Biocomposites GmbH v. Artoss, Inc.

COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
NATHAN A. COOK LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
VICE CHANCELLOR 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734

Date Submitted: May 3, 2024
Date Decided: May 14, 2024

Ethan H. Townsend Kelly A. Green
Daniel T. Menken Jason Z. Miller
Ryan D. Konstanzer Smith, Katzenstein & Jenkins LLP
McDermott Will & Emery LLP 1000 N. West Street, Suite 1501
1000 N. West Street, Suite 1400 Wilmington, DE 19801
Wilmington, DE 19801

RE: Biocomposites GmbH, f/k/a ARTOSS GmbH v. Artoss, Inc.
C.A. No. 2023-1189-NAC

Dear Counsel:

On April 19, 2024, I delivered my ruling denying the parties’ cross motions

for preliminary injunction (the “Ruling”). 1 On April 26, 2024,

Defendant / Counterclaim-Plaintiff Artoss, Inc. (“Artoss”), moved for partial

reargument under Court of Chancery Rule 59(f) (the “Motion”). 2 For the reasons

below, I deny the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 1, 2015, Plaintiff / Counterclaim-Defendant Biocomposites GmbH

(“GmbH”), formerly known as ARTOSS GmbH, and Artoss entered into an

1 Biocomposites GmbH, f/k/a ARTOSS GmbH v. Artoss Inc., C.A. No. 2023-

1189-NAC, Docket (“Dkt.”) 113 (“Ruling”).
2 Dkt. 105 (“Def.’s Mot.”).
C.A. No. 2023-1189-NAC
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Page 2

agreement for Artoss to distribute GmbH’s products in North America (the

“Distributor Agreement”). 3 The Distributor Agreement granted GmbH

significant rights, including “the right, in its sole discretion, to modify the

[territory in which Artoss may distribute GmbH’s products] upon ninety (90) days

written notice to [Artoss].” 4

On October 29, 2015, GmbH and Artoss amended the Distributor

Agreement (“Amendment 1”). Amendment 1, a one-page document, gave Artoss

the right to distribute Putty 2.0, a product that was in the development stages. 5

On September 19, 2023, GmbH purported to exercise its right to modify

unilaterally the territory in which Artoss could distribute GmbH’s products. 6 This

litigation followed, with both parties requesting that I enjoin the other party from

selling GmbH’s products.

II. ANALYSIS

“On a motion for reargument, the movant bears a heavy burden.” 7 “Rule 59

relief is available to prevent injustice and will be granted only when the moving

3 Dkt. 1 at Exhibit 1.

4 Id.

5 Id. at Exhibit 3 (“Amendment 1”).

6 Id. at Exhibit 2.

7 Neurvana Med., LLC v. Balt USA, LLC, 2019 WL 5092894, at *1 (Del. Ch.

Oct. 10, 2019).
C.A. No. 2023-1189-NAC
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Page 3

party demonstrates that the court’s decision ‘rested on a misunderstanding of a

material fact or a misapplication of law.’” 8 “Where a motion for reargument

‘merely rehashes arguments already made by the parties and considered by the

Court when reaching the decision from which reargument is sought, the motion

must be denied.’” 9 “It is appropriate to deny a motion for reargument where the

explicit language in the Court’s challenged decision implicitly rejects an argument

offered or request made by the movant.” 10 “A motion for reargument ‘may not be

used to relitigate matters already fully litigated or to present arguments or

evidence that could have been presented before the court entered the order from

which reargument is sought.’” 11

Artoss asserts that this Court “misapprehends Artoss’s position on the

contractual interpretation of Amendment #1” and “overlooks the case law holding

that discretion (when it exists) gives rise to the implied covenant, and that it must

8 In re ML/EQ Real Estate P’ship Litig., 2000 WL 364188, at *1 (Mar. 22,

2000) (quoting Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, C.A. No. 12883, at 1 (Del. Ch.
June 30, 1995)).
9 Nguyen v. View, Inc., 2017 WL 3169051, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 26, 2017)

(quoting Wong v. USES Hldg. Corp., 2016 WL 1436594, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5,
2016)).
10 Neurvana, 2019 WL 5092894, at *1.

11 Bocock v. Innovate Corp., 2022 WL 17101448, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 22,

2022) (quoting Standard Gen. Master Fund L.P. v. Majeske, 2018 WL 6505987, at
*1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2018)).
C.A. No. 2023-1189-NAC
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Page 4

be exercised reasonably and in good faith.” 12

The Motion fails for several reasons. First, the Ruling did not overlook or

misapprehend the law or record. In the Ruling, I explained why Artoss is not

reasonably likely to prevail on its breach of contract claim based on the record

presented. In summary, Artoss’s suggested interpretation of Amendment 1 seems

inconsistent with both the plain text of the Distributor Agreement and its

amendments, as well as the contemporaneous evidence the parties put forward

following fairly intensive expedited discovery.

