J.W.B., IV, a child v. State of Florida

2025-1954Fladistctapp1

Texte intégral

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2025-1954
_____________________________
J.W.B., IV, a child,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA ,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.
Susanne Wilson Bullard, Judge.
March 25, 2026
P ER C URIAM.
Appellant, 	J.W.B., 	challenges 	the 	trial 	court’s 	order
committing him to a high-risk program. Appellant argues, and we
agree, that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements
of section 985.433(7)(b), Florida Statutes, as interpreted in E.A.R.
v. State, 4 So. 3d 614 (Fla. 2009), when it departed from the
recommendation of the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a
moderate-risk program.
Here, the trial court did not provide a “legally sufficient
foundation” 	for 	disregarding 	the 	DJJ’s 	recommendation 	“by
identifying significant information that the DJJ has overlooked,
failed to sufficiently consider, or misconstrued” with regard to
Appellant’s needs and the risks he poses to the public. E.A.R., 4
2
So. 3d at 638. Instead, the trial court merely concluded that the
DJJ misconstrued the time Appellant needs for rehabilitation and
the risk he poses, without identifying any information the DJJ
supposedly 	misconstrued, 	overlooked, 	or 	failed 	to 	sufficiently
consider. For this reason, the trial court’s generalized conclusions
are insufficient to disregard the restrictiveness recommendation
by the DJJ. See M.H. v. State, 69 So. 3d 325, 328 (Fla. 1st DCA
2011) (“In order to deviate lawfully, a trial court must do more than
place generalized reasons on the record; it must engage in a well-
reasoned and complete analysis of the [predisposition report] and
the type of facility to which the trial court intends to send the
child.”).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand the disposition order so
that the trial court may provide sufficient reasons for deviating
from the DJJ’s recommendation or, in the alternative, impose the
DJJ’s recommendation. State v. J. J., 359 So. 3d 863, 869 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2023); C.M.H. v. State, 25 So. 3d 678, 680 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
R EVERSED and R EMANDED.
ROBERTS, R AY , and TREADWELL , JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Jasmine R. Dixon, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
James 	Uthmeier, 	Attorney 	General, 	and 	Heather 	F. 	Ross,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

OCR transcription; preserved printed pages are authoritative

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA

No. 1D2025-1954

J.W.B., IV, a child,
Appellant,
v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.
Susanne Wilson Bullard, Judge.

March 25, 2026
PER CURIAM.

Appellant, J.W.B., challenges the trial court’s order
committing him to a high-risk program. Appellant argues, and we
agree, that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements
of section 985.433(7)(b), Florida Statutes, as interpreted in E.A.R.
v. State, 4 So. 3d 614 (Fla. 2009), when it departed from the
recommendation of the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a
moderate-risk program.

Here, the trial court did not provide a “legally sufficient
foundation” for disregarding the DJJ’s recommendation “by
identifying significant information that the DJJ has overlooked,
failed to sufficiently consider, or misconstrued” with regard to
Appellant’s needs and the risks he poses to the public. E.A.R., 4

So. 3d at 638. Instead, the trial court merely concluded that the
DJJ misconstrued the time Appellant needs for rehabilitation and
the risk he poses, without identifying any information the DJJ
supposedly misconstrued, overlooked, or failed to sufficiently
consider. For this reason, the trial court’s generalized conclusions
are insufficient to disregard the restrictiveness recommendation
by the DJJ. See M.H. v. State, 69 So. 3d 325, 328 (Fla. 1st DCA
2011) (“In order to deviate lawfully, a trial court must do more than
place generalized reasons on the record; it must engage in a well-
reasoned and complete analysis of the [predisposition report] and
the type of facility to which the trial court intends to send the
child.”).

Accordingly, we reverse and remand the disposition order so
that the trial court may provide sufficient reasons for deviating
from the DJJ’s recommendation or, in the alternative, impose the
DJJ’s recommendation. State v. J. J., 359 So. 3d 863, 869 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2023); C.M.H. v. State, 25 So. 3d 678, 680 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ROBERTS, RAY, and TREADWELL, JJ., concur.

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Jasmine R. Dixon, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Heather F. Ross,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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