LAPARRA-DELEON

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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 389 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4155
Matter of Sergio Rodolfo LAPARRA-DELEON, Respondent
Decided by Board December 17, 20251
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
Matter of Laparra, 28 I&N Dec. 425 (BIA 2022), which held that service of a statutorily
compliant notice of hearing is sufficient written notice to support the entry of an in absentia
order of removal even if the respondent was served with a noncompliant notice to appear,
is reinstated in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and is good law in any circuit
without contrary precedent.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Lidia M. Sanchez, Esquire, Providence, Rhode Island
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Alexandra Wolff, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	GOODWIN and VOLKERT, Appellate Immigration Judges;
MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge:
On November 4, 2022, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit issued Laparra-Deleon v. Garland, 52 F.4th 514 (1st Cir. 2022),
vacating our prior published decision in part and remanding this case for
further 	proceedings 	consistent 	with 	its 	opinion. 	The 	Department 	of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) moves to reinstate our prior decision, Matter of
Laparra, 28 I&N Dec. 425 (BIA 2022), in light of intervening precedent
from the Supreme Court of the United States in Campos-Chaves v. Garland,
602 U.S. 447 (2024). 	The respondent has not responded to DHS’ motion,
which will be granted.
The respondent, who was initially served with a notice to appear at a date
and time “to be set,”2 was properly served on March 19, 2010, with a notice
1 	Pursuant to Order No. 6581-2026, dated January 9, 2026, the Attorney General
designated the Board’s decision in Matter of Laparra-Deleon (BIA Dec. 17, 2025), as
precedent in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3)
(2025). Editorial changes have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a
precedent.
2 	The notice to appear was thus statutorily noncompliant under Pereira v.
Sessions, 585 U.S. 198, 202 (2018), and Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155,
161–62 (2021).

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of 	hearing 	scheduled 	for 	April 	8, 	2010, 	at 	1:30 	p.m. 	at 	the 	Boston
Immigration Court. Matter of Laparra, 28 I&N Dec. at 426. He was ordered
removed in absentia after failing to appear. 	Id. 	We denied his subsequent
motions to reopen to terminate for lack of jurisdiction and to reopen
proceedings and rescind the in absentia order for lack of sufficient notice. Id.
at 430–36.
The First Circuit granted the petition for review in part. The court agreed
with our jurisdictional ruling, but remanded for further proceedings after
holding that where the initial notice to appear lacked a date and time, a
subsequent notice of hearing cannot support an in absentia removal order
because it cannot provide a “new” time or place of the proceedings as
required by section 239(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(A)(i) (2018). 	Laparra-Deleon, 52 F.4th at
519–21.
The 	Supreme 	Court 	subsequently 	decided 	that 	exact 	issue 	in
Campos-Chaves, and held that a respondent served with a notice to appear
that lacks a date or time may be ordered removed in absentia under section
240(b)(5)(A) 	of 	the 	INA, 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1229a(b)(5)(A) 	(2024), 	if 	that
respondent received a notice of hearing under section 239(a)(2) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2), and subsequently failed to appear at that hearing,
because the notice of hearing can provide a “new” time or place of the
proceedings. 602 U.S. at 461–62. While the First Circuit’s decision was not
among those directly vacated and remanded by Campos-Chaves, 602 U.S.
at 465, the First Circuit explained that its decision “accords” with Singh v.
Garland, 24 F.4th 1315 (9th Cir. 2022), which was. 	Laparra-Deleon,
52 F.4th at 520. And the First Circuit’s reasoning relied on a statement from
Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198, 202 (2018), that the Supreme Court
clarified was “mere dicta” in rejecting identical reasoning. Campos-Chaves,
602 U.S. at 463–64; see also Laparra-Deleon, 52 F.4th at 520. We find no
way to read the First Circuit’s decision in this case that does not directly
conflict with Campos-Chaves and conclude that it has been effectively
overruled.
We will therefore reinstate in the First Circuit our prior decision and
holding, which accords with the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in
Campos-Chaves. 	As stated in our prior decision, “the respondent received
sufficient ‘written notice’ to support the entry of an in absentia order of
removal under section 240(b)(5)(A) [of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A)],
and that order [cannot] be rescinded for lack of ‘notice’ under section
240(b)(5)(C)(ii) of the [INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)],” because even
though he was served with a notice to appear that did not specify the time or

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place of his removal hearing, “he was properly served with a statutorily
compliant notice of hearing under section 239(a)(2) [of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
1229(a)(2),] specifying this information. 	Matter of Laparra, 28 I&N Dec.
at 434.3 Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.
ORDER: DHS’ motion to reinstate is granted.
FURTHER 	ORDER: 	Matter 	of 	Laparra, 	28 	I&N 	Dec. 	425
(BIA 2022), denying the motion to reopen proceedings and rescind the in
absentia removal order, is reinstated.
FURTHER ORDER: The motion to reopen proceedings and rescind
the in absentia removal is denied.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. 	See INA
§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2025). Further,
any respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any
time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both. See INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).
3 	Before the First Circuit, the government raised an argument that regardless of
whether the respondent received written notice, he received actual notice, and thus
our prior decision was harmless error. The court noted that this argument had not
been 	raised 	before 	the 	Board 	and 	left 	it 	for 	us 	to 	address 	on 	remand.
Laparra-Deleon, 52 F.4th at 523. 	As we reinstate our prior decision that the
respondent did receive statutorily compliant written notice, we need not reach the
issue.