Sanjay Johnson v. State of Florida

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
SANJAY JOHNSON,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 4D2023-2802
[April 15, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward 	County; 	Martin 	Samuel 	Fein, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
17007053CF10A.
Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Timothy Wang, Assistant Public
Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
James 	Uthmeier, 	Attorney 	General, 	Tallahassee, 	and 	Sorraya 	M.
Solages-Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for
appellee.
L EVINE , J.
Appellant appeals his convictions and sentences for second-degree
murder and child abuse without great harm. On appeal, appellant argues
that the trial court erred by: (1) allowing the state to introduce evidence of
a baseball bat that was allegedly insufficiently connected to the crime, (2)
sentencing appellant based on uncharged conduct, (3) denying appellant’s
motion to correct a written restitution order which did not comport with
the trial court’s oral pronouncement, (4) utilizing a “random sequence”
jury selection process, (5) having a six-person jury rather than a twelve-
person jury, and (6) denying appellant’s request for jury instructions of
several lesser-included offenses.1 	Appellant claims that he should get a
1 Appellant concedes that the fourth issue was previously decided by this court
in Paul v. State, 407 So. 3d 468 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025), rev. granted, No. SC2025-
0478, 2025 WL 1672365 (Fla. June 13, 2025). Appellant also concedes that the
fifth issue was previously decided by this court in Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d
72, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), rev. denied, No. SC2022-1597, 2023 WL 3830251

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new trial. 	We think otherwise. 	As such, we affirm on all issues raised,
and we remand only to correct a scrivener’s error in appellant’s written
restitution order.
Appellant was charged with second-degree murder following the death
of the victim, appellant’s wife. 	The state alleged that appellant beat the
victim with a baseball bat until she bled out internally. Appellant was also
charged with child abuse without great bodily harm, based on the state’s
allegation 	that 	the 	six-year-old 	son 	of 	appellant 	and 	the 	victim 	saw
appellant hitting the victim with the baseball bat.
Appellant filed a motion in limine requesting that the trial court exclude
any testimony regarding a baseball bat found at appellant and the victim’s
residence. Appellant argued that the baseball bat was insufficiently linked
to the charged crime. 	The trial court disagreed and denied appellant’s
motion.
Police testified at the trial that they responded to appellant and the
victim’s residence, following a 911 call in the early morning hours of June
16, 2017. 	They found the victim unresponsive in the bedroom shared by
appellant, the victim, and their child. 	Appellant was performing CPR on
the victim. 	The bedroom was in disarray, and there appeared to be blood
stains around the room. 	An officer noticed the child asleep in the room
and carried him outside the bedroom to another officer.
Appellant told law enforcement that the victim was in the bathtub while
they were having a conversation about their future. 	Appellant said the
victim told him that she fell and hit her head, but as he was drowsy, he
did not see the victim fall. Appellant helped the victim out of the bathroom
into their bedroom and tried to help control the bleeding. 	Appellant then
awoke their roommate, who lived in the other bedroom, for help. Appellant
admitted 	that 	he 	and 	the 	victim 	were 	arguing 	but 	claimed 	that 	the
argument had not turned physical.
Multiple witnesses, including the medical examiner, testified that there
were 	visible 	injuries 	on 	the 	victim, 	such 	as 	lacerations, 	contusions,
bruising, and discoloration. 	The medical examiner testified that the
victim’s injuries were “consistent with being caused by a cylindric object.”
The medical examiner determined that the manner of the victim’s death
was homicide, and 	the cause of the 	victim’s death was 	“blunt force
(Fla. June 6, 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2595 (2024). We find the sixth issue
to be without merit. 	As such, we affirm these three issues without further
comment.

