Order

UNITED STATES
Flied
United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE co4J>&r2 5 2017
WASHINGTON, ;D.C. LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk of Court
IN RE UNKNOWN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT ORDERS.
Not Docketed/Leave Denied
ORDER
This Court has received a pleading titled Motion for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae
and for En Banc Order Directing Investigation, submitted by Landmark Legal Foundation
("Landmark") on April 20, 2017. Although presented as a request to appear as an amicus curiae
("friend of the court"), there is no matter pending before the Court with respect to which such an
appearance would be proper. Therefore,
LEAVE to FILE IS DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
April24,2017
Presiding Judge, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
IN RE UNKNOWN FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
COURT ORDERS
MOTION FOR LEA VE TO APPEAR AS AMICUS CURIAE
AND FOR EN BANC ORDER DIRECTING INVESTIGATION
Landmark Legal Foundation (Landmark) respectfully requests the Court permit
Landmark's appearance as Amicus Curiae for the limited purpose of submitting the attached
Motion and Memorandum of Law seeking an order directing an investigation into the apparent
leaking of surveillance activity conducted in accordance with the rulings of the Court.
Landmark respectfully urges the Court to exercise its inherent authority to protect the
administration of justice and the integrity of the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act (PISA)
process and direct the federal government to conduct a thorough investigation into these leaks,
which include violations of 50 U.S.C. Section 1809 and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 798.
Landmark further certifies that no publicly-held company owns 10% or more of it and
that it has no parent companies. Landmark is a non-profit, charitable, legal foundation that
promotes individual liberty, limited government, and ethical government.
As ground for its Motion, Landmark respectfully refers the Court to the accompanying
Memorandum of Law.
Landmark attaches a Proposed Order consistent with this request.
Respectfully submitted,
Isl Richard P. Hutchison

2
Richard P. Hutchison
Landmark Legal Foundation
3100 Broadway, Suite 1210
Kansas City, MO 64111
816-931-5559 (phone)
816-931-1115 (facsimile)
pete.hutch@landmarklegal.org
Attorney for Movants

UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
IN RE UNKNOWN FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
COURT ORDERS
AMICUS CURIAE LANDMARK LEGAL FOUNDATION MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR EN BANC ORDER DIRECTING
INVESTIGATION
Amicus Curiae Landmark Legal Foundation (Landmark) respectfully moves this court to
exercise its authority pursuant to 50 U.S.C. Section l 803(a)(2)(A) to consider "exceptional
matters" en bane, and its inherent authority under the Constitution of the United States, and issue
all orders necessary to protect the administration of justice, including an order to direct a full
investigation into the leaking of surveillance activity conducted in accordance with the rulings of
this court. Landmark does not seek to join any matter before this Court, but respectfully appears
as a friend of the Court. 1
I. 	INTRODUCTION
A flurry of recent published reports citing numerous anonymous federal intelligence and
law enforcement officials has disclosed an enormous amount of classified information,
apparently gathered pursuant to orders issued by this Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) Court. The nature, timing, and volume of classified information released indicate a
systematic effort to exploit the orders of this Court for political purposes. Landmark respectfully
urges the Court to exercise its inherent power to protect the administration of justice and the
integrity of the FISA process and direct the federal government to conduct a thorough
1 Landmark is a national public interest law firm committed to preserving the principles of limited government and
separation of powers and defending individual rights and responsibilities.

investigation into these leaks, which include felony violations of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. Section 1809 and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 798.
Landmark submits that officials within the Executive Branch have abused the judicial
process, placing the integrity of this Court and the constitutional rights of individuals at risk.
The Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction and order the federal government to
investigate fully, and the FBI to explain fully, the following questions:
1. 	Have this Court's order or orders been used by intelligence and law enforcement
entities of the federal government as a subterfuge to surveil private citizens and at
least one United States Senator for political purposes?
2. 	Did government officials seek one or more national security surveillance warrants
from this Court as a pretext to conduct an investigation for the purpose of affecting an
ongoing national presidential campaign and subsequent transition of an incoming
president?
3. 	When applying to this Court for one or more warrants in this matter, did the FBI
inform this Court that it had apparently paid some of the expenses of a former British
spy who prepared the dossier reportedly relied on, in whole or part, in its application
to convince this Court to issue a warrant, and that it had apparently negotiated to
make further payments to the former British spy, which efforts were ultimately
unsuccessful?
4. 	When applying to this Court for one or more warrants in this matter, did the FBI
inform this Court that the dossier it reportedly presented in pursuit of one or more
warrants had originally been prepared by the former British spy for a Washington
2

