EEOC Appeal 2020000560

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Shawnta A.,1
Complainant,
v.
Andrew M. Saul,
Commissioner,
Social Security Administration,
Agency.
Appeal No. 2020000560
Hearing No. 530-2019-00243X
Agency No. PHI-18-0679-SSA
DECISION
On October 29, 2019, Complainant filed an appeal, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the
Agency’s October 18, 2019 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)
complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
BACKGROUND
During the period at issue, Complainant worked as a Human Resources (HR) Specialist at the
Agency’s Pay & Benefits, Philadelphia Regional Office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
On July 9, 2018, Complainant filed the instant formal complaint. Complainant claimed that the
Agency discriminated against her based on race (African-American) and sex (female) when:
1. 	on April 24, 2018, Complainant was informed by management she was being placed
on a “structured training process;”
2. 	on April 24, 2018, her telework was reduced to one day; and
1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.

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3. 	on April 24, 2018, her Alternative Work Schedule (AWS) was rescinded.
After an investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the investigative file, and
Complainant requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ assigned to
the case issued a Notice of Intent to Issue a Decision Without a Hearing on September 10, 2019.
Complainant responded to the Notice of Intent. On September 30, 2019, the AJ issued a decision
by summary judgment in favor of the Agency. The Agency thereafter issued the instant final order
implementing the AJ’s decision.
The instant appeal followed. Complainant did not submit a timely brief on appeal.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to grant summary judgment when he or she finds that
there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). An issue of fact is “genuine”
if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105
(1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. 	In
rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and
the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. 	See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a
“decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review…”); see
also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO-MD-
110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (as revised, August 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s
determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed
de novo).
To successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must identify, with
specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing further supporting evidence,
and must further establish that such facts are material under applicable law. Such a dispute would
indicate that a hearing is necessary to produce evidence to support a finding that the agency was
motivated by discriminatory animus. Here, however, Complainant failed to establish such a
dispute. Even construing any inferences raised by the undisputed facts in favor of Complainant, a
reasonable fact-finder could not find in Complainant’s favor.
A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-party analysis first enunciated in
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For complainant to prevail, he
must first establish a prima facie of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a
factor in the adverse employment action. 	See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco
Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 	The burden then shifts to the agency to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. 	See Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

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Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade
the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited
reason. See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
In finding no discrimination by summary judgment, the AJ found that the record developed during
the investigation established the following undisputed facts.
During the relevant period, Complainant was employed as a HR Specialist at the Agency’s Pay &
Benefits, Philadelphia Regional Office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Complainant’s immediate
supervisor was the Team Lead.
Regarding claim 1, Complainant asserted that on April 24, 2018, management informed
Complainant that she was being placed on a “structured training process.” 	The AJ noted that
Agency management placed Complainant on a “structured training process,” a hands-on training
with the goal of improving Complainant’s work performance.
The Team Lead (Caucasian female), also Complainant’s supervisor, explained that Complainant
was placed on a “structured training process” due to her poor performance and “not performing
the duties of her position independently. Complainant was in her position for two years but was
not performing a vast array of duties in her position.” 	The Team Lead stated that by having
Complainant on the training process, “management was attempting to assist Complainant in
improving her work performance, so Complainant could be fully successful in her position and
move from having her work reviewed.” The supervisor also stated that management hoped that
Complainant 	can 	perform 	additional 	work 	duties. 	Moreover, 	the 	supervisor 	stated 	that
Complainant’s race and sex were not factors in management’s decision to have her on a “structured
training process.”
The Center Director (Caucasian male), also Complainant’s third-level supervisor, noted that after
approximately one year and a half, Complainant “was still not completing the full scope of her
position’s duties. Additionally, Complainant was still having all of her work reviewed by other
employees.” The Center Director stated that management believed that the training program and
change in schedule would allow Complainant “the face-to-face interaction with her mentor and
peers and provide her with useful feedback to ensure she could perform the full scope of her duties
independently.” 	Furthermore, the Center Director stated that he did not discriminate against
Complainant based on her race and sex.
Regarding claim 2, Complainant alleged that on April 24, 2018, her telework was reduced to one
day.
The AJ noted that to effectively supervise and train Complainant, Agency management also
reduced Complainant’s telework schedule to one day. The supervisor stated that Complainant’s
telework was reduced in conjunction with the structured training program.

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Specifically, the supervisor stated that management “was seeking to ensure that Complainant was
in the office with her mentor and experienced staff to assist Complainant, as we believed that
Complainant would benefit from more face-to-face mentoring. Finally, the supervisor stated that
it was management’s goal to help Complainant perform the full scope of her HR Specialist duties
successfully and independently.
Regarding claim 3, Complainant alleged that on April 24, 2018, her AWS was rescinded.
The supervisor explained that Complainant’s AWS was rescinded “to allow her additional face-
to-face interaction with her mentor. In addition to the added mentoring, we reduced Complainant’s
workloads to help her focus on the specific workloads that she was performing at the time.” She
stated that she informed Complainant that if she successfully demonstrates the ability to perform
her duties independently, her AWS would be restored.
Here, the undisputed facts fully support the AJ’s determination that the responsible management
officials clearly articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. Complainant did
not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that these proffered reasons were a pretext designed
to mask discrimination. Beyond her bare assertions, Complainant has simply provided no evidence
to support her claim that her treatment was the result of her race or sex.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the Agency’s final order, implementing the AJ’s decision by summary judgment,
finding no discrimination.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. 	The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or
law; or
2. 	The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.

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Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal
Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have
twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in
which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment
Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B
(Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 	Complainant’s request may be
submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131
M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. 	In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to
reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted
in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). 	See 29 C.F.R. §
1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as
untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. 	Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. 	The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety
(90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must
name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department
head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result
in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider
and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of
your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request
permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs.
Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the
court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or
appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests.

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Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled
Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________ 	Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
September 14, 2020
Date