Lamb's Custom Painting & Restoration v. Douglas & Elizabeth Brown

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR SUSSEX COUNTY

LAMB’S CUSTOM PAINTING &
RESTORATION, INC.,

Plaintiff, C.A. No. CPU6-23-000985

Vv.

DOUGLAS A. BROWN and ELIZABETH
A. BROWN, husband and wife,

Defendants.

Nee ee? Ne ee ee ee ee Se

Submitted: July 14, 2025
Decided: October 21, 2025

DECISION AFTER TRIAL

Blake W. Carey, Esquire, 323 Rehoboth Avenue, Suite D, Rehoboth Beach, DE 19971. Attorney
for Plaintiff:

Peter K. Shaeffer, Jr, Esquire, 1073 S. Governor’s Avenue, Dover, DE 19904. Attorney for
Defendants.

MIMS, J.
Lamb’s Custom Painting & Restoration, Inc. (“Plaintiff’) brought this action against
Douglas A. Brown (“Brown”) and Elizabeth A. Brown (“Mrs. Brown) (collectively “Defendants”),
through its legal counsel for a breach of contract and, in the alternative, a claim of quantum meruit
seeking damages of $26,144.39, pre- and post-judgment interest, and such other relief deemed fair
and equitable by this Court. This honorable Court held trial on July 14, 2025, and reserved its
decision. The Court finds by preponderance of the evidence Plaintiff failed to meet its burden as it
failed to prove a contract existed between the parties, and it failed to justify its demand for
compensation under quantum meruit from Defendants.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a breach of contract claim and, in the alternative, a
quantum meruit claim against Defendants.' In its Complaint, Plaintiff alleges it provided the
materials and performed the painting and soft washing for two of Defendants’ properties totaling
$26,144.39.? Plaintiff alleges Defendants previously owned both 313 East Savannah Road, Lewes,
Delaware 19958 (the “Lewes Property”), and 28881 Harmons Hill Road, Millsboro, Delaware
19966 (the “Millsboro Property”).’ It further alleges painting the Lewes Property spanned 494
hours; however it provides no set time spent soft washing the Millsboro Property.* On or before
October 2022, Plaintiff completed all work requested by Defendants. Plaintiff requested payment

through electrical services from Brown who failed to perform the work.* Consequently, Plaintiff’s

' Compl. J 1, Sept. 29, 2023.

? Compl., supra note 1, at 3; Answer, § 3, Apr. 16, 2024.

3 Compl., supra note 1, at 1-2; Answer, supra note 2, at 3.
“ Compl., supra note 1, at 3.

> Id.
prayer for relief under the breach of contract claim is $26,144.39 in damages for Defendants’
alleged failure to perform.®

In the alternative, Plaintiff alleges Defendant received a substantial benefit thereby being
significantly enriched by Plaintiff’s work performed on both of Defendants’ properties. Plaintiff's
prayer for relief is either the $26,144.39 in damages or specific performance in the form of
equivalent electrical services from Brown.’

On December 13, 2023, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 10 Del. C. §
8106 (a), action asserting there was a three-year statute of limitations on this action.® Defendants
maintain Plaintiff is barred from pursuing this action because Plaintiff filed suit three years and
eight months subsequent to the date goods and services were provided to Defendants.” Defendants
maintain Plaintiff’s performance completion occurred prior to January 9, 2020 based on Plaintiff’s
Facebook post.'° Further, Defendants maintain Plaintiff “generated an invoice in support of its

claim two years and nine months subsequent to the date goods and services were provided to

Defendants.”!!

6 Id. at 4,

‘Id.

§ Mot. to Dismiss § 1, Dec. 13, 2023; see also 10 DEL. C. § 8106 (“(a) No action to recover damages
for trespass, no action to regain possession of personal chattels, no action to recover damages for
the detention of personal chattels, no action to recover a debt not evidenced by a record or by an
instrument under seal, no action based on a detailed statement of the mutual demands in the nature
of debit and credit between parties arising out of contractual or fiduciary relations, no action based
on a promise, no action based on a statute, and no action to recover damages caused by an injury
unaccompanied with force or resulting indirectly from the act of the defendant shall be brought
after the expiration of 3 years from the accruing of the cause of such action; subject, however, to
the provisions of §§ 8108-8110, 8119 and 8127 of this title.”).

? Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 3.

10 Id: see Attachment B, at *1 (Del. Com. Pl. Dec. 13, 2023).

1! Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 2, at 3; Attachment A, at *1, Dec. 13, 2023.

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Plaintiff responded to this Motion on February 26, 2024, arguing a breach of contract action
accrues when a breach occurs.!” Plaintiff maintains it requested electrical services from Defendants
in October 2022 and Defendants refused to perform.'? Consequently, Plaintiff asserts its claim is
not barred by the statute of limitations under 10 Del. C. § 8106 (a) because less than one year
passed between the alleged breach in October 2022 and the filing of its Complaint on September
29, 2023.'4 Further, Plaintiff maintains the oral contract between Plaintiff and Defendants could
be considered the exception to 10 Del. C. § 8106 (a), a mutual running account under 10 Del. C. §
8108.!> Plaintiff argues its account remained open and current until Defendants failed and refused
to provide electrical services to Plaintiff to reduce their side of the account from the work Plaintiff
performed on the two properties."

On April 2, 2024, this Court denied the Motion to Dismiss and found the statute of
limitations began to run when Defendant allegedly refused to pay or perform services to Plaintiff
in October 2022.!” On April 16, 2024, Defendants filed an Answer denying all allegations to both
claims.!8 In their Answer, Defendants assert Brown retired from electrical work on August 31,
2023.'9 However, Defendants admit Plaintiff “provided painting services to the Lewes Property

prior to January 9, 2020,” but denied it sought to have the exterior of their previous Millsboro

5 Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, §§ 2-3, Feb. 26, 2024.

Id.
'4 Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 6, at 3-4.
'5. 10 Del. C. § 8108 (“In the case of a mutual and running account between parties, the limitation,
specified in § 8106 of this title, shall not begin to run while such account continues open and
current.”’).
'6 Resp. to Mot. Dismiss, supra note 6, at 4-5.
"7 Order, (4 3-4, Apr. 2, 2024; see Guerrieri v. Cajan Cove Condo. Council, 2007 WL 1520039, at
*6 (Del. Super. Apr. 25, 2007) (“In cases of continuous contract and continuing breach, the statue
begins to run only when full damages can be ascertained and recovered.”).
'8 Answer, supra note 2, at 2-7.

'9 Td. at 3.
Property soft-washed.”° Defendants also assert “Douglas Brown and Richard and Dawn Lamb
exchanged various goods and services as friends for several years, such as reciprocal electrical and
painting services, as well as climate-controlled storage for Richard Lamb’s (the owner of Lamb’s
Custom Painting) motorcycle and use by Richard and his wife Dawn Lamb of Defendants’ Florida
property for vacation; no cash was exchanged by either party.””!

Additionally, Defendants assert several affirmative defenses including: the Complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; Plaintiff has waived any right to pursue the
claims listed in the Complaint; Plaintiff is barred from relief under the doctrine of laches and/or
applicable statutes of limitations; Plaintiff is barred from recovery because it failed to give notice
of an alleged breach; Plaintiff has failed to join all necessary parties, speifically Richard and Dawn
Lamb, 34850 Picnic Basket Ct., Rehoboth Beach, DE 19971; Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue the
claims and relief sought in the Complaint; Plaintiff is barred from recovery as a result of its own
breach of the parties’ agreement(s); Plaintiff is barred from recovery under the theory of accord
and satisfaction; answering Defendants hereby reserve the right to assert additional defenses,
affirmative or otherwise, as may be revealed by discovery or investigation.””

From May 30, 2024, to August 13, 2024, the parties attempted to resolve the matter through
mediation.”? However, by August 13, 2024, the parties notified this honorable Court they failed to

reach an agreement.24 The Court set October 22, 2024, for a scheduling conference.*> Under the

scheduling order, the Court set a pretrial conference date for April 15, 2025.7° This Court held a

20 Id.

2! Td. at 4.

