G.K., The Father v. Department of Children and Families

D ISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL O F T HE STATE OF F LORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
G.K., the father,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES and
STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE,
Appellees.
No. 4D2025-3212
[March 25, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach 	County; 	Kathleen 	Janice 	Kroll, 	Judge; 	L.T. 	Case 	No.
502025DP000082XXXAMB.
Ilene Felice Tuckfield of Ilene F. Tuckfield, P.A., Coral Gables, for
appellant.
Andrew Allen Feigenbaum of Children’s Legal Services, West Palm
Beach, for appellee Department of Children and Families.
Sara Elizabeth Goldfarb, Statewide Director of Appeals, and Sarah Todd
Weitz, Senior Attorney, Appellate Division of Statewide Guardian ad Litem
Office, Tallahassee, for appellee Statewide Guardian Ad Litem Office.
SHEPHERD, J.
This is an appeal from a final judgment terminating the father, G.K.’s,
parental rights to his children, K.K. and R.K. 	The father argues that: (1)
the circuit court failed to certify that his surrender of parental rights was
knowing and voluntary; (2) termination was not the least restrictive means
of protecting the children; and (3) termination was not in the children’s
manifest best interests. We affirm the circuit court’s ruling for the reasons
discussed below.
Background
The Department of Children and Families (“the Department”) sheltered
the two children in the underlying dependency proceeding—then thirteen-

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year-old K.K. and eleven-year-old R.K.—based on allegations that the
father physically abused the children and that their mother, R.B., was
unavailable as a caregiver. The father was subsequently arrested for child
abuse, and the circuit court entered a no-contact order prohibiting him
from contacting the children.
The Department filed an expedited petition to terminate the father’s
parental rights. The father was present on the first day of the adjudicatory
hearing on the petition. 	At the outset of the proceeding, the children’s
attorney ad litem informed the court that the father had expressed an
intention 	to 	voluntarily 	surrender 	his 	parental 	rights 	if 	the 	children
confirmed that was what they wanted. 	The parties agreed that the father
would participate in a supervised virtual meeting with the children the
following morning before returning to court to continue the hearing.
Before recessing, the circuit court advised the father that he was
required to return for the second day of the hearing and that his parental
rights could be terminated if he failed to appear. The father indicated that
he understood.
The father did not appear on the second day of the hearing. 	Instead,
his counsel filed the father’s Affidavit and Acknowledgment of Surrender,
Consent, and Waiver of Notice, through which the father voluntarily
surrendered 	his 	parental 	rights 	and 	consented 	to 	the 	Department’s
placement of the children for adoption. 	The circuit court reviewed the
affidavit on the record, found that it appeared to be in proper form,
confirmed that it had been executed with the required witnesses, and
accepted and filed the affidavit.
After accepting the father’s surrender, the circuit court scheduled a
manifest best interests hearing. At the hearing’s start, the father’s counsel
stipulated to two of the statutory manifest best interests factors, including
the father’s ability and capacity to provide for the children.
The 	circuit 	court 	then 	heard 	testimony 	from 	the 	Department’s
dependency case manager. 	The case manager testified that the children
had been placed in licensed care and did not have special needs. 	She
explained that the Department had been unable to locate an approved
relative placement, but that the children’s mother was actively working on
a reunification case plan. 	The case manager further testified that the
children were straight-A students, were capable of forming bonds with a
parental substitute, and had expressed during her most recent home visit
that they did not wish to have further contact with the father.

