D.L. v. Community Based Care of Brevard, Inc., d/b/a Brevard Family Partnership, The Devereaux Foundation, Inc., d/b/a Devereaux Florida and Barbara Jones

FIFTH DISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
Case Nos. 5D2024-2975
5D2024-3492
LT Case No. 05-2023-CA-24604
_____________________________
D.L.,
Appellant,
v.
COMMUNITY B ASED C ARE OF
B REVARD , INC. d/b/a Brevard
Family Partnership, T HE
D EVEREAUX F OUNDATION , INC.,
d/b/a Devereaux Florida, and
B ARBARA J ONES,
Appellees.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County.
Michelle L. Naberhaus, Judge.
Bryan S. Gowdy and Dimitrios A. Peteves, of Creed & Gowdy,
P.A., Jacksonville, and Lisa M. Hoffman, of Justice for Kids, a
Division of Kelley Kronenberg, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for
Appellant.
Dorothy DiFiore and Megan G. Colter, of Quintairos, Prieto,
Wood & Boyer, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee, Community Based
Care of Brevard Inc. d/b/a Brevard Family Partnership.

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Rebecca E. Rhoden and Michael D. Piccolo, of Lowndes, Drosdick,
Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee, The Devereux
Foundation Inc d/b/a Devereux Florida.
Lauren Elizabeth Bobek and Sage Morris-Webster, of Webster Law
Group, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee, Barbara Jones.
February 13, 2026
SOUD, J.
Appellant D.L. brought her lawsuit against Appellees
Community Based Care of Brevard, Inc., d/b/a Brevard Family
Partnership, the Devereux Foundation, Inc., and Barbara Jones
alleging that their individual and collective negligence caused her
to become a victim of sexual battery while a minor in the foster
care system. The trial court dismissed D.L.’s claims against
Brevard Family Partnership and Jones and granted summary
final judgment in favor of the Foundation, concluding D.L.’s claims
against the Appellees were barred by the four-year statute of
limitations set forth in section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2022).
D.L. appeals these decisions, arguing that section 95.11(9)
allows her claim to be brought at any time. We have jurisdiction.
See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b). We
reverse and remand for further proceedings, as we conclude the
trial court erred in its determination that the four-year statute of
limitations barred D.L.’s suit.
I.
The allegations in D.L.’s complaint are relatively
straightforward. D.L. was born in 2000. She was removed from the
care and custody of her biological parents in 2009 and placed with
a family member. Because of physical limitations of that family
member, the Florida Department of Children and Families placed
D.L. in foster care in 2012. The Department contracted with
Brevard Family Partnership to provide foster care and related
services to children such as D.L. Brevard Family Partnership in
turn contracted with the Foundation to provide foster care
licensing, management, and other related services. Ultimately,

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D.L. was placed in the foster home of Bobby and Barbara Jones,
who were licensed foster parents.
In 	June 	2014, 	D.L. 	disclosed 	that 	she 	was 	“molested 	by
another 	child 	while 	living 	in 	the 	Jones’ 	foster 	home.”
Notwithstanding the Joneses’ knowledge of these allegations, they
“took no actions to protect D.L.” In 2015, following the closure of
the Jones’ foster home in November 2014, D.L. further disclosed
that Bobby Jones sexually battered her.
In her three-count complaint filed in 2023, D.L. claimed that
Brevard Family Partnership (Count I) and the Foundation (Count
II) were each negligent by failing to appropriately screen the Jones
home and continue to assess the safety of children placed there,
thus allowing D.L. to be placed and remain in the home where she
was sexually 	battered. D.L. also 	claimed 	that Barbara Jones
(Count III) was negligent in failing to use reasonable care while
caring for D.L., and failing to prevent D.L. from being sexually
abused by Barbara Jones’s husband, Bobby, as well as other
children within the home.1
Brevard Family Partnership and Jones each moved to dismiss
D.L.’s complaint, arguing that since her claims sound in negligence
and not intentional or criminal acts of Brevard Family Partnership
or Jones, D.L.’s claims were barred by the four-year statute of
limitations in section 95.11(3)(a).2 D.L. responded that section
95.11(9) allowed her to bring her action “at any time” because it
was “related to” the sexual battery she alleged she suffered.
Acknowledging that these motions presented a “difficult call,” the
1 D.L. did not bring any claim against Bobby Jones as the
alleged perpetrator.
2 D.L. filed her complaint on March 23, 2023, when the version
of section 95.11 then in effect—covering the period from July 1,
2018, to March 23, 2023—provided for a four-year statute of
limitations for negligence claims. Effective March 24, 2023, the
statute 	was 	amended 	to 	reduce 	the 	limitations 	period 	for
negligence to two years. See § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2023). The
parties agree that the four-year statute of limitations governs this
case.

