Rekeisha T. Samuels v. State of Florida

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
REKEISHA T. SAMUELS,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
Nos. 4D2024-2569 and 4D2024-2570
[February 18, 2026]
Consolidated 	appeals 	from 	the 	Circuit 	Court 	for 	the 	Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Michael I. Rothschild, Judge; L.T. Case
Nos. 18010482CF10A and 18012001CF10A.
Daniel 	Eisinger, 	Public 	Defender, 	and 	Sue-Ellen 	Kenny, 	Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marcus Russell
Kelly II, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
SHAW , J.
The defendant appeals the circuit court’s order revoking her probation
and imposing a sentence. For the reasons discussed more fully below, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the circuit court with
instructions.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On August 15, 2019, the circuit court adjudicated the defendant guilty
of grand theft of a vehicle in one case and burglary of a dwelling and petit
theft 	in 	another 	case. 	The 	defendant 	was 	sentenced 	to 	a 	term 	of
imprisonment, to be followed by four years’ probation in each case. 	The
circuit court ordered these sentences to run concurrently with each other.
Four years later, on August 4, 2023, the defendant’s probation officer
filed an amended affidavit of violation of probation (the “Affidavit”) alleging
that the defendant had committed the following four violations of the
conditions of her probation:

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(1) Allegation 1: The defendant violated Condition 2 of her
probation 	by 	failing 	to 	pay 	the 	State 	of 	Florida
approximately $850.00 toward the cost of supervision, as
of May 23, 2023.
(2) Allegation 2: The defendant violated Condition 3 of her
probation 	by 	changing 	her 	residence 	without 	first
procuring the consent of her probation officer, which the
officer discovered on May 23, 2023.
(3) Allegation 3: The defendant violated Condition 9 of her
probation by failing to comply with her probation officer’s
May 16, 2023 instructions to remain in her residence on
May 21, 2023 until the probation officer made contact with
her.
(4) Allegation 4: The defendant violated Condition 3 of her
probation 	by 	changing 	her 	residence 	without 	first
procuring the consent of her probation officer, which the
officer discovered on July 28, 2023. 	It was further alleged
that 	the 	defendant 	made 	herself 	unavailable 	for
supervision and that her whereabouts were unknown.
At the subsequent violation of probation hearing, the State announced
it was not proceeding on Allegation 1 or 2 and would proceed only on
Allegations 3 and 4. 	After hearing the testimony of two probation officers
and argument from the parties, the circuit court orally found:
As to Allegation 1, that [the defendant] failed to pay the State
of Florida $25 towards the cost of supervision, the Court
would find there’s no evidence to support that allegation. The
Court would dismiss the first allegation of the warrant.
As to Allegations 2, 3 and 4 of the warrant, the Court would
find the State has presented competent, substantial evidence
that 	[the 	defendant] 	changed 	her 	residence 	without
permission, without procuring the consent of the probation
officer, and as such, there’s sufficient evidence to find her in
violation on Counts II, III, and IV, and the Court will do so.
….

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The 	Court 	is 	going 	to 	decline 	to 	have 	a 	danger 	hearing,
because the Court’s actions will not be dependent upon a
finding of dangerousness. 	In each case, the Court is going to
revoke 	probation, 	maintain 	adjudication, 	sentence 	[the
defendant] to 40.05 months, Florida State Prison.
….
And just to be clear, the Court has declined to hold a danger
hearing because had I found her a danger, I still … would’ve
been obliged to revoke her, but she would’ve received the same
sentence as if I found her not to be a danger. The Court would
not have reinstated and the Court would’ve revoked anyway,
so 	the 	danger 	hearing 	is 	not 	necessary 	under 	the
circumstances as the Court finds it.
The defendant subsequently filed a notice of appeal challenging the
circuit court’s order revoking her probation and imposing a sentence. The
defendant also filed a motion to correct sentence requesting entry of a
written order specifying the conditions violated, supporting evidence, and
reasons for revoking probation, as well as a hearing and a written order
determining whether the defendant posed a danger to the community, as
required under section 948.06(8)(e), Florida Statutes (2024). 	The record
on appeal does not contain an order on the motion to correct sentence,
which has been pending since March 17, 2025.
II. 	STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Different standards govern our review in this appeal. 	Whether the
circuit court acted without jurisdiction presents a pure question of law,
which we review de novo. See Cromartie v. State, 70 So. 3d 559, 563 (Fla.
2011) (citing D’Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2003)). We
also review de novo the circuit court’s order on a motion to correct a
sentencing error. 	See Pitts v. State, 202 So. 3d 882, 884 (Fla. 4th DCA
2016) (citing Willard v. State, 22 So. 3d 864, 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)).
We review “the [circuit] court’s revocation of probation under an abuse
of discretion standard.” Bryant v. State, 389 So. 3d 740, 742 (Fla. 3d DCA
2024) (citing Russell v. State, 982 So. 2d 642, 646 (Fla. 2008)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
On appeal, the defendant contends that the circuit court erred in four
ways by: (1) considering Allegation 2 when the State had withdrawn that

