Jennifer Martin v. Craig Sater

FIFTH DISTRICT C OURT OF A PPEAL
S TATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
Case No. 5D2024-1301
LT Case No. 2022-DR-10836
_____________________________
JENNIFER M ARTIN ,
Appellant,
v.
C RAIG S ATER,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County.
Kathryn M. Speicher, Judge.
Elizabeth Siano Harris, of Harris Appellate Law Office, Mims, for
Appellant.
Curtis N. Flajole, of Curtis N. Flajole, P.A,, Rockledge, for
Appellee.
December 10, 2025
EN BANC
SOUD, J.
Appellant Jennifer Martin appeals the trial court’s denial of
her verified motion to set aside marital settlement agreement,
which she filed after entry of the final judgment ratifying the
agreement, making it a part of the judgment, and dissolving her

2
marriage to Appellee Craig Sater. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V,
§ 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). We affirm
because Martin failed to establish a legally sufficient basis to set
aside the final judgment of dissolution of marriage under Florida
Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540. In reaching this decision,
we recede from Suppa v. Suppa, 871 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA
2004), 	which 	declined 	to 	apply 	Rule 	12.540 	under 	similar
circumstances.
I.
Martin 	and 	Sater 	separated 	after 	a 	more 	than 	28-year
marriage. During their marriage, Sater was a dentist, and Martin
worked in the dental practice. Contemplating the immediate filing
of 	a 	petition 	for 	dissolution 	of 	their 	marriage, 	the 	parties
voluntarily attended numerous mediation sessions with a certified
family law mediator who was an attorney and had been contacted
by Martin to conduct the mediation. The result was a marital
settlement agreement.1
Pertinent 	here, 	the 	parties 	agreed 	to 	the 	distribution 	of
considerable 	marital 	assets, 	alimony, 	and 	other 	necessary
considerations involved with dissolving the marriage. Regarding
equitable distribution, the agreement included a detailed list and
valuation of assets identifying the dental practice (and a related
company), 	numerous 	properties, 	automobiles, 	and 	financial
accounts the parties owned.
Just two days after the parties signed the agreement, Martin
petitioned to dissolve the marriage. The trial court entered its
uncontested final judgment of dissolution of marriage that ratified
the marital settlement agreement and made it a part of the
judgment.
Nearly nine months later, Martin filed her verified motion to
set aside the marital settlement agreement, relying on Casto v.
Casto, 508 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987). Martin claimed that during
mediation of the parties’ divorce, she remained “an emotional
1 An addendum to the agreement that benefited Martin was
later signed by the parties.

3
wreck” because her father died in June 2019, and she had to put
down her dog. She also alleged Sater, who was “in full control of
the finances,” never provided financial disclosures and “provided
misinformation” by telling her that the agreement “was the best
she was going to get in Court and that she better sign or she was
going to get nothing. If we go to Court, I guarantee you, I will get
more than you.” As a result of her state of mind, lack of financial
disclosure, 	and 	the 	alleged 	misinformation 	from 	Sater, 	she
asserted the agreement should be set aside as it was “patently
unfair on its face and would shock the conscious [sic].”
Relying 	on 	Casto, 	the 	trial 	court 	denied 	the 	motion.
Specifically, the trial judge found insufficient evidence that Sater
engaged in “fraud, deceit, duress, coercion, misrepresentation, or
overreaching” and that Martin “had a general knowledge and
understanding 	of 	the 	Husband’s 	business 	and 	its 	generated
income” and she failed to show the agreement was unfair to her in
its terms.
This appeal followed.
II.
In resolving this case, we first consider which law governs
Martin’s motion. Should the motion have been resolved under the
dictates of Casto, or does Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure
12.540 drive the trial court’s analysis? And we do so de novo. See
O’Hair v. O’Hair, 396 So. 3d 630, 631 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024) (citing
Bosem v. Musa Holdings, Inc., 46 So. 3d 42, 44 (Fla. 2010)), review
denied, No. SC2024-0853, 2024 WL 3515473 (Fla. July 24, 2024).
Though the trial court’s Casto analysis was consistent with our
binding precedent in Suppa, we now conclude Casto does not
apply. Rather, rule 12.540 governs.
A.
1.
At the outset, it is helpful to recall Casto and certain of its
progeny. 	In 	Casto, 	the 	parties 	entered 	into 	a 	postnuptial
agreement approximately one year prior to filing a dissolution
action—when the parties were not contemplating divorce. See

