Kevin Leiske v. Robert Gregory Kidd

COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
LORI W. WILL LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
VICE CHANCELLOR 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734

February 2, 2026

Richard P. Rollo, Esquire Margaret M. DiBianca, Esquire
Travis S. Hunter, Esquire DiBianca Law, LLC
Alexandra M. Ewing, Esquire 1201 North Orange Street, Suite 504
Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. Wilmington, Delaware 19801
920 North King Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19801

RE: Kevin Leiske et al. v. Robert Gregory Kidd et al.,
C.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)

Dear Counsel,

I write regarding the defendants’ exceptions to a Magistrate in Chancery’s

final report.1 In that Report, the Magistrate held that the plaintiffs are entitled to

advancement of the legal fees and expenses they are incurring in several

proceedings. For the following reasons, I affirm the Report, albeit on narrower

grounds.

1
Telephonic Report of the Magistrate on Cross-Mots. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 67) (“Report”).
C.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)
February 2, 2026
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I. BACKGROUND

The facts are drawn from the summary judgment record presented to the

Magistrate and are largely undisputed.2

A. The Parties and Agreements

Plaintiffs Kevin Leiske, Joseph Christopher Lewis, and Margaret Slemmer are

managers of Hard Yaka Ventures GP, LLC (the “GP”).3 The GP is general partner

of an investment fund, Hard Yaka Ventures, LP (the “Fund”).4 Defendant Robert

Gregory Kidd is also a manager of the GP and the Fund’s sole indirect limited

partner.5

The GP is governed by a Second Amended and Restated Limited Liability

Company Agreement (the “GP Agreement”), which provides managers with

advancement and indemnification rights.6 The GP Agreement states that

2
See Pls.’ Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Regarding Entitlement to
Advancement and Fees-on-Fees (Dkt. 30) (“Pls.’ Opening Summ. J. Br.”); Defs.’
Corrected Opening Br. in Supp. of Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 35) (“Defs.’ Corrected
Opening Summ. J. Br.”).
3
Verified Am. Compl. for Advancement and Other Specific Performance (Dkt. 11) (“Am.
Compl.”) ¶¶ 8-10.
4
Id. ¶ 17.
5
Id. ¶ 11.
6
Defs.’ Opening Br. in Supp. of Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 32) (“Defs.’ Opening
Summ. J. Br.”) Ex. 2 (“GP Agreement”).
C.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)
February 2, 2026
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advancement must be approved by the managers unless the requesting person is a

founder.7 None of the plaintiffs are founders.

Each plaintiff manager also entered into separate Indemnification Agreements

with Kidd personally (and his retirement trusts)8 in 2024. These Indemnification

Agreements provide mandatory advancement of fees and expenses incurred in

proceedings where the manager is involved “by reason of” their “Corporate Status.”9

They state that these rights are “cumulative and in addition to” any other

advancement rights the plaintiffs may have, including under the GP Agreement.10

B. The Underlying Proceedings

The present dispute arises from a business divorce. Kidd sought to wind down

the Fund and withdraw capital.11 The plaintiffs, allegedly exercising their voting

rights as managers, blocked his actions, purportedly to protect their performance

allocations.12 This standoff spawned several legal battles.

7
GP Agreement § 12.3.
8
The retirement trusts are defendants Pacific Premier Trust Custodian FBO Robert G. Kidd
IRA, and Pacific Premier Trust Custodian FBO Robert G. Kidd Roth IRA. See Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 12-13.
9
Am. Compl. Exs. 1-3 (“Indemnification Agreements”) § 5.
10
Id. § 8(a).
11
Am. Compl. ¶ 30.
12
Defs.’ Opening Summ. J. Br. Ex. 29 at Ex. A, 6-7.
C.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)
February 2, 2026
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First, Kidd caused the Fund’s primary limited partner to sue the GP in

Nevada.13 The plaintiffs intervened as defendants due to the allegations against them

and “to protect the [GP]’s interests.”14 Kidd then amended the complaint to assert

breach of fiduciary duty claims against the plaintiffs.15 Ultimately, the Nevada court

dismissed the claims and held that they should be pursued in arbitration.16

Second, the plaintiffs initiated JAMS arbitration against Kidd.17 They

demanded access to the GP’s books and records and to prevent further

mismanagement by Kidd.18 They also sought advancement “for all costs and

fees . . . incurred by the [plaintiffs] in their role as [m]anagers[.]”19

Third, the plaintiffs sued in this court for the GP’s books and records pursuant

to the GP Agreement.20 A Magistrate in Chancery stayed the case in deference to

13
Report 12.
14
Am. Compl. ¶ 33; see Defs.’ Answer to Pls.’ Verified Am. Compl. (Dkt. 25) 8-9.
15
Defs.’ Opening Summ. J. Br. Ex. 13.
16
Id. at Ex. 30 (describing the dismissal).
17
Am. Compl. ¶ 34.
18
Id.; Defs.’ Opening Summ. J. Br. Ex. 8 (arbitration demand).
19
Defs.’ Opening Summ. J. Br. Ex. 8 at 14.
20
Am. Compl. ¶ 36; see Report 24.
C.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)
February 2, 2026
Page 5 of 14

