Hinson v. State of Florida

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2023-1893
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J USTIN H INSON ,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA ,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Francis J. Allman, Jr., Judge.
December 17, 2025
O PINION ON M OTION FOR R EHEARING E N B ANC , W RITTEN OPINION ,
AND CERTIFICATION
P ER C URIAM.
DENIED.
ROBERTS and KELSEY , JJ., concur; R OWE , J., concurs in part and
dissents in part.
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ROWE , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

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I concur in the majority’s decision to deny the motion for
rehearing en banc and the motion for certification. But I dissent
from the majority’s decision to deny the motion for written opinion.
At issue in this appeal is whether the trial court reversibly
erred when it failed at sentencing to renew the offer of counsel to
the pro se defendant. Florida’s Constitution recognizes the right to
counsel and self-representation in all criminal prosecutions. See
Art. I, § 16, Fla. Const. In Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 968 (Fla.
1992), 	the 	Florida 	Supreme 	Court 	explained 	that 	a 	criminal
defendant 	“is 	entitled 	to 	decide 	at 	each 	crucial 	stage 	of 	the
proceedings whether he or she requires the assistance of counsel.”
The Court held that a trial court must renew the offer of counsel
“at 	each 	subsequent 	stage 	of 	the 	proceedings 	at 	which 	the
defendant appears without counsel.” Id. Sentencing is a critical
stage 	of 	the 	proceedings 	and 	this 	court 	has 	repeatedly 	and
consistently reversed when the trial court fails to renew the offer
of counsel at sentencing. See Richardson v. State, 229 So. 3d 446
(Fla. 1st DCA 2017); Brooks v. State, 180 So. 3d 1094, 1096 (Fla.
1st DCA 2015); Henretty v. State, 155 So. 3d 1254, 1255 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2015); Howard v. State, 147 So. 3d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA
2014), overruled on other grounds by Noetzel v. State, 328 So. 3d
933, 952 n.9 (Fla. 2021); Cuyler v. State, 131 So. 3d 827, 828 (Fla.
1st DCA 2014); Travis v. State, 969 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 1st DCA
2007); Parker v. State, 539 So. 2d 1168, 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989);
Smith v. State, 444 So. 2d 542, 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Baranko
v. State, 406 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Billions v.
State, 399 So. 2d 1086, 1087 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
So, too have Florida’s other district courts.* See, e.g., Murray
v. State, 265 So. 3d 723, 724 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019); Hinrichs v. State,
659 So. 2d 1389 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Birlkey v. State, 220 So. 3d
* The Sixth District has not yet addressed whether a trial
court reversibly errs if it fails to renew the offer of counsel at
sentencing. But that court has reversed when the trial court failed
to renew the offer of counsel at another critical stage of the
proceedings—when a defendant moved to withdraw his plea. See
Brannon v. State, 396 So. 3d 420, 423 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024).

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431, 433 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); Williams v. State, 228 So. 3d 699
(Fla. 5th DCA 2017).
Even so, the majority affirms the sentence in this case—even
though the trial court failed to renew the offer of counsel at
sentencing. The majority does so without any explanation and
without citation to any authority that would call into question this
court’s prior decisions. See In re Rule 9.331, Determination of
Causes by a Dist. Ct. of Appeal En Banc, Fla. Rules of App. Proc.,
416 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 1982) (“[T]he suggestion that each
three-judge panel may rule indiscriminately without regard to
previous decisions of the same court is totally inconsistent with the
philosophy of a strong district court of appeal which possesses the
responsibility to set the law within its district.”); Wanless v. State,
271 So. 3d 1219, 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“We are of course bound
to 	follow 	our 	own 	decisions 	unless 	and 	until 	an 	intervening
decision 	from 	the 	Florida 	Supreme 	Court, 	the 	United 	States
Supreme Court, or this court sitting en banc compels otherwise.”);
but see Normandy Ins. Co. v. Bouayad, 372 So. 3d 671, 695 (Fla.
1st DCA 2023) (Tanenbaum, J., concurring) (“[T]he idea that three
independent judicial officers constituting one of this court’s panels
are legally ‘bound’ by a decision of a prior panel of equivalent
judicial officers comes from ... nowhere.”) (footnote omitted).
And thus it is unsurprising that Appellant questions whether
the court’s ruling conflicts with our prior decisions and asks for an
explanation for that ruling. With the majority’s decision to deny
the motion for a written opinion, the parties, the bench, and the
bar are left guessing. I would grant the motion and explain the
court’s reasons for affirming.
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Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Victor D. Holder, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
James 	Uthmeier, 	Attorney 	General, 	and 	Adam 	Blair 	Wilson,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.