Suzuki Motor Corporation v. Scott Winckler

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
Case No. 5D2024-1959
LT Case No. 16-2014-CA-4130
_____________________________
SUZUKI MOTOR CORPORATION,
Appellant,
v.
SCOTT WINCKLER,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Katie L. Dearing, Judge.
Raoul G. Cantero and W. Dylan Fay, of White & Case LLP,
Miami, Niels P. Murphy and Catherine M. Licandro, of Murphy &
Anderson, P.A., Jacksonville, and Rick Mueller, pro hac vice, of
Mueller Counts, St. Louis, for Appellant.
Jeffrey A. Cohen, of Carlton Fields, Miami, and Nathaniel G.
Foell, of Carlton Fields, Tampa, Amicus Curiae Product Liability
Advisory Council, Inc.
Keith R. Mitnik, Joshua D. Moore, Harris I. Yegelwel, and T.
Michael Morgan, of Morgan and Morgan, P.A., Orlando, and Shea
T. Moxon, of Brannock Berman & Seider, Tampa, and Jeffrey R.
Bankston, of Bushman, Ahern, Persons & Bankston, Jacksonville,
for Appellee.
April 10, 2026

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KILBANE, J.
This claim arises from a collision between a motorcycle
manufactured by Suzuki Motor Corp. (“Suzuki”) and a sports
utility vehicle (“SUV”). Scott Winckler (“Winckler”)—who was
driving his friend’s motorcycle when the accident occurred—sued
Suzuki asserting the accident was caused by design and warning
defects relating to the motorcycle’s braking system. After ten
years of litigation and four jury trials, Suzuki appeals a final
judgment finding it liable for negligent warning. Suzuki raised
five issues on appeal, only two of which merited discussion: (1)
whether the trial court erred in allowing Winckler to proceed on
the warning defect claim after a jury returned a defense verdict
on the strict liability design defect claim and (2) whether the trial
court erred in admitting Suzuki’s safety recall into evidence.
Because we answer both questions in the negative, we affirm.
Facts
A. Background
On June 14, 2013, Paul Barker changed the brake fluid in
his 2007 Suzuki GSX-R1000 motorcycle to prepare to attend a
rider improvement event at a raceway near Savannah, Georgia.
At the event, motorcyclists pay to ride their own bikes on the
racetrack under the supervision of a professional rider. Barker
rode his motorcycle at speeds from 40 to 160 mph. During these
sessions, Barker did not feel any issues with the front brake.
That evening, Barker and Winckler trailered the motorcycle
to Winckler’s house, where Winckler agreed to drive the
motorcycle a little over a mile to Barker’s house. Before leaving,
Winckler tested the front brakes by pressing the brake lever to
feel for pressure and then applying them to perform a “stoppie”1
on the driveway at approximately 10 mph. On the way to
Barker’s house, Winckler stopped at a stop sign before returning
to around 30 mph. But when an SUV pulled in front of him at a
subsequent intersection, Winckler’s use of the front brake failed
1. A “stoppie” is performed by pulling the front brakes hard
enough that the back tire lifts from the pavement.

3
to stop the motorcycle before it collided with the vehicle.
Winckler was thrown from the bike and suffered a spinal injury
causing permanent paralysis from the waist down.
B. Suzuki Safety Recall
In October 2013, Suzuki notified the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) that it was recalling
certain motorcycles including Barker’s 2007 GSX-R1000. Suzuki
would be replacing each motorcycle’s front brake master cylinder
because the brake piston inside could corrode, which “may result
in a reduction of fluid pressure transmission to the front brake.”
In notices sent to owners, Suzuki warned “[c]orrosion of the brake
piston generates gas, which may not be adequately purged from
the master cylinder . . . can affect braking power by reducing
proper fluid pressure transmission to the front brake.” With
enough accumulation, they explained, “the front brake lever may
develop a ‘spongy’ feel and stopping distances may be extended,
increasing the risk of a crash.” Owners were warned not to allow
anyone to ride a recalled motorcycle until it was serviced, even if
the brakes “feel like they have adequate pressure.”
C. Legal Proceedings
In June 2014, Winckler sued Suzuki and others for warranty
breaches, negligence, and strict liability. As to Suzuki, he
brought claims for strict liability design defect and negligent
warning defect asserting the accident was caused by the
reduction of fluid pressure transmission in the front braking
system.
Four trials were held in this case. The first and third trials
ended in mistrial. In May 2022, at the second trial, the jury
rendered a defense verdict as to the strict liability claim but could
not reach a verdict as to the negligence claim. Winckler objected
that accepting the partial verdict would erroneously direct the
jury to reconsider part of an inconsistent verdict, but the trial
court found it was not an inconsistent verdict. The trial court
accepted the partial verdict at Suzuki’s request. Suzuki had
moved for directed verdict and renewed its motion at the end of
the trial but never moved for judgment in accordance with its
motion after the verdict was rendered.