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injuries.” The medical examiner further testified that the victim “had a lot
of injuries. All of them together caused her death.” The emergency doctor,
who attempted to treat the victim when she arrived at the hospital, also
testified that the victim’s injuries were not consistent with a fall or a car
crash.
One of the detectives made contact with the child who volunteered
information relating to a baseball bat. 	Another detective located a black
and blue baseball bat behind a television in the family’s bedroom. 	This
detective also recovered surveillance footage and a receipt indicating that
appellant had purchased a bat on June 6, 2017, ten days before the
victim’s death.
The child, who was appellant and the victim’s son, also testified at trial.
The child, who was six years old at the time of the incident, was twelve at
the time of the trial. 	He heard appellant and the victim “yelling and
screaming.” 	The child said he saw appellant hit the victim with a black
and blue baseball bat. 	The child did not know how many times appellant
hit the victim with the bat, or where appellant hit the victim. 	He said his
memory of appellant hitting the victim with a bat “wasn’t a dream” because
there was “blood on [his] shirt.”
The child was shown the bat recovered from the bedroom. 	He said it
“kind of looks like” the bat appellant was using to hit the victim. The child
remembered the bat being bigger, but he was six years old and smaller at
the time of the incident.
According to the roommate, appellant believed that the victim was
cheating on him. 	The day before the incident occurred, appellant called
the roommate to express his concerns that the victim was seeing other
men. 	Later 	that 	evening, 	after 	the 	victim 	had 	returned 	home, 	the
roommate heard a “commotion,” and it sounded like appellant and the
victim were arguing. After the roommate had fallen asleep that night, she
was awoken by appellant pounding on her door asking for help. 	The
roommate followed appellant to his bedroom and saw the victim on the
floor not breathing. 	The roommate called 911. 	Later, while executing a
search warrant for the apartment, the detective found a note allegedly
written by the victim, in a pile of clothes, in which the victim admitted to
adultery.
The jury found appellant guilty of second-degree murder and child
abuse as charged in the information. 	At the sentencing hearing, the trial
court stated that it was “making this determination based only, only, on
the criminal history of the [appellant], the facts of the case as I heard in

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the trial, [and] the victims’ statements and feelings in that regard, which I
read in the PSI, as well as what has been presented here today, as well as
any and all mitigation that has been presented on behalf of [appellant].”
The trial court continued:
So, again, only relying on the four criteria that I already
articulated, the criminal history of the Defendant, the facts of
the case, the victims’ statements or feelings, and then all
mitigation. 	The underlying facts of this case that I heard at
the trial are egregious, egregious. The State is the prosecuting
authority, they make these decisions, I’m just the referee, but
what I heard and what I saw was premeditation in the form of
purchasing this baseball bat at some period of time ahead of
time, and then either a heightened level of premeditation that
would be cold and calculated or heinous, atrocious and cruel
based on what happened to the victim in this case, or both,
and 	then 	we 	might 	be 	sitting 	here 	in 	a 	whole 	different
proceeding, but the State didn’t elect to go that route, so I’m
not considering it as a first degree murder case, but that was
certainly the evidence that I heard. 	The injuries that the
victim suffered in this case, the cause of death specifically, it’s
a new one on me, and I have been in this business a long time,
to have such internal injuries that it causes you to bleed
internally to the point where you lose so much volume of blood
that you lose your life, I couldn’t find facts more egregious.
Appellant was sentenced to life in prison on the second-degree murder
count, 	and 	five 	years 	in 	prison 	on 	the 	child 	abuse 	count, 	with 	the
sentences to run concurrently. 	Appellant was also ordered to pay $7,500
in restitution to the Crime Victims Compensation Fund. 	The written
restitution order stated that the trial 	court “retain[ed] jurisdiction to
modify restitution in this case.” 	Appellant filed a motion to correct
sentencing error, arguing that the written restitution order conflicted with
the trial court’s oral pronouncement, because the trial court did not orally
pronounce that it would retain jurisdiction to modify restitution. 	The
state, at that time, conceded that the restitution order should be corrected.
The trial court did not rule on appellant’s motion within 60 days, so it was
deemed denied. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B) (“[I]f the trial court does
not file an order ruling on the motion within 60 days, the motion shall be
deemed denied.”). 	This appeal follows.