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allegation; (2) finding the evidence was sufficient to establish Allegation 4;
(3) revoking the defendant’s probation without entering a written order;
and (4) revoking the defendant’s probation without first making written
findings regarding whether she posed a danger to the community. 	We
address each issue in turn below.
A. The Circuit Court Fundamentally Erred in Considering a Violation
of Allegation 2 in Revoking the Defendant’s Probation.
The State withdrew 	Allegation 2 during the violation of 	probation
hearing, as it was allowed to do. 	See Randolph v. State, 355 So. 3d 442,
448–49 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (noting that where an affidavit of violation of
probation alleges multiple violations, the State is not required to proceed
on every allegation in the affidavit). Thus, the circuit court fundamentally
erred by orally finding that the defendant violated probation based on
Allegation 2. 	See Davis v. State, 210 So. 3d 101, 103–04 (Fla. 2d DCA
2016) (holding that the trial court fundamentally erred by considering a
probation violation allegation that was withdrawn by the State). 	On
remand, the circuit court’s written order should reflect only violations
based on Allegations 3 and 4.
B. The 	Circuit 	Court 	Did 	Not 	Fundamentally 	Err 	in 	Finding 	the
Evidence was Sufficient to Establish a Violation of Condition 3 of
the Defendant’s Probation as Alleged in Allegation 4.
The defendant argues that the sole basis for Allegation 4 was hearsay
from the defendant’s mother to the probation officer —specifically, the
mother’s statement that her daughter did not live at the listed location.
However, this is incorrect. 	The circuit court heard testimony from the
probation officer that he had personally made multiple, unsuccessful
attempts to contact the defendant at her listed residence and that the
defendant had made several relevant admissions to him. 	On May 21,
2023, 	the 	defendant 	admitted 	that 	she 	was 	not 	at 	home 	when 	the
probation officer instructed her to wait for him there, and on April 24,
2023, the defendant admitted that she was living with a boyfriend at a
different 	address. 	Accordingly, 	competent, 	substantial 	evidence
established Allegation 4. See Mosley v. State, 735 So. 2d 547, 547–48 (Fla.
4th DCA 1999) (finding that the probation officer’s testimony was sufficient
for the trial court to conclude that appellant had changed his residence
without his probation officer’s permission where the evidence established
that the officer could not make contact with the probationer after visiting
the residence numerous times and leaving several messages which were
never answered).

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C. The Circuit Court Erred by Revoking the Defendant’s Probation
without Entering a Written Order.
Florida 	law 	is 	clear 	that 	if 	a 	circuit 	court 	revokes 	a 	defendant’s
probation, that court is “required to render a written order noting the
specific conditions of probation that were violated.” 	King v. State, 46 So.
3d 1171, 1172 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). That did not occur here. Accordingly,
we 	remand 	for 	the 	circuit 	court 	to 	render 	a 	written 	order 	reflecting
violations of Conditions 9 and 3 of the defendant’s probation, as set forth
in Allegations 3 and 4. 	See Whittaker v. State, 223 So. 3d 270, 276 (Fla.
4th DCA 2017) (remanding for entry of a written order of revocation of
probation specifying the conditions appellant was found to have violated)
(citing Clark v. State, 201 So. 3d 799, 799 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)).
D. The Circuit Court Erred by Revoking the Defendant’s Probation
without First Making Written Findings Regarding Whether She
Posed a Danger to the Community.
When a violent felony offender of special concern (“VFOSC”) is found to
have violated a condition of their probation, section 948.06(8)(e), Florida
Statutes (2024), requires the circuit court to “make written findings”
regarding whether that individual poses a danger to the community. This
requirement is mandatory, not discretionary. 	See Lillard v. State, 382 So.
3d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). 	Here, the defendant does not dispute
that she qualifies as a violent felony offender of special concern pursuant
to section 948.06(8)(e), Florida Statutes (2024). However, the circuit court
did not make the required written findings, nor did it make any oral
findings on dangerousness. Indeed, the circuit court explicitly stated twice
that it was going to decline to hold a danger hearing, because it would
have given the defendant the same sentence regardless of a finding of
dangerousness. 	This was error.
However, the parties differ on the remedy upon remand. The defendant
cites Barber v. State, 207 So. 3d 379 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016), arguing that in
this situation, “the proper remedy is to reverse the sentencing order and
remand for another sentencing hearing with directions that the trial court
make the necessary written findings under section 948.06(8)(e) when
imposing its sentence.” 	The State, on the other hand, argues that the
appropriate disposition is for the circuit court to conduct the requisite
VFOSC hearing and enter written findings, with the understanding that
the revocation judgment stands, and the existing lawful guideline sentence
should be reimposed.

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We are persuaded that Barber provides the correct approach. 	See
Barber, 207 So. 3d at 384–85; see also Thompson v. State, 265 So. 3d 700,
703 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (reversing and remanding for a new sentencing
hearing where the circuit court failed to consider the factors under section
948.06(e) and make written findings as to whether the defendant was a
danger to the community); Whittaker, 	223 So. 3d at 273–76 (same).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for another sentencing hearing with
directions that the circuit court make the necessary written findings
under section 948.06(8)(e) when imposing its sentence.1 See id.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The circuit court erred in three respects by: (1) considering Allegation
2 in revoking the defendant’s probation, when that allegation had been
withdrawn by the State; (2) revoking the defendant’s probation without
entering 	a 	written 	order; 	and 	(3) 	revoking 	the 	defendant’s 	probation
without first making written findings regarding whether the defendant
posed a danger to the community. 	The circuit court did not err in finding
the evidence was sufficient to establish a violation of Condition 3 of the
defendant’s probation, as alleged in Allegation 4. 	Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of revocation, reverse the finding that the defendant violated
probation based on Allegation 2, reverse the defendant’s sentence, and
remand for the circuit court to conduct another sentencing hearing and
make written findings when imposing its sentence. 	Furthermore, the
circuit court’s written order revoking the defendant’s probation shall not
consider a violation based on Allegation 2.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with instructions.
CIKLIN and LEVINE , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.
1 	If 	the 	circuit 	court 	had 	made 	oral 	findings 	regarding 	the 	defendant’s
dangerousness to the community during the hearing, we would remand solely for
the entry of a written order conforming to these oral findings, and the circuit
court would not need to conduct another sentencing hearing. 	See Arnone v.
State, 204 So. 3d 556, 557–58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). 	However, the record here
does not contain such findings.