Dortch v. State of Florida

2024-2312Fladistctapp1

Texte intégral

FIRST DISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2024-2312
_____________________________
J OHN S EBASTIAN D ORTCH ,
Appellant,
v.
S TATE OF F LORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the County Court for Escambia County.
Kristina Lightel, Judge.
December 23, 2025
P ER C URIAM.
A FFIRMED.
K ELSEY and L ONG, JJ., concur; T ANENBAUM, J., dissents with
opinion.
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
2
T ANENBAUM, J., dissenting.
The appellant did not receive the assistance of appointed
appellate counsel to which he constitutionally is entitled. There
also is no rendered judgment for us to review. Still, the majority
proceeds with a per-curiam affirmance without further comment.
In the trial court, the appellant appears to have pleaded no
contest 	to 	misdemeanors 	under 	a 	plea 	agreement. 	The 	plea
agreement in turn reserved for the appellant the ability to appeal
the denial of his motion to suppress following an evidentiary
hearing at which the arresting officer testified and his dashcam
video 	played. 	What 	the 	appellant 	received 	in 	the 	way 	of
representation was a one-page recitation of the facts and one page
of 	legal 	argument. 	The 	legal 	argument 	simply 	noted 	a 	Fifth
District opinion that says only the trial court can determine the
credibility of testifying witnesses.
The U.S. Supreme Court requires that “if counsel finds his
case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it,
he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw”;
but counsel must include with that request “a brief referring to
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.”
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We then must
decide, 	after 	conducting 	our 	own 	full 	examination 	of 	the
proceedings, “whether the case is wholly frivolous.” Id. If we do,
then we can grant counsel’s request. But if we do not—because we
“find[] any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and
therefore not frivolous)”—we “must, prior to decision, afford the
indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.” Id. Like it
or not, the supreme court requires us to go further: When an
Anders brief is filed, we are to “assume[] the responsibility of
conducting a full and independent review of the record to discover
any arguable issues apparent on the face of the record.” In re
Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149, 151 (Fla. 1991).
To ensure that the reviewing court itself does not become the
appellant’s advocate, however, initial responsibility rests with
appointed counsel—not us—to master the record and point us to
anything that “arguably support[s] the appeal.” Anders, 386 U.S.
at 	744. 	That 	is, 	the 	brief 	must 	give 	the 	court 	comfort 	that
3
appointed counsel has provided the appellant the constitutionally
mandated assistance; in essence, the brief should demonstrate
that counsel has done the necessary work. The Anders brief falls
short here in two respects, and we should be ordering counsel to
submit a better one—not just affirming.
First, there was a dashcam video played at the suppression
hearing in connection with the arresting officer’s testimony. One
could review that video and conclude that the testimony stood in
direct contradiction to what the video showed. See Wiggins v. Fla.
Dep’t of High. Saf. & Motor Veh., 209 So. 3d 1165, 1172 (Fla. 2017).
As the court explained in Wiggins:
We 	respect 	the 	authority 	and 	expertise 	of 	law
enforcement officers, and thus rely on an officer’s memory
when necessary. But we would be remiss if we failed to
acknowledge 	that 	at 	times, 	an 	officer’s 	human
recollection and report may be contrary to that which
actually happened as evinced in the real time video. This
is the reality of human imperfection; we cannot expect
officers to retain information as if he or she were a
computer. Therefore, a judge who has the benefit of
reviewing objective and neutral video evidence along with
officer testimony cannot be expected to ignore that video
evidence simply because it totally contradicts the officer’s
recollection. Such a standard would produce an absurd
result.
Id. The Anders brief does state that the “[v]ideo was shown at the
hearing,” and that it did “not show the violations testified to by
Officer Bell, nor any other traffic violations.” Counsel, however,
does not follow this up with an explanation why an argument
under Wiggins was not viable. Indeed, the brief does not cite
Wiggins at all. This is not to say Wiggins wins the day here, but
the argument plainly is not frivolous.
Second, there is no final judgment of conviction signed by the
judge—so there is no conclusive exercise of judicial power to be
reviewed. Reproduced below is what we have in the record on
appeal, purporting to be the “judgment and sentence”:
4
The first page reflects the clerk’s minutes of the proceeding. It
is not a final “order,” because a judge cannot render an order via
minutes. 	See 	Fla. 	R. 	App. 	P. 	9.020(f) 	(defining 	“order” 	as 	a
“decision, order, judgment, decree, or rule of a lower tribunal,
excluding minutes and minute book entries” (emphasis supplied)).
And there cannot be rendition without an “order” that is signed by
5
the judge. See id. (h). There is further evidence that we have no
judgment here. The first page in no way resembles the following
form judgment that must be used by all courts in every criminal
case:
6
True, the form may be used with “variations” allowed. Fair to say,
though, that using the clerk’s minutes we have here as a substitute
is significantly beyond what could be considered a “variation.”
The next reproduced page purports to be a cost order, not a
sentencing 	order. 	See 	Fla. 	R. 	Crim. 	P. 	3.700(a) 	(defining 	a
“sentence” as the penalty imposed). Though the judge did sign this
next page, the two pages are not integrated—they do not reference
each 	other—so 	they 	cannot 	be 	considered 	as 	a 	single 	order.
Moreover, a judgment and a sentence are two separate orders. Cf.
Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(3) (requiring that a notice of appeal be filed
“at any time between rendition of a “final judgment and 30 days
following rendition of a written order imposing sentence”). The
appellant purports to have appealed his judgment of conviction.
Before the court affirms an exercise of judicial power, it should first
confirm that there is a proper exercise of that power; or at least
have counsel address the issue rather than accept a barebones
Anders brief.
Appointed counsel is not limited to sure-winners or slam
dunks. To provide the proper appellate assistance, counsel must
identify issues that are arguable. When counsel clearly has not
done this, rather than let counsel off the hook anyway, we are duty
bound to strike the brief and require more from counsel. I have
identified two obvious issues. The bare constitutional minimum
has not been done in this appeal, and we should not be affirming
until that happens.
_____________________________
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Lori A Willner, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA

No. 1D2024-2312

JOHN SEBASTIAN DORTCH,
Appellant,
Vv.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

On appeal from the County Court for Escambia County.
Kristina Lightel, Judge.
December 23, 2025
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED.

KELSEY and LONG, JJ., concur; TANENBAUM, J., dissents with
opinion.

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.

TANENBAUM, J., dissenting.

The appellant did not receive the assistance of appointed
appellate counsel to which he constitutionally is entitled. There
also is no rendered judgment for us to review. Still, the majority
proceeds with a per-curiam affirmance without further comment.

In the trial court, the appellant appears to have pleaded no
contest to misdemeanors under a plea agreement. The plea
agreement in turn reserved for the appellant the ability to appeal
the denial of his motion to suppress following an evidentiary
hearing at which the arresting officer testified and his dashcam
video played. What the appellant received in the way of
representation was a one-page recitation of the facts and one page
of legal argument. The legal argument simply noted a Fifth
District opinion that says only the trial court can determine the
credibility of testifying witnesses.

The U.S. Supreme Court requires that “if counsel finds his
case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it,
he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw’;
but counsel must include with that request “a brief referring to
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.”
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We then must
decide, after conducting our own full examination of the
proceedings, “whether the case is wholly frivolous.” Jd. If we do,
then we can grant counsel’s request. But if we do not—because we
“find[] any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and
therefore not frivolous)’—we “must, prior to decision, afford the
indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.” Id. Like it
or not, the supreme court requires us to go further: When an
Anders brief is filed, we are to “assume[] the responsibility of
conducting a full and independent review of the record to discover
any arguable issues apparent on the face of the record.” Jn re
Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149, 151 (Fla. 1991).