4
Casto, 508 So. 2d at 332. After the husband filed his petition for
dissolution of marriage, and before entry of final judgment, the
wife successfully moved to set aside the postnuptial agreement.
See 	id. 	Ultimately, 	the 	Florida 	Supreme 	Court 	held 	that 	a
postnuptial agreement may be set aside if the challenging spouse
establishes: (a) that the agreement “was reached under fraud,
deceit, duress, coercion, misrepresentation, or overreaching”; or (b)
“that the agreement makes an unfair or unreasonable provision for
that spouse,” and the defending spouse is not able to show either
(i) full and frank disclosure regarding the assets and income of the
parties or (ii) “a general and approximate knowledge [of the]
challenging spouse” as to the character and extent of the marital
property. See id. at 333.
Years 	later, 	the 	Florida 	Supreme 	Court 	addressed 	the
applicability of the Casto analysis to a post-judgment challenge of
a marital settlement agreement reached by counseled parties after
the 	dissolution 	action 	was 	filed 	and 	the 	parties 	conducted
discovery. See Macar v. Macar, 803 So. 2d 707, 711–13 (Fla. 2001).
In this context, the Florida Supreme Court held,
[R]ule 1.540, and not Casto, provides the framework for
challenging settlement agreements entered into after the
commencement of litigation and utilization of discovery
procedures. . . . Casto applies only to agreements entered
into 	prior 	to 	litigation 	and 	discovery, 	because 	before
spouses file for dissolution, they engage each other as
fiduciaries 	and 	as 	such, 	fraudulent 	behavior 	may 	be
perpetrated more easily.
Id. at 713.2
Thereafter, we held in Suppa that the Casto analysis applied
to a post-judgment challenge to a marital settlement agreement
reached 	by 	parties 	(with 	the 	assistance 	of 	a 	paralegal) 	in
2 At the time of Macar, rule 12.540 provided that Florida Rule
of Civil Procedure 1.540 applied except that there was no time
limit on claims of fraudulent financial affidavits in marital or
paternity cases. See 803 So. 2d at 709 n.4; see also Suppa, 871 So.
2d at 989 n.1.

5
contemplation 	of 	an 	imminent 	petition 	for 	dissolution 	action,
which was filed shortly thereafter. See 871 So. 2d at 988–90.
Following a hearing on the petition, the trial court entered its
“Final 	Judgment 	of 	Dissolution 	of 	Marriage 	with 	Marital
Settlement Agreement.” See id. at 988. Less than one month later
the former wife moved to set aside the judgment, alleging fraud
and misrepresentations by the former husband and her lack of
adequate knowledge of her rights and financial resources of the
marriage. See id. at 988–89. Relying on Casto, the trial court
granted the motion and set aside the agreement. See id. at 989–90.
We affirmed, stating, “[t]his case is controlled by Casto.” Id. at 990.
Finally, in 2024 the Sixth District decided O’Hair, which is
factually similar to both Suppa and the case sub judice. After
twenty-eight years of marriage, the O’Hairs entered into a marital
settlement agreement. See O’Hair, 396 So. 3d at 632. Shortly
thereafter, the husband petitioned for simplified dissolution of
marriage. See id. The trial court entered final judgment ratifying
and incorporating the agreement. See id. More than ten years
later, relying on Casto, the former wife moved to set aside the
agreement, and the trial court, based on Casto, granted the motion.
See id. The Sixth District reversed and remanded for further
proceedings, concluding that “this case is not . . . governed by
Casto.” See id. at 633. Rather, the Sixth District concluded the trial
court’s decision must be determined under rule 12.540. See id.
2.
Rule 12.540 governs a party’s motion seeking relief from a
final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The rule provides five
grounds 	upon 	which 	a 	movant 	may 	be 	granted 	relief 	from
judgment. See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.540(b).
Pertinent here, the rule allows a movant to timely seek relief
from a final judgment when the adverse party engaged in “fraud .
. . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct.” See Fla. Fam. L. R. P.
12.540(b)(3). Importantly, the plain language of rule 12.540(b)
provides no opportunity for relief from a final judgment based upon
an alleged unfairness or unreasonableness of a marital settlement
agreement incorporated thereby. Rather, relevant to the case
before us, rule 12.540(b)(3) focuses entirely on the alleged conduct
of the non-moving party and allows for relief from a final judgment