The plain text of Amendment 1 provides, in Section 2, that the Putty 2.0

distribution rights are being acquired “under the terms of the [Distributor]

Agreement” and, in Section 6, that the amendment “will be governed by and

construed in accordance with the terms of the [Distributor] Agreement.” 13 In

other words, Amendment 1 seemingly makes clear the parties’ agreement that,

although the scope of covered products was being expanded to include Putty 2.0,

Artoss’s distribution of Putty 2.0 would still be governed by, and subject to, the

Distributor Agreement. And this included the very first term in the Distributor

Agreement—GmbH’s territory modification right in Section 1.1. 14

12 Def.’s Mot. at 1–2.

13 Ruling at 14–15 (quoting Amendment 1 §§ 2, 6).

14 Id. at 16–17 (“[T]his is also not a right that was hidden in the depths of a

thousand-page agreement. The disputed right is found in Section 1.1, the very
C.A. No. 2023-1189-NAC
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Notwithstanding this, Artoss suggested during oral argument that what

appears to be a short boilerplate provision in the one-page document prohibiting

modifications of Amendment 1 except in writing signed by the parties actually

reflected the parties’ implicit revocation of GmbH’s territory modification right.

As I explained in the Ruling, that is an enormous amount of weight to place on a

very thin reed, bending it well past the breaking point. 15

As I also explained in the Ruling, even if I were to consider extrinsic

evidence here, Artoss fares no better. The evidentiary record suggests a near-

total absence of contemporaneous documentation supporting Artoss’s position. 16

Instead, the contemporaneous record includes an email among the principals of

Artoss indicating that even Artoss, at least when discussing the matter internally,

treated the modification right as distinct from the parties’ amendments to the

Distributor Agreement, including Amendment 1. 17 The contemporaneous record

first section of the relatively short Distributor Agreement.”).
15 Id. at 20.

16 Id. at 17.

17 Id. at 18–19 (“It is further significant that this contemporaneous email is

between Cassidy and Byerley, when they were seemingly being candid, and their
subsequent proposal to expressly remove the modification right was not
approved.”); Dkt. 75 at Exhibit 30. As the foregoing parenthetical notes, Artoss
soon thereafter proposed an amended and restated distributor agreement that
specifically omitted the territory modification right. But GmbH did not approve
it.
C.A. No. 2023-1189-NAC
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otherwise appears to be bereft of references to the modification right following

execution of the Distributor Agreement. 18 As I discussed in the Ruling, GmbH’s

territory modification right strikes me as both unusual and powerful in the

context of an exclusive distributor relationship. 19 Artoss asks me to believe that

the parties revoked GmbH’s right without providing a scrap of contemporaneous

writing on the matter other than a debatably Delphic reference to modification in

Amendment 1. Far from suggesting the parties negotiated and reached a meeting

of the minds to extract the modification right from the parties’ relationship, the

absence of contemporaneous discussion of the right or its cancellation strongly

suggests the opposite to me. 20

18 Ruling at 17.

19 Id. at 13.

20 During oral argument, Artoss’s counsel suggested that, notwithstanding

the meager contemporaneous record, Artoss would prove its case via its principals’
live testimony at trial. Dkt. 104 at 89. Maybe so, but “ask[ing] me to enter a
preliminary injunction based on future trial testimony that [Artoss] says will
convince me of the correctness of its position, but that has not yet occurred[,]” was,
to state the obvious, a bridge too far. Ruling at 20–21. Ironically, perhaps,
deposition testimony from Cassidy and Byerley seems, at this stage, to cut against
Artoss. In depositions in separate litigation, Cassidy and Byerley seemed to
understand that GmbH possessed a contractual right under the Distributor
Agreement to restrict unilaterally Artoss’s distribution territory to “Alaska.” Id.
at 17. GmbH argues that testimony should be accorded particular weight because
Section 1.1 was not a point of dispute between the parties at the time Cassidy and
Byerley gave the testimony. Id. at 17–18. To be clear, Artoss vigorously contests
drawing any such conclusions from the testimony, but, if anything, it seems clear
to me that no injunction is warranted at this stage.
C.A. No. 2023-1189-NAC
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It would be one thing for Artoss to dispute the foregoing. But that is not the

route Artoss takes with the Motion. Instead, Artoss appears to assert an entirely

new argument in the Motion that Artoss did not make in support of its

preliminary injunction motion. Specifically, Artoss now asserts that

Amendment 1 granted Artoss new rights that are independent from, and

untethered to, GmbH’s rights under the Distributor Agreement. First, and

perhaps most obviously, a party cannot use a motion for reargument as a vehicle

to advance new arguments and theories. This alone is reason to deny the Motion

as to Artoss’s breach of contract claim.

