) (“The case law on the effect of a ‘per curiam, affirmed’ decision (PCA) is
clear: It becomes the law of the case, is res judicata, but is not stare decisis.”).
8 Accord Committee on Per Curiam Affirmed Decisions, supra note 3, at x (“The
PCA Committee is of the opinion that the present caseload facing each district
court judge would make such opinion writing a significant burden, in terms of
judicial time, and could subtract from time available for writing opinions in cases
where such writing is more deserved.”).

5
Issuing such would clog up the reporters without meaningfully developing
or clarifying the law.9
I, for one, would welcome a system of selective publication which would
allow 	district 	judges 	in 	appropriate 	cases 	to 	issue 	non-precedential
opinions 	binding 	only 	on 	the 	parties 	before 	them 	that 	explain 	their
reasoning in those cases with more specificity than a PCA.10
District 	judges 	and 	others, 	to 	be 	sure, 	have 	lodged 	many 	sound
defenses of the PCA.11 Thus a selective publication system need not, and
should not, end the PCA entirely.
9 Accord Committee on Per Curiam Affirmed Decisions, supra note 2, at 3 (“[M]any
appeals that come before the DCAs are matters well established by law and that
written opinions in these matters would serve not to further define but confuse
the law, and further clutter an already crowded reporter system”); Whipple v.
State, 431 So. 2d 1011, 1012 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (declining to write opinion where
“an opinion would not have been of any significant assistance to the bench or bar
of this state”).
10 I do not doubt that this is a minority position among district judges. See, e.g.,
Williams v. State, 425 So. 2d 1163, 1164 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (Orfinger, C.J.,
concurring 	specially) 	(“In 	this 	writer’s 	opinion, 	selective 	publication 	would
enhance, rather than alleviate, appellate overload problems, because wherever
the system is used, there is usually a concomitant requirement that an opinion
of some kind be written in every case, even if not for publication.”).
11 See, e.g., Elliott v. Elliott, 648 So. 2d 137, 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (“[T]he notion
that an appellate practitioner would view a per curiam disposition, without
opinion, as lacking in a meaningful review is absolutely astounding.”); Horn v.
Marine Hosp. Corp., 745 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“In cases so lacking
in merit as this one, however, a written opinion would serve no useful purpose.
An opinion would not explain anything to the appellant that would not already
be apparent from the record in this case. 	Other cases in which we routinely
affirm without opinion are (1) those in which appellant is unable to establish error
because of the lack of a transcript of a trial, (2) those in which the appellant has
failed to preserve the error by making an objection in the trial court, and (3) those
in which litigants (often pro se) are unable to identify any specific error made by
the trial court but are simply unhappy with the result. Those who would advocate
requiring appellate courts to write opinions in all cases would be surprised at
how many cases fall in the above categories . . . . [A PCA would] unnecessarily
enlarge 	the 	Southern 	Reporter 	and 	further 	burden 	attorneys 	with 	their
research.”) (quotation and citation omitted); Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 172 So.
2d 907, 908 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) (“[O]pinions generally are dispensed with
upon affirming cases which do not involve new or unusual points of law, or which
turn on facts to which established rules of law are applicable, or where a full or
adequate opinion has been supplied by the trial judge; and where the writing of

6
Indeed, summary affirmances are explicitly permitted in Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 36(a)(2) and routinely issued by federal courts even
in lieu of unpublished opinions.12
Rather, a selective publication system would preserve the PCA while
also allowing many of the benefits of the PCA to be manifested in short
unpublished opinions, providing an avenue for panels to explain their
reasoning to litigants in appropriate cases sufficiently for litigants to
understand that their arguments were, indeed, thoroughly considered and
rejected on the merits.13 	Further, while a panel might choose to spend
marginally more resources drafting unpublished affirming opinions than
it would drafting PCAs, it could conserve resources in a new-found ability
to issue shorter, non-precedential reversing opinions.
an opinion would be without useful purpose, serving only to satisfy the parties
that the court adverted to the issues and gave them attention, and to add
needlessly to an already excessive volume of opinions.”); Whipple, 431 So. 2d at
1015 (“The fact remains, however, that most of the cases cited by zealous
advocates as being in direct conflict with our PCA decisions are simply not close
enough to write about.”); Crittenden v. State, 67 So. 3d 1184, 1185 n.1 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2011) (“We reiterate that a per curiam affirmance without opinion is not an
indication that the case was not considered on the merits. Each and every appeal
receives the same degree of attention.”); Committee on Per Curiam Affirmed
Decisions, supra note 3, at x (largely defending PCAs); see also H. Michael Muñiz,
Oh No! Not A Per Curiam Affirmed Decision on My Appeal, 93-JUN Fla. B.J. 26
(2019) at 28 (identifying six circumstances for PCAs and noting that “[o]bjectively
considered, such grounds may not be deemed unreasonable.”).
12 One survey found that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued Rule
36 summary affirmances in 16 to 32 percent of judgments each year in an eight-
year period. See Daniel Roberts, et al., Predicting Fed. Circ. Rule 36 Affirmances
in 	Patent 	Cases, 	Law 	360 	(October 	12, 	2021),
https://www.dechert.com/content/dam/dechert%20files/people/bios/h/kathe
rine-a--helm/Predicting-Fed-Circ-Rule-36-Affirmances-In-Patent-Cases.pdf.
13 Accord Anstead, 34 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 215 (“Adding selective publication to the
list of opinion options available to Florida appellate judges will not guarantee a
written opinion in every case. 	It will, however, remove one existing obstacle by
permitting judges to write opinions for the benefit of the parties without worrying
that by doing so an additional burden is being placed on the legal community.”).

7
* 	* 	*
This is all quite hypothetical for now. 	It does not appear that any
mechanism for selective publication could come about without concerted
change to Supreme Court precedent and the appellate rules.14
Until such change occurs, the PCA will not be going anywhere.
I therefore join our PCA in this case.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.
14 Cf. Anstead, 34 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 201 (discussing consideration and rejection
of selective publication by Appellate Rules Committee).