Palmetto Surety Corp. v. Escambia County Clerk of Court

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2025-0765
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P ALMETTO SURETY C ORP .,
Appellant,
v.
E SCAMBIA C OUNTY C LERK OF
C OURT ,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
Stephen A. Pitre, Judge.
April 8, 2026
O STERHAUS, C.J.
Under Florida’s bail law, chapter 903, Florida Statutes, a
surety 	that 	posts 	a 	bond 	guarantees 	to 	the 	State 	that 	the
defendant 	will 	appear 	at 	a 	subsequent 	court 	proceeding. 	A
defendant’s 	subsequent 	failure 	to 	appear 	triggers 	proceedings
between the surety and the clerk of court and a forfeiture of the
bail bond. If the forfeiture is not paid by the surety to the clerk
within 	sixty 	days or is 	not 	discharged, the clerk 	must 	enter
judgment against the surety for amount of the bond and issue
execution.

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All of this occurred here where Palmetto Surety appeals an
order denying its motion to set aside a bond forfeiture judgment.
Under § 903.27(5), Florida Statutes, Palmetto Surety sought to
have the forfeiture judgment set aside. Palmetto Surety argues
that because it followed the path prescribed by this statute—it (1)
filed a motion to set aside the judgment within 35 days, (2)
deposited the amount of the judgment with the Escambia County
Clerk of Court, and (3) returned the defendant back into the
custody of a neighboring county with an Escambia County hold
long 	before 	judgment 	was 	entered—it 	qualified 	to 	have 	the
judgment set aside. We agree with Palmetto Surety and reverse.
I.
Palmetto Surety executed $40,000 in appearance bonds for a
defendant, who had been arrested and charged with a crime in
Escambia County. After the defendant failed to appear for court in
May 2024, the bonds were forfeited. About a month later, Palmetto
Surety surrendered the defendant to the Santa Rosa County Jail
on 	separate 	pending 	warrants 	and 	forfeitures 	issued 	there.
Palmetto Surety also notified the Escambia County Sherriff’s office
of the surrender with an offer to pay transport costs. A hold for
Escambia County was placed on the defendant the next day.
Meanwhile, the clock continued ticking for another month on the
Escambia County forfeitures that hadn’t been paid or discharged.
When that clock expired in July 2024, the Escambia County Clerk
of 	Court 	entered 	a 	final 	judgment 	of 	bond 	forfeiture 	against
Palmetto Surety. Once Palmetto Surety received the notice of
judgment, it immediately satisfied the judgment and filed a timely
motion to set it aside under § 903.27(5). The trial court, however,
denied the motion. It concluded that even though Palmetto Surety
had surrendered the defendant within a month of the forfeiture,
only court- or county-made “errors in procedure or substance”
allowed 	the 	court 	to set 	aside 	a judgment 	under 	§ 903.27(5).
Palmetto Surety appealed.
II.
Generally, orders on motions for relief from judgment are
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gjokhila v. Seymour, 349 So. 3d
496, 499 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). But here, the question is one of
statutory interpretation, which is reviewed de novo. Fla. Dep't of

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Revenue v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 380 So. 3d 541, 544 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2024).
Section 903.27(5) governs proceedings to set aside a bond
forfeiture judgment. It provides that “[a]fter notice of judgment
against the surety given by the clerk of the circuit court, the surety
or bail bond agent may within 35 days file a motion to set aside the
judgment or to stay the judgment.” Id. Subsection (5) doesn’t
prescribe any standards for courts to use in determining whether
to set aside a judgment. Courts have relied instead upon the
conditions described for discharging bond forfeitures in § 903.26 as
a yardstick for deciding whether set aside is warranted under
§ 903.27(5). See, e.g., Cardoza v. State, 98 So. 3d 1217 (Fla. 3d DCA
2012) 	(vacating 	a 	judgment 	where 	the 	Clerk 	didn’t 	abide 	by
§ 903.26(8)); Mike Snapp Bail Bonds v. Orange County, 913 So. 2d
88 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (awarding § 903.27 relief to a surety on the
basis of § 903.26(5)(c) or (8)); Bailey v. State, 282 So. 2d 32, 34 (Fla.
1st DCA 1973) (reversing a forfeiture judgment where the clerk
failed to failed to provide §903.26(1)(b) notice); cf., State ex rel.
Metropolitan Dade County v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 558 So.
2d 539, 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (refusing to set aside judgment in
the case of surrender after the § 903.26(5) deadline). In fact, the
textual history of § 903.27(5) explicitly directed courts to § 903.26
as providing the grounds for setting aside forfeiture judgments.
The pre-1986 version of § 903.27(5) stated: “Upon the filing of [a
motion to set aside the judgment], the court may . . . set aside the
judgment in whole or in part only for those reasons for which the
forfeiture could have been discharged.” Id. (1985). Under that
version of the statute, Palmetto Surety’s motion to set aside the
judgment would have been granted expressly because it satisfied
§ 903.26(5)(b) and (c). The 1986 revision eliminated the set-aside
statute’s 	exclusive 	reliance 	upon 	the 	discharge 	conditions 	in
§ 903.26 	as 	the 	basis 	for 	obtaining 	§ 903.27(5)-based 	relief,
effectively broadening its scope. See ch. 86-151, § 9 at 514, Laws of
Fla. 	Conversely, 	the 	removal 	of 	these 	conditions 	cannot 	be
considered to have narrowed the scope of relief available under
§ 903.27(5).
Palmetto 	Surety’s 	argument 	is 	squarely 	grounded 	in 	a
§ 903.26(5)-based rationale that satisfies both the old and new