6
if the movant shows that the non-challenging spouse engaged in
“fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct.”
B.
With this law in mind, we turn to this case. Martin’s motion
was governed by rule 12.540 because the final judgment dissolving
the marriage and incorporating the marital settlement agreement
was entered before she sought relief.
As the Sixth District succinctly concluded in O’Hair, “[w]hen
a marital settlement agreement is incorporated into a judgment,
relief from the agreement requires relief from the judgment.” 396
So. 3d at 631 (emphasis added). And when a party seeks relief from
an agreement ratified and incorporated by a final judgment, she
“must 	do 	so 	by 	seeking 	relief 	from 	the 	judgment, 	not 	the
agreement.” Id. at 632–33 (citing Miller v. Preefer, 1 So. 3d 1278,
1282 	(Fla. 	4th 	DCA 	2009) 	(“Effectively, 	the 	trial 	court 	had
incorporated the settlement agreement into its final judgment
resolving the 1992 lawsuit. When it did, the settlement agreement,
even though it contained an illegal covenant restraining trade,
essentially became sheltered within the judgment. To undo the
settlement agreement, or even just the covenant not to compete
recited 	within 	it, 	Miller 	was 	required 	to 	undo 	the 	judgment
itself.”)).
We agree. The entry of a final judgment of dissolution of
marriage is a terminal event in the litigation of the petition for
dissolution of marriage. And once the time for appeal has run, it
resolves “for all time” the substantive terms of the parties’ divorce,
as framed by the petition (and any counter petition). See Miller v.
Fortune Ins., 484 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. 1986).3
3 Rule 12.540(b) is “substantively identical” to rule 1.540. See
Macar, 803 So. 2d at 709 n.4. As a result, “motions filed under rule
12.540(b) are governed by the body of law applicable to rule
1.540(b).” Shlimbaum v. Shlimbaum, 394 So. 3d 1157, 1161 (Fla.
4th DCA 2024). See also Gjokhila v. Seymour, 349 So. 3d 496, 499
n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).

7
There is but one lone exception to “this absolute finality”
wrought by entry of the final judgment—the “narrow range of
circumstances” set forth in rule 12.540 that vests the trial court
with jurisdiction to relieve a party from the judgment. See id.; see
also Bane v. Bane, 775 So. 2d 938, 941 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Miller);
O’Hair, 396 So. 3d at 632–33. And other than that provided by the
rule, trial courts “have no authority” to vacate or modify the final
judgment. See Bigelow v. Ritsema, 289 So. 3d 550, 551 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2020) (holding that it is “a well-established rule that ‘trial
courts 	have 	no 	authority 	to 	alter, 	modify, 	or 	vacate 	a 	final
judgment except as provided in Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
1.530 and 1.540’ and Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure
12.530 and 12.540.” (quoting Levy v. Levy, 900 So. 2d 737, 745 (Fla.
2d DCA 2005))).
Here, Martin and Sater entered into the marital settlement
agreement after mediation—not as fiduciaries, but as parties soon
to 	be 	legally 	adverse 	in 	an 	imminent 	dissolution 	action 	to
effectuate their divorce. And the final judgment entered by the
trial court ratified their agreement and made it a part of the final
judgment. As a result, it is the final judgment, rather than the
agreement, that possesses legal force and effect in providing the
parties’ respective rights and obligations. It is the final judgment
by which the parties are bound—to which each party is entitled to
enforcement 	and 	subjected 	to 	contempt 	for 	noncompliance.
Therefore, 	Martin 	was 	required 	to 	seek 	relief 	from 	the 	final
judgment itself, not the marital settlement agreement made a part
thereof. See O’Hair, 396 So. 3d at 632–33. And there is only one
path in Florida law by which she could seek such relief—that
paved by rule 12.540. Outside of that “narrow” path, the trial court
simply 	is 	without 	jurisdiction 	to 	vacate 	or 	modify 	the 	final
judgment. See Miller, 484 So. 2d at 1223.
Therefore, the trial court’s decision had to be considered under
the 	provisions 	of 	rule 	12.540—not 	Casto. 	In 	reaching 	this
conclusion, we recede from our decision in Suppa.
C.
Nonetheless, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Martin’s motion
because the record makes clear that there is insufficient evidence
to demonstrate any basis under rule 12.540 to vacate the final