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In February 2023, Suzuki moved for summary judgment
asserting the verdict on the strict liability claim disposed of the
negligent warning claim. Winckler responded that Suzuki was
implicitly arguing that the jury reached an inconsistent verdict,
which it waived, by failing to object before the jury was
discharged, and that the jury was not precluded from considering
the negligent warning claim in a new trial because even a non-
defective product requires adequate warnings of foreseeable
risks. After a hearing, the trial court denied the summary
judgment motion.2
In April 2024, the fourth jury found Suzuki negligent in
failing to warn about the risks of the front brake master cylinder.
The trial court rendered its final judgment consistent with the
jury’s verdict. Suzuki timely appealed.
Analysis
Suzuki asserts the trial court reversibly erred in (1)
denying its motion for summary judgment after the second trial
and (2) admitting evidence of its safety recall in the fourth trial.
We discuss each in turn.
A. Motion for Summary Judgment After the Second Trial
A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is
reviewed de novo. Sommers v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 388 So.
3d 256, 260 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). Generally, “an order denying
summary judgment is not reviewable after final judgment.”
Quest Diagnostics, Inc. v. Clarke, 406 So. 3d 949, 950 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2025). But an exception arises “where summary judgment
is denied based on purely legal issues.” Id. at 950 n.1 (citation
modified); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a) (“The court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” (emphasis added)).
2. A written order denying the motion was not rendered
until June 13, 2024, after the third and fourth trials were held.

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In Florida, the manufacturer of a defective product may be
found liable under either negligence or strict liability theories.
See Grieco v. Daiho Sangyo, Inc., 344 So. 3d 11, 17 (Fla. 4th DCA
2022). In negligence, “the focus is on . . . whether a duty of care
was owed to the injured parties, and whether the defendants
breached that duty of care.” Id. at 18 (citation omitted). Strict
liability, on the other hand, “is not concerned with the
reasonableness of a manufacturer’s conduct” but “instead the
focus is on the product itself and the reasonable expectations of
the consumer.” Id. (citation modified); see also Davis v. Little
Giant Ladder Sys., LLC, No. 2:19-CV-780-SPC-NPM, 2022 WL
657062, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2022) (“[N]egligence focuses on
defendant’s conduct, while strict liability emphasizes the product
and plaintiff’s expectations.”).
Under either theory, the plaintiff must establish a defect in
the product. Grieco, 344 So. 3d at 17–18 (citation modified); see
also id. at 18 (“Proof of a defect determines a breach of duty
under a negligence theory and the presence of an unreasonably
dangerous condition under a strict liability theory.” (citation
modified)). There are three distinct forms of possible defects:
manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning defects. See
Force v. Ford Motor Co., 879 So. 2d 103, 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).
To succeed on a strict liability design-defect claim, the
plaintiff must show “the defective design . . . made the product
unreasonably dangerous.” Grieco, 344 So. 3d at 18. Further,
“[t]he alleged design defect must also cause unforeseeable
dangers during normal—that is, intended—use of the product.”
Id. at 19. The focus is on the consumer’s expectations, meaning
“a product is defectively designed if the plaintiff is able to
demonstrate that the product did not perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in the intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner.” Id. (quoting Aubin v. Union
Carbide Corp., 177 So. 3d 489, 504 (Fla. 2015)).
In a negligent warning claim, however, “a product is
considered defective when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision
of reasonable instructions or warnings and their omission renders
the product not reasonably safe.” Id. at 20 (citation modified).