Second, in delivering the Ruling, I was under no misimpression as to

whether the Amendment 1 gave Artoss rights to sell Putty 2.0. That is frankly

hard to miss in the one-page document. Yet, again, also hard to miss is the fact

that the rights are expressly granted “under the terms of the [Distributor]

Agreement” and are to “be governed by and construed in accordance with the

terms of the [Distributor] Agreement.” 21 The plain text of Amendment 1 shows

that, consistent with the document’s title, Amendment 1 is an “amendment” to

the Distributor Agreement. Amendment 1 appears to make a relatively small

change to the Distributor Agreement, namely adding a product to Artoss’s

exclusive distribution roster, while also making unequivocally clear that the

21 Amendment 1 §§ 2, 6.
C.A. No. 2023-1189-NAC
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Distributor Agreement supplies the terms of that distribution relationship.

Besides being a new argument that is an improper subject of a reargument,

Artoss’s assertion that Amendment 1 reflects a new, independent agreement

among the parties is contradicted by the plain terms of Amendment 1. That would

seem to be true no matter how much twisting and contorting Artoss may strain to

pursue, and it certainly does not cause me to reconsider my conclusion that Artoss

has not demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits.

I next turn to Artoss’s contention that “[t]he Ruling minimally addresses

Artoss’s arguments concerning breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing.” 22 It is correct that the Ruling did not discuss Artoss’s implied

covenant claim at the same length as Artoss’s breach of contract claim. But I

noted in the Ruling that Artoss’s counsel also gave the implied covenant claim

short shrift at oral argument. Surprisingly, Artoss now suggests that it did not

have enough time at the preliminary injunction hearing to present its implied

covenant argument at length. Artoss’s assertion is misguided, given that Artoss’s

counsel alone presented argument for approximately two hours during a hearing

that was originally scheduled for ninety minutes.

In any event, the Ruling addressed the implied covenant claim in a manner

consistent with the limited attention Artoss gave to the argument, the claim’s

22 Def.’s Mot. at 9.
C.A. No. 2023-1189-NAC
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conflict with the record, and the difficulty of succeeding on the claim at trial. The

implied covenant is to be used sparingly, particularly among sophisticated parties

to a contract. Prevailing on an implied covenant claim is not a walk in the park,

even with a supportive record.

Artoss seeks to prove at trial that GmbH exercised its contractually

permitted discretion arbitrarily or in bad faith. But the record before me is hardly

supportive of Artoss’s implied covenant claim, at least at this stage. I therefore

could not conclude Artoss was reasonably likely to show GmbH acted in an

arbitrary manner in exercising its contractually permitted discretion to reduce

Artoss’s territory. As I explained, the record “includes ample evidence that Artoss

performed for years substantially below forecasts and expectations in terms of

sales and sales revenue.” 23

I understand that Artoss now blames others, including GmbH, for its failure

to achieve its forecasts for nearly a decade. And there is always the possibility I

could reach a different conclusion at trial, after further discovery and seeing

witnesses testify live. But it is no stretch to say Artoss will have significant

difficulty showing the territory reduction was arbitrary or undertaken in bad faith

for implied covenant purposes after years of failing to achieve forecasted sales. 24

23 Ruling at 22–23.

24 I discuss above that Artoss’s principals seemingly understood GmbH’s

ability to reduce Artoss’s territory to Alaska. Notably, far from leaving Artoss
C.A. No. 2023-1189-NAC
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This, then, is not a circumstance to issue a preliminary injunction on an implied

covenant claim. At this preliminary injunction stage, I am, accordingly, under no

misimpression as to the law or record in this regard.

GmbH suggests that the Motion warrants fee-shifting. As the Chancellor

observed in denying a motion for reargument in Twitter, Inc. v. Musk, “[a] court

makes rulings, not proposals for the parties to counter. Defendant[‘s] approach

wastes judicial and litigant resources.” 25 Although Artoss’s Motion comes close to

the line, I decline to shift fees.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Artoss’s motion for reargument is denied.

Sincerely,

/s/ Nathan A. Cook

Nathan A. Cook
Vice Chancellor

with Alaska, GmbH purported to reduce Artoss’s territory from North America to
California, Arizona and Nevada. Dkt. 1 at Exhibit 2. As GmbH’s counsel points
out, Artoss has both historical sales and future growth opportunities in these
three states, especially with California alone standing as the fifth largest economy
in the world. Dkt. 104 at 27.
25 2022 WL 4298178, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2022).