8
judgment. See Crupi v. Crupi, 784 So. 2d 611, 612 (Fla. 5th DCA
2001). In denying the motion, the trial court found there was “no
sufficient evidence to prove” that Sater engaged in “fraud, deceit,
duress, 	coercion, 	misrepresentation, 	or 	overreaching.” 	While
couched in the vernacular of Casto, this finding addresses the
grounds for relief available under rule 12.540(b)(3). And the trial
court’s findings in this regard are supported by the record before
us.
III.
As a result, we A FFIRM the trial court’s order denying Martin’s
motion to set aside the marital settlement agreement. In doing so,
and in light of the statement in Macar indicating that the Casto
analysis applies only to agreements entered into prior to litigation
and 	discovery, 	we 	certify 	to 	the 	Florida 	Supreme 	Court 	the
following question as one of great public importance:
DOES MACAR V. MACAR, 803 SO. 2D 707 (FLA. 2001)
REQUIRE 	THE 	TRIAL 	COURT 	TO 	APPLY 	FAMILY 	RULE
12.540 RATHER THAN THE “UNFAIRNESS TEST” OF CASTO
V. CASTO, 508 SO. 2D 330 (FLA. 1987) TO THE RESOLUTION
OF POST-JUDGMENT LITIGATION SEEKING TO SET ASIDE
A 	MARITAL 	SETTLEMENT 	AGREEMENT—THAT 	WAS
ENTERED INTO JUST PRIOR TO FILING FOR DIVORCE AND
WITH THE SPECIFIC INTENT TO INCORPORATE IT INTO A
FINAL 	JUDGMENT 	OF 	DISSOLUTION 	OF 	MARRIAGE—
WHERE 	THE 	PARTIES 	DID 	NOT 	ENGAGE 	IN 	FORMAL
DISCOVERY 	OR 	LITIGATION 	BEFORE 	ENTRY 	OF 	FINAL
JUDGMENT?
It is so ordered.
W ALLIS, LAMBERT , E DWARDS, B OATWRIGHT , and M ACIVER, JJ.,
concur.
M AKAR, J., concurs in result only with opinion.
E ISNAUGLE, J., concurs in result with opinion in which KILBANE,
J., concurs.

9
K ILBANE, J., concurs in result with opinion in which Jay, C.J.,
concurs.
H ARRIS, J., recused.
_____________________________
Not 	final 	until 	disposition 	of 	any 	timely 	and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________

10
Case No. 5D2024-1301
Lt. Case No. 2020-DR-10836
M AKAR , J., concurring in result only.
The en banc court reaches the correct result, affirmance of the
trial court’s order denying the request to set aside the marital
settlement agreement, but it does not appear necessary for the full
court 	to 	have 	weighed 	in 	on 	this 	determination 	or 	overruled
precedent. No direct conflict exists between Suppa v. Suppa, 871
So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), and the supreme court’s decisions
in Macar v. Macar, 803 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 2001), and Casto v. Casto,
508 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987). Admittedly, a gray area exists as the
Sixth District seems to allude to in its footnote in O’Hair v. O’Hair,
396 So. 3d 630, 633 n.1 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024), review denied, No.
SC2024-0853, 2024 WL 3515473 (Fla. July 24, 2024), but enough
play exists in the jurisprudential joints for the case to be resolved
on its facts without upending Suppa. That said, Judge Soud’s
opinion is a reasonable and thoughtful approach that creates a
brighter line for litigants and judges to apply prospectively.