2 Answer, supra note 2, at 8-9.

23 See Docket Items.

25 Id.

26 Scheduling Order, J 1, Oct. 22, 2024.
scheduled trial for July 14, 2025 with a second pretrial conference scheduled for July 7, 2025, in
advance of the trial date.

The Court heard testimony from the following witnesses for the Plaintiff: Richard Lamb;
Dawn Lamb, Mr. Lamb’s wife; Douglas Brown; Elizabeth Brown; and Kent Schoch, as an expert
witness for Plaintiff.2” Plaintiff admitted 13 documents into evidence without objection.”* The
Court heard testimony from the following witnesses for the Defendants: Douglas Brown; Elizabeth
Brown; Richard Lamb; and Dawn Lamb. Defendant admitted nine documents into evidence
without objection.”’

FACTS

After reviewing each party’s proffered evidence and hearing testimony at trial, the Court
finds the relevant facts to be as follows:

Plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, is owned and operated by Richard Lamb (“Lamb”) a
painting contractor for 25 years.*” Lamb lives at 34850 Picnic Basket Court, Rehoboth Beach, DE
19971.7! Plaintiff’s operation consists primarily of interior and exterior residential painting with a
minor amount of commercial painting as well as exterior soft-wash services.** Plaintiff testified he

primarily works for clients in Sussex County and submits proposals to prospective clients with an

hourly rate of $50 per hour for each employee.*? However, Plaintiff testified that he charges only

27 The Court gave little weight to the testimony of this witness as he had no personal knowledge
of this matter and he charged at an hourly rate for electrical services, in contrast to Brown who
charged at a flat rate for services.

8 Pl Ex. A~M

*° Def. Ex. A—I.

3° Compl., supra note 1, at 1-2.

33 See Pl. Ex. B., July 14, 2025.
time and materials at an hourly rate for friends. Plaintiff bills only for the materials based on what
is paid with no mark-up.*4

On or about 2012, Lamb testified he met Brown on a contracting job at Henlopen Acres
where Lamb was painting, and Brown was conducting electric work. Brown served as a Master
electrician licensed in Delaware for 30 years as the owner and operator of Brown Electric Services,
Inc. until he let his license lapse September 1, 2023.°° Richard and Dawn Lamb (“The Lambs”)
and Douglas and Elizabeth Brown (“Defendants”) became friends and socialized often over the
years including vacations, dinners, birthday parties, and motorcycle rides.°° Lamb and Brown
testified they engaged in a bartering system where they would work on projects and jobs for each
other with no financial exchange. Neither party discussed time or materials for any project they
engaged in both personally and professionally. Further, Brown kept scaffolding, ladders, and
materials in his garage for Lamb. Brown also housed a motorcycle for Lamb in his garage for no
financial compensation. Brown testified he engaged with other contractors on a similar barter-
exchange basis for no financial compensation. As of the date of this suit, neither party provided a
written contract to these exchanges in services.°’

Defendants previously owned both the Lewes Property, sold on August 23, 2022, as well
as the Millsboro Property, sold on August 25, 2023.78 On or about 2014, Plaintiff painted the

exterior of Defendants’ Lewes Property using three different colors.*? Plaintiff utilized three of its

34 Td.

35 Answer, supra note 2, at 3.

36 Answer, supra note 2, at 4; Pl. Ex. M, July 14, 2025; Def. Ex. I, July 14, 2025; see Pl. Ex. K,
July 14, 2025; see Pl. Ex. L, July 14, 2025.

37 See Pl. Ex. A— M; see Def. Ex. A—I.

38 Compl., supra note 1, at 1-2; Answer, supra note 2, at 3.

3° Compl. supra note 1, at 2-3; Pl. Ex. A, July 14, 2025 (the exhibit proffers a photo of the newly
painted Lewes Property); Pl. Ex. D, July 14, 2025.

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employees to complete the job and kept receipts of the materials paid and used for the job.*° On or
about 2019, Plaintiff returned to the Lewes Property to paint 90 percent of the interior, as well as
additional exterior painting including: scalloped detail with three colors, an addition to the home,
and two roofs.*! Brown admitted he knew the painting was not free; however, he understood there
would be a continued bartering of services.”

