Madeline O'Connor and Patrick Cullen v. Beachy Keen Services, LLC

COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE

LORI W. WILL LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
VICE CHANCELLOR 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734

March 13, 2025

William B. Larson, Jr., Esquire Beachy Keen Services, LLC
Jalen S. Frantal, Esquire c/o Michael Friedrich
Manning Gross + Massenburg LLP 7 Rockford Road, D5
1007 N. Orange Street, Suite 711 Wilmington, Delaware 19806
Wilmington, Delaware 19801

RE: Madeline O’Connor and Patrick Cullen v. Beachy Keen Services, LLC,
C.A. No. 2024-1345-LWW

Dear Counsel and Mr. Friedrich:

This action concerns defendant Beachy Keen Services, LLC’s refusal to abide

by a contract to sell real estate. The parties entered into an agreement for the sale of

a home owned by the defendant, which had purchased the property to flip it but ran

out of funds. When the time came to close, the defendant and its principal vanished.

This lawsuit followed. After an expedited trial, I conclude that specific

performance is appropriate. Judgment is entered in the plaintiffs’ favor.
C.A. No. 2024-1345-LWW
March 13, 2025
Page 2 of 14

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the evidentiary trial record and the

allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint, which are deemed admitted due to the

defendant’s default.1

A. The Property

Defendant Beachy Keen Services, LLC is a New York limited liability

company. Its registered agent and principal is Michael Friedrich, who maintains an

address in Wilmington, Delaware. Beachy Keen is involved in residential house

flipping.2 It owns a vacant property located at 2106 North Bancroft Parkway in

Wilmington (the “Property”).

1
The plaintiffs’ pre-trial brief seeks a default judgment against the defendant. Dkt. 21 at
13. Service of the complaint was unsuccessfully attempted on Beachy Keen’s registered
agent, Michael Friedrich, five times over eight days. Dkt. 10 Ex. A. Friedrich is also the
principal of Beachy Keen who signed the agreement of sale at issue in this case. Service
was, however, perfected on the Secretary of State through hand delivery on January 9, 2025.
See Dkt. 10 Ex. B; Dkts. 11-13; 6 Del. C. § 18-910; see also T.A.H. First, Inc. v. Clifton
Leasing Co., Inc., 35 A.3d 420 (Del. 2011) (TABLE). The plaintiffs and their counsel also
tried to contact the defendant in numerous ways: through his realtor, social media, calls to
cell and office phones, and faxes. There was never a response. Beachy Keen is in default.
See Ct. Ch. R. 55(b). The allegations in the complaint are therefore deemed admitted. See
Hauspie v. Stonington P’rs, Inc., 945 A.2d 584, 586 (Del. 2008). At trial, I heard live
testimony and reviewed documentary evidence that confirm the plaintiffs’ allegations and
support the findings of fact made in this decision.
The plaintiffs’ trial exhibits are cited as “PX __.” Trial testimony is cited as
[Witness] Tr. __.” Dkt. 24.
2
Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 42.
C.A. No. 2024-1345-LWW
March 13, 2025
Page 3 of 14

Plaintiffs Madeline O’Connor and Patrick Cullen are a married couple living

in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.3 Both native Delawareans, they plan to relocate to

their hometown with their young child. 4 They have targeted Wilmington’s

Highlands neighborhood—a historic residential section of the city that is walkable

to parks, restaurants, and cultural attractions.5

After touring the Property, the plaintiffs decided that it was the “perfect” home

for their family.6 They decided to make an offer, and they hoped to settle quickly.7

B. The Agreement of Sale

Beachy Keen listed the Property for sale on June 15, 2024 at a price of

$649,999.8 After a series of price reductions, the plaintiffs submitted an offer of

$550,000 on October 30. 9 Beachy Keen accepted this offer on November 4 by

signing an Agreement of Sale (the “Agreement”).10

3
Id. ¶¶ 5-6.
4
Id. ¶¶ 13-14.
5
Id. ¶ 18; see O’Connor Tr. 5-6.
6
O’Connor Tr. 6-7.
7
Id. at 8.
8
Compl. ¶ 19.
9
Id. ¶ 28.
10
Id.; PX 1 (Agreement of Sale of the Property); see Barone Tr. 20.
C.A. No. 2024-1345-LWW
March 13, 2025
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The plaintiffs made a $10,000 earnest money deposit, obtained lender

approval for mortgage financing, and met all other contingencies in the Agreement.11

C. The Failed Closing

Closing on the Property was set for November 26, 2024. The plaintiffs

prepared to move. They bought appliances for their new kitchen, reached an

agreement with their landlord to break their lease early, booked movers, and packed

up their apartment. 12 They rented moving supplies. 13 They also began to pay

heating bills for the Property to prevent pipe damage during the cold winter months

since Beachy Keen had stopped making payments.14

But just before November 26, the law firm handling the closing told the

plaintiffs that Friedrich was non-responsive and failed to return needed

documentation.15 The closing was canceled.16 The plaintiffs made multiple attempts

to contact Friedrich and his associates, friends, and family by phone, email, and

social media.17 Their efforts were unsuccessful.

11
Compl. ¶¶ 29, 30.
12
O’Connor Tr. 10.
13
PX 2 (utility bills); see Cullen Tr. 14-15.
14