research firm conducting opposition research against the Republican nominee for
president, candidate Donald Trump?
Landmark respectfully suggests that the Court, sitting en bane, should direct the
government to complete its investigation and report its findings to the Court within 90 days. The
Court should also consider whether it is appropriate to issue an order to all relevant federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies to show cause as to why they should not be held in
contempt for failing to protect the secrecy of classified information obtained pursuant to orders
of this Court. The Court should then consider whether additional remedial actions, including
further investigations, referrals to appropriate ethics authorities, or even referrals for criminal
prosecution, are appropriate. The Court may also deem it appropriate to question under oath
attorneys and affiants responsible for securing the FISA warrant revealed by leaks to the media
chronicled herein. Testimony may also be heard by those responsible for gathering, analyzing,
and disseminating information as a result of the relevant warrants.
Landmark respectfully encourages this Court to use the full arsenal of legal powers
available to it to resolve this matter.
II. 	BACKGROUND
In 2016, the FBI investigated the possibility of a Russian role in the American
presidential campaign. They scrutinized Donald Trump's advisors for connections to Russian
financial figures and to the hacking of the DNC's computers. Ultimately, however, they found
no direct link between Mr. Trump and the Russian government. Eric Lichtblau and Steven Lee
Myers, "Investigating Donald Trump, F.B.I. Sees No Clear Link to Russia," The New York Times
Oct. 31, 2016, https://nyti.ms/2dWiffiL (April 18, 2017). Rather than closing the investigation,
3

the FBI apparently took the highly unusual step of converting the matter into a national security
investigation. Andrew C. McCarthy, "PISA and the Trump Team," National Review, Jan. 11,
2017, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/443768/obama-fisa-trump-wiretap (April 18,
2017). After reportedly being denied a warrant in June, 2016, which supposedly had named
presidential candidate Donald Trump, the FBI sought and was granted "a PISA court warrant in
October, giving counter-intelligence permission to examine the activities of 'U.S. persons' in
Donald Trump's campaign with ties to Russia." Louise Mensch, "Exclusive: FBI 'Granted FISA
Warrant' Covering Trump Camp's Ties To Russia," Heat Street, November 7, 2016,
https://heatst.com/world/exclusive-fbi-granted-fisa-warrant-covering-trump-camps-ties-to-russia/
(April 18, 2017).
In addition, according to The New York Times, in the closing days of the Obama
administration, steps were taken to expand the NSA's authority to distribute certain intelligence
information to several other federal departments and agencies:
In its final days, the Obama administration ... expanded the power of the National
Security Agency to share globally intercepted personal communications with the
government's 16 other intelligence agencies before applying privacy protections.
The new rules significantly relax longstanding limits on what the N.S.A. may do with the
information gathered by its most powerful surveillance operations, which are largely
unregulated by American wiretapping laws. These include collecting satellite
transmissions, phone calls and emails that cross network switches abroad, and messages
between people abroad that cross domestic network switches.
The change means that far more officials will be searching through raw data.
Charlie Savage, "N.S.A. Gets More Latitude to Share Intercepted Communications," The New
York Times, Jan. 12, 2017, https://nyti.ms/2jAh0bh (April 18, 2017). The expanded policy was
approved in December and became effective January 3, 2017, two weeks before the inauguration
of the next president. Procedures for the Availability or Dissemination of Raw Signals
4