During this same time, Brown provided electric work for Plaintiff and some of Plaintiffs
customers and friends where there was damage during painting or other favors.’ Brown installed
a ceiling fan and reinstalled siding and insulation; completed a rough-in above and below kitchen
lighting; installed new kitchen, dining, and stairwell fixtures; installed a primary bath vanity light
fixture and a primary bedroom ceiling fan; installed second floor bathroom vanity lighting fixtures
and a ceiling fan; installed dimmers for rough-in protected receptacle outlet in the garage; and
removed existing 100 amp 20 circuit electrical service in the Lambs’ E. Estate Drive residence in
Rehoboth in preparation for the sale of the property.** While Plaintiff admits he received barter
services from Defendant after he completed the work on Defendants’ Lewes property, Plaintiff
feels it was not equal in value.

Neither Lamb nor Brown ever discussed financial compensation or submitted invoices to
each other for the services they provided from 2014 through 2022. Moreover, Mrs. Brown served
as a friend to the Lambs and never engaged in her husband’s business or entered into any agreement
or contract with Plaintiff. Brown admitted he discussed in 2014, during the painting of his Lewes

Property, the possibility of installing all the electrical work for Lamb’s proposed shop/garage and

40 pj, Ex. B, July 14, 2025; Pl. Ex. C, July 14, 2025.

41 pl Ex. E, July 14, 2025; Pl. Ex. F, July 14, 2025.

” Compl., supra note 1, at 2; Answer, supra note 2, at 3.
3 Def. Ex. E, July 14, 2025; Def. Ex. F, July 14, 2025.
44 Def. Ex. E, July 14, 2025; Def. Ex. F, July 14, 2025.

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the new Lamb residence that would be attached, however there was no definitive agreement. In
fact, Lamb completed construction on the shop on or about October 2022; as of this date, the
attached residence has yet to be built. On or about October 2022, Lamb requested Brown complete
the electrical work for the shop/garage. Brown advised he could pull the permit and conduct the
- final inspection; however, he could not complete the labor due to his planned move to Florida.
Defendants moved to Naples, Florida on or about October 2022 upon their retirement and
sale of their two homes in Delaware.*> Defendants sold the Lewes Property on or about August
2022 and the Millsboro Property on or about September 2023.4° Once Mr. Brown expressed he
could not complete the work on the shop/garage the relationship was irretrievably broken.*’
Plaintiff itemized the cost of the paint work from 2014 and 2019 it had conducted in a statement
dated October 20, 2022.48 As expressed in both its Complaint and the statement, Plaintiff’s prayer
for relief under the breach of contract claim is $26,144.39 in damages for Defendants’ alleged

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failure to perform.*? It is unclear whether Defendants received this as it was mailed to the

Millsboro Property and Defendants had moved to Florida. Plaintiff retained a lawyer who sent a
demand letter dated February 9, 2023, to Defendants at their Millsboro property and their home in

Naples, FL.°° Defendants admitted they received this communication.*!

45 Answer, supra note 2, at 4.

46 Compl., supra note 1, at 1-2; Answer, supra note 2, at 3.

47 Compl., supra note 1, at 3; Answer, supra note 2, at 3.

48 Compl., supra note 1, at 3; Pl. Ex. C, July 14, 2025; Pl. Ex. F, July 14, 2025; Pl. Ex. H, July
14, 2025.

Compl., supra note 1, at 4.

0 Pl Ex. J, July 14, 2025.

5! Def. Ex. C, July 14, 2025.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court is the trier of facts and has the sole discretion to determine the credibility of the
witnesses and any evidence provided.” If evidence introduced at trial conflicts, the Court must
reconcile these conflicts to find congruity.°? However, if the Court is unable to find such congruity,
the Court must determine which portions of the testimony deserve more weight.** Any portion of
the testimony that the Court finds unsuitable for consideration shall be disregarded. Furthermore,
the Court considers “the witnesses’ demeanor, or the fairness and descriptiveness of their
testimony, their ability to personally witness or know the facts about which they testify, and any
biases or interests they may have concerning the nature of the case.”*°

Moreover, under Delaware law, a plaintiff in a civil matter shoulders the burden of proving
their claims by preponderance of the evidence.*’ The preponderance of the evidence standard
“means proof that something is more likely than not.”°* Thus, the law demands that Plaintiff and

Defendants meet this standard to prove their claims and defenses.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff failed to prove it formed a contract with Defendants.

