Michael Hawryluk v. Kathryn Hawryluk

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
Case Nos. 5D2024-0972
5D2024-2069
LT Case No. 2019-30639-FMCI
_____________________________
MICHAEL HAWRYLUK, JR.,
Appellant,
v.
KATHRYN HAWRYLUK,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County.
Sandra C. Upchurch, Judge.
Michael Hawryluk, Jr., Ormond Beach, pro se.
Sheila M. Ennis, of Sheila M. Ennis, P.A., Edgewater, for
Appellee.
February 27, 2026
EDWARDS, J.
To determine whether the former or the 2023 amended
version of section 61.08, Florida Statutes, governs an award of
alimony requires us to answer the following question: At what
point is the initial petition in a dissolution of marriage case no
longer considered “pending?” There may be different answers for
different circumstances, but in this case, the initial petition ceased

2
to be “pending” once the trial court issued its written final
judgment, regardless of the fact that an appeal was pursued, the
judgment was reversed in part, and the trial court conducted
further proceedings. We agree with the views on this topic held by
the First and Fourth District Courts of Appeal. However, we
certify that our decision is in direct conflict with the Second
District’s opinions in Woodward v. Woodward, 400 So. 3d 861 (Fla.
2d DCA 2025), and Morgan v. Morgan, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D53 (Fla.
2d DCA Jan. 7, 2026). We affirm the trial court’s final orders in
all respects, but of the several matters appealed by Appellant, the
only issue that merits discussion is which version of section 61.08
applies.
Statutory Amendment
In 2023, the Florida Legislature amended section 61.08,
Florida Statutes (2023). Compared to the older statute, the
amended version of section 61.08 reduces the types, amounts, and
duration of alimony available in dissolution of marriage
proceedings. Naturally, the changes in alimony law had to take
effect at some point in time. The amended version states that,
“[t]he court shall apply this section to all initial petitions for
dissolution of marriage . . . pending or filed on or after July 1,
2023.” § 61.08, Fla. Stat. (2023) (emphasis added). This is the
parties’ second appeal and requires us to decide whether the initial
petition in this case was pending on July 1, 2023, as Former
Husband claims the trial court erred in its decision of which
version of section 61.08 governed.1
Timeline for the Current Case
After twenty-six (26) years, in May of 2019, Appellee, Kathryn
Hawryluk (“Former Wife”), petitioned to dissolve her marriage to
Appellant, Michael Hawryluk, Jr. (“Former Husband”). The trial
was held in December 2020. Judge Steven C. Henderson issued
1 Former Husband filed a third appeal, which is consolidated
with the second appeal, raising issues about the Fifth Order of
Contempt rendered below, which we affirm without need for
further discussion.

3
the initial final judgment in December of 2020, and an amended
final judgment in August of 2021.
In the amended final judgment, Former Husband was
ordered, inter alia, to pay Former Wife durational alimony of
$3,513.75 per month for seven (7) years, $1,000 per month for five
(5) years as equitable distribution, and $636.34 per month as child
support. He was also ordered to pay Former Wife’s attorney $1,200
per month for seventy-six (76) months as attorney’s fees. Thus,
Former Husband’s monthly obligations under the amended final
judgment totaled $6,350.09.
Former Husband appealed and Former Wife cross-appealed
various aspects of the amended final judgment. This Court issued
a written opinion on May 19, 2023, which affirmed all but one of
the several issues the parties had raised. See Hawryluk v.
Hawryluk, 365 So. 3d 477 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023). The opinion read,
in part, that
the [trial] court failed to make clear in the record how
a $6,000 average monthly surplus can cover a
$6,350.09 monthly obligation. Because the aggregate
monthly payments would exceed the amount that the
court found to be Former Husband’s monthly surplus
(i.e., ability to pay after living expenses), we reverse
and order a recalculation of the payment schedule that
would bring the monthly aggregate payment within
the range of Former Husband’s estimated monthly
surplus of $6,000.
Hawryluk, 365 So. 3d at 478.2 Former Husband’s motion for
rehearing was denied by order on June 20, 2023, and the mandate
issued from this Court on July 18, 2023. Former Husband then
sought review with the Florida Supreme Court, which declined to
accept jurisdiction. Hawryluk v. Hawryluk, Case No. SC2023-
1024, 2023 WL 8819870 (Fla. Dec. 21, 2023).
2 Former Wife’s attorney’s fees motion for the first appeal was
granted.

