David Scott Wells, and North Florida OBGYN, LLC d/b/a Women's Care Florida v. Rodrigo Quintero, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Iris Quintero, Rodrigo Quintero and D.E.Q., a Child, by and through his Parent and Natural Guardian Rodrigo Quintero, and St. Vincent's Medical Center, Inc. d/b/a Ascension St. Vincent's Riverside Hospital

FIFTH DISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D2024-3379
LT Case No. 2021-CA-003505
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DAVID S COTT W ELLS, and N ORTH
F LORIDA OBGYN, LLC d/b/a
Women’s Care Florida,
Appellants,
v.
R ODRIGO Q UINTERO,
Individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
Iris Quintero, R ODRIGO
Q UINTERO AND D.E.Q., a Child,
by and through his Parent and
natural Guardian Rodrigo
Quintero, and S T . V INCENT ’S
M EDICAL CENTER, I NC. d/b/a
Ascension St. Vincent’s
Riverside Hospital,
Appellees.
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Nonfinal appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Virginia Baker Norton, Judge.
Dinah S. Stein and Lindsey A. Hicks, of Hicks, Porter, Ebenfield
& Stein, P.A., Miami, and Mindy McLaughlin and Kaitlin
Rosenthal, of Beytin, McLaughlin, McLaughlin, Osborne,
Brumby, Hoffman & Mirelman, P.A., Tampa, for Appellants.

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Bard D. Rockenbach and Adam Richardson, of Burlington &
Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, and Jonathan R. Gdanski
and David Silverman, of Schlesinger Law Offices, P.A., Fort
Lauderdale, for Appellees, Rodrigo Quintero, Individually and as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Iris Quintero, Rodrigo
Quintero and D.E.Q., a Child, by and through his Parent and
Natural Guardian Rodrigo Quintero.
January 23, 2026
SOUD, J.
Appellants David Wells, M.D. and North Florida OBGYN,
LLC d/b/a Women’s Care Florida, appeal the trial court’s order
denying their motion to dismiss three counts in this wrongful
death 	medical 	malpractice 	action 	filed 	by 	Appellee 	Rodrigo
Quintero. Concluding that Quintero failed to provide presuit notice
regarding counts II, III, and IV as required by The Medical
Malpractice Act, Chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2018), we reverse
and remand to the trial court with instructions to grant the motion
and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
As personal representative of his late wife’s estate and on
behalf of himself and his minor child, Quintero filed a wrongful
death medical malpractice action against Dr. Wells and North
Florida 	OBGYN. 	In 	the 	operative 	third 	amended 	complaint,
Quintero alleged that his wife Iris died as a result of the medical
negligence of Dr. Wells, an obstetrician and gynecologist, in his
treatment of her uterine tumor.
Prior to filing his initial complaint, Quintero served his Notice
of Intent to Initiate Litigation for Medical Malpractice on Dr. Wells
and 	his 	employer, 	North 	Florida 	OBGYN. 	The 	corroborating
affidavit 	from 	out-of-state 	obstetrician 	and 	gynecologist 	Dr.
Marcela del Carmen asserted that, during the course and scope of
his employment with North Florida OBGYN and while working at

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St. Vincent’s Medical Center,1 Dr. Wells was negligent in his
treatment of Iris by failing to timely diagnose her, causing a delay
in 	treatment, 	and 	negligently 	“[p]erforming 	a 	morcellation
procedure which resulted in disease progression and worsening,
metastasis and a recurrence of [Iris’s] Leiomyosarcoma to other
parts of her body, including, but not limited to her lungs, upper
abdomen 	and 	Pelvis, 	resulting 	in 	her 	ultimate 	death.”
Importantly, 	Dr. 	del 	Carmen’s 	presuit 	affidavit 	contains 	no
opinions regarding any negligent acts by North Florida OBGYN.
Quintero filed his original complaint (amended two weeks
later) asserting five causes of action against Dr. Wells, North
Florida OBGYN, and St. Vincent’s Medical Center. After North
Florida OBGYN moved to dismiss, Quintero ultimately filed his
third amended complaint,2 alleging, as before, Negligence against
Dr. Wells (Count I), Negligence against North Florida OBGYN
(Count III), and Vicarious Liability against North Florida OBGYN
for Dr. Wells’s negligence (Count V). However, two new causes of
action were asserted: Lack of Informed Consent against Dr. Wells
(Count II) and against North Florida OBGYN (Count IV). Dr.
Wells and North Florida OBGYN moved to dismiss counts II, III,
and 	IV 	with 	prejudice, 	arguing, 	in 	part, 	that 	allegations 	of
negligence by North Florida OBGYN’s employees and/or agents in
Count III were uncorroborated, because the expert’s affidavit
attached to Plaintiffs’ presuit Notice of Intent only addressed
clinical claims of medical negligence against Dr. Wells. They also
argued counts II and IV should be dismissed because the informed
consent claims were uncorroborated.
The trial court denied the motion and ordered Appellants to
answer the operative complaint. This appeal followed.
II.
1 Appellee St. Vincent’s Medical Center did not join Dr. Wells’s
and North Florida OBGYN’s motion to dismiss below and has not
appeared in this appeal.
2 No second amended complaint is presented in the record
before us.