Intelligence Information by the National Security Agency Under Section 2. 3 of Executive Order
12333 (Raw SIGINT Availability Procedures), p. 23.
Against this backdrop, The New York Times, The Washington Post, McClatchy, Heat
Street, the BBC, and other national and international media outlets have published a series of
articles relating to intelligence surveillance conducted in accordance with orders issued by the
FISA Court. Details leaked to reporters include the name of a private U.S. citizen subject to a
surveillance warrant, namely Carter Page, and speculation about the targeting of former Trump
campaign manager, Paul Manafort, and Trump surrogate, Roger Stone, and certain information
gathered pursuant to one or more warrants. Moreover, information gathered on President Donald
Trump's former National Security Advisor, Michael Flynn, said to have been gathered
"incidental" to the surveillance of the Russian ambassador, and whose identity was "unmasked"
by government officials, was unlawfully leaked to the media.
Each leak is potentially criminal and certainly unethical. They also undermine the
public's faith in the credibility of the FISA process. These leaks appear to be part of a
systematic, political effort designed to undermine an incoming presidential administration.
Landmark respectfully urges this Court to exercise immediately its authority to direct the
federal government to investigate the sources of these pervasive leaks. The following is a partial
list of articles published since the new SIGINT rules took effect with a sampling of the leaks:
I. 	Paul Wood, "Trump 'compromising' claims: How and why did we get here?" BBC
News, Jan. 12, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38589427 (April
18, 2017).
5

• 	"A former CIA officer told me that ... Mr. Trump [turned down lucrative
Kremlin-offered "sweetheart deals"] .... But a joint intelligence and law
enforcement taskforce has been looking at allegations that the Kremlin paid
money to his campaign through his associates."
• 	"On 15 October, the US secret intelligence court issued a warrant to investigate
two Russian banks. This news was given to me by several sources and
corroborated by someone I will identify only as a senior member of the US
intelligence community. He would never volunteer anything - giving up
classified information would be illegal - but he would confirm or deny what I had
heard from other sources." (Emphasis added.)
• 	"The taskforce included six agencies or departments of government. Dealing with
the domestic, U.S., side of the inquiry, were the FBI, the Department of the
Treasury, and the Department of Justice. For the foreign intelligence aspects of
the investigation, there were another three agencies: the CIA, the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence and the National Security Agency, responsible
electronic spying."
• 	"Lawyers from the National Security Division in the Department of Justice then
drew up [a FISA warrant] application .... Their first application, in June, was
rejected outright by the judge. They returned with a more narrowly drawn order
in July and were rejected again. Finally, before a new judge, the order was
granted, on 15 October, three weeks before election day."
6

• 	"A lawyer - outside the Department of Justice but familiar with the case - told me
that three of Mr. Trump's associates were the subject of the inquiry. 'But it's
clear this is about Trump,' he said."
2. 	Peter Stone and Greg Gordon, "FBI, 5 other agencies probe possible covert Kremlin
aid to Trump," McClatchy, Jan. 18, 2017,
hm>://www .mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-govemment/article 127231799 .html
(April 18, 2017).
• 	"The FBI and five other law enforcement and intelligence agencies have
collaborated for months in an investigation into whether money from the Kremlin
covertly aided President-elect Donald Trump, two people familiar with the matter
said.,, (Emphasis added.)
• 	The agencies involved in the inquiry are the FBI, the CIA, the National Security
Agency, the Justice Department, the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network and representatives of the director of national intelligence,
the sources said. " (Emphasis added.)
• 	"Investigators are examining how money may have moved from the Kremlin to
covertly help Trump win, the two sources said. One of the allegations involves
whether a system for routinely paying thousands of Russian-American pensioners
may have been used to pay some email hackers in the United States or to supply
money to intermediaries who would then pay the hackers, the two sources said."
(Emphasis added.)
• 	"The informal, inter-agency working group began to explore possible Russian
interference last spring, long before the FBI received information from a former
7