the Nevada action.21 Exceptions to that stay order are pending before another

member of this court.22

Fourth, the plaintiffs filed the present case for advancement.23 They seek

advancement from Kidd personally under the Indemnification Agreements. 24 They

are not pursuing advancement under the GP Agreement in this action.

C. The Final Report

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ entitlement

to advancement.25 The plaintiffs asserted that the Indemnification Agreements

mandate advancement because the underlying proceedings implicate their Corporate

Status as managers.26 They further maintained that the Indemnification Agreements

provide rights “cumulative” to the GP Agreement.27 The defendants countered that

the proceedings do not arise “by reason of” the plaintiffs’ Corporate Status because

they concern personal financial payouts.28 They also insisted that the GP Agreement

21
Defs.’ Opening Summ. J. Br. Ex. 18 at 8-9.
22
Report 13-14.
23
Dkt. 1. The plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on May 13, 2025. Dkt. 11.
24
Report 15-17; Am. Compl., Prayer for Relief.
25
Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 30); Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 31).
26
Pls.’ Opening Summ. J. Br. 10-12.
Pls.’ Answering Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. and in Further Supp. of Pls.’
27

Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 39) 6.
28
Defs.’ Corrected Opening Summ. J. Br. 20-22.
C.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)
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is the primary source of advancement, requiring the plaintiffs to pursue advancement

from the GP before invoking the Indemnification Agreements.29

Oral argument on the cross-motions was heard by Magistrate Wright on

December 16, 2025.30 On January 2, 2026, he issued an oral Final Report

recommending that summary judgment be granted in favor of the plaintiffs.31

The Magistrate concluded that the plaintiffs are entitled to advancement under

the Indemnification Agreements.32 That is so, he explained, because the claims in

the underlying proceedings relate to the plaintiffs’ ability to exercise managerial

powers.33 The Report also noted that the Indemnification Agreements grant

advancement rights separate from the GP Agreement.34 The Magistrate awarded the

plaintiffs fees-on-fees for successfully prosecuting this advancement action.35 In

doing so, he explained that Section 7(d) of the Indemnification Agreements provides

for fees in enforcing advancement rights regardless of the outcome.36

29
Id. at 28-29.
30
Dkt. 44.
31
Dkts. 50, 57.
32
Report 21, 25.
33
Id. at 23-24.
34
Id. at 31.
35
Id. at 30-31.
36
Id. at 31.
C.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)
February 2, 2026
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D. The Exceptions

On January 7, the defendants timely took exception to the Report.37 They

challenge four of the Report’s conclusions: (1) that the plaintiffs are involved in the

underlying proceedings “by reason of” their Corporate Status; (2) that the plaintiffs

may recover advancement from Kidd without first pursuing it from the GP; (3) that

the plaintiffs are entitled to fees-on-fees for this case; and (4) that the plaintiffs would

be entitled to fees-on-fees under Section 7(d) regardless of their success.38

Consistent with the summary nature of advancement proceedings, I ordered

expedited briefing and have endeavored to resolve the exceptions within 30 days of

the Report.39 Briefing on the exceptions was complete as of January 27.40

37
Defs.’ Notice of Exceptions to the Magistrate’s Final Report (Dkt. 51); see Ct. Ch.
R. 144(c)(2)(B).
38
Opening Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Exceptions to Magistrate’s Jan. 2, 2026 Report (Dkt. 60)
(“Defs.’ Opening Exceptions Br.”) 2-3.
39
Dkt. 54.
40
Id.; see also Pls.’ Answering Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Exceptions (Dkt. 62); Reply Br. in
Further Supp. of Defs.’ Exceptions to Magistrate’s Jan. 2, 2026 Report (Dkt. 65). After
exceptions briefing was complete, the plaintiffs’ counsel informed me that their answering
brief contained generative AI (GenAI) errors. See Letter Providing Corrected Answering
Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Exceptions (Dkt. 68); Pls.’ Corrected Answering Br. in Opp’n to
Defs.’ Exceptions (Dkt. 69). The defendants asked that I “review all prior filings in this
Action for accuracy and propose a path forward to remedy the time, expense, and other
harms to the Court and Defendants.” Letter in Resp. to Pls.’ Letter Regarding GenAI Errors
(Dkt. 70). I have carefully reviewed the briefs and cited case law so that I can issue a
prompt ruling on the legal questions before me. But I retain jurisdiction to determine what
remedy, if any, should issue to address the GenAI errors in the plaintiffs’ brief.
C.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)
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II. ANALYSIS