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Issue 1 – Sufficiency of the Connection Between
the Baseball Bat and the Alleged Crime
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the state to
introduce evidence of the baseball bat, because the state failed to establish
a sufficient nexus between the bat and the crime charged. 	“The standard
of review for the admissibility of evidence is abuse of discretion, limited by
the rules of evidence.” 	Bartholomew v. State, 101 So. 3d 888, 891 (Fla.
4th DCA 2012).
“It 	is 	well-settled 	that 	in 	order 	for 	evidence 	of 	a 	[weapon] 	to 	be
admissible as relevant in a criminal trial, the state must show a sufficient
link between the weapon and the crime.” Metayer v. State, 89 So. 3d 1003,
1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). 	“Conversely, when the nexus between the
weapon or ammunition and the crime is too tenuous, such evidence is
generally not relevant.” 	Holloway v. State, 114 So. 3d 296, 297 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2013). 	“In determining whether a sufficient nexus exists, the trial
court can consider testimony identifying distinct similarities between the
weapon used in the crime and the weapon proffered at trial. Likewise, the
lapse of time between the crime and the discovery of the proffered evidence
may be a considerable factor for the court.” 	Gartner v. State, 118 So. 3d
273, 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (citation omitted). 	“A sufficient nexus does
not, however, require testimony that the proffered weapon is definitively
the weapon that was used during the crime.” 	Id.
The state established a sufficient nexus between the baseball bat and
the crime charged to allow introduction of the bat and the corresponding
testimony. 	The child’s testimony that appellant was using a black and
blue bat to hit the victim established “distinct similarities between the
weapon used in the crime and the weapon proffered at trial.” 	Id. 	The
medical examiner’s testimony that the victim’s injuries were “consistent
with 	being 	caused 	by 	a 	cylindric 	object,” 	also 	provided 	“distinct
similarities” between the bat and the victim’s injuries. 	The court could
also consider the fact that the bat was located soon after the crime had
been committed. See id. Further, the bat was found in close proximity to
the victim in the bedroom, and appellant had purchased a bat ten days
before, within temporal proximity, to the incident. 	These factors, taken
together, established more than a sufficient link between the bat and the
crime charged for the bat to be admitted into evidence.
Appellant relies on Metayer. 	Metayer involved a “triple shooting” with
three victims and a codefendant. 	89 So. 3d at 1004-05. 	One of the
surviving victims testified that there were two guns at the scene. 	Id. at
1008. 	It was conclusively established that the codefendant’s .40 caliber

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gun and the decedent’s .45 caliber gun were used in the crime. 	Id. at
1005-06. Metayer was arrested at his mother’s home six months after the
incident. 	Id. at 1006. 	At the time of Metayer’s arrest, police found a .40
caliber gun and two .45 caliber magazines in the house, which were
admitted into evidence over Metayer’s objection that the items were not
linked to the crime. 	Id. 	The prosecutor argued that there was the
possibility of a third weapon at the scene. 	Id. at 1008. 	The only evidence
linking Metayer’s .40 caliber gun to the crime was a firearm expert’s
testimony that projectiles recovered from the surviving victim “could have
been fired from any .40 caliber weapon.” 	Id. at 1006, 1008. 	This court
held that “the state failed to show a sufficient link between the shootings
and the firearm and ammunition found in [Metayer’s] mother’s home.” Id.
at 1007.
Metayer is clearly distinguishable. 	That is because: (1) evidence in
Metayer established that the other two weapons were used in commission
of the crime, (2) Metayer’s gun was not recovered by police until six months
after the incident, and (3) there was no eyewitness testimony as to any
distinct characteristics on Metayer’s gun. 	The fact that the projectiles
recovered from the surviving victim’s person could have been fired from
any .40 caliber weapon did not sufficiently link Metayer’s gun to the crime.
Thus, Metayer differs from the instant case, since here there was no
testimony of other weapons used, the bat was recovered immediately after
the incident and was located in the same room as the victim, and the child
testified that appellant beat the victim with a bat with the same colors as
the bat recovered. 	Other testimony that linked a bat being used as the
weapon 	included 	the 	medical 	examiner’s 	testimony 	that 	the 	victim’s
injuries were consistent with being caused by a cylindrical object.
We find the present case to be more similar to Holloway and Gartner.
In Holloway, the trial court allowed the state to introduce evidence that a
half box of .32 caliber bullets was found in the defendant’s home. 114 So.
3d at 296. This court held that the state established an “adequate nexus”
between the bullets and the crime to establish relevancy because the
bullets were of the same caliber as those used to kill the victim, the bullets
were for a revolver or a pistol and “evidence established that the murder
weapon was most likely a revolver,” and further the bullets were found on
the day of the murder. 	Id. at 297.
In Gartner, the court found a sufficient nexus between the weapon
displayed during a robbery and a BB gun found in the defendant’s vehicle,
where the victim testified that she recognized the grips and shape of the
handles of the pistol, and the BB gun was seized from the defendant’s
vehicle only two days after the robbery. 	118 So. 3d at 276-77. 	Like in