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That is, a failure-to-warn claim, “boil[s] down to three elements—
(1) the warnings accompanying the item were inadequate; (2) the
inadequacy of the warnings proximately caused the injury; and
(3) plaintiff suffered injury by using the product.” Davis, 2022
WL 657062, at *5 (citation modified). Thus, the plaintiff must
“prove that a manufacturer or distributor did not warn of a
particular risk for reasons which fell below the acceptable
standard of care, i.e., what a reasonably prudent manufacturer
would have known and warned about.” Ferayorni v. Hyundai
Motor Co., 711 So. 2d 1167, 1172 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (quoting
Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 558
(Cal. 1991)).
Even a product that leaves the manufacturer without a
design or manufacturing defect must have adequate warnings of
its foreseeable risks. See id. at 1170 (“In the failure-to-warn
context, an ‘otherwise safe product’ may be ‘defective’ solely by
virtue of an inadequate warning.” (quoting Giddens v. Denman
Rubber Mfg. Co., 440 So. 2d 1320, 1323 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)));
Moorman v. Am. Safety Equip., 594 So. 2d 795, 801 (Fla. 4th DCA
1992) (“[P]roducts which are non-defective when they leave the
manufacturer’s plant may still be the subject of a claim of
negligent failure to warn against the manufacturer for non-
obvious defects which he can foresee appearing after normal use
by the consumer or user.”); Cohen v. Gen. Motors Corp., Cadillac
Div., 427 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (“[A] warning of a
known danger in a non-defective machine is required in the
exercise of reasonable care.”).
Nine months after the second trial, Suzuki moved for
summary judgment alleging the defense verdict for the strict
liability claim barred further litigation of the negligence claim
because the jury found there was no design defect in the front
braking system. Suzuki contends the negligence claim was
explicitly presented as the failure to warn about the alleged
design defects in the master cylinder and therefore the jury’s
verdict on the design-defect claim disposed of both claims.
But Winckler’s claims were in fact more nuanced. Winckler
asserted claims based on different (though similar) theories and
distinct (but potentially interrelated) defects: (1) a strict liability

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design-defect claim alleging the motorcycle’s front braking
system was unreasonably dangerous and (2) a negligence
warning-defect claim based on Suzuki’s breach of its duty to warn
of the “foreseeable risks” of the front braking system. While the
jury’s finding on the strict liability claim may have resolved
whether the front braking system was defective in design,3 it did
3. For the second trial, the verdict form provided:
1. Did Suzuki Motor Corporation place the
subject front brake master cylinder on the
market with a design defect which was a
legal cause of loss, injury or damage to
Scott Winckler?
2. Was there negligence on the part of Suzuki
Motor Corporation in failing to warn about
particular risks of the front brake master
cylinder which Suzuki knew or should have
known are involved in the reasonably
foreseeable use of the front brake master
cylinder, which was a legal cause of loss,
injury or damage to Scott Winckler?
(emphases added). The jury answered the first question in the
negative but did not resolve the second.
In considering the effect of the jury’s verdict on the strict
liability claim, it is not for this or any court to guess whether the
jury found the front brake was not defective in design at all or
when it was placed on the market, or that Winckler failed to
otherwise establish negligence per se. See Grieco, 344 So. 3d at
18 (“Strict liability means negligence as a matter of law or
negligence per se, the effect of which is to remove the burden
from the user of proving specific acts of negligence.” (quoting West
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976))); cf. Coba
v. Tricam Indus., Inc., 164 So. 3d 637, 648 (Fla. 2015) (“Any
inconsistency in a verdict must be resolved by a jury—not a court
attempting to guess the jury’s intent.”); Moorman, 594 So. 2d at
800 (“There is nothing unjust about refusing to relieve a party of
its own failure to do something about an internal inconsistency in