This court reviews a Magistrate’s final report de novo.41 A hearing is

unnecessary; the summary judgment record lends itself to a review on the papers.42

Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.43 Proper

interpretation of a contract is a question of law and often suitable for resolution on

summary judgment.44

Delaware courts enforce contracts as written.45 When interpreting a contract,

the court gives priority to the parties’ intentions as reflected in the four corners of

41
See DiGiacobbe v. Sestak, 743 A.2d 180, 184 (Del. 1999).
42
See id. (observing that “[i]t is possible . . . to conduct a review de novo on the record”).
43
Ct. Ch. R. 56(c).
44
NBC Universal v. Paxson Commc’ns Corp., 2005 WL 1038997, at *5 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 29, 2005) (“[S]ummary judgment is a proper framework for enforcing unambiguous
contracts because there is no need to resolve material disputes of fact. Rather, a
determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is a question for the court to resolve as a
matter of law.”).
45
See Salamone v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 354, 367–68 (Del. 2014) (explaining that Delaware
“adheres to the objective theory of contracts[]”).
C.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)
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the agreement.46 Absent ambiguity, the court will give effect to the plain meaning

of the contract’s terms.47

A. The “By Reason Of” Analysis

The primary question is whether the plaintiffs are parties to the underlying

proceedings “by reason of [their] Corporate Status.”48 The Indemnification

Agreements define “Corporate Status” to include the status of a person who is or

was a “director, officer, employee, agent or fiduciary” of the indemnitor or any other

enterprise (including the GP) at the indemnitor’s request.49

Consistent with the policy favoring advancement, Delaware courts interpret

such language broadly.50 The phrase “by reason of” requires a “nexus or causal

46
See GMG Cap. Invs., LLC v. Athenian Venture P’rs I, L.P., 36 A.3d 776, 779 (Del. 2012)
(holding that, in interpreting a contract, Delaware courts “give priority to the parties’
intentions as reflected in the four corners of the agreement”).
47
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903 A.2d 728, 739 (Del. 2006) (noting
that language that is “[c]lear and unambiguous” must “be given its ordinary and usual
meaning”); Eagle Indus., Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 702 A.2d 1228, 1232
(Del. 1997) (stating that contractual provisions control “when they establish the parties’
common meaning[,]” such that “a reasonable person in the position of either party would
have no expectations inconsistent with the contract language”).
48
Indemnification Agreements § 5.
49
Id. § 13(b) (defining “Corporate Status”); see also Report 9.
50
See VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 84 (Del. 1998) (discussing the legislative
history and policy animating Delaware’s approach to advancement); cf. Perconti v.
Thornton Oil Corp., 2002 WL 982419, at *2, *4 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2002) (explaining that
indemnification “encourages corporate service by assuring individuals that the risks
C.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)
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connection” between the underlying proceeding and “one’s official corporate

capacity.”51 It does not require an evaluation into the covered person’s subjective

“motivation[s] for engaging in” the proceeding.52

Regarding the Nevada Action, the connection to the plaintiffs’ Corporate

Status is undeniable. Kidd sued the plaintiffs for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging

they misused their managerial voting rights. Defending against allegations of

official misconduct is a paradigmatic case for advancement.53

The requisite nexus also exists for the offensive claims in the JAMS

arbitration and books and records action. As the Magistrate correctly held, these

proceedings involve the plaintiffs’ authority as managers, such as their voting and

information rights. Advancement is warranted to determine and enforce such rights,

which are intertwined with the plaintiffs’ Corporate Status.

The defendants argue that the underlying litigation is not “by reason of” the

plaintiffs’ Corporate Status because the claims seek personal financial

incurred by them as a result of their efforts on behalf of the corporation will be met, not
through their personal financial resources, but by the corporation”).
51
Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 214 (Del. 2005).
52
Id.
53
See Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 2002 WL 1358761, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 18, 2002)
(describing “a consistent line of authority upholding the contractual . . . advancement . . .
rights of corporate officials charged with serious misconduct allegedly inspired by personal
greed”).
C.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)
February 2, 2026
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payouts. They rely on Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc. and Gentile v. SinglePoint

Financial, Inc. to contend that suits advancing purely personal interests generally

fall outside the scope of advancement and indemnification.54

Those cases addressed very different situations. In Shearin, advancement was

denied for a suit to enforce a personal employment contract that had no bearing on

corporate duties or power.55 And in Gentile, the plaintiff’s personal motivation for

suing to obtain shares was determinative since the claims did not involve his

corporate authority.56 Here, by contrast, the underlying proceedings would not exist

absent the plaintiffs’ roles as managers.