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Gartner, here, the child recognized the colors of the black and blue bat
alleged to have been used in the crime and recovered the same day.
In 	both 	Holloway 	and 	Gartner, 	even 	though 	the 	weapon 	was 	not
definitively determined to be the same weapon used in the commission of
the crime, there was still sufficient evidence for the jury to properly infer
that the weapon could have been used in the crime. Just like those cases,
in the present instance, even though there was no evidence definitively
determining that the bat was the weapon, the nexus linking the bat to the
crime was certainly sufficient for its admission into evidence.
Appellant’s arguments on appeal go to the weight to be afforded to the
bat rather than its admissibility. Id. at 276 (“[I]f it is inconclusive that the
proffered weapon is the weapon used during the crime but a sufficient
nexus exists, it is the jury’s province to determine the credibility and
weight of the evidence.”). 	For example, while the medical examiner could
not “say with any more specificity” what the cylindrical object was, any
uncertainty as to the object went to the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility. 	Appellant did in fact attack the weight of 	the bat as
evidence, for example by pointing out that swabs of the bat were not tested
for DNA.
The 	bat 	was 	clearly 	admissible 	in 	the 	instant 	case, 	as 	the 	state
established a sufficient nexus between the bat and the crime charged.
Issue 2 – Sentencing
Appellant argues that the trial court improperly based the sentence
upon its belief that appellant committed premeditated first-degree murder.
Appellant concedes that he did not object to the trial court’s statements at
sentencing. 	“However, ‘a trial court’s consideration of a constitutionally
impermissible sentencing factor is a fundamental error in the sentencing
process’ reviewable for the first time on direct appeal.” 	Landis v. State,
404 So. 3d 405, 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (citation omitted).
“[W]hen a trial court relies on impermissible factors in sentencing a
defendant, the court violates the defendant’s due process rights.” Charles
v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). 	“[U]nsubstantiated
allegations of misconduct or speculation that the defendant probably
committed other crimes may not be relied upon by a trial court in imposing
sentence.” 	Nusspickel v. State, 966 So. 2d 441, 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
It is abundantly clear that the trial court did not rely upon uncharged
conduct in sentencing appellant. 	The trial court articulated the four