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The 	Department 	advised 	the 	circuit 	court 	that 	case 	management
supported termination of the father’s parental rights. 	The Guardian ad
Litem 	Office 	and 	the 	children’s 	attorney 	ad 	litem 	likewise 	supported
termination.
Following 	the 	hearing, 	the 	circuit 	court 	entered 	a 	final 	judgment
terminating the father’s parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(a),
Florida Statutes (2025), based, in part, on the father’s sworn surrender
affidavit. 	The circuit court also made written findings addressing each of
the eleven manifest best interests factors under section 39.810, Florida
Statutes 	(2025), 	concluding 	that 	termination 	was 	in 	the 	children’s
manifest best interests and constituted the least restrictive means of
protecting them from further harm.
The father did not move for rehearing before filing this appeal.
Discussion
A circuit court may terminate parental rights only upon clear and
convincing evidence. 	M.D. v. State, Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 187 So. 3d
1275, 1277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting J.G. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams.,
22 So. 3d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). 	On appeal, however, we review
whether 	competent, 	substantial 	evidence 	supports 	the 	circuit 	court’s
judgment. 	Id. 	Proof of one statutory ground for termination is sufficient.
Id.
As a threshold matter, the father did not preserve the arguments which
he raises on appeal. 	When an alleged error first appears on the face of a
final order, the party must raise the issue in a motion for rehearing or
other appropriate motion to preserve it for appellate review. 	B.A. v. Dep’t
of Child. & Fams., 311 So. 3d 34, 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). 	Because the
father did not move for rehearing, our review is limited to fundamental
error analysis.
Fundamental error is error that goes to the foundation of the case or
the merits of the cause of action. 	Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 575
(Fla. 2008). 	“The doctrine of fundamental error should be applied only in
rare cases where a jurisdictional error appears or where the interests of
justice present a compelling demand for its application.” 	Smith v. State,
521 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1988); see also B.T. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams.,
300 So. 3d 1273, 1280-81 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). We therefore evaluate the
father’s arguments under this standard.

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The father first argues that the circuit court’s failure to conduct a
colloquy before he surrendered his parental rights—at a hearing that the
father voluntarily did not attend—constitutes fundamental error. 	Not so.
Section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2025), authorizes termination
when a parent voluntarily executes a written surrender of the child and
consents 	to 	the 	Department’s 	custody 	for 	adoption 	purposes. 	The
surrender document must be executed before two witnesses and a notary
or other authorized official. 	§ 39.806(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2025). 	Once
accepted, the surrender may be withdrawn only upon a judicial finding
that it was obtained by fraud or duress. § 39.806(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2025).
The statute imposes no requirement that the circuit court conduct a
colloquy before accepting a voluntary surrender.
Here, the father does not contend that his surrender was involuntary,
procured 	by 	fraud 	or 	duress, 	or 	otherwise 	deficient 	under 	section
39.806(1)(a). 	Instead, he argues only that the circuit court was required
to conduct a colloquy or make additional findings not mandated by statute
or rule at a hearing which he elected not to attend after receiving notice.1
Under these circumstances, the circuit court did not commit fundamental
error.
The father next argues that termination was not the least restrictive
means of protecting the children.
To terminate parental rights, the Department must establish three
elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a statutory ground for
termination under section 39.806 exists; (2) termination is in the child’s
manifest best interests under section 39.810; and (3) termination is the
least 	restrictive 	means 	of 	protecting 	the 	child 	from 	serious 	harm.
§ 39.802(4), Fla. Stat. (2025); B.K. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 166 So. 3d
866, 873 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
The least restrictive means prong is a due process safeguard designed
to protect the fundamental liberty interest which parents have in the care,
1 The father relies on Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.500(g) and 8.520(c)
to support his assertion that the circuit court was required to ensure that the
father’s termination of his rights was made knowingly and voluntarily. 	This
argument, however, fails to distinguish between surrenders of parental rights
executed in court and those made outside of court. 	Neither rule applies where,
as here, a parent executes a written Affidavit and Acknowledgment of Surrender,
Consent, and Waiver of Notice outside of court.