11
Case No. 5D2024-1301
LT Case No. 2020-DR-10836
EISNAUGLE, J., concurring in result.
I agree that we must affirm because, whether we apply Casto
v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987), or Florida Family Law Rule of
Procedure 12.540, the order denying Martin’s motion to set aside
her marital settlement agreement is not in error. However, as I
will briefly explain, I cannot join the portion of the majority’s
opinion receding from Suppa v. Suppa, 871 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2004).
As a matter of first principles, I agree that our sister court’s
analysis in O’Hair v. O’Hair, 396 So. 3d 630, 632–33 (Fla. 6th DCA
2024), is correct. However, as I read the holdings in Casto and
Macar v. Macar, 803 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 2001), I find no room to apply
O’Hair. The decisional path in Casto rests on the reasonableness
of the marital settlement agreement and, if unreasonable,1 the
challenging party’s knowledge of the value of the marital property
and income.2 Casto, 508 So. 2d at 333. Although the agreement in
1 “Once the claiming spouse establishes that the agreement is
unreasonable, a presumption arises that there was either
concealment by the defending spouse or a presumed lack of
knowledge by the challenging spouse of the defending spouse's
finances at the time the agreement was reached.” Casto, 508 So.
2d at 333.
2 “A holding consists of those propositions along the chosen
decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually decided,
(2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to the
judgment.” Pedroza v. State, 291 So. 3d 541, 547 (Fla. 2020)
(quoting State v. Yule, 905 So. 2d 251, 259 n.10 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
(Canady, J., specially concurring)).

12
Casto was not incorporated into a final judgment, the supreme
court did not rely on that fact in reaching its disposition.
And while Macar limits Casto’s holding, it does not overrule
Casto.3 Instead, Macar merely instructs that rule 12.540 applies
(in lieu of Casto) when an agreement is entered into after
“extensive discovery.” Macar, 803 So. 2d at 712–13 (“[O]ur focus
is on the fact that the challenging party here was afforded an
opportunity to engage extensively in the discovery process.”).
According to Macar, “Casto applies only to agreements entered
into prior to litigation and discovery[.]” 803 So. 2d at 713. So,
consistent with Casto, Macar’s decisional path employs rule 12.540
based on the opportunity for discovery—not on whether the
agreement is incorporated into a final judgment.
In my view, the sixth district identified the correct analysis in
O’Hair.4 But given the supreme court’s holdings in Casto and
Macar, I conclude O’Hair’s analysis is unavailable to us. As a
result, we have no opportunity to recede from Suppa.
KILBANE, J., concurs.
3 In fact, Macar expressly limits its own holding and preserves
the test announced in Casto. Macar, 803 So. 2d at 714 nn.6–7
(“[O]ur decision today that Casto is inapplicable to this type of case
is limited to cases which have attained the procedural posture of
this case, i.e., cases where a contested action has been commenced
and the parties have had the opportunity to obtain full disclosure
through the various discovery mechanisms.”).
4 Our supreme court should adopt O’Hair’s framework.