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Dr. Wells and North Florida OBGYN urge this Court to
exercise jurisdiction and reverse the trial court’s order denying
their motion to dismiss counts II, III, and IV. Succinctly stated,
Appellants 	argue 	that 	Quintero 	did 	not 	comply 	with 	the
requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act because he did not
corroborate the claims raised in these counts with a corroborating
affidavit from a qualified expert.
A.
Initially, 	we 	reject 	Appellants’ 	suggestion 	that 	we 	have
jurisdiction under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3),
which provides for interlocutory review of nonfinal orders that
“deny a motion to dismiss on the basis of the qualifications of a
corroborating expert witness under subsections 766.102(5)–(9),
and 	(12), 	Florida 	Statutes[.]” 	Fla. 	R. 	App. 	P. 	9.130(a)(3)(H)
(emphasis added). The referenced statutory provisions address the
necessary qualifications of persons seeking to offer expert opinion
concerning 	the 	prevailing 	professional 	standard 	of 	care 	in
corroboration 	of 	claims 	of 	negligence 	as 	part 	of 	the 	presuit
investigation process required of medical malpractice claims. See
§ 766.102(5)–(9), (12), Fla. Stat.
Here, this case does not turn on whether Dr. del Carmen was
qualified 	to 	render 	certain 	opinions 	regarding 	alleged 	direct
negligence of North Florida OBGYN or its other employees, or
opinions pertaining to informed consent. Rather, Dr. Wells and
North Florida OBGYN urged dismissal based on the absence
altogether of any corroborating opinion supporting the claims
raised in counts II, III, and IV. As a result, the plain language of
Rule 9.130(a)(3)(H) does not vest us with interlocutory jurisdiction,
as the rule is limited to denial of dismissal “on the basis of the
qualifications of a corroborating expert witness.” Fla. R. App. P.
9.130(a)(3)(H).
Yet, this does not end our jurisdictional inquiry. Dr. Wells and
North Florida OBGYN alternatively request that we exercise our
certiorari jurisdiction.

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B.
Certiorari is “an ‘extraordinary remedy’ . . . provid[ing] this
Court ‘the prerogative to reach down and halt a miscarriage of
justice 	where 	no 	other 	remedy 	exists.’” 	Adventist 	Health
Sys./Sunbelt, Inc. v. Machalek, 383 So. 3d 534, 536 (Fla. 5th DCA
2023) (quoting Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trs. v. Carmody, 372 So. 3d 246,
251–52 (Fla. 2023)). The writ is more limited in scope than that of
review on appeal and is not “intended to redress mere legal error .
. . .” Id. at 537. And certiorari does not serve as an end around to
facilitate 	interlocutory 	review 	of 	orders 	falling 	outside 	those
provided by Rule 9.130. See id. (citing Abbey v. Patrick, 16 So. 3d
1051, 1053–54 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)) (“[Certiorari] is not a remedy
that can be used simply because the order in question is not
appealable . . . .”).
To warrant certiorari relief from the denial of their motions to
dismiss, Dr. Wells and North Florida OBGYN must establish that
in denying dismissal the trial court (1) departed from the essential
requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the
remainder 	of 	the 	case, 	(3) 	that 	cannot 	be 	corrected 	on 	post-
judgment appeal. See id. at 537 (citing Carmody, 372 So. 3d at
252). The last two requirements are often combined into the
concept of “irreparable harm.” Id. “We must first consider the final
two elements because irreparable harm is jurisdictional and must
be found before we may decide whether there has been a departure
from the essential requirements of the law.” Id.
Because nonfinal orders subject to interlocutory review are
limited to those set forth in Rule 9.130 of the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure, certiorari generally is unavailable to review
a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss. See id. at 537 (citing
Carmody, 372 So. 3d at 252). However, “Florida courts have
created an ‘exception . . . when the presuit requirements of a
medical malpractice statute are at issue’ since the ‘purpose’ of the
Medical 	Malpractice 	Act 	is 	‘to 	avoid 	meritless 	claims 	and 	to
encourage 	settlement 	for 	meritorious 	claims.’” 	Id. 	(quoting
Carmody, 372 So. 3d at 252).
Thus, as the Florida Supreme Court reiterated in Carmody,
certiorari lies “to ensure that the procedural aspects of the presuit
requirements are met.” Id. at 537–38 (quoting Carmody, 372 So.