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custody, and companionship of their children. 	Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So.
2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991). 	Because termination “irretrievably destroys” the
parent-child relationship, the State generally must demonstrate that it
employed measures short of termination, or that such measures would be
futile, before seeking to sever parental rights. 	Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-
54; Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571. In most cases, this requirement is satisfied
through a case plan and reunification services designed to address the
conditions leading to dependency. 	See Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571.
“In all cases, . . . to pass constitutional muster, the termination of
parental rights to the current child must be the least restrictive means of
protecting that child from harm.” 	Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. F.L., 880
So. 2d 602, 608 (Fla. 2004). The least restrictive means requirement does
not mandate reunification efforts where such efforts would place the child
at substantial risk. 	Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602,
608-09 (Fla. 2004); see also Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. B.B., 824 So.
2d 1000, 1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).
As a threshold matter, the father’s argument overlooks the effect of his
voluntary surrender. 	A voluntary surrender of parental rights under
section 	39.806(1)(a) 	provides 	an 	independent 	statutory 	basis 	for
termination and waives challenges relating to reunification efforts. 	See §
39.806(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2025); see also D.M. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 315
So. 3d 90, 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020).
In 	addition 	to 	the 	surrender, 	the 	record 	reflects 	extraordinary
circumstances such that termination without a case plan constituted the
least restrictive means. 	See In re T.M., 641 So. 2d 410, 413 (Fla. 1994).
Here, 	the 	expedited 	petition 	alleged 	egregious 	conduct 	and 	abuse—
grounds that independently excuse reunification efforts under section
39.806(2). 	A 	no-contact 	order 	remained 	in 	place 	throughout 	the
proceedings, and the circuit court found that reunification would pose a
substantial 	risk 	of 	significant 	harm 	to 	the 	children. 	Under 	these
circumstances, 	termination 	constituted 	the 	least 	restrictive 	means 	of
protecting the children.
Lastly, the father argues that termination of his parental rights was not
in the manifest best interests of the children. 	We disagree.
Before terminating parental rights, the circuit court must determine by
clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s manifest
best interests. B.K., 166 So. 3d at 873. In making that determination, the
circuit court must consider the nonexclusive factors set forth in section

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39.810, 	which 	collectively 	focus 	on 	the 	child’s 	safety, 	stability,
permanency, and long-term welfare. 	§ 39.810, Fla. Stat. (2025).
Although the circuit court must evaluate each statutory factor, it is not
required to assign equal weight to each factor or to quantify the weight
given to any particular factor. 	A.F. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 276 So. 3d
61, 63–64 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019); see also E.A. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams.,
332 So. 3d 493, 499–500 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). 	Rather, the circuit court
satisfies its obligation by making findings sufficient to demonstrate that it
considered 	the 	statutory 	factors 	and 	exercised 	its 	discretion 	in
determining the child’s manifest best interests. A.F., 276 So. 3d at 63–64;
E.A., 332 So. 3d at 499–500.
Measured against this standard, the father’s challenge fails. 	As an
initial matter, the father does not meaningfully challenge any specific
manifest best interests finding made by the circuit court. 	Instead, he
broadly asserts that the evidence supporting the statutory factors was
“little to none.” 	Such conclusory argument is inadequate to preserve the
issue for appellate review. 	Hammond v. State, 34 So. 3d 58, 59 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2010); Coolen v. State, 696 So. 2d 738, 742 n.2 (Fla. 1997).
In any event, the record contains competent, substantial evidence
supporting the circuit court’s findings. 	The circuit court made written
findings addressing each of the eleven manifest best interests factors
under section 39.810. 	Those findings were supported by testimony from
the Department’s dependency case manager that the children were placed
in 	licensed 	care, 	had 	no 	special 	needs, 	and 	were 	performing 	well
academically as straight-A students. The case manager also testified that
the Department had been unable to locate an approved relative placement,
the children were capable of forming bonds with a parental substitute, and
the children had expressed that they did not wish to have any further
contact with the father. 	The circuit court also considered the unanimous
recommendations of the Guardian ad Litem Office and the children’s
attorney ad litem that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the
children’s manifest best interests.
The 	father’s 	argument 	ultimately 	asks 	this 	Court 	to 	reweigh 	the
evidence considered by the circuit court. 	That we cannot do. 	Appellate
courts do not substitute their judgment for that of the circuit court where
the findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. 	See E.A.,
332 So. 3d at 500.

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Because 	the 	circuit 	court’s 	findings 	are 	supported 	by 	competent,
substantial evidence and the father has demonstrated no fundamental
error, we affirm the final judgment terminating his parental rights.
Affirmed.
LEVINE and F ORST , JJ., concur.
* 	* 	*
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.