British spy hired to develop politically damaging and unverified research about
Trump, according to the sources, who spoke on the condition of anonymity
because of the sensitive nature of the inquiry."
• 	"The working group is scrutinizing the activities of a few Americans who were
affiliated with Trump's campaign or his business empire and of multiple
individuals from Russia and other former Soviet nations who had similar
connections, the sources said."
• 	"The BBC reported that the FBI had obtained a warrant on Oct. 15 from the
highly secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Curt allowing investigators
access to bank records and other documents about potential payments and money
transfers related to Russia. One of McClatchy's sources confirmed the report."
(Emphasis added.)
3. 	Michael S. Schmidt, Matthew Rosenberg, Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo,
"Intercepted Russian Communications Part of Inquiry Into Trump Associates," The
New York Times, Jan. 19, 2017, htq,s://nyti.ms/2k6mKgl (April 18, 2017).
• 	"Phone records and intercepted calls show that members of Donald J. Trump's
2016 presidential campaign and other Trump associates had repeated contacts
with senior Russian intelligence officials in the year before the election, according
to four current and former American officials."
• 	"American law enforcement and intelligence agencies are examining intercepted
communications and financial transactions as part of a broad investigation into
possible links between Russian officials and associates of President-elect Donald
8

J. Trump, including his former campaign chairman Paul Manafort, current and
former senior American officials said."
• 	"The intelligence agencies then sought to learn whether the Trump campaign was
colluding with the Russians on the hacking or other efforts to influence the
election."
• 	"The officials interviewed in recent weeks said that, so far, they had seen no
evidence of such cooperation. But the intercepts alarmed American intelligence
and law enforcement agencies in part because of the amount of contact that was
occurring while Mr. Trump was speaking glowingly about the Russian president,
Vladimir V. Putin."
• 	"The officials said the intercepted communications were not limited to Trump
campaign officials, and also included members of the government outside of the
intelligence services, they said."
• 	"All of the current and former officials spoke on the condition of anonymity
because the continuing investigation is classified."
• 	"The intercepted calls are different from the wiretapped conversations last year
between Michael T. Flynn, Mr. Trump's former national security advisor, and
Sergey I. Kislyak, Russia's ambassador to the United States. In those calls, which
led to Mr. Flynn's resignation on Monday night, the two men discussed sanctions
that the Obama administration imposed on Russia in December."
• 	"The National Security Agency, which monitors the communications of foreign
intelligence services, initially captured the calls between Mr. Trump's associates
and the Russians as part ofroutine foreign surveillance. After that, the F.B.I.
9

asked the N.S.A. to collect as much information as possible about the Russian
operatives on the phone calls, and to search through troves of previous intercepted
communications that had not been analyzed."
• 	"The F.B.I. has closely examined at least three other people close to Mr. Trump,
although it is unclear if their calls were intercepted. They are Carter Page, a
businessman and former foreign policy adviser to the campaign; Roger Stone, a
longtime Republican operative; and Mr. Flynn."
• 	"As part of the inquiry, the F.B.I. is also trying to assess the credibility of the
information contained in a dossier that was given to the bureau last year by a
former British operative. The dossier contained a raft of allegations of a broad
conspiracy between Mr. Trump, his associates and the Russian government. It
also included unsubstantiated claims that the Russians had embarrassing videos
that could be used to blackmail Mr. Trump."
4. 	Matthew Rosenberg, Adam Goldman and Michael S. Schmidt, "Obama
Administration Rushed to Preserve Intelligence of Russian Election Hacking," March
1, 2017, The New York Times, htg>s://nyti.ms/2IB7cSL (April 18, 2017).
• 	"In the Obama administration's last days, some White House officials scrambled
to spread information about Russian efforts to undermine the presidential election
- and about possible contacts between associates of President-elect Donald J.
Trump and Russians-across the government. Former American officials say
they had two aims: to ensure that such meddling isn't duplicated in future
American or European elections, and to leave a clear trail of intelligence for
government investigators." (Emphasis added.)
10