To ensure that the reviewing court itself does not become the
appellant’s advocate, however, initial responsibility rests with
appointed counsel—not us—to master the record and point us to
anything that “arguably support[s] the appeal.” Anders, 386 U.S.
at 744. That is, the brief must give the court comfort that

appointed counsel has provided the appellant the constitutionally
mandated assistance; in essence, the brief should demonstrate
that counsel has done the necessary work. The Anders brief falls
short here in two respects, and we should be ordering counsel to
submit a better one—not just affirming.

First, there was a dashcam video played at the suppression
hearing in connection with the arresting officer’s testimony. One
could review that video and conclude that the testimony stood in
direct contradiction to what the video showed. See Wiggins v. Fla.
Dep't of High. Saf. & Motor Veh., 209 So. 3d 1165, 1172 (Fla. 2017).
As the court explained in Wiggins:

We respect the authority and expertise of law
enforcement officers, and thus rely on an officer’s memory
when necessary. But we would be remiss if we failed to
acknowledge that at times, an officer's human
recollection and report may be contrary to that which
actually happened as evinced in the real time video. This
is the reality of human imperfection; we cannot expect
officers to retain information as if he or she were a
computer. Therefore, a judge who has the benefit of
reviewing objective and neutral video evidence along with
officer testimony cannot be expected to ignore that video
evidence simply because it totally contradicts the officer’s
recollection. Such a standard would produce an absurd
result.

Id. The Anders brief does state that the “[v]ideo was shown at the
hearing,” and that it did “not show the violations testified to by
Officer Bell, nor any other traffic violations.” Counsel, however,
does not follow this up with an explanation why an argument
under Wiggins was not viable. Indeed, the brief does not cite
Wiggins at all. This is not to say Wiggins wins the day here, but
the argument plainly is not frivolous.

Second, there is no final judgment of conviction signed by the
judge—so there is no conclusive exercise of judicial power to be
reviewed. Reproduced below is what we have in the record on
appeal, purporting to be the “judgment and sentence”:

JOHN SEBASTIAN DORTCH vs. STATE OF FLORIDA LT. CASE NO: 2024 MM 001728 A HT. CASE NO: 1D24-2312 COURT WORKSHEET AND ORDER
DATE: 9/06/2024
JUDGE: KRISTINA DENISE LIGHTEL
DEFENDANT: DORTCH, JOHN SEBASTIAN
STATE ATTORNEY:
S. PARKER
CASE: 2024 mm 001728A
PD APPT.
DEFATTY: S. SPIEGEL, APD
DCP () DCA ( ) DPA9 DA () VP () INTER
PLEA Plea Agreement ( Straight up Guilty No Contest 1,2
As Charged 1 DUW 201
State Amends Information / Lesser Included Offense:
(2) False A. M KLEO
Downward Departure
SENTENCING No Pros Nolle Proget 3
Adjudication Withheld Ct 2 Adjudicated Guilty >C+1
Designated/Sentenced as a
Pursuant to FS
County Jail
Time Served
State Prison
Credit
Comm Ctrl
Probation
Concurrent / Consecutive
Cost of Supervision: $26 / $52 / $55 / Waived
Pay $1 .00 to Circuit One First Step per month
SS Monthly if less than face to face reporting
SPECIAL CONDITIONS CSW hours at a minimum of
hours per month, begin within /over 1" Days / Months of Supervision
May buy out
community service work at a rate of
Restitution / Court Reserves Jurisdiction / To be Determined
Pay 1ª / J & S w/Co-defendant / into Registry Lien
State to file amount w/in days, Deft has days to object or set hearing if no objection / hearing amount stands
EVAL: Sub Abuse / Mental Health Sign-up / Enroll / Complete within
Successfully complete / follow through with recommended treatment / counseling Live In Person Course/Treatment
COURSE: Anger Management / Anti- Theft / DVIP / Parenting Sign-up / Enroll / Complete within
May not possess/consume: Alcohol / Illegal Drugs / Controlled Substances w/out a valid RX / not validly prescribed by Physician Random urinalysis / breath testing at defendant's own expense
Do not be in the presence of anyone using possessing illegal drugs / alcohol
Take prescriptions in prescribed dosages / Provide Probation with prescriptions w/in
and w/in of new RX
No violent contact with victim, victim's family / witnesses / co-defendant(s) / direct / indirect / 3rd party / social media
Stay away from
Testify truthfully regarding Co-Defi
Seek/Maintain steady full-time employment and/or full-time student/school at least 12 hours per term or a combination of both
OR perform Job Searches / Apps per / each week if working less than
hrs wkly until hired / or proof of Disability
Begin w/in
Days / Months of supervision Complete
Hours CSW per Mo if not employed FT or enrolled in Sch FT Enroll / Complete w/in
Vehicle Impounded: 10/ 30/ 90 days / Waived Drunk Driver / Victim Impact Panel
Sign-up w/in
Complete w/in
Driver's License: DL suspended / revoked
BPO if Qualified / Court has no objection
_Obtain Valid / Clear Driver's License
V Advised of Habitual Traffic Offender
May apply / automatic / early termination / if all conditions satisfied and no violations after
Report to Probation by
Other Terms
Defense Reserves Right to Appeal Courts Denial of the After to suppress
23
JOHN SEBASTIAN DORTCH vs. STATE OF FLORIDA LT. CASE NO: 2024 MM 001728 A HT. CASE NO. 1D04-2312
The Defendant shall pay the following Court Costs:
$518 Mandatory Felony Court Costs
F.S. 938.01. 938.03, 938.05. 938.06, 938.15, 938.19, 938.27, 939.185. 775.083(2). Escambia County Ord 34-7, 34-9, and 34-11)
5273 Mandatory Misdemeanor Court Costs
(F.S. 938.01. 938.03, 938.05. 938.06, 938.15, 938.19. 938.27. 939.185, 775.083(2). Escambia County Ord 34-7, 34-9 and 34-11)
$686 Felony DUI Court Costs
(F.S. 938.01. 938.03(1), 938.05. 938.07, 938.13, 938.15. 938.19, 938.27, 939.185. 775.083, 318.18(17), 318.18(13Ka)(1), Escambia County Ord 34-6, 34-7, 34-9, 34-10 and 34-11)
$653 Felony BUI Ceuit Costs
(F.S. 938.01. 938.03. 938.05. 938.06, 938.07, 938.13. 938.15, 938.19, 938.27, 939.185. 775.083(2), Escambia County Ord 34-7 and 34-9)
5456 Misdemeanor DUI Court Costs
(F.S. 938.01, 938.03(1), 938.05, 938.07, 938.13. 938.15, 938.19, 938.27, 939,185, 775.083. 318.18(17), 318.18(13)a)( 1), Escambia County Ord 34-6. 34-7, 34-9. 34-10 and 34-11) $423 Misdemeanor BUI Court Cous
(F.S. 938.01. 938.03. 938.05. 938.06. 938.07. 938.13. 938.15.938.19, 938.27. 939.185.
775.083(2), Escambia County Ord 34-7 and 34-9)
$201 Domestic Violence Trust Fund (F.S. 938.05)
5153 Rape Crisis Trust Fund (F.S. 938.085)
$151 Crimes against Minors (F.5. 938.10)
$15 Misdemeanor Crimes Involving Drugs/Alcohol (F.S. 938.13)
55,000 Prostitution (F.S. 796.07(6))
$65 Reckless Driving / Racing on Highway (F.S. 318.18(20))
$30 State Facility Surcharge (F.S. 318.18, Escambia County Ord 34-6)
53 State Radio (F.S. 318.18(17))
55 EMS Trust Fund (F.S. 316.192/316.061)
5 County Drug Abuse Trust Fund (F.5. 938.21) 5 Additional Cost of Prosecution (F.S. 938.27)
$50 Public Defender Application (F.S. 27.52)
$ 50 for legal assistance (F.S. 938.29)
S100 FDLE (F.S. 938.055)
S
Cost of Transportation to
S
Cost of Investigation to
(F.S. 938.27)
5% Surcharge on all fines (F.S. 938.04)
Court Costs and Fines shall be paid as follows:
Pay all Court Costs and Fines during Probation
May perform CSW at 5
per hour
Reduce all monetary to Lien / D6
Pay Court Costs/Fines or enter into a Payment Plan within / by 10/09/2024
of Sentencing of Release from Custody Jor Reduce to Lien
2år D6
Pay Coun Costs/Fines in minimum equal monthly installments to begin within |"
The above sentence was imposed in open court in Escambia County, Florida
CASE: 2024 mm 001728A DEFENDANT.
Dortch, John S.
19/4/24
County / Circuit Judge
Date
_Advised of Right to Appeal
The first page reflects the clerk's minutes of the proceeding. It is not a final "order," because a judge cannot render an order via minutes. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(f) (defining "order" as a "decision, order, judgment, decree, or rule of a lower tribunal, excluding minutes and minute book entries" (emphasis supplied)). And there cannot be rendition without an "order" that is signed by
4
Without written consent
DUI |"/ Multiple / Advanced Defensive Driving School
Interlock
w/BPO
_Weekly UA 13 weeks. Random thereafter
REMANDED TO CUSTODY _Under Same Terms and Conditions
LIVD/CR
Fine