Under a breach of contract claim, Plaintiff must prove by preponderance of the evidence
that (1) the parties formed a contract, (2) what the terms of that contract were, (3) Defendant

breached the contract, and (4) Plaintiff suffered monetary damages because of Defendant’s

2 Leen v. Weline, 2018 WL 301089 at *5 (Del. Com. Pl. Jan. 3, 2018).

3 Id,

4 Leep, 2018 WL 301089 at *5.

6 Leep, 2018 WL 301089 at *5.

57 JER Judson GP XXI LLC v. DLE Investors, LP, 275 A.3d 755, 782 (Del. Ch. 2022).

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breach.” As to the first element, a contract is a legally enforceable agreement typically formed by
mutual assent and consideration provided there are no viable defenses.

In the instant case, Plaintiff fails to prove the formation of a contract between the parties.
Plaintiff proffered no written contract, no written messages referencing offer, acceptance, and
consideration, and no evidence of an oral agreement by which Plaintiff would paint and soft wash
Defendants’ properties in exchange for Brown’s electrical services.

Plaintiff solely proffered evidence of the parties assisting each other with jobs and projects
pursuant to their personal friendship. Indeed, the Lamb’s and Brown’s friendship is evidenced by
Defendants’ housing Plaintiff's motorcycle and painting materials for several years,°! Plaintiff's
company painting and soft washing the Defendants’ homes, and Brown providing electrical work
on the Lamb’s home.” Likewise, each party picked up the tab when they went out to restaurants
together, and Mr. and Mrs. Lamb vacationed at Defendants’ Florida home.®

Furthermore, no contract formed between the parties because both Lamb and Brown
testified that they engaged in a bartering system where each party would work on projects and jobs
for each other with no financial exchange. Plaintiff and Brown discussed the painting of
Defendants’ home in exchange for electrical services on Plaintiffs garage and residence in 2014,
however Plaintiff did not construct the garage until 2022. The Court finds there can be no meeting
of the mind with such a large time gap and a prospective project, with no writing to that effect.

Neither party discussed time or materials for any project they engaged in both personally and

professionally. Thus, the exchanges that occurred between the parties for more than a decade were

°° Freeman v. Scott, 2017 WL 2633487 at *4 (Del. Com. Pl. Jun 19, 2017).

6° Osborn ex. Rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153, 1158-59 (Del. 2010).

6! Pj, Ex. M, July 14, 2025.

® Def, Ex. I, July 14, 2025; See Pl. Ex. K, July 14, 2025; see Pl. Ex. L, July 14, 2025.
6 Answer, supra note 12, at 4.

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predicated by friendship not a contract. In addition, Plaintiff fails to show any contract formed
with Mrs. Brown, who did not work with her husband or know of his professional finances. Rather,
Plaintiff proffers solely that mere co-ownership of the Lewes and Millsboro properties makes her
liable under a breach of contract. The Court finds no such contract was formed.

Consequently, as Plaintiff failed to prove the first step in contractual analysis, this Court
shall not assess the remaining elements. In sum, this Court finds Plaintiff failed to prove
Defendants breached a contract, because Plaintiff failed to prove the formation of a contract
between the parties.

IL Plaintiff failed show it was impoverished, and Defendants were not justified in not
compensating Plaintiff.

Under Delaware law, a court finds quantum meruit—unjust enrichment—when (1) a party
is enriched, (2) by another party that is impoverished, (3) there is a direct relation between the
enrichment and the impoverishment, (4) the enriched party lacks justification for not compensating
the impoverished party, and (5) there is an absence of a remedy provided by law.™

In the instant case, Plaintiff fails to prove the second, third, fourth, and fifth elements of
unjust enrichment. Regarding the first element, Plaintiff clearly established Defendants were
enriched when it painted Defendants’ Lewes Property in 2014 and later in 2019.