• 	"Separately, American intelligence agencies had intercepted communications of
Russian officials, some of them within the Kremlin, discussing contacts with
Trump associates."
• 	"The disclosures about the contacts came as new questions were raised about
Attorney General Jeff Session's ties to the Russians. According to a former
senior American official, he met with the Russian ambassador, Sergey I. Kislyak,
twice in the past year. The details of the meetings were not clear, but the contact
appeared to contradict testimony Mr. Sessions provided Congress during his
confirmation hearing in January when he said he 'did not have communications
with the Russians."'
• 	"At the Obama White House, Mr. Trump's statements stoked fears among some
that intelligence could be covered up or destroyed - or its sources exposed - once
power changed hands. What followed was a push to preserve the intelligence that
underscored the deep anxiety with which the White and American intelligence
agencies had come to view the threat from Moscow." (Emphasis added.)
• 	"Former senior Obama administration officials said that none of the efforts were
directed by Mr. Obama." (Emphasis added.)
• 	"As Inauguration Day approached, Obama White House officials grew convinced
that the intelligence was damning and that they needed to ensure that as many
people as possible inside government could see it, even if people without security
clearances could not."
• 	"More than a half-dozen current and former officials described various aspects of
the effort to preserve and distribute the intelligence, and some said they were
11

speaking to draw attention to the material and ensure proper investigation by
Congress. All spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were discussing
classified information, nearly all of which remains secret, making an independent
public assessment of the competing Obama and Trump administration claims
impossible."
• 	"On Wednesday, a Justice Department official confirmed that Mr. Sessions had
two conversations with Ambassador Kislyak last year, when he was still a senator,
despite testifying at his Jan. I 0 confirmation hearing that he had no contact with
the Russians."
• 	"However, Justice officials acknowledged that Mr. Sessions had spoken with Mr.
Kislyak twice: once, among a group of ambassadors who approached him at a
Heritage Foundation event during the Republican National Convention in
Cleveland in July and, separately, in an office meeting on Sept. 8. The contacts
were first reported by the Washington Post."
• 	"As WikiLeaks was pushing out emails stolen from the Democratic National
Committee through online publication, American intelligence began picking up
conversations in which Russian officials were discussing contacts with Trump
associates, and European allies were starting to pass along information about
people close to Mr. Trump meeting with Russians in the Netherlands, Britain and
other countries."
• 	"But what was going on in the meetings was unclear to the officials, and the
intercepted communications did little to clarify matters - the Russians, it
appeared, were arguing about how far to go in interfering in the presidential
12

election. What intensified the alarm at the Obama White House was a campaign
of cyberattacks on state electoral systems in September, which led the
administration to deliver a public accusation against the Russians in October."
5. 	Adam Entous, Ellen Nakashima and Greg Miller, "Sessions met with Russian envoy
twice last year, encounters he later did not disclose," The Washington Post, March 1,
2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sessions-spoke-
twice-with-russian-ambassador-during-trumps-presidential-campai gn-justice-
officials-say/2017/03/0 l /77205eda-feac- l l e6-99b4-
9e613afeb09f story.html?utm term=.6a76a243b950 (April 18, 2017).
• 	"Then-Sen. Jeff Sessions (R.-Ala.) spoke twice last year with Russia's
ambassador to the United States, Justice Department officials said, encounters he
did not disclose when asked about possible contacts between members of
President Trump's campaign and representatives of Moscow during Sessions's
confirmation hearing to become attorney general."
• 	"One of the meetings was a private conversation between Sessions and Russian
Ambassador Sergey Kislyak that took place in September in the senator's office,
at the height of what U.S. intelligence officials say was a Russian cyber campaign
to upend the U.S. presidential race."
6. 	Ellen Nakashima, Devlin Barrett and Adam Entous, "FBI obtained FISA warrant to
monitor Trump adviser Carter Page," The Washington Post, April 11, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-obtained-fisa-warrant-
to-monitor-former-trump-adviser-carter-page/2017/04/11/620192ea- l eOe-11e7-ad74-
3a742a6e93a7 story.html?utm term=.37786cd20fe7 (April 18, 2017).
13

