Michael Alexander James v. State of Florida

FIRST D ISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2025-0938
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M ICHAEL A LEXANDER JAMES,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA ,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Levy County.
David P. Kreider, Judge.
March 25, 2026
P ER C URIAM.
Appellant, 	Michael 	Alexander 	James, 	challenges 	an
involuntary commitment order finding him to be a sexually violent
predator and civilly committing him under Florida’s Involuntary
Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, which is
commonly referred to as the “Jimmy Ryce Act.” Appellant argues
that 	the 	trial 	court 	erred 	in 	granting 	the 	State’s 	summary
judgment motion because permitting summary judgment in this
type of proceeding is unconstitutional. 	He alternatively argues
that 	even 	if 	no 	constitutional 	violation 	occurred, 	summary
judgment was improper because his general denial in response to
the State’s request for admissions created a genuine issue of
material 	fact 	as 	to 	whether 	he 	met 	the 	criteria 	for 	civil

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commitment. For the following reasons, we reject both arguments
and affirm.
To constitute a sexually violent predator under the Jimmy
Ryce Act, an individual must have been convicted of a sexually
violent offense and must suffer from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes him or her likely to engage in acts
of sexual violence if not confined to a secure facility for long-term
control, care, and treatment. 	§ 394.912(10)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. 	It is
undisputed that Appellant satisfied the first criterion. Prior to his
release from prison for committing sexual battery on a child, the
State petitioned the trial court to deem him a sexually violent
predator and commit him. 	The State later moved for summary
judgment, 	relying 	upon 	its 	expert 	witnesses’ 	opinions 	that
Appellant 	suffered 	from 	a 	mental 	abnormality 	or 	personality
disorder that made him likely to engage in sexual violence if not
confined.
In opposition to the summary judgment motion, Appellant
relied upon his response to the State’s request for admissions, in
which he wrote “Deny” when asked to admit that he suffered from
a 	mental 	abnormality 	or 	a 	personality 	disorder. 	During 	the
summary judgment hearing, defense counsel admitted that he was
unable to secure a favorable expert witness as to that issue, and
he claimed to not needing additional time to try to find one.
Counsel acknowledged, “[W]hat I would suggest to the Court is
that if there was [sic] favorable opinions to the defense that the
State could not dispute, then the defense could use this mechanism
for summary judgment. Because the summary judgment is – built
into the rules.” 	He argued, however, that granting summary
judgment in the State’s favor would violate Appellant’s right to
trial and due process.
The 	trial 	court 	granted 	the 	State’s 	summary 	judgment
motion, finding no genuine issue of material fact as to Appellant’s
status as a sexually violent predator. 	The court did so because
Appellant did not respond to the motion with any attachments or
sworn statements and provided no testimony or evidence during
the hearing to refute the State’s expert witnesses’ opinions. 	The
court subsequently entered an order committing Appellant. 	This
appeal followed.

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Section 394.9155(1), Florida Statutes, which addresses the
“[r]ules of procedure and evidence” in Jimmy Ryce proceedings,
provides that the “Florida Rules of Civil Procedure apply unless
otherwise specified in this part.” Rule 4.110(a) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure 	for 	Involuntary 	Commitment 	of 	Sexually 	Violent
Predators provides that “[a]fter the pleadings and discovery are
closed, but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party
may move for summary judgment” and that “[s]ummary judgment
practice is governed by [Florida Rule of Civil Procedure] 1.510.”
Under rule 1.510(a), a “party may move for summary judgment,
identifying each claim or defense – or the part of each claim or
defense – on which summary judgment is sought.” 	A court must
grant summary judgment if the movant shows “that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
Appellant 	contends 	that 	utilizing 	summary 	judgment 	in
Jimmy Ryce proceedings is unconstitutional because it deprives a
respondent of his right to due process and to a jury trial. 	The
constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo
review. 	Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2010). 	A court is
obligated 	to 	accord 	legislative 	acts 	a 	presumption 	of
constitutionality and to construe a challenged law to effect a
constitutional outcome whenever possible. Id.
As Appellant acknowledges, the Florida Supreme Court has
held that involuntary civil commitment under the Jimmy Ryce Act
is constitutional. 	See Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93 (Fla.
2002). In doing so, the court observed that the act provides a range
of procedural safeguards, including, but not limited to, the right to
a jury trial. Id. at 105 (citing section 394.916(5), Florida Statutes,
which provides that a respondent “has the right to demand that
the trial be before a jury of six members” and that if no demand is
made, “the trial shall be to the court”); see also Mitchell v. State,
911 So. 2d 1211, 1216 (Fla. 2005) (“The liberty interests affected in
Ryce Act proceedings are not dissimilar to the liberty interests
involved in criminal proceedings, although there are obviously
critical 	distinctions.”). 	We 	find 	nothing 	about 	the 	summary
judgment procedure that vitiates the safeguards built into the
involuntary civil commitment framework.