13
Case No. 5D2024-1301
Lt. Case No. 2022-DR-10836
K ILBANE, J., concurring in result.
I 	concur 	with 	the 	majority 	that 	Martin 	cannot 	establish
grounds to set aside her marital settlement agreement under
either Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540 or Casto v.
Casto, 508 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987). 	I write separately because this
case should not have been addressed en banc.
Below, the trial court denied Martin’s motion to set aside her
marital settlement agreement because she failed to satisfy the
requirements of Casto. As the trial court properly declined to grant
relief under Casto, we rightly affirm on this issue. 	See State v.
Wright, 172 So. 3d 982, 983 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (“The primary
function of the appellate court is to correct errors committed by the
trial court.”). That said, the decision to take the matter en banc to
address the validity of granting relief under Casto in Suppa v.
Suppa, 	871 	So. 	2d 	988 	(Fla. 	5th 	DCA 	2004)—which 	is 	not
controlling in this case—is unwarranted.1 	See Fla. R. App. P.
9.331(a) (“En banc hearings . . . shall not be ordered unless the case
or 	issue 	is 	of 	exceptional 	importance 	or 	unless 	necessary 	to
maintain uniformity in the court’s decisions.” (emphasis added)).
Even so, Suppa was correctly decided because Casto remains
1 	Other than a mistaken belief that this case is bound by
Suppa, the majority fails to explain why en banc review should
have been ordered here. While this case poses a question of great
public importance, the majority does not claim the case or issue
rises to the level of “exceptional importance” demanding en banc
consideration. 	See R.C. v. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 323
So. 3d 366, 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (Long, J., concurring in the
denial 	of 	the 	motion 	for 	certification) 	(“The 	legal 	inquiry 	for
exceptional 	importance 	differs 	from 	the 	decision 	to 	certify 	a
question 	of 	great 	public 	importance. 	The 	purpose, 	procedural
posture, and the inquiry itself contrast in significant ways.”).

14
binding on this Court except as limited by Macar v. Macar, 803 So.
2d 707 (Fla. 2001).2
In Casto, the Florida Supreme Court identified two grounds
under which a party may challenge a postnuptial agreement: (1) it
was 	entered 	“under 	fraud, 	deceit, 	duress, 	coercion,
misrepresentation, 	or 	overreaching” 	or 	(2) 	it 	was 	unfair 	or
unreasonable with an unrebutted presumption of concealment or
lack of knowledge regarding the parties’ finances when executed.
508 So. 2d at 333; see also Macar, 803 So. 2d at 711 (“Casto dictates
that a postnuptial agreement may be set aside where there is a
direct showing of fraud or overreaching by one party or, assuming
the agreement was unreasonable or unfair, where the challenging
party shows by unrebutted presumption that he or she did not
have adequate knowledge of the marital property at the time the
agreement was entered into, or that the other party concealed
assets.”). 	Notably, the application of Casto hinges on the parties’
position 	when 	they 	entered 	the 	agreement, 	if 	executed 	before
litigation and discovery. See Casto, 508 So. 2d at 334 (“The critical
test in determining the validity of marital agreements is whether
there 	was 	fraud 	or 	overreaching 	on 	one 	side, 	or, 	assuming
unreasonableness, whether the challenging spouse did not have
adequate knowledge of the marital property and income of the
parties at the time the agreement was reached.” (emphasis added));
see also Macar, 803 So. 2d at 711–12 (distinguishing between pre-
and post-litigation agreements).
2 	While 	I 	agree 	that 	a 	post-judgment 	challenge 	to 	an
incorporated 	settlement 	agreement 	should 	be 	based 	on 	the
applicable 	procedural 	rules for 	setting 	aside 	a 	judgment, 	the
Florida Supreme Court limited Casto’s application only when the
parties engaged in sufficient discovery prior to executing their
settlement agreement. 	See Macar, 803 So. 2d at 714 n.7. 	Were
that not the case I would fully agree with the majority and the
Sixth District. 	See O’Hair v. O’Hair, 396 So. 3d 630, 632–33 (Fla.
6th DCA 2024) (declining to apply Casto and ruling relief could be
obtained only by challenging judgment under rule 12.540 where
agreement was incorporated into final judgment), review denied,
No. SC2024-0853, 2024 WL 3515473 (Fla. July 24, 2024).