• 	"The FBI obtained a secret court order last summer to monitor the
communications of an adviser to presidential candidate Donald Trump, part of an
investigation into possible links between Russia and the campaign, law
enforcement and other U.S. officials said."
• 	"The FBI and the Justice Department obtained the warrant targeting Carter Page's
communications after convincing a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judge
that there was probable cause to believe Page was acting as an agent of a foreign
power, in this case Russia, according to the officials."
• 	"This is the clearest evidence so far that the FBI had reason to believe during the
2016 presidential campaign that a Trump campaign adviser was in touch with
Russian agents. Such contacts are now at the center of an investigation into
whether the campaign coordinated with the Russian government to swing the
election in Trump's favor."
• 	"The counterintelligence investigation into Russian efforts to influence U.S.
elections began in July, officials have said. Most such investigations don't result
in criminal charges. The officials spoke about the court order on the condition of
anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss details of a
counterintelligence probe." (Emphasis added.)
• 	"The government's application for the surveillance order targeting Page included
a lengthy declaration that laid out investigators' basis for believing that Page was
an agent of the Russian government and knowingly engaged in clandestine
intelligence activities on behalf of Moscow, officials said."
14

• 	"Among other things, the application cited contacts that he had with a Russian
intelligence operative in New York City in 2013, officials said. Those contacts
had earlier surfaced in a federal espionage case brought by the Justice Department
against the intelligence operative and two other Russian agents. In addition, the
application said Page had other contacts with Russian operatives that have not
been publicly disclosed, officials said."
• 	"The application also showed that the FBI and the Justice Department's national
security division have been seeking since July to determine how broad a network
of accomplices Russia enlisted in attempting to influence the 2016 presidential
elections, the officials said. Since the 90-day warrant was first issued, it has been
renewed more than once by the FISA court, the officials said."
III. 	REQUEST FOR ORDER DIRECTING INVESTIGATION
According to media reports, during the last year of the prior administration, law
enforcement and intelligence officials sought, and eventually obtained, authorization from this
Court to eavesdrop on then or former Trump campaign officials; continued monitoring the
individuals even when no evidence of wrongdoing was said to have been found; then relaxed the
NSA rules to allow evidence to be shared widely within the government; and rushed to collect
and then distribute intelligence information collected to numerous federal agencies, increasing
the likelihood that certain information, including the identities and conversations of private U.S.
citizens, might be leaked to the media. In the case of Michael Flynn, that did, in fact, occur, as
his name was "unmasked" and provided to the media.
15

It is impossible for Amicus Curiae to know the breadth and extent of the FISA Court's
order or orders. Consequently, it is not possible for Landmark to know what of the leaked
classified infonnation detailed herein is subject to this Court's order or orders and jurisdiction.
But this Court knows its orders and is uniquely situated to take action to determine whether or
not its orders have been and are being abused.
Courts Have a Broad Array of Inherent Powers to Exercise in Defense of the
Administration of Justice
The Supreme Court has recognized that federal courts have implied powers since 1812.
U.S. v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32
(1990), the Supreme Court described inherent powers as those "necessary to the exercise of all
others" and "necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly
and expeditious disposition of cases." Id. at 43. Inherent powers are used at all stages of
litigation and for various purposes. They are used in both pretrial case management and during
the conduct of trials. They are used to improve the fact-finding process, as in the appointment of
auditors and amicus curiae. Finally, they are used to craft punishment to sanction parties.
Joseph J. Anclien, The Broader the Better: The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts, 64 N.Y.U.
Ann. Surv. Am. L. 37, 44-48 (2008).
The court's power to sanction is broad and is not limited to the attorneys appearing
before it. This power also extends to misconduct outside the immediate confines of the
courtroom.
Inherent sanctions, like Rule 11 sanctions, may be imposed against any person
responsible for wrongdoing, regardless of whether that person is a litigant or an attorney.
Sanctionable wrongdoing includes prelitigation misconduct as well as abuses of process
that occur beyond the courtroom, such as the willful disobedience of an otherwise valid
court order, so long as the court affords a violator due process before imposing sanctions.
16