8
not preclude consideration as to whether it was defective because
of inadequate warnings. Cf. Moorman, 594 So. 2d at 801
(reasoning that jury’s verdict for the defense on strict liability
while finding for plaintiff on negligence could indicate jury found
“the defect arose later . . . and that the manufacturer was
therefore negligent in failing to warn of the potential hazard”);
see also Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Roy, 498 So. 2d 859, 862 (Fla. 1986)
(holding jury could have found negligent warning defect where
only theories presented were negligent failure to warn and
breach of warranty). Accordingly, the trial court denied Suzuki’s
motion because it found the jury’s ruling on the design-defect
claim revealed only that “the front brake master cylinder was not
defective when Suzuki placed it on the market,” which “does not
preclude [Winckler’s] claim of negligent failure to warn.” Relying
on Moorman, it specifically noted Suzuki still had a duty to
provide “a warning of a known danger in a ‘non-defective’
machine.”
Again, given the posture of this issue—an appeal of a
summary judgment motion after subsequent trials—only “purely
legal issues” are reviewable. See Quest Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Clarke, 406 So. 3d 949, 950 & n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025). Whether
a duty is owed is a question of law, Grieco, 344 So. 3d at 22,
which the trial court correctly decided, see Moorman, 594 So. 2d
at 801; cf. Scheman-Gonzalez v. Saber Mfg. Co., 816 So. 2d 1133,
1139 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“Summary judgments should be
granted with caution in negligence cases.”). But whether
warnings were adequate is generally a question for the jury. See
Edwards v. Cal. Chem. Co., 245 So. 2d 259, 263, 265 (Fla. 4th
a verdict until long after the rendering jury had been
discharged.”); Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 241 (1998)
(“[L]iability can exist under a failure-to-warn theory in cases in
which the substantial modification defense . . . might otherwise
preclude a design defect claim.”). Winckler proposes several
reasons the jury might have rendered the defense verdict that
would not bar the negligent warning claim including that the
jury could have found the motorcycle was not defective when
Suzuki put it on the market but had risks that could develop over
time depending on the owner’s use and maintenance. See
Moorman, 594 So. 2d at 801.

9
DCA 1971). But see Hayes v. Spartan Chem. Co., 622 So. 2d
1352, 1354 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (“There are occasions when the
adequacy of a warning is a question of law for the judge to decide.
These occasions, however, are limited to circumstances in which
the warning is ‘accurate, clear, and unambiguous.’” (quoting Felix
v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 540 So. 2d 102, 105 (Fla. 1989))).
Because the adequacy of Suzuki’s warnings of the foreseeable
risks arising from the front braking system as designed was not
“accurate, clear, or unambiguous,” our review is limited. Thus,
Suzuki failed to establish the trial court reversibly erred in
denying summary judgment.4
4. On appeal, Winckler asserts Suzuki waived this issue
because it is implicitly challenging the verdict as inconsistent.
Were this Suzuki’s claim, it would be unpreserved. See Alvarez v.
Rendon, 953 So. 2d 702, 710 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (“To preserve
the issue of an inconsistent verdict for review on appeal, the
party claiming inconsistency must raise the issue before the jury
is discharged.” (citation omitted)). Further, in accepting the
verdict form—which did not indicate that a decision on one claim
could mean the exclusion of the other—and in requesting that the
trial court accept the partial verdict, Suzuki failed to notify the
court of their theory that the claims were definitively
interrelated. Thus, the invited error doctrine would have
applied. See Gjokhila v. Seymour, 349 So. 3d 496, 502 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2022). But—as Suzuki correctly notes—the verdict was not
legally inconsistent because the jury did not make a finding on
the negligent warning claim. Cf. Coba v. Tricam Indus., Inc., 164
So. 3d 637, 643 (Fla. 2015) (noting inconsistent verdict exists
where “two definite findings of fact material to the judgment are
mutually exclusive”). Thus, Suzuki’s claim is not that the verdict
was inconsistent but that the defense verdict on the design claim
precluded the warning claim.
That said, Suzuki also waived the preclusion argument in
failing to file a post-verdict motion under Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.480. Under the rule, Suzuki had fifteen days after
the jury’s verdict to move for judgment in accordance with its
motion for directed verdict. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.480(b). Its
failure to do so constituted waiver. See Hartzog v. State, 133 So.
3d 570, 573 n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“[A] pre-verdict motion for

