Dalhou Fletcher- Johnson v. Colin Wayne Johnson

2024-1124Fladistctapp4

Texte intégral

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
DALHOU FLETCHER-JOHNSON,
Appellant,
v.
COLIN WAYNE JOHNSON,
Appellee.
No. 4D2024-1124
[November 12, 2025]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Elaine A. Carbuccia, Judge; L.T. Case No. DVCE-24-
3500.
Dalhou Fletcher-Johnson, Miramar, pro se.
Colin Wayne Johnson, Miramar, pro se.
PER CURIAM .
This appeal involves a final judgment of an injunction for protection
against domestic violence. 	Appellant raises two issues: (1) whether the
trial 	court 	erred 	in 	entering 	an 	injunction 	against 	Appellant, 	when
Appellant was not present at the hearing; and (2) whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motions to vacate the final
judgment and the dismissal order without an evidentiary hearing.
As to the first issue, Appellant has not provided a transcript of the
relevant hearing. 	Without a transcript, we cannot determine whether
Appellee’s petition for injunction was supported by competent, substantial
evidence, and therefore cannot review whether the trial court abused its
discretion in granting the petition. 	See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of
Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) (“Without a record of the
trial 	proceedings, 	the 	appellate 	court 	can 	not 	properly 	resolve 	the
underlying factual issues so as to conclude that the trial court’s judgment
is not supported by the evidence or by an alternative theory. 	Without
knowing the factual context, neither can an appellate court reasonably
conclude 	that 	the 	trial 	judge 	so 	misconceived 	the 	law 	as 	to 	require
reversal.”).
2
Furthermore, Appellant was not deprived of due process when the trial
court ruled on the petition despite her absence. 	Appellant had actual
notice of the April 1, 2024 final hearing when she was served the order
setting the hearing by hand delivery in open court approximately two
weeks before the hearing. 	Appellant hand-signed the acknowledgment of
receipt, stating she received the order setting the April 1, 2024 hearing.
As to the second issue, the notice of appeal clearly states that Appellant
is appealing only the final judgment of injunction for protection against
domestic violence. 	An order denying a motion to vacate is separate from
the final judgment and is appealable separately. 	Because the notice of
appeal fails to include the order denying the motions to vacate the final
judgment and the dismissal order, we have no jurisdiction to review those
orders. 	See De Gaglia v. State, 257 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
(“[E]ven if an order had been entered denying the motion to vacate, the
notice of appeal directed to the judgment and sentence will not vest
jurisdiction to review that order.”); Santos v. HSBC Bank USA, 258 So. 3d
535, 538-39 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction
to review the trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate because appellant
failed to amend the notice of appeal to include the subsequent denial of
the motion). 	Because we lack jurisdiction, we cannot address the second
issue’s merits.
Affirmed.
KUNTZ , C.J., M AY and SHAW , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.

OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

DALHOU FLETCHER-JOHNSON,
Appellant,

Vv.

COLIN WAYNE JOHNSON,
Appellee.

No. 4D2024-1124
[November 12, 2025]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Elaine A. Carbuccia, Judge; L.T. Case No. DVCE-24-
3500.

Dalhou Fletcher-Johnson, Miramar, pro se.
Colin Wayne Johnson, Miramar, pro se.
PER CURIAM.

This appeal involves a final judgment of an injunction for protection
against domestic violence. Appellant raises two issues: (1) whether the
trial court erred in entering an injunction against Appellant, when
Appellant was not present at the hearing; and (2) whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motions to vacate the final
judgment and the dismissal order without an evidentiary hearing.

As to the first issue, Appellant has not provided a transcript of the
relevant hearing. Without a transcript, we cannot determine whether
Appellee’s petition for injunction was supported by competent, substantial
evidence, and therefore cannot review whether the trial court abused its
discretion in granting the petition. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of
Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) (“Without a record of the
trial proceedings, the appellate court can not properly resolve the
underlying factual issues so as to conclude that the trial court’s judgment
is not supported by the evidence or by an alternative theory. Without
knowing the factual context, neither can an appellate court reasonably
conclude that the trial judge so misconceived the law as to require
reversal.”).

Furthermore, Appellant was not deprived of due process when the trial
court ruled on the petition despite her absence. Appellant had actual
notice of the April 1, 2024 final hearing when she was served the order
setting the hearing by hand delivery in open court approximately two
weeks before the hearing. Appellant hand-signed the acknowledgment of
receipt, stating she received the order setting the April 1, 2024 hearing.

As to the second issue, the notice of appeal clearly states that Appellant
is appealing only the final judgment of injunction for protection against
domestic violence. An order denying a motion to vacate is separate from
the final judgment and is appealable separately. Because the notice of
appeal fails to include the order denying the motions to vacate the final
judgment and the dismissal order, we have no jurisdiction to review those
orders. See De Gaglia v. State, 257 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
(“[E]ven if an order had been entered denying the motion to vacate, the
notice of appeal directed to the judgment and sentence will not vest
jurisdiction to review that order.”); Santos v. HSBC Bank USA, 258 So. 3d
535, 538-39 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction
to review the trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate because appellant
failed to amend the notice of appeal to include the subsequent denial of
the motion). Because we lack jurisdiction, we cannot address the second
issue’s merits.

Affirmed.

KUNTZ, C.J., MAY and SHAW, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.

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