However, Plaintiff fails to prove elements two, three, and four. Under element two, Plaintiff
admits to Brown performing some electrical work, though it may not have been equal in value to
the work Plaintiff performed on Defendants’ properties. This work includes installing a ceiling fan

and reinstalling siding and insulation; completing a rough-in above and below kitchen lighting;

64 PR Acquisitions, LLC v. Midland Funding LLC, 2018 WL 2041521 at *14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30,
2018); Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308 at *42 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 14, 2017).

6 Pp], Ex. A, July 14, 2025.

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installing new kitchen, dining and stairwell fixtures; installing a master bath vanity light fixture
and master bedroom ceiling fan; installing second floor bathroom vanity lighting fixtures and
ceiling fan; installing dimmers for rough-in protected receptacle outlet in garage; and removing
existing 100 amp 20 circuit electrical service in the Lambs’ E. Estate Drive residence in Rehoboth
in preparation for the sale of the property.°° Consequently, Plaintiff cannot prove it was
impoverished after painting the Defendants’ Lewes Property and soft washing the Millsboro
Property because it admitted to receiving electrical compensation by Brown on the Lamb’s home.
As to element three, Plaintiff failed to prove it was impoverished; therefore, no direct relationship
exists between an enrichment and an impoverishment.

Regarding element four, Defendants are justified in not compensating Plaintiff because the
relationship between the parties was predicated on friendship and more than a decade of exchange
of services, i.e. bartering. Both parties’ exchange services without financial compensation is
illustrated by the extensive electrical work Brown performed on the Lamb’s home, the Lamb’s
vacationing at Defendants’ Florida home, the Lamb’s soft washing Defendants’ Millsboro
Property, each couple treating the other to dinner, Defendants’ housing Lamb’s motorcycle and
paint materials in their climate-controlled garage, and Lamb’s company painting Defendants’
Lewes Property. Thus, the Court finds that Defendants are justified in not financially compensating
the Plaintiff because of the parties’ history exchanging services without financial compensation.
Plaintiff never submitted an invoice to Defendants for the painting of the Lewes property either in

2014 or 2019.

6 Def. Ex. E, July 14, 2025; Def. Ex. F, July 14, 2025.
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Moreover, Plaintiff requested services from Brown in 2022, which was eight years after
Plaintiff’s initial painting of the Lewes Property.’ Defendants are therein justified for not
compensating Plaintiff because Plaintiff asked for electrical services nearly a decade after the
Lewes Property was painted. Furthermore, Defendants clearly have justification for not
compensating Plaintiff after the Lewes Property painting in 2014 and 2019 because the electrical
services Plaintiff requested in 2022 and again in 2023, were for a home and shop of which Plaintiff
proffered no concrete plans for the Lamb’s building a garage and attached residence in 2014
through 2019.°8 Though Brown admitted to discussing the possibility of the conducting electrical
services for the garage and home being built by Plaintiff, no evidence proffered demonstrates the
buildings were set to be constructed at that time. Consequently, Plaintiff failed to prove
Defendants’ lack of justification for not compensating Plaintiff.

As Plaintiff failed to prove elements two through four, it also cannot meet element five, an
absence of a remedy provided by law. This Court can apply no remedy because Plaintiff failed to
prove an unjust enrichment to Defendants occurred. Thus, this Court finds Plaintiff cannot meet

all elements required to order quantum meruit damages.

87 pl. Ex. I, July 14, 2025; Def. Ex. C, July 14, 2025.
68 p]_ Ex. J, July 14, 2025; Def. Ex. D, July 14, 2025.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, IT IS SO ORDERED this 21* day of October
2025 the Court finds that Plaintiff did not meet its burden by a preponderance of the evidence that
the Defendants are liable for breach of contract or, in the alternative, for quantum meruit damages.

This honorable Court enters judgment in favor of Defendants.

Ly Mt Ll

The Honorable Rae M. Mims
Judge

Cc: Shelly Swafford, Judicial Case Manager Supervisor

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