15
Even where such an agreement was incorporated into a final
judgment and the petition to set aside the agreement was filed
after entry of the judgment, the applicability of Casto was explicitly
left open by the Florida Supreme Court.3 See Macar, 803 So. 2d at
714 n.7 (“[O]ur decision today that Casto is inapplicable to this
type of case is limited to cases which have attained the procedural
posture of this case, i.e., cases where a contested action has been
commenced and the parties have had the opportunity to obtain full
disclosure through the various discovery mechanisms.” (emphasis
added)). Compare id. at 709 (“[W]e conclude that challenges to
these types of agreements, made after extensive litigation and
discovery, should be controlled by rule 1.540.” (emphasis added))
with id. at 713 n.6 (“If, on the other hand, the parties were not
afforded an opportunity to engage in discovery, Casto may become
more 	applicable, 	because 	the 	chances 	of 	undetected 	asset
concealment increase.”). 	Consistent with the door left open in
Macar, this Court affirmed a final judgment setting aside an
agreement in such circumstances based on Casto. See Suppa, 871
So. 2d at 990.
In 	Suppa, 	the 	parties 	executed 	a 	marital 	settlement
agreement before the dissolution petition was filed. 	Id. at 988.
The 	agreement 	was 	ratified 	by 	the 	trial 	court 	in 	the 	“Final
Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage with Marital Settlement
Agreement.” Id. After obtaining counsel, the former wife moved to
set aside the final judgment and settlement agreement under
3 Whether a party may challenge an agreement by invoking
Casto is based on the timing of the agreement’s execution (pre- or
post-litigation/discovery) rather than the filing of the petition
challenging the agreement (pre- or post-judgment). See Casto, 508
So. 	2d 	at 	332 	(permitting 	challenge 	where 	parties 	entered
agreement before filing dissolution petition); Macar, 803 So. 2d at
711 (“Critical to our analysis is the fact that the parties in Casto
reached their postnuptial agreement one year before the husband
had even filed the petition for dissolution of marriage.”); see also
Suppa, 871 So. 2d at 988 (applying Casto where agreement was
executed 	before 	filing 	dissolution 	petition 	or 	engaging 	in
discovery). Thus, for so long as Casto is viable, the majority’s focus
on the post-judgment posture of the challenge is misplaced.

16
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540.4 Id. The court granted the
motion based on the unfairness of the agreement, the former
husband’s 	lack 	of 	disclosure, 	and 	the 	former 	wife’s 	lack 	of
understanding, relying on Casto. Id. at 987–90. Believing it to be
unnecessary under Casto, the trial court explicitly declined to
reach fraud. 	Id. at 990. 	The former husband objected, asserting
the former wife’s motion only alleged fraud or duress. Id. Yet the
trial court found she had alleged a lack of knowledge in her motion
and allowed the motion to be amended to conform to the evidence
before ultimately setting aside the agreement. Id.
On appeal, the former husband raised one single issue: “[the
former wife] had only alleged fraud in her rule 1.540 motion, and
so granting relief on any other basis was not permissible.” 	Id. at
990 (emphasis added). 	This Court affirmed finding the wife had
initially alleged a lack of financial disclosure and the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing the motion to be amended.
Id. 	This Court then stated the matter was “controlled by Casto”
because the “trial court expressly found that this was not an arms’
length negotiation and that Wife did not know her rights.” Id.
Because of the continuing applicability of Casto—as limited
by Macar—Suppa was not erroneously decided. 	Thus, en banc
review is not appropriate because there is not an issue of decisional
uniformity nor is this a case of “exceptional importance.” See Fla.
R. App. P. 9.331(a). 	The majority does not explain its reasoning
for ruling otherwise.
If we were writing on a blank slate, I would agree these post-
judgment issues should be governed by procedural rules—here
rule 12.540—irrespective of the posture of the parties when the
settlement agreement was executed. 	But unfortunately, that is
not the current state of the law. 	As it is, en banc review is
unnecessary.
J AY, C.J., concurs.
4 At the time, Florida Family Law Rule 12.540 provided for
relief from judgment under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540.
See Suppa, 871 So. 2d at 989 n.1.