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versions 	of 	§ 903.27(5). 	Section 	903.26(5) 	requires 	courts 	to
discharge a forfeiture within 60 days if there is:
(b) A determination that, at the time of the required
appearance 	or 	within 	60 	days 	after 	the 	date 	of 	the
required appearance, the defendant . . . was confined in
any county . . . detention facility; . . . [or]
(c) Surrender or arrest of the defendant . . . within 60 days
after the date of the required appearance in any county .
. . jail . . . and upon a hold being placed to return the
defendant to the jurisdiction of the court. . . .
Id. Palmetto Surety met both of these conditions. In fact, the trial
court noted that “it is undisputed as a matter of substance that
discharge would have been required under §903.26(5)(b) or (c)
because [the defendant] was confined in an institution or in jail
with a hold for a return within 60 days of the date of the required
appearance.” Because Palmetto Surety’s circumstances met the
standard for discharging a forfeiture under § 903.26(5)(b) and (c),
and its motion to set aside the judgment otherwise satisfied the
standards for a § 903.27(5) motion, its motion should have been
granted.
By contrast, the circuit court decided against setting aside the
judgment for reasons not encompassed by the statutes. Of course,
forfeitures are not favored by the courts of this state. Boyle v. State,
47 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1950). And we reject the Clerk of Court’s view,
citing American Bankers Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d at 540, that only
county-made “errors of substance or procedure leading up to the
entry of judgment” could have allowed the forfeiture judgment to
be set aside here under § 903.27(5). We see nothing in the text or
structure of the statute that limits the availability of set-aside
relief to government-made mistakes. In American Bankers, from
which the Clerk draws its theory, the Third District noted that
“[t]he State contends . . . that a motion to set aside the judgment
under subsection 903.27(5) only allows the trial court to revisit
errors 	of 	substance 	or 	procedure 	leading 	up 	to 	the 	entry 	of
judgment.” 558 So. 2d at 540 (emphasis added). But the court
didn’t adopt that rationale as part of its holding. Rather, the court
held that the surety could not use § 903.27(5) to obtain relief from
judgment on a belated surrender that would have been too late to

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obtain a discharge under § 903.26(5). American Bankers Ins. Co.,
558 	So. 	2d 	at 	541. 	There, 	the 	surety 	did 	not 	surrender 	the
defendant 	until 	55 	to 	60 	days 	after 	the 	final 	judgment 	was
rendered – well after the deadline for any discharge of forfeiture
under § 903.26(5). Whereas here, Palmetto Surety delivered the
defendant 	into 	custody 	of 	the 	adjacent 	county 	jail, 	with 	an
Escambia County hold, well before the judgment was entered and
squarely within the period prescribed by § 903.26(5)(b) and (c).
Thus, 	contrary 	to 	the 	Clerk’s 	argument, 	we 	don’t 	see 	that
American Bankers calls for a different result here.
We therefore reverse the order on appeal. And because it is
clear from the record that Palmetto Surety’s motion would have
been granted but for legal error, we remand for entry of an order
granting 	its 	motion 	to 	set 	aside 	the 	final 	judgment 	of 	bond
forfeiture.
REVERSED and R EMANDED.
NORDBY and TREADWELL , JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Lisa H. Colon, Miami, and Bruce S. Reich, Coral Springs, for
Appellant.
Codey L. Leigh, Counsel for Escambia County Clerk of the Circuit
Court and Comptroller, Pensacola, for Appellee.