Domenique Wilson v. Rashaldo Martin

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
DOMENIQUE WILSON,
Appellant,
v.
RASHALDO MARTIN,
Appellee.
No. 4D2024-3155
[November 12, 2025]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Sara Alijewicz, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502021DR001254.
Scott E. Siverson of the Siverson Law Firm PLLC, Winter Garden, for
appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
KLINGENSMITH, J.
Appellant Domenique Wilson (“Mother”) appeals the final judgment of
paternity and order denying her motion for rehearing. Although she raises
four arguments on appeal, we find only two have merit. 	First, the trial
court erred by including a prospective relocation time-sharing default
provision in the final judgment of paternity. 	Second, the trial court erred
by allowing the father to pick up the children at their school, where the
mother worked, in violation of a pre-existing final judgment of injunction.
On both of these arguments, we reverse. 	We affirm on all other issues
without comment.
Prior to the underlying proceedings, the trial court granted a final
judgment of injunction for protection against domestic violence with minor
children (after notice) against Appellee Rashaldo Martin (“Father”). 	The
final judgment of injunction stated in pertinent part:
[Father] shall not to go to, in or within 500 feet of: [Mother’s]
current residence . . . or any residence to which [Mother] may
move; 	[Mother’s] 	current 	or 	any 	subsequent 	place 	of
employment . . . or place where [Mother] attends school; or the

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following 	other 	places 	(if 	requested 	by 	[Mother]) 	where
[Mother] or [Mother’s] minor child(ren) go often:
[Father] may not knowingly come within 100 feet of [Mother’s]
automobile at any time.
Subsequently, 	Father 	petitioned 	to 	establish 	paternity, 	parental
responsibility, 	and 	a 	parenting 	plan/time-sharing 	schedule. 	Father
requested 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	adopt 	or 	establish 	a 	parenting 	plan
consistent with his request for equal time-sharing between the parents.
While 	his 	petition 	was 	pending, 	Father 	moved 	for 	the 	trial 	court 	to
determine a temporary time-sharing schedule considering the no-contact
order as to Mother.
Mother filed an answer and counterpetition, noting that the parties’
minor children resided with her pursuant to the modification of the final
judgment of injunction, which awarded her sole decision-making and 100
percent of time-sharing until further court order. 	Mother also petitioned
to 	permanently 	relocate 	to 	Duval 	County, 	including 	a 	request 	to
temporarily relocate.
The trial court entered an order setting a non-jury trial on Father’s
paternity petition and Mother’s counterpetition for relocation. 	However,
the order did not indicate that any modification of the final judgment of
injunction would be addressed at the final hearing.
After the non-jury trial, the trial court entered a final judgment of
paternity, adopting and ratifying the parties’ agreed parenting plan and
establishing child support. 	The final judgment awarded Father the right
to attend “any and all extracurricular activities” of the children and
ordered him to maintain a minimum distance of 100 feet from Mother and
to not “willfully make direct contact with Mother.” 	The trial court also
designated Father as an authorized pick-up person at the children’s
school, where Mother was employed as a full-time teacher. 	Additionally,
the trial court noted that while it had approved Mother’s relocation, that
approval might be 	subject to reversal 	in the future dependent upon
Mother’s noncompliance with the time-sharing agreement.
Mother then timely filed a motion for rehearing, raising four issues: 1)
changes made in Father’s favor in the final judgment of injunction; 2)
reconsideration 	of 	the 	child 	support 	calculations 	and 	dependency
exemptions; 3) reconsideration of the ultimate decision-making regarding
medical decisions; and 4) a prospective relocation time-sharing default