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criteria it was relying upon in sentencing appellant. 	That included: (1)
appellant’s “criminal history,” (2) “the facts of the case,” (3) “the victims’
statements and feelings,” and (4) “all mitigation” evidence. “The trial court
is permitted to consider the circumstances surrounding the crimes for
which appellant was being sentenced.” 	Landis, 404 	So. 	3d at 411;
Alhasani v. State, 397 So. 3d 814, 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024) (“Trial courts
are permitted ‘to consider the circumstances surrounding the primary
offense . . . .’”) (citation omitted). 	The trial court gave no indication that it
relied on impermissible factors when sentencing appellant. The trial court
merely noted that the facts of the case indicated that appellant may have
premeditated the crime. 	It noted that appellant had just purchased the
baseball bat, that the victim died of internal injuries due to loss of blood,
and that the facts were “egregious.” 	Still, there is no indication that the
trial court sentenced appellant as if he was charged with first-degree
murder.
Where the trial court gives no indication that it relied on impermissible
factors, affirmance of a sentence is warranted. 	See State v. Garcia, 346
So. 3d 581, 586 (Fla. 2022); see also Serrano v. State, 279 So. 3d 296, 302
(Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“[T]here must be some indication that the court based
its sentence on an impermissible factor before this Court will reverse.”).
Instead, “we can rely on the trial court to adhere to proper sentencing
factors and to not consider improper information when meting out a
sentence.” 	Landis, 404 So. 3d at 412. 	“[T]rial judges are routinely made
aware of information which may not be properly considered in determining
a cause. 	Our judicial system is dependent upon the ability of trial judges
to disregard improper information and to adhere to the requirements of
the law in deciding a case or in imposing a sentence.” 	Harvard v. State,
414 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Fla. 1982). 	That is true in this case.
The 	trial 	court’s 	belief 	that 	appellant 	potentially 	could 	have 	been
charged with first-degree murder is more akin to comments made at
sentencing in Nusspickel. During sentencing in Nusspickel, the trial judge
“commented as to his belief that the jury gave Nusspickel a pardon by
convicting her of lesser charges. The judge emphasized his concern about
the seriousness of the incident and the punishment that Nusspickel would
have faced had she been convicted of the more serious charges.” 	966 So.
2d at 446. 	The trial judge later explained that “his comments regarding a
jury pardon were not made to justify the sentences but were made to
emphasize to Nusspickel that she was fortunate to avoid felony convictions
and the resulting exposure to a maximum sentence of 105 years in state
prison and a minimum guidelines sentence of 17 years.” 	Id. 	The Second
District 	found 	that 	the 	trial 	judge 	did 	not 	rely 	on 	impermissible

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considerations, 	holding 	that 	the 	record 	“include[d] 	the 	judge’s 	own
explanation as to his intent in making the complained-of comments.” 	Id.
Similarly, here, even though the trial court expressed its concern about
the serious nature of the offense and that appellant could have potentially
been charged with first-degree murder, ultimately, the trial court indicated
that it knew obviously appellant was not charged with first-degree murder,
and that it was relying only on four permissible criteria in deciding
appellant’s sentence. 	Thus, we find no error in appellant’s sentencing.
Issue 3 – Restitution Order
Finally, appellant correctly argues that his written restitution order
must be corrected to comport with the trial court’s oral pronouncement.
“Because a motion to correct a sentencing error involves a pure issue of
law, our standard of review is de novo.” 	Brooks v. State, 199 So. 3d 974,
976 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (citation omitted). 	As conceded by the state, the
trial court did not orally pronounce that it would retain jurisdiction to
modify the restitution order. However, the written sentencing order states
that the trial court “retains jurisdiction to modify restitution in this case.”
“[W]hen there is a discrepancy between the written sentence and ‘the
oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement prevails.’” 	State v. Akins,
69 So. 3d 261, 269 (Fla. 2011) (citation omitted). 	Restitution orders are
subject to this rule of oral pronouncement. 	See Trueblood v. State, 635
So. 2d 1024, 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (reversing restitution order not
orally pronounced at sentencing). This additional provision in the written
restitution order, retaining indefinite jurisdiction to modify restitution,
thus represents a scrivener’s error that must be deleted. See Blair v. State,
336 So. 3d 304, 307-08 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).
In summary, we affirm and remand for the trial court to correct only
the solitary scrivener’s error in appellant’s written restitution order. 	As
such, appellant does not need to be present for this ministerial correction.
Stephenson v. State, 368 So. 3d 5, 6 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).
Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
FORST and S HEPHERD , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.