10
B. Admissibility of Suzuki’s Safety Recall in the Fourth Trial
“A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is
subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, but the
court’s discretion is limited by the rules of evidence and the
applicable case law.” Newman v. State, 390 So. 3d 1262, 1264–65
(Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (citation omitted). “Discretion is abused
when the judicial action taken is arbitrary, fanciful,
unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would adopt the
view taken by the trial court.” LaValley v. State, 30 So. 3d 513,
515 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).
On appeal, Suzuki asserts that the product recall evidence
was inadmissible in the fourth trial because (1) the recall was
directed verdict does not itself preserve the point; after the
verdict is returned, the movant must file another motion, e.g., a
motion to set aside the verdict and enter judgment in accordance
with the motion for directed verdict.”); Roosevelt v. State, 42 So.
3d 293, 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“In order to preserve the point
for appellate review, it was necessary that the defendant renew
the motion at the conclusion of the case and make the appropriate
post-trial motion.” (emphasis added)); Adee Resort Corp. v. Brewer
& Co., 653 So. 2d 1052, 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“Failure to
timely file [a rule 1.480 motion] is a waiver.”). Thus, Suzuki’s
assertion that the defense verdict on the design-defect claim
precluded the warning-defect claim in a summary judgment
motion filed nine months later was rightly denied. Cf. CG Tides
LLC v. SHEDDF3 VNB, LLC, 388 So. 3d 1081, 1084 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2024) (“Properly understood, summary judgment is akin to
a pre-trial directed verdict.”). Even if the motion was not waived
and even if the trial court erred in denying the motion on the
merits, Suzuki’s affirmative actions led the court to view the
claims as independent both in joining in the verdict form and
asking the court to accept the partial verdict. Cf. Rauch, Weaver,
Norfleet, Kurtz & Co. v. AJP Pine Island Warehouses, Inc., 313
So. 3d 625, 632 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“Under the invited-error
doctrine, a party cannot successfully complain about an error for
which he or she is responsible or of rulings that he or she has
invited the trial court to make.” (citation modified)).

11
irrelevant to Winckler’s accident; (2) it was a subsequent
remedial measure precluded by section 90.407, Florida Statutes;
and (3) its admission was unfairly prejudicial in violation of
section 90.403. We address each in turn.
i. Relevance
Suzuki argues the recall evidence was irrelevant because it
addressed a defective condition—“spongy brakes”—unrelated to
the “sudden and complete brake failure” that caused Winckler’s
accident. Florida law allows for the admission of “[a]ll relevant
evidence . . . except as provided by law.” § 90.402, Fla. Stat.
(2024). Evidence is relevant if it “tend[s] to prove or disprove a
material fact.” Id. § 90.401.
By the fourth trial, the only remaining claim was negligent
warning. Because the claim was built on a failure-to-warn defect,
Winckler did not need to show that the product itself was
defective. Instead, the “defect” to be proven was the product’s
inadequate warning of foreseeable risks. See Giddens v. Denman
Rubber Mfg. Co., 440 So. 2d 1320, 1323 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
(“[A]n otherwise safe product may nevertheless be defective when
no warning is given regarding the danger involved in a particular
foreseeable use . . . .”); Benavides v. Tesla, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 3d
1242, 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2025) (“Under Florida law, a product may
be in a defective condition due to a defective warning.” (citation
modified)); see also Grieco, 344 So. 3d at 20 (“Unless the danger is
obvious or known, a manufacturer has a duty to warn where its
product is inherently dangerous or has dangerous propensities.”
(citation omitted)).
While a motorcycle is not an “inherently dangerous” product,
its manufacturer has “a duty to warn of known dangers which are
not otherwise fully appreciated by the user.” Byrnes v. Honda
Motor Co., 887 F. Supp. 279, 280 (S.D. Fla. 1994); see also High v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 610 So. 2d 1259, 1262 (Fla. 1992) (“[A]
manufacturer has a duty to warn of dangerous contents in its
product which could damage or injure even when the product is
not used for its intended purpose.”); Advance Chem. Co. v. Harter,
478 So. 2d 444, 448 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“[I]f the particular
injury is reasonably foreseeable, however rare, the manufacturer
or seller has the duty to warn.”); NBIS Constr. & Transp. Ins.