the judge. See id. (h). There is further evidence that we have no judgment here. The first page in no way resembles the following form judgment that must be used by all courts in every criminal case:
RULE 3.986. FORMS RELATED TO JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
(a) Sufficiency of Forms. The forms as set forth below, or computer generated formats that duplicate these forms, shall be used by all courts. Variations from these forma do not void a judgment, sentence, order, ce fingerprints that are otherwise sufficient
(b) Form for Judgment.
Probation Violator
Community Control Violator
Retrial
Resentence
In the Circuit Court, Judicial Circuit, in and
County, Florida
Division
Case Number
State of Florida
v.
Defendant
JUDGMENT
The defendant, being personally before this court
represented
by , the attorney of record, and the state represented by and having
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure November 26, 2025
395
been tried and found guilty by jury/by court of the
following crime(s)
- entered a plea of guilty to the following crime[a]
entered a plea of nolo contendere to the following crime(s)
Degree
Count
Crime
Offense Statute Number(s]
Crime
Case Number
OBTS Number
and no cause being shown why the defendant should not be adjudicated guilty, IT IS ORDERED THAT the defendant is hereby ADJUDICATED GUILTY of the above crimela).
- and being a qualified offender pursuant to section 943.325, Florida Statutes, the defendant shall be required to submit DNA samples as required by law.
- and good cause being shown; IT IS ORDERED THAT ADJUDICATION OF GUILT BE WITHHELD.
DONE AND ORDERED in open court in Florida, on ..... |date) ......
County,
Judge
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure
November 26, 2025
396
5

True, the form may be used with “variations” allowed. Fair to say,
though, that using the clerk’s minutes we have here as a substitute
is significantly beyond what could be considered a “variation.”

The next reproduced page purports to be a cost order, not a
sentencing order. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.700(a) (defining a
“sentence” as the penalty imposed). Though the judge did sign this
next page, the two pages are not integrated—they do not reference
each other—so they cannot be considered as a single order.
Moreover, a judgment and a sentence are two separate orders. Cf.
Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(3) (requiring that a notice of appeal be filed
“at any time between rendition of a “final judgment and 30 days
following rendition of a written order imposing sentence”). The
appellant purports to have appealed his judgment of conviction.
Before the court affirms an exercise of judicial power, it should first
confirm that there is a proper exercise of that power; or at least

have counsel address the issue rather than accept a barebones
Anders brief.

Appointed counsel is not limited to sure-winners or slam
dunks. To provide the proper appellate assistance, counsel must
identify issues that are arguable. When counsel clearly has not
done this, rather than let counsel off the hook anyway, we are duty
bound to strike the brief and require more from counsel. I have
identified two obvious issues. The bare constitutional minimum
has not been done in this appeal, and we should not be affirming
until that happens.

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Lori A Willner, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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