Department of Corrections v. Steven P. Beebe, Semir Jusic, Stephen Ryan Mote, Joseph Jimmie Ohern, and Rachel Jessica McKinney.

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2024-2146
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F LORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
C ORRECTIONS,
Appellant,
v.
STEVEN P. B EEBE , SEMIR JUSIC ,
STEPHEN R YAN M OTE , JOSEPH
JIMMIE OHERN , and R ACHEL
JESSICA MC KINNEY ,
Appellees.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
John C. Cooper, Judge.
December 31, 2025
P ER C URIAM.
The Florida Department of Corrections appeals a non-final
order that denied its motion to dismiss. The trial court concluded
that Steven Beebe had sufficiently pled his claims, and that the
Department was not entitled to sovereign immunity. We disagree
and reverse, finding that sovereign immunity applies because the
Department’s employees were acting outside the course and scope
of their employment under the facts alleged by Beebe.

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Beebe claims that after his mother called the correctional
facility and advised them that Beebe was in fear for his life,
correctional officers retaliated against him. Specifically, he alleges
that Department staff placed him in a cell with another inmate
with the purpose and intent that he be raped by the other inmate
as punishment for having his mother call. Beebe was then raped
by this inmate, and staff did not respond when he asked to be
moved out of the cell.
Beebe sued the Department for negligence and negligent
supervision of a known dangerous inmate. He also brought claims
against 	several 	individual 	correctional 	officers 	for 	intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The Department moved to dismiss
the complaint, arguing that the claims were barred by sovereign
immunity, that Beebe failed to state a cause of action for negligent
supervision, and that the act of transferring Beebe to another cell
was a discretionary one for which it was immune from suit. The
trial 	court 	denied 	the 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	finding 	that 	Beebe
sufficiently pled his claims, and that the Department was not
entitled to sovereign immunity.
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a complaint based
on whether the claim is barred under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is a question of law and, thus, our review is de novo. See
Andrew v. Shands at Lake Shore, Inc., 970 So. 2d 887, 888–89 (Fla.
1st DCA 2007). We “[m]ust accept as true the complaint’s well-
pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences
from the allegation in favor of the plaintiff when reviewing an
order on a motion to dismiss.” Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trustees v.
Browning, 387 So. 3d 371, 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (citing Medina
v. Pollack, 300 So. 3d 173, 175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)).
Sovereign immunity “protects the state and its subdivisions
from civil liability unless such immunity is waived by legislative
enactment or constitutional amendment.” Id. In section 768.28,
Florida Statutes, the Legislature set forth a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity:
(1) 	In 	accordance 	with 	s. 	13, 	Art. 	X 	of 	the 	State
Constitution, the state, for itself and for its agencies or
subdivisions, 	hereby 	waives 	sovereign 	immunity 	for

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liability for torts, but only to the extent specified in this
act. Actions at law against the state or any of its agencies
or subdivisions to recover damages in tort for money
damages against the state or its agencies or subdivisions
for injury or loss of property, personal injury, or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the agency or subdivision while acting within
the scope of the employee’s office or employment under
circumstances 	in 	which 	the 	state 	or 	such 	agency 	or
subdivision, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant, in accordance with the general law of this state,
may be prosecuted subject to the limitations specified in
this act.
. . .
(9)(a) An officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any
of its subdivisions may not be held personally liable in
tort or named as a party defendant in any action for any
injury or damages suffered as a result of any act, event,
or 	omission 	of 	action 	in 	the 	scope 	of 	her 	or 	his
employment or function, unless such officer, employee, or
agent acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a
manner 	exhibiting 	wanton 	and 	willful 	disregard 	of
human rights, safety, or property. . . . The state or its
subdivisions are not liable in tort for the acts or omissions
of an officer, employee, or agent committed while acting
outside the course and scope of her or his employment or
committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a
manner 	exhibiting 	wanton 	and 	willful 	disregard 	for
human rights, safety, or property.
§ 	768.28(1), 	(9)(a), 	Fla. 	Stat. 	This 	statute 	“expressly 	waives
governmental immunity and authorizes tort actions caused by the
negligent act or omission of government employees acting within
the scope of their employment under circumstances in which a
private person would be liable.” Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Miller, 19 So.
3d 1037, 1040–41 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).
The Department argues it is sovereignly immune from suit
because the alleged conduct by its staff can only be construed as

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willful 	and 	wanton 	and 	outside 	the 	course 	and 	scope 	of
employment, 	and 	thus, 	such 	conduct 	cannot 	support 	Beebe’s
negligence 	or 	negligent 	supervisions 	claims. 	“Conduct 	is 	only
within the scope of employment if (a) it is the type of conduct which
the employee is hired to perform, (b) it occurs substantially within
the time and space limits authorized or required by the work to be
performed, (c) the conduct is activated at least in part by a purpose
to serve the employer.” Craft v. John Sirounis & Sons, Inc., 575 So.
2d 795, 796 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). Generally, custodians are not
liable for injuries sustained by an inmate as a result of an assault
upon him by another inmate because the injuries are an indirect
rather than a direct result of any negligence by the custodian. See
Spann v. State, Dep’t of Corrs., 421 So. 2d 1090, 1092 (Fla. 4th DCA
1982). “In order to find that the custodian’s negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury it must be shown that the injury was
a reasonably foreseeable consequence of that negligence.” Id.
Based on a plain reading of section 768.28 and the facts as
alleged in the complaint, we find the trial court erred when it
concluded the Department was not entitled to sovereign immunity.
Beebe argues that he did not sue the Department for the acts of its
employees but based on the Department’s own negligence and its
failure to monitor the prison, its employees, or other inmates. It is
true that the Department is “responsible for the inmates and for
the 	operation 	of, 	and 	[has] 	supervisory 	and 	protective 	care,
custody, 	and 	control 	of, 	all 	. . 	. 	matters 	connected 	with, 	the
correctional system.” Desue v. State, 908 So. 2d 1116, 1117 (Fla.
1st 	DCA 	2005) 	(quoting 	§ 945.04(1), 	Fla. 	Stat.) 	But 	Beebe’s
argument is not supported by a plain reading of the complaint.
Beebe alleged under the negligence claim that “the officers
named herein acted inside the course and scope of employment.”
He also pled elsewhere in the complaint that the officers’ “actions
were taken in bad faith and with a malicious purpose and with a
willful disregard for [Beebe’s] rights.” The complaint makes clear
that the basis of his claims is that the named correctional officers
facilitated his rape in retaliation for his mother calling the prison
and telling them that Beebe needed to be placed in protective
custody. 	Such 	conduct 	falls 	outside 	the 	course 	and 	scope 	of
employment because facilitating a rape is not “the type of conduct
which the employee is hired to perform.” Craft, 575 So. 2d at 796.

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Because the correctional officers were acting outside the course
and scope of employment, the waiver of sovereign immunity found
in section 768.28(1) does not apply. Accordingly, we reverse the
order denying the Department's motion to dismiss and remand to
the trial court with instructions to dismiss with prejudice all
claims 	against 	the 	Department, 	leaving 	in 	place 	Bebee’s
intentional conduct claims against the various officers. Finding
that the claims against the Department are barred by sovereign
immunity, we need not address the remaining issues raised on
appeal.
R EVERSED and R EMANDED with instructions.
OSTERHAUS, C.J., and M.K. THOMAS and NORDBY, JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Christopher 	R. 	Ramirez 	and 	Dawn 	M. 	McMahon, 	Henry
Buchanan, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Marie A. Mattox and Ashley N. Richardson, Marie A. Mattox, P.A.,
Tallahassee, for Appellees.