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against Mother. 	The motion for rehearing was denied, and this appeal
follows.
On 	the 	first 	issue, 	Mother 	argues 	the 	trial 	court’s 	final 	order 	is
unenforceable as a matter of law because it includes “conditions which
automatically trigger an alteration of time-sharing and even a relocation
based on possible future events.” 	We agree. 	“A trial court has broad
discretion in timesharing matters and its decision is reviewed for an abuse
of that discretion.” 	Tucker v. Tucker, 375 So. 3d 323, 325 (Fla. 5th DCA
2023) (citing Schwieterman v. Schwieterman, 114 So. 3d 984, 987 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2012)). 	“The timesharing plan will be affirmed if there is competent,
substantial evidence to support the decision and reasonable people could
differ with respect to the trial court’s decision.” 	Id. (citing Schwieterman,
114 So. 3d at 987).
Section 	61.13001(7), 	Florida 	Statutes 	(2024), 	provides 	that 	“[a]
presumption in favor of or against a request to relocate with the child does
not arise if a parent or other person seeks to relocate and the move will
materially affect the current schedule of contact, access, and time-sharing
with the nonrelocating parent or other person.” 	In reaching its decision
regarding a proposed temporary or permeant relocation, the trial court
must evaluate a list of factors. 	See § 61.13001(7)(a)-(k), Fla. Stat. (2024).
In Arthur v. Arthur, 54 So. 3d 454 (Fla. 2010), the Florida Supreme
Court held that time-sharing and relocation decisions must be based on
the child’s best interests as they exist at the time of the final hearing,
rather than on predictions about future circumstances. 	Id. at 459. 	This
approach acknowledges that trial courts are not equipped with a “crystal
ball” to predict whether future events, like relocation, will be in the child’s
best interests. 	Id. 	Because courts cannot know whether any of the
statutory factors under section 61.13001(7) will occur in the future, a
relocation petition must be evaluated based on present circumstances. Id.
Here, 	the 	final 	judgment 	granted 	Mother’s 	petition 	for 	permanent
relocation, allowing Mother and the children to reside in Duval County,
while Father resides in Palm Beach County. 	However, the judgment’s
relocation provision has a compliance provision, which states:
[I]f the Mother willfully and repeatedly interrupts the Father’s
timesharing, 	i.e., 	failure 	to 	exchange 	at 	the 	designated
location, 	significant 	late 	drop 	offs 	(more 	than 	one 	hour),
unilaterally 	reschedule 	the 	exchange 	dates/time, 	or 	deny
telephonic visits, for foreseeable and/or avoidable reasons,
the Mother and children will be required to relocate to Palm

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Beach 	County, 	FL 	and 	the 	parties 	will 	exercise 	a 	50/50
timesharing schedule. 	If the Mother cannot, or does not wish
to, relocate back to Palm Beach County, FL, then the children
shall relocate to live primarily with the Father in Palm Beach
County and the parents’ timesharing shall be swapped.
The provision referenced above violates Florida law because it imposes
an automatic, prospective, and punitive modification based solely on
contingent, speculative events. 	See Natali v. Natali, 313 So. 3d 958, 959
(Fla. 2d DCA 2021). 	As the only triggering condition is the possibility of
Mother’s future noncompliance, the condition is not “reasonably and
objectively certain to occur at an identifiable time in the future,” thus
violating Arthur. 	See Natali, 313 So. 3d at 960 (“[W]e reverse the portion
of the parenting plan that prospectively allows the [f]ather to automatically
graduate 	to 	unsupervised 	timesharing 	upon 	the 	satisfaction 	of
predetermined conditions.”).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to strike the
portion of the final judgment that prospectively mandates Mother and the
children to automatically relocate upon Mother’s possible noncompliance
with the time-sharing plan.
On the second issue, Mother argues the portion of the final judgment
allowing Father to pick up the children after school and to be within 100
feet of Mother is improper because Father filed no pleading requesting
such modification of the final judgment of injunction. 	Additionally, the
adopted parenting plan limited exchanges to a police station equidistant
between the parties’ homes.
Florida courts have consistently held a trial court violates due process
and commits reversible error when it grants a party relief that the party
did not request. 	Booth v. Hicks, 301 So. 3d 369, 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)
(“[W]e have found reversible error in final judgments in which the trial
court awarded shared responsibility to a father who did not request a
change in parental responsibility . . . .”).
The final judgment of injunction ordered Father not to go within 500
feet of Mother. However, in the final judgment of paternity, the trial court
awarded Father the right to attend “any and all extracurricular activities”
of the children and ordered him to maintain a minimum distance of 100
feet from Mother and to not “willfully make direct contact with Mother.”
The trial court also designated Father as an authorized pick-up person at
the children’s school despite Mother’s employment as a full-time teacher
there.

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Father did not properly plead a request to modify the injunction to allow
him to pick up the children at their school or to modify the 500-foot barrier
as previously ordered. 	See Merlihan v. Skinner, 382 So. 3d 735, 738 (Fla.
4th DCA 2024) (trial court erred by including a provision which the statute
did not require, and the parents did not request). In fact, Mother explicitly
requested the final judgment of injunction protections stay in place. Thus,
the trial court did not have authority to modify the injunction. 	Flemming
v. Flemming, 742 So. 2d 843, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). 	We therefore
reverse and remand this portion of the trial court’s order to the extent it is
inconsistent with the injunction previously entered.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
K UNTZ , C.J., and M AY , J., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.