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As has been observed, one of the principal purposes of the
summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims or defenses. In re Amends. to Fla. R. of Civ. P.
1.510, 309 So. 3d 192, 194 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 317 (1986)); see also Williams v. Washington,
120 	So. 	3d 	1263, 	1264 	(Fla. 	1st 	DCA 	2013) 	(observing 	that
summary judgments are pretrial mechanisms that serve to avoid
the time and expense of a useless trial if it clearly appears that no
genuine issue of material fact exists). 	As long as a respondent in
a Jimmy Ryce proceeding is able to present competent evidence
when faced with a summary judgment motion that shows the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact, he or she may proceed
to 	trial. 	Importantly, 	the 	function 	of 	the 	trial 	court 	at 	the
summary judgment stage is to act as a gatekeeper, not to weigh
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter. 	See Whitlow
v. Tallahassee Mem’l Healthcare, Inc., 421 So. 3d 729, 736 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2023) (explaining that the Florida Supreme Court’s adoption
of the federal summary judgment standard “represents a return to
the procedural expediencies that the supreme court approved over
a century earlier as complementing, rather than conflicting with,
the right to a trial by jury”). 	As such, there is nothing about the
procedure that violates a respondent’s right to a jury or to due
process. 	See Jones v. State, 419 So. 3d 619, 625 (Fla. 2025)
(observing that due process requires a defendant to be given notice
and an opportunity to be heard). 	The trial court in this case
properly served in its gatekeeper capacity, and its doing so did not
violate Appellant’s constitutional rights.
Appellant alternatively argues that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment because a genuine issue of material
fact exists as to whether he suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality 	disorder 	that 	makes 	him 	likely 	to 	commit 	sexual
violence if not confined. A court must grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. 	Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a). 	Florida’s summary judgment
standard “shall be construed and applied in accordance with the
federal summary judgment standard.” Id. If a moving party fails
to satisfy its initial burden, then the nonmoving party need not
present any evidence in opposition to the summary judgment
motion. Casey v. Mistral Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 380 So. 3d 1278, 1285

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(Fla. 1st DCA 2024). If the movant satisfies its initial burden, then
the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of at
least one fact issue that is both genuine and material. 	Id. 	To
satisfy that burden, the nonmoving party must present competent
evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial. 	Id. 	A trial court’s
ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo.
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 So. 3d 599, 601
(Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
In support of his argument, Appellant relies solely upon his
one-word 	denial 	in 	his 	response 	to 	the 	State’s 	request 	for
admissions that he suffers from the requisite mental abnormality
or personality disorder. Like the trial court, we reject Appellant’s
argument that this established the existence of a genuine and
material 	factual 	issue. 	This 	case 	is 	distinguishable 	from
Ridenhour v. State, 338 So. 3d 473, 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), where
we held that summary judgment was erroneously granted in a
Jimmy Ryce proceeding. 	There, the appellant filed an affidavit
containing “concrete factual assertions” in opposition to the State’s
summary judgment motion. 	Id. 	In reversing, we rejected the
State’s argument that the case was one where the appellant’s
affidavit framed only self-serving conclusions of law that fell short
of raising a genuine issue of material fact. 	Id. at 476; see also
United 	States 	v. 	Stein, 	881 	F.3d 	853, 	857 	(11th 	Cir. 	2018)
(explaining that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) allows a
nonmoving party to dispute a material fact through an affidavit,
“which must be ‘made on personal knowledge, set out facts that
would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or
declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated’” therein).
Here, as set forth, Appellant did not submit any affidavits, expert
opinions, or any other competent evidence in opposition to the
State’s summary judgment motion. 	Thus, the trial court did not
err in granting it. The commitment order is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
LEWIS, R OBERTS, and KELSEY , JJ., concur.

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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Kathryn Lane, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and David Welch, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.