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trial court granted the motions and dismissed D.L.’s claims with
prejudice.
Thereafter, the Foundation moved for summary judgment,
based on essentially the same argument that D.L.’s claim against
it, sounding in negligence, was barred by 95.11(3)(a)’s four-year
statute of limitations. Consistent with its prior ruling, the trial
court granted the motion and entered summary final judgment in
favor of the Foundation, recognizing this case was a “close call,”
that 	there 	was 	not 	much 	caselaw 	addressing 	the 	legal 	issue
presented, and that the issue was one the appellate courts should
resolve.
This appeal followed.
II.
We review de novo the trial court’s dismissal of D.L.’s claims
against Brevard Family Partnership and Jones, as we do the
summary final judgment entered 	against her in 	favor of the
Foundation. See Baldwin v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., 396 So. 3d 798, 800
(Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (“The trial court’s dismissal of this case,
requiring the interpretation of Florida Statutes, presents a pure
question of law. Thus, our review is de novo.”); see also State v.
Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004) (“This question of statutory
interpretation is subject to de novo review.”); Bradenton Grp., Inc.
v. State, 970 So. 2d 403, 408 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (“The standard
of review for orders on summary judgment is de novo.”).
A.
The 	Florida 	Legislature 	“has 	adopted 	a 	comprehensive
statutory framework to govern limitations periods.” R.R. v. New
Life Cmty. Church of CMA, Inc., 303 So. 3d 916, 918 (Fla. 2020). In
doing 	so, the 	Legislature 	has given 	considerable 	attention 	to
addressing the “difficult questions about how best to balance the
interests 	of 	minors 	with 	the 	interests 	served 	by 	statutes 	of
limitations, especially in cases like this one.” Id. at 918.
When deciding whether a limitations provision bars a claim,
our work is relatively well-defined and statutorily driven. See id.
at 923 (“[B]asic principles of statutory interpretation and, more

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broadly, of separation of powers . . . [require] courts . . . faithfully
apply the . . . rules prescribed by the Legislature.”). In this context,
our analysis considers three distinct, yet related, questions: (1)
what statute of limitations provision applies; (2) when did the
statute begin to run, i.e., when did the cause of action accrue; and
(3) 	whether 	a 	tolling 	provision 	is 	provided 	by 	statute 	that
suspended the running of the limitations period for a length of
time. See id. at 920.
Our resolution of this appeal hinges entirely on our answer to
the first question:3 which statute of limitation applies—are D.L.’s
negligence claims subject to section 95.11(3)(a)’s four-year statute
of limitations for negligence actions, or do her claims fall under
section 95.11(9), which allows claims “related to” sexual abuse she
suffered while under 16 years of age to be brought at any time? In
considering 	this 	issue, 	we 	must 	turn 	to 	the 	language 	of 	the
respective statutes.
B.
At the time D.L. filed her complaint, Florida law generally
required actions founded on negligence to be commenced within
four years. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. However, as part of the
comprehensive framework governing limitation periods, in 2010
the Florida Legislature “abolished the statute of limitations for
actions related to [sexual] battery on a victim under 16, so long as
the claim was not time-barred on or before July 1, 2010.” Doe 1 v.
3 The parties before us do not dispute that D.L.’s causes of
action accrued at the time provided by the “statutory default rule,”
see R.R., 303 So. 3d at 922—“when the last element constituting
the cause of action occurs.” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. And in cases such
as this, that would be when the sexual abuse was inflicted upon
the victim. See R.R., 303 So. 3d at 921. Likewise, D.L. does not
suggest the applicable statute of limitations was tolled. Rather, the
entirety of her argument rests on her contention that section
95.11(9) allows her to bring her case “at any time.”