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3d at 253). For example, certiorari review is permitted to resolve
“whether a plaintiff—before the filing of the medical malpractice
lawsuit—gave the defendant ‘advance notice’ and provided an
‘opportunity [for the defendant] to examine [the] claim.’ Thus, a
district court can grant certiorari review to verify that the
plaintiff submitted the corroborating affidavit of an expert
witness.” Id. (quoting Carmody, 372 So. 3d at 253); see also Shands
Jacksonville Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Pusha, 254 So. 3d 1076, 1080 (Fla.
1st DCA 2018) (“When a petitioner seeks certiorari relief on
grounds 	that 	a 	plaintiff 	has 	not 	complied 	with 	the 	presuit
requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act, the latter two prongs
of the certiorari standard are satisfied as ‘[t]he statutes requiring
presuit notice and screening cannot be meaningfully enforced
postjudgment because the purpose of the presuit screening is to
avoid the filing of the lawsuit in the first instance.’” (quoting St.
Joseph’s Hosp., Inc. v. Doe, 208 So. 3d 1200, 1201–02 (Fla. 2d DCA
2017)). And if an appropriate corroborating affidavit has not been
provided, “[c]ertiorari may be an appropriate remedy if the error is
one that resulted in the deprivation of the right to the process
itself.” Machalek, 383 So. 3d at 538 (quoting Abbey, 16 So. 3d at
1054).
As a result, we have certiorari jurisdiction to review whether
Quintero complied with the Medical Malpractice Act and provided
to Dr. Wells and North Florida OBGYN the required presuit
notification.
C.
The Medical Malpractice Act sets out numerous requirements
a plaintiff must satisfy before filing a medical malpractice action.
See Carmody, 372 So. 3d at 248. These requirements “address a
legitimate 	legislative 	policy 	decision 	relating 	to 	medical
malpractice and establish[] a process intended to promote the
settlement of meritorious claims at an early stage without the
necessity 	of 	a 	full 	adversarial 	proceeding.” 	Williams 	v.
Campagnulo, 588 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1991); see also Largie v.
Gregorian, 913 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (quoting
Williams).