4
The matter was ultimately remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this Court’s mandate. The
post-appeal trial court, Judge Sandra Upchurch presiding, held a
hearing on March 11, 2024, during which the issue of how to reduce
Former Husband’s monthly aggregate payment was the primary
focus. During this hearing, Former Husband argued, inter alia,
that the amended version of section 61.08 should be applied
because there was “an alimony component still pending resolution
on July 1, 2023.”
The trial court rendered its Order Complying with Mandate
by Recalculating Payment Schedule (“the Order”), which removed
Former Husband’s obligation to pay $1,000 per month as equitable
distribution, thereby reducing his monthly aggregate payment to
$5,350.09. The Order provided that Former Wife could pursue her
equitable distribution rights by other means. Former Husband
moved for rehearing, arguing that the Order was incorrect for a
number of reasons, and again included a claim that the amount of
alimony payable to Former Wife should have been newly
determined by applying the 2023 amended version of section 61.08.
The trial court denied his motion, and Former Husband timely
commenced this appeal.
Analysis
Given that the initial petition for dissolution was filed well
before July 1, 2023, the amended version of section 61.08 would
apply only if the initial petition remained “pending” as of July 1,
2023.
Neither section 61.08, nor any other section of Chapter 61,
defines “pending.” In Stockdale, the First District searched to see
if any case had judicially defined “pending” as used in Florida’s
dissolution statutes and found none. Stockdale v. Stockdale, 409
So. 3d 163, 167 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025). The First District then
consulted several dictionaries and concluded that the overlapping
ordinary and litigation-specific definitions of “not yet decided,”
“remaining undecided,” and “awaiting decision,” are sensible when
applied to the term “pending,” as used in the amended section
61.08. Id. at 166–67. The Fourth District agreed with the court in
Stockdale, and cited it with approval for the proposition that

5
“within the practice of law, ‘pending’ means that the term it
modifies (here, a petition) has not been decided.” Alfonso v.
Alfonso, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D1043 (Fla. 4th DCA May 7, 2025).
Former Husband claims that the 2023 amended version of
section 61.08 should have been applied by the trial court on
remand when it recalculated his monthly aggregate obligation
because there was “an alimony component still pending resolution
on July 1, 2023.”3 In making that argument, Former Husband
relies on the Second District’s Woodward and Morgan cases. We
respectfully disagree with the Second District and Former
Husband because both overlook the specific statutory language,
which defines under what circumstances the amended alimony
would be applied to pending matters.
Because Florida follows the supremacy of text principle,
“[w]hen the statutory language is ‘clear and unambiguous and
conveys a clear and definite meaning,’ . . . ‘the statute must be
given its plain and obvious meaning.’” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
v. Sheffield, 266 So. 3d 1230, 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (quoting
McNeil v. State, 162 So. 3d 274, 275 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)
(additional citation omitted)). “Likewise, ‘[a] court cannot construe
an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or
limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications.’”
Id. (quoting Casais v. State, 204 So. 3d 969, 970 (Fla. 5th DCA
2016) (additional citation omitted)). When the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, it is to be applied as written.
Richards v. State, 288 So. 3d 574, 576 (Fla. 2020) (citing McCloud
v. State, 260 So. 3d 911, 914 (Fla. 2018)).
Here, the amended section 61.08 clearly and unambiguously
states that it only applies to “initial petitions pending or filed on
or after July 1, 2023.” The legislature could have made the
amended section applicable to any aspect or issue of alimony
pending on or after July 1, 2023, but it did not. It could have also
chosen to say that the new law applied to all actions pending or
3 Former Husband asserts that the amount of durational
alimony he must pay would be reduced if the amended statute is
applied, but he did not provide any further details.