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Archdiocese of Miami, Inc., 360 So. 3d 778, 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023).
Specifically, section 95.11(9)4 provided:
An action related to an act constituting a violation
of s. 794.011 involving a victim who was under the
age of 16 at the time of the act may be commenced
at any time. This subsection applies to any such
action other than one which would have been time
barred on or before July 1, 2010.
§ 95.11(9), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Thus, under the applicable
version of the statute, for an action to be permitted under this
statute, it must: (1) “relate to”; (2) an act violative of section
794.011 (a sexual battery); (3) committed against a victim less than
16 years of age when the battery was committed; and (4) not be
time-barred on or before July 1, 2010. See id.
There is no material dispute that the allegations in D.L.’s
complaint fall within the last three statutory requirements; that
is, she alleges she was the victim of a sexual battery when a minor
under the age of 16 years that occurred after she was placed in the
Jones’ foster home in August 2012 (post July 1, 2010). As a result,
the dispositive issue is whether D.L.’s claims against Appellees are
“related to” the alleged sexual battery she suffered. If they are,
section 95.11(9) allowed her to bring her case “at any time,” and
section 95.11(3)(a)’s four-year limitation did not bar her suit.
1.
When interpreting statutes, this Court’s “task is to give effect
to the words that the legislature has employed in the statutory
text.” Lab’y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 323 (Fla. 2022).
To fulfill this duty, “‘our first (and often only) step . . . is to ask
what the Legislature actually said in the statute, based upon the
common 	meaning 	of 	the 	words 	used’ 	when 	the 	statute 	was
enacted.” Tsuji v. Fleet, 366 So. 3d 1020, 1025 (Fla. 2023).
4 Following the statute’s 2023 amendment, this provision,
which now also contemplates claims related to human trafficking,
is found at 95.11(10).

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Of course, we remain “mindful of the ‘fundamental principle
of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the
meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be
drawn from the context in which it is used.’” Davis, 339 So. 3d at
324. In the end, our aim “is to arrive at a ‘fair reading’ of the text
by ‘determining the application of [the] text to given facts on the
basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language,
would have understood the text at the time it was issued.’” Ham v.
Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 947 (Fla. 2020)
(quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (2012)); see also Baldwin, 396 So.
3d at 801.
2.
Generally, the common meaning of the phrase “related to,” as
found in this statute, “is a broad one.” Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992). It simply means, “[c]onnected
in some way; having relationship to or with something else.”
Related, B LACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The American
Heritage Dictionary, 5th Edition, likewise defines “related” to
mean, “being connected; associated.”
The 	United 	States 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	provided 	a
substantially 	similar 	meaning. 	In 	interpreting 	the 	Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, the Court emphasized the breadth of the
phrase “relating to” and defined it to mean “to stand in some
relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into
association with or connection with.” Morales, 504 U.S. at 383
(quoting B LACK’S L AW D ICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979)). Decades
later, in 	the 	context of interpreting federal law allowing 	the
deportation of illegal aliens convicted of an aggravated felony,
including 	those 	“relating 	to 	obstruction 	of 	justice,” 	the 	Court
determined that the words “relating to” included “offenses that
have ‘a connection with’ obstruction of justice.” Pugin v. Garland,
599 U.S. 600, 607 (2023) (emphasis added).
Florida courts have followed suit. See Republic Props. Corp. v.
Grand Jury Presentment on City of W. Palm Beach, Part A, Fall
Term 2006, 971 So. 2d 289, 292 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (quoting
Morales and adopting its broad definition of “relating to”). And
Florida law does not require a heightened nexus. “The phrase