12
Servs., Inc. v. Liebherr-Am., Inc., 93 F.4th 1304, 1312 (11th Cir.
2024) (“Florida’s intermediate appellate courts have applied the
duty to warn in various cases, including those involving goods
with ‘dangerous propensities.’”) (collecting cases). Thus, Winckler
had to establish Suzuki had a duty to warn him of foreseeable
risks, Suzuki breached that duty by inadequate warning, the
breach caused his injury, and he suffered damages. See Grieco,
344 So. 3d at 22 (“To prevail on a products liability claim based
on negligence, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a duty or obligation
recognized by the law requiring the defendant to protect others
from unreasonable risks; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a
reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the
resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damages.”).
When notifying NHTSA of its safety recall, Suzuki explained
that “[c]orrosion of the brake piston, inside of the front brake
master cylinder, may result in a reduction of fluid pressure
transmission to the front brake.” As the associated consequence,
Suzuki noted “front braking power may be reduced increasing the
risk of a crash.” Yet in the safety recall notices sent to owners,
Suzuki focused on another symptom, “spongy brakes”:
After a long-term service life of the
motorcycle without changing the brake fluid,
the brake fluid can deteriorate and absorb
moisture. The brake piston inside the front
brake master cylinder of some motorcycles may
not have uniform surface treatment. This
combination of conditions can lead to corrosion
of the brake piston. Corrosion of the brake
piston generates gas, which may not be
adequately purged from the master cylinder
due to the side position location of the reservoir
port. Gas remaining in the master cylinder can
affect braking power by reducing proper fluid
pressure transmission to the front brake. Over
time, as gas continues to slowly accumulate
above the reservoir port, the front brake lever
may develop a “spongy” feel and stopping
distances may be extended, increasing the risk
of a crash.

13
In the frequently asked questions attached to the owners’
notice, Suzuki wrote:
3. What symptoms could I have with my
motorcycle related to this recall campaign?
When you apply your front brakes, the
front brake lever could feel spongy or have too
much travel and your stopping distance may be
extended. This sponginess builds over time and
does NOT happen suddenly.
4. The brakes on my Suzuki seem to work
just fine. Do I still need to have the recall
performed and do I need to stop riding it?
Yes. Even if the brakes seem to operate in
a normal fashion and feel like they have
adequate pressure, you should have the recall
repair completed. We also recommend you don’t
ride the motorcycle until this repair is
performed.
If the condition causing the risks was materially different
than that described in the recall, it would be irrelevant. Here,
however, “spongy brakes” was only one “symptom”—also known
as “risk”—of the front braking system. Another foreseeable risk
was extended lever travel, which occurred here. Thus, Winckler
argued the condition that necessitated the recall also had
foreseeable risks relevant to the accident.5 In discussing the
5. The recall confirmed the motorcycle could develop reduced
fluid pressure transmission to the front brake leading to “spongy
brakes” or “too much travel” in the front brake lever, which could
extend stopping distances. As to the possible “sponginess,”
Suzuki warned that it “builds over time and does NOT happen
suddenly.” But the recall did not address whether extended lever
travel or stopping distance could occur suddenly. While Winckler
denied that the accident was directly caused by spongy brakes,
Barker testified he had experienced “sponginess” in his front
brake multiple times before the crash. Evidence admitted at trial
also revealed the corrosion-gas generation condition could return

14
expert testimony supporting its contention, Winckler argued “the
distinction between spongy brakes and sudden loss of brake
pressure is immaterial because they are simply different degrees
of the same phenomenon: a reduction in braking pressure caused
by air or gas in the braking system.” This evidence is relevant to
whether the motorcycle’s master cylinder posed foreseeable risks.
Cf. Webster v. Body Dynamics, Inc., 27 So. 3d 805, 810 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The 2004 ban [on
ephedrine-containing products] does not conclusively prove that
the products used in 1998 were in fact defective, but it does tend
to show that ephedrine alkaloids posed a significant threat.”
(emphasis added)) (dissenting regarding majority’s finding that
precluding evidence of recall was harmless error).
Other cases addressing this same recall—on which Suzuki
relies—are distinguishable from the facts here. See Soulliere v.
Suzuki Motor Corp., No. G057266, 2020 WL 7223370, at *11 (Cal.
Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2020) (finding admission of recall evidence
relevant but unduly prejudicial where expert testimony linking
motorcycle accident to recall was excluded); Stubblefield v.
Suzuki Motor Corp., 826 F. App’x. 309, 314 n.3 & 321–22 (5th
Cir. 2020) (noting plaintiff withdrew failure to warn claim before
closing arguments; affirming preclusion of recall evidence when
offered to prove causation or feasible alternative design in design
defect claim); see also Jackson v. Suzuki Motor of Am., Inc., No.
8:23-CV-02189-FWS-JDE, 2024 WL 3914666, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
July 9, 2024) (dismissing class action brought regarding 2020-
2023 Suzuki models based on statutory consumer protection
claims, fraud by concealment, and unjust enrichment).
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
the evidence was relevant.
even after brake fluid is replaced and that gas could stay in the
closed system depending on the method used to change the brake
fluid. Expert testimony also suggested the high temperatures
generated from riding the motorcycle at the racetrack and
vibrations from trailering it to Winckler’s house could have
accelerated generation and coalescence of larger gas bubbles in
the brake line.