6
filed on or after July 1, 2023, but it did not. Thus, Former
Husband’s argument fails.
With all due respect, we believe that the Second District
answered the wrong question when deciding whether the old or
amended version applied in Woodward and Morgan. In those
cases, the Second District incorrectly focused on whether the
dissolution action remained pending following an appeal and
remand, rather than whether the initial petition remained
pending. In our view, the initial petition for dissolution was no
longer pending in either Woodward or Morgan, as final judgments
had been entered in both cases and neither was remanded for a
trial de novo.
In Woodward, the Second District noted that an action or case
continues to exist post-judgment, and “continues to have life until
there is a final determination on an appeal.” Woodward, 400 So.
3d at 863 (quoting Wilson v. Clark, 414 So. 2d 526, 530 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1982)). The First District later disagreed with Woodward,
and announced in Stockdale that its decision in Wilson “has no
application” and “provides no guidance” in the determination of
whether the initial petition for dissolution remained pending on
July 1, 2023. Stockdale, 409 So. 3d at 166.
The Second District’s more recent opinion, Morgan, dealt with
circumstances quite similar to those in our case. In Morgan, after
final judgment issued, the former husband appealed and in 2021,
the Second District reversed and remanded portions of the final
judgment involving equitable distribution, alimony, and child
support for further proceedings.4 On remand, the trial court
entered an amended judgment that awarded the former husband
permanent periodic alimony. Morgan, 2026 WL 61539, at *1.
Although the date of the post-appeal amended judgment isn’t
disclosed in the Morgan opinion, we will assume that it was
sometime on or after July 1, 2023, as the Second District
determined that the trial court erred in awarding permanent
alimony as it was not available under the amended statute. Id.
The Second District in Morgan discussed and disagreed with both
4 Morgan v. Morgan, 327 So. 3d 898, 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021).

7
the Fourth District’s opinion in Alfonso and our Court’s decision in
Secrist. Id. at *2, *3.
In Stockdale, the First District determined that the initial
petition for dissolution remained pending on July 1, 2023, even
though there had been a hearing on June 30, 2023, before the
appointed magistrate, as no oral findings were announced, no
written report had been submitted, and no judgment had issued
from the circuit court. Stockdale, 409 So. 3d at 167–68. In other
words, there had been no decision regarding the initial petition
before July 1, 2023; thus, the petition remained pending.
In Secrist, on June 30, 2023, the trial court conducted a status
conference and at the conclusion of the hearing, it orally
announced its findings and rulings. Secrist v. Secrist, 412 So. 3d
781, 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025). However, the final judgment was
not entered until after July 1, 2023. Id. We concluded that the
initial petition remained pending until September 15, 2023, when
the written final judgment was entered. Id.
The fact that Appellant here timely perfected an appeal and
the appellate court ultimately reversed and remanded the case for
the trial court’s reconsideration on one issue does not change the
fact that a decision was made regarding the initial petition; thus,
it was no longer pending. The remand in this case was not for a
trial de novo; rather, it was for entry of an amended judgment that
would limit Former Husband’s monthly financial obligations to an
amount that was within his ability to pay. The trial court did not
need to reconsider any aspect of the initial petition on remand.
Instead, it reviewed the financial evidence before it, held a hearing
on how to reduce Former Husband’s monthly aggregate payment,
and entered an amended judgment setting the amount of Former
Husband’s obligations lower than his monthly surplus.
We hereby certify that our decision in this case expressly and
directly conflicts with the Second District’s decisions in Woodward
and Morgan as both cases were decided by focusing on answering
the question of whether the action remained pending, rather than
an analysis of whether the initial petition remained pending.
Woodward, 400 So. 3d at 863; Morgan, 2026 WL 61539, at *2.

8
AFFIRMED; DIRECT CONFLICT CERTIFIED WITH
DECISIONS OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL.
LAMBERT and SOUD, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________