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[‘relating 	to”] 	does 	not 	necessarily 	mean 	. 	. 	. 	a 	‘significant’
association or connection. Indeed, the word ‘significantly’ does not
appear 	anywhere 	in 	the 	statute; 	nor 	is 	the 	word 	‘relating’
modified.” Id.; see also Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798, 814–15
(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding that because the term
“sweep[s] quite broadly” this relationship “does not require a
complete overlap between” those things connected).
Thus, against this backdrop the phrase “related to” in section
95.11(9) is properly understood to require D.L.’s claims to have a
connection with the alleged sexual battery committed against her
when she was less than 16 years old. And it is clear that D.L.’s
claims against Appellees are sufficiently connected to the sexual
abuse she alleges she suffered at the hands of Bobby Jones while
a minor in foster care. The essence of her action is that the
individual and collective negligence of the Appellees allowed—and
even facilitated—her sexual abuse. And this connection between
the claimed negligence of Appellees and the alleged sexual abuse
suffices for purposes of section 95.11(9) such that D.L.’s claims can
be brought at any time.
3.
Notwithstanding Appellees’ arguments to the contrary, the
statute does not limit the nature of the actions permitted under
the statute. Rather, section 95.11(9) permits in broad terms “an
action.” § 95.11(9), Fla. Stat. There is no qualifier or other limiting
phrase modifying the word “action.” The statute simply permits
“an action,” which, in this context, simply means “[a] civil . . .
judicial proceeding.” Action, B LACK’S L AW D ICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
If the Legislature wanted to limit the kind of action that can
be brought under subsection (9), it certainly knows how to do so.
This is evident in the fact that subsection (7), just two subsections
before subsection (9), does expressly address “Intentional Torts
Based on Abuse.”5 Likewise, subsection (10) immediately following
subsection 	(9) 	of 	the 	2022 	version 	of 	the 	statute 	addresses
5 	This limitations provision addressing “Intentional Torts
Based on Abuse” is now found in section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes.

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“Intentional Torts Resulting in Death.”6 Yet, there is no language
in section 95.11(9) that limits a permitted claim to intentional
torts, 	such 	as 	in 	sections 	95.11(7) 	and 	(10). 	And 	“when 	the
legislature includes particular language in one section of a statute
but 	not 	in 	another 	section 	of 	the 	same 	statute, 	the 	omitted
language is presumed to have been excluded intentionally.” USAA
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Emerg. Physicians, Inc., 393 So. 3d 257, 261 (Fla.
5th DCA 2024), review denied, No. SC2024-1485, 2025 WL 353601
(Fla. Jan. 31, 2025).
When 	viewed 	together, 	this 	textual 	evidence 	is 	a 	strong
indicator that a child such as D.L. can bring any legally cognizable
claim 	under 	subsection 	(9)—whether 	sounding 	in 	negligence,
intentional torts, or respondeat superior—that is related to sexual
abuse against her when she was under age 16 that was not barred
prior to July 1, 2010. See Alachua County v. Watson, 333 So. 3d
162, 169 (Fla. 2022) (stating that courts are to “exhaust ‘all the
textual and structural clues’ bearing on that meaning. When
exhausting 	those 	clues enables us to resolve the 	interpretive
question put to us, our ‘sole function’ is to apply the law as we find
it.” (quoting Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 160 (2021))).
Additionally, the language of the statute does not limit a
defendant against whom an action may be brought to only the
perpetrator of the abuse. “The language is broad enough to include
a cause of action against a non-perpetrator if it is related to a
sexual battery.” W.D. v. Archdiocese of Miami, Inc., 197 So. 3d 584,
589 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); see also Doe 1, 360 So. 3d at 78 (citing
W.D. for this same conclusion).
III.
Accordingly, because D.L.’s suit could be brought at any time
pursuant 	to 	section 	95.11(9), 	we 	REVERSE 	the 	trial 	court’s
dismissal of D.L.’s claims against Brevard Family Partnership and
Jones, as well as the summary final judgment entered in favor of
6 	This 	limitations 	provision 	governing 	“Intentional 	Torts
Resulting in Death” is now found in section 95.11(11).

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the Foundation. This case is R EMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
W ALLIS and K ILBANE, JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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