Thomas E. Baker, The Inherent Power to Impose Sanctions: How a Federal Judge Is Like an
800-Pound Gorilla, 14 Rev. Litig. 195, 201 (Winter 1994).
Landmark respectfully urges this Court to exercise its full inherent and statutory authority
to defend the integrity of the justice system by taking the remedial steps proposed herein.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
This is an extremely important matter. Fundamental constitutional rights and civil liberty
protections are threatened if unlawful and unethical tactics are used in an abuse of significant
governmental power, i.e., the surveillance of private citizens. Whether this Court's good faith
order or orders were abused by Executive Branch officials for bad faith purposes requires
thorough investigation and, if appropriate, the strongest sanctions available to the Court.
17
Respectfully submitted,
Isl Richard P. Hutchison
Richard P. Hutchison
Landmark Legal Foundation
3100 Broadway, Suite 1210
Kansas City, MO 64111
816-931-5559 (phone)
816-931-1115 (facsimile)
pete.hutch@landmarklegal.org
Attorney for Movants

CERTIFICATION OF BAR MEMBERSHIP AND SECURITY CLEARANCE STATUS
Pursuant to the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's Rules of
Procedure 7(h)(l ), 7(i), and 63, Movants respectfully submit the following information regarding
the bar membership and security clearance of the undersigned counsel.
Richard P. Hutchison is a member in good standing of the following federal courts: the
Supreme Court of the United States; the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth, Eighth,
Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia; and the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri. He is licensed to practice law by the Supreme Court of Missouri.
Mr. Hutchison does not hold a security clearance. Because Amicus Curiae's motion and
memorandum do not contain classified information and Amicus does not seek to join any
proceeding pending before this Court, Movant respectfully requests that the undersigned counsel
may participate in proceedings on the motion without access to classified information or security
clearances. FISC R.P. 63 (requiring counsel only to have "appropriate security clearances").
18
Respectfully submitted,
Isl Richard P. Hutchison
Richard P. Hutchison
Landmark Legal Foundation
3100 Broadway, Suite 1210
Kansas City, MO 64111
816-931-5559 (phone)
816-931-1115 (facsimile)
pete.hutch@landmarklegal.org
Attorney for Movants

UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
IN RE UNKNOWN FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
COURT ORDERS
PROPOSED ORDER
Upon consideration of Landmark Legal Foundation's Motion For Leave To Appear As
Amicus Curiae and For En Banc Order Directing Investigation and the accompanying
Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1) Government officials responsible for securing any of this Court's orders implicated by
the reports described in Landmark Legal Foundation's Memorandum of Law are to
appear and give sworn testimony as to the truthfulness of the underlying affidavits
submitted in support of the requests.
2) 	The Attorney General of the United States shall conduct an investigation into the
circumstances leading to the warrants sought or issued by the Court that are relevant to
the leaks of classified information.
3) 	Inspector Generals of all federal agencies having access to the classified information
leaked from investigations stemming from this Court's orders shall conduct
investigations into the circumstances surrounding these leaks.
4) 	All relevant federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies with access to the
surveillance information obtained pursuant to the orders of this Court are to appear before
the Court within 90 days and show cause why they should not be held in contempt of

court for not properly protecting the secrecy of classified information obtained pursuant
to the relevant orders of this Court; and
5) 	Enter such other and further orders or relief the Court deems appropriate.
SO ORDERED.
2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Richard P. Hutchison, certify that I served Amicus Curiae Landmark Legal Foundation,
Motion, Memorandum, and Proposed Order this 20th day of April, 2017 upon:
Daniel 0. Hartenstine at Daniel.o.hartenstine@usdoLgov
Pursuant to FISC Rule 8 and procedures established by the Security and Emergency Planning
Staff of the United States Department of Justice.
Isl Richard P. Hutchison
Attorney for Movant