15
ii. Subsequent Remedial Measures
Even if relevant, Suzuki asserts that the recall is a
subsequent remedial measure inadmissible under section 90.407,
Florida Statutes. Section 90.407 precludes evidence of remedial
measures from being used to establish negligence or a product
defect. See § 90.407, Fla. Stat. (“Evidence of measures taken
after an injury or harm caused by an event, which measures if
taken before the event would have made injury or harm less
likely to occur, is not admissible to prove negligence, the
existence of a product defect, or culpable conduct in connection
with the event.”). At the same time, the trial court maintains
discretion to admit this evidence if offered for another purpose.
Id. (“This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent remedial measures when offered for another purpose,
such as proving ownership, control, or the feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.”
(emphasis added)); cf. Cavey v. Wells, 313 So. 3d 188, 195 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2021) (“This testimony would not necessarily be
inadmissible as a subsequent remedial measure if it could be
used for impeachment purposes or to prove the feasibility of
precautionary measures.” (emphasis added)).
Here, the issue was waived by Suzuki’s failure to adequately
address the trial court’s reasoning in its initial brief. Before each
trial, Suzuki filed motions in limine regarding the safety recall.
In response to each motion, Winckler argued that the recall was
either not a subsequent remedial measure or that it fell under
the control and impeachment exceptions. The trial court denied
the first motion explicitly finding the recall was a subsequent
remedial measure but that it was admissible under the control
exception, which might also be used for impeachment at trial.
Each subsequent motion was also denied but with little
explanation. When ruling on the fourth motion—the subject of
this appeal—the trial court declared: “I don’t think anything is
new. I have the same ruling. The motion is denied.” In its
initial brief, Suzuki asserted only that the recall was
inadmissible as a subsequent remedial measure, failing to
challenge the exceptions on which the trial court explicitly relied
in admitting the evidence. Thus, Suzuki waived this issue. See
Union Planters Bank v. Guardianship of Heft, 866 So. 2d 1246

16
(Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (finding issue waived where appellant failed
to “directly address the court’s reasoning”); see also D.H. v. Adept
Cmty. Servs., Inc., 271 So. 3d 870, 880 (Fla. 2018) (“A trial court’s
ruling is treated as correct except insofar as an appellant raises
claims of error. Points covered by a decree of the trial court will
not be considered by an appellate court unless they are properly
raised and discussed in the briefs. Claims of error not raised by
an appellant in its initial brief are deemed abandoned.” (citation
modified)).
iii. Unfairly Prejudicial
Even if otherwise admissible, Suzuki asserts the recall was
unfairly prejudicial. “Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” § 90.403, Fla.
Stat. Evidence of a product recall is likely to weigh on a jury’s
consideration, even with appropriate jury instructions regarding
the limitations of proper use of subsequent remedial measures.
Yet Suzuki failed to demonstrate the prejudice outweighed the
probative value such that no reasonable person would have
permitted this evidence to be admitted. See LaValley v. State, 30
So. 3d 513, 515 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (“Discretion is abused when
the judicial action taken is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or
when no reasonable person would adopt the view taken by the
trial court.”).
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court did not err in denying summary
judgment as to the negligent warning claim or in admitting the
safety recall, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
JAY, C.J., and LAMBERT, J., concur.

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____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________