SANTIAGO-SANTIAGO

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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 589 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4186
Matter of Catalina SANTIAGO-SANTIAGO, Respondent
Decided April 24, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
The Immigration Judge erred in terminating removal proceedings based solely on the
fact that the respondent has been accorded Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) and without considering the reasons for any opposition to termination.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Luis A. Cortes Romero, Esquire, Kent, Washington
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 	Gregory X. Gonzalez,
Assistant Chief Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board 	Panel: 	MALPHRUS, 	Chief 	Appellate 	Immigration 	Judge;
HUNSUCKER and CHABAN, Appellate Immigration Judges.
CHABAN, Appellate Immigration Judge:
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has filed an appeal of
the Immigration Judge’s September 8, 2025, decision, terminating the
respondent’s removal proceedings based on her receipt of Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”). 	The respondent has filed a brief in
opposition to the appeal. 	The appeal will be sustained, and the record will
be remanded for further proceedings.
The respondent was placed in removal proceedings upon the filing of a
notice to appear with the Immigration Court on August 5, 2025. 	8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.14(a) (2026). 	The notice to appear charged her with removability
under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2024), as an alien present in the United States
without being admitted or paroled. 	The respondent filed a motion to
terminate her removal proceedings without prejudice because she is a
recipient of DACA and alleges prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status
based on her marriage to a United States citizen. 	DHS opposed the
respondent’s motion to terminate, arguing that deferred action does not
confer any right or entitlement to remain in or reenter the United States and
does not prohibit DHS from moving forward with removal proceedings.
DHS also noted that there is no evidence indicating the respondent’s spouse
had filed an immigrant visa petition on the respondent’s behalf.

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On September 8, 2025, the Immigration Judge granted the respondent’s
motion to terminate the removal proceedings. The Immigration Judge cited
the fact that the respondent’s DACA had not been terminated1 and relied on
the regulations in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(d)(1)(ii)(C) (2025), which permit
“discretionary termination” of removal proceedings where the alien is a
beneficiary of deferred action.
DHS filed a motion to reconsider the Immigration Judge’s decision, as
well as a motion to recuse the Immigration Judge from the case based on a
purported email from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement to the
Immigration Judge’s spouse, a member of the United States House of
Representatives, that discussed the respondent.2 On September 10, 2025, the
Immigration Judge denied DHS’ motions to reconsider and to recuse. DHS
argues on appeal that the Immigration Judge erred in terminating the removal
proceedings and in declining to recuse himself from the case.
We review de novo issues of law, discretion, or judgment, including the
Immigration 	Judge’s 	determination 	that 	discretionary 	termination 	is
warranted in this case. 8 C.F.R § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2026). The Immigration
Judge granted the respondent’s motion to terminate removal proceedings
based on the fact that the respondent was accorded DACA protection that has
not been terminated and the regulations expressly allow Immigration Judges
to terminate proceedings under such circumstances.
While the regulations provide Immigration Judges with the authority to
terminate proceedings where the “alien is a beneficiary of . . . deferred
action,” the regulations also expressly provide that this action is an “exercise
of discretion” that involves consideration of “the reason termination is sought
and 	the 	basis 	for 	any 	opposition 	to 	termination.” 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 1003.18(d)(1)(ii)(C). Thus, the fact that the respondent is the beneficiary
of deferred action is not the sole, dispositive consideration for whether
discretionary 	termination 	is 	warranted. 	Moreover, 	a 	discretionary
determination should include an analysis and weighing of the positive factors
against the adverse ones. 	See Matter of Gamboa, 14 I&N Dec. 244, 249
(BIA 1972) (explaining that the adjudicator should set forth the reasons for
a favorable exercise of discretion “so that a reviewing tribunal may be in a
better position to assess [the] judgment”).
1 	A copy of the DACA approval notice submitted by the respondent indicates that the
respondent’s deferred action is valid from April 30, 2024, to April 29, 2026.
2 	The email was not included in the record.

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In the instant case, the Immigration Judge’s decision did not address the
reasons for DHS’ opposition to termination. We have repeatedly held that a
party’s interest in bringing removal proceedings to a close on the merits is a
persuasive reason to move forward with the case. 	See Matter of Cahuec
Tzalam, 29 I&N Dec. 300, 305 (BIA 2025); Matter of B-N-K-, 29 I&N Dec.
96, 101 (BIA 2025); Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17, 19–20 (BIA 2017).
Also, “[t]here is an important public interest in the finality of immigration
proceedings.” 	Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. at 19. 	The Immigration
Judge’s decision makes no reference to and appears to give no consideration
to DHS’ interests in this case or any interests outside of the fact that the
respondent 	has 	DACA 	protection. 	The 	Immigration 	Judge 	erred 	in
terminating removal proceedings based solely on the fact that the respondent
has been accorded DACA protection and without considering the reasons for
any opposition to termination. 	Accordingly, we will remand for further
consideration of whether termination is warranted.3
In remanding, we will direct that this case be transferred to a different
Immigration Judge, which is warranted in an abundance of caution under the
specific circumstances in this case. 	See Matter of H-C-R-C-, 28 I&N
Dec. 809, 814 (BIA 2024) (remanding to a different Immigration Judge). On
appeal, DHS alleged that during the pendency of the respondent’s removal
proceedings, the Immigration Judge’s spouse, who is a member of the House
of Representatives, made a public statement on social media specifically
discussing and advocating for the respondent.
The respondent has not disputed this allegation. It is unclear whether the
Immigration Judge was aware or was made aware of his spouse’s public
statements and advocacy on the respondent’s behalf during the course of the
proceedings. 	Under 	these 	particular 	circumstances, 	we 	conclude 	that
remanding the record to a different Immigration Judge is the best course of
action to avoid the appearance of partiality or bias and to ensure the integrity
of the removal proceedings.4 	See id. (holding that the Board has “the
authority to reassign a case based on the appearance of bias, in order to ensure
fairness and impartiality”); see also Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272, 287
n.20 (3d Cir. 2005) (recognizing that assignment of an Immigration Judge is
within the province of the Attorney General); see also generally Fort Bend
Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 59 F.4th 180, 202 (5th Cir. 2023)
3 	We note that the respondent, who is involved in a habeas action, cannot be removed
from the United States while she has DACA protection. Santiago v. Noem, No. EP-25-
CV-361, 2025 WL 2792588, at *1, *4, *10, *12, *14. (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025).
4 	Given that we are requiring that the case be reassigned to a different Immigration Judge,
we need not further address the merits of DHS’ appeal of the denial of its motion to recuse.

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(recognizing the appellate court’s authority to reassign a case to another
judge on remand and considering, inter alia, whether “reassignment is
advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and [] whether reassignment
would entail waste and duplication out of 	proportion to any gain in
preserving the appearance of fairness”) (quoting Miller v. Sam Houston State
Univ., 986 F.3d 880, 892 (5th Cir. 2021)).
Both parties may supplement the record with additional evidence and
arguments on remand. 	We express no opinion as to the ultimate outcome of
these removal proceedings. 	See Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 413, 422
(BIA 1996).
ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained, and the record is remanded to the
Immigration Court for assignment to a new Immigration Judge and for
further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and entry of a new
decision.