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As a condition precedent to filing suit, the Act requires a
potential 	plaintiff 	to 	conduct 	“a 	reasonable 	investigation [3] 	as
permitted 	by 	the 	circumstances 	to 	determine 	that 	there 	are
grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in
the care or treatment of the claimant.” § 766.104(1), Fla. Stat.
Prior to issuing notification of intent to initiate medical negligence
litigation as required by 766.106, a claimant must “conduct an
investigation to ascertain that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that: (a) [a]ny named defendant in the litigation was
negligent in the care or treatment of the claimant; and (b) [s]uch
negligence resulted in injury to the claimant.” § 766.203(2), Fla.
Stat. “Corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical
negligence 	litigation 	shall 	be 	provided 	by 	the 	claimant’s
submission of a verified written medical expert[4] opinion . . . , at
the time the notice of intent to initiate litigation is mailed, which
statement shall corroborate reasonable grounds to support the
claim of medical negligence.” Id. And as the plain language of the
Act requires, this information must be provided to each named
defendant. See §§ 766.202(5) and 203(2), Fla. Stat.
The 	purpose 	of 	the 	presuit 	investigation 	notice 	with
corroborating affidavit is not to simply give notice to a named
defendant of an impending medical malpractice suit; rather, “[t]he
purpose of the medical expert opinion is to ‘assure the defendants,
and the court, that a medical expert has determined that there is
justification for the plaintiff’s claim . . . to corroborate that the
claim is legitimate.’” Tomas v. Sandler, 406 So. 3d 1089, 1093 (Fla.
3d DCA 2025) (quoting Rell v. McCulla, 101 So. 3d 878, 881 (Fla.
3 The Act defines “investigation” to mean “that an attorney
has reviewed the case against each and every potential defendant
and has consulted with a medical expert and has obtained a
written 	opinion 	from 	said 	expert.” 	§ 	766.202(5), 	Fla. 	Stat.
(emphasis added).
4 “‘Medical expert’ means a person duly and regularly engaged
in the practice of his or her profession who holds a health care
professional degree from a university or college and who meets the
requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102.” §
766.202(6), Fla. Stat.

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2d DCA 2012)); see also Wolfsen v. Applegate, 619 So. 2d 1050,
1054–55 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (stating that a corroborating affidavit
is required by the statute “to ensure that a claim or denial has been
preceded by a reasonable investigation, and that it rests on a
reasonable basis—i.e., to eliminate frivolous claims and defenses.”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Together, the
notice 	of 	intent 	to 	initiate 	litigation 	and 	the 	corroborating
affidavit, “must sufficiently indicate the manner in which the
defendant . . . allegedly deviated from the standard of care, and
must provide adequate information for the defendants to evaluate
the merits of the claim.” Tomas, 406 So. 3d at 1093–94 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
On certiorari review, we do not consider the sufficiency of the
substantive evidence presented by an affidavit. See Carmody, 372
So. 3d at 254. Rather, our gaze remains focused on “process-related
deficienc[ies].” 	Id. 	And 	that 	is 	precisely 	that 	nature 	of 	the
procedural defect before us. The entirety of Dr. del Carmen’s
affidavit addresses only the claimed clinical negligence of Dr.
Wells in his treatment of Iris. The affidavit contains no opinion
whatsoever as to any negligence by North Florida OBGYN or its
medical support staff. As such, North Florida OBGYN as a named
defendant received no advance notice of the impending litigation
concerning its alleged negligence and was thereby deprived of the
statutorily granted ability to investigate the claim(s) and resolve
any meritorious claim without the need for adversarial litigation.
As a result, dismissal of count III should have been granted. See
Rafferty v. Martin Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 335 So. 3d 144 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2022) (affirming dismissal of medical negligence complaint
against 	a 	hospital 	and 	nursing 	staff 	where 	the 	presuit
corroborating affidavit identified reasonable grounds to initiate
malpractice suit against a midwife but failed to identify “any
deficiencies in the care provided by the hospital and its nursing
staff”); see also Largie, 913 So. 2d at 642 (affirming summary
judgment in favor of a nurse “based on the total failure of the
[plaintiffs] to demonstrate that, as to this defendant, the presuit
investigation requirements of Chapter 766 had been satisfied”).
Likewise, Quintero’s allegations claiming lack of informed
consent are not addressed in the corroborating affidavit regarding
either Dr. Wells or North Florida OBGYN. As such, the affidavit

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failed to “sufficiently indicate the manner in which [Dr. Wells
and/or North Florida OBGYN] . . . allegedly deviated from the
standard of care” in that regard. See Tomas, 406 So. 3d at 1093–
94. As a result, neither Dr. Wells nor North Florida OBGYN were
afforded the opportunity 	to receive “adequate information 	for
[them] to evaluate the merits of the claim.” See id. Therefore,
counts II and IV should have been dismissed.
III.
As Quintero failed to provide presuit notice to Dr. Wells and
North Florida OBGYN as required by the Medical Malpractice Act
regarding causes of action asserted in counts II, III, and IV of the
third amended complaint, we R EVERSE the trial court’s order
denying the motion to dismiss those counts and R EMAND the case
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
W ALLIS and K ILBANE, JJ., concur.
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Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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