The Report distinguished these cases, in part, by highlighting the differences

between the corporate and alternative entity contexts. The Magistrate suggested that

the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act affords broader contractual freedom

than Section 145 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.57 Although the LLC

Act embodies a strong policy of contractarianism, the phrase “by reason of” is

interpreted uniformly across corporate and alternative entity contexts, unless the

54
Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Gp. Inc., 652 A.2d 578 (Del. Ch. 1994); Gentile v. SinglePoint
Fin., Inc., 787 A.2d 102 (Del. Ch. 2001).
55
Shearin, 652 A.2d at 594-95.
56
Gentile, 787 A.2d at 108-09.
57
Report 22-23.
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parties bargain for a different standard.58 I need not decide whether the LLC Act

compels a different result than the DGCL because the facts satisfy the traditional “by

reason of” test. As such, I affirm the Magistrate’s conclusion without adopting the

Report’s statutory distinction as necessary to the outcome.

B. The Exhaustion Defense

The defendants next contend that the plaintiffs are not entitled to advancement

from Kidd since they have yet to exhaust their remedies against the GP. The

Magistrate rejected this argument, holding that the contracts “foreclose any

argument that the GP Agreement displaces rights granted by the Indemnification

Agreements.”59 I agree.

The defendants’ argument is belied by the Indemnification Agreements’ plain

text. The rights provided by the Indemnification Agreements are “cumulative” and

“non-exclusive.”60 The Indemnification Agreements lack an exhaustion

requirement or language subordinating Kidd’s obligation to that of the GP. The

inclusion of cumulative rights, contrasted with the absence of an exhaustion

58
See Barr v. Genesis CMG Hldgs., LLC, 2025 WL 3720720, at *5 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 23, 2025) (observing that the “by reason of the fact” standard in an LLC agreement
was “comparable” to the standard under 8 Del. C. § 145 (citing Charney v. Am. Apparel,
Inc., 2015 WL 5313769, at *12 (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 2015))).
59
Report 29-30.
60
Indemnification Agreements § 8(a).
C.A. No. 2025-0426-CDW (LWW)
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requirement, confirms that the parties did not intend to subordinate Kidd’s

obligations.61

C. The Fees-on-Fees Issue

Finally, the defendants take exception to the Magistrate’s award of

fees-on-fees to the plaintiffs for prosecuting this advancement action. The

defendants insist that the award was improper and highlight that Section 7(d) of the

Indemnification Agreements, which contemplates fees-on-fees regardless of

success, is void as against public policy.62 The Report—in self-described “dicta”—

observed that such a provision might be enforceable in the LLC context given the

statute’s emphasis on freedom of contract.63

I need not decide that novel legal issue. Under settled Delaware law, fees-on-

fees are awarded to a successful plaintiff in an advancement action to prevent the

61
Active Asset Recovery, Inc. v. Real Est. Asset Recovery Servs., Inc., 1999 WL 743479,
at *11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 1999) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius to explain that the exclusion of one term coupled with the inclusion of other,
parallel terms “speaks volumes”); see also 3 Corbin on Contracts § 552, at 206 (1960) (“If
one subject is specifically named, or if several subjects of a larger class are specifically
enumerated, and there are no general words to show that other subjects of that class are
included, it may reasonably be inferred that the subjects not specifically named were
intended to be excluded.”).
62
Defs.’ Opening Exceptions Br. 36-38.
63
Report 31.
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victory from being pyrrhic.64 Because the plaintiffs succeeded on the merits of their

advancement suit, they are entitled to fees-on-fees under Delaware law, consistent

with Stifel Financial Corp v. Cochran.65

I therefore affirm the award of fees-on-fees because of the plaintiffs’ success,

without reaching the validity of the unconditional fee provision.

III. CONCLUSION

The defendants’ exceptions are overruled and the Magistrate’s Report is

affirmed, as set out above. The plaintiffs are entitled to advancement of fees and

expenses incurred in the underlying proceedings under the Indemnification

Agreements. They are also entitled to fees-on-fees in connection with this suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Lori W. Will

Lori W. Will
Vice Chancellor

64
Stifel Fin. Corp. v. Cochran, 809 A.2d 555, 561-62 (Del. 2002).
65
Id.; see also Fasciana v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 829 A.2d 178, 179 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(awarding fees-on-fees proportionate to the plaintiff’s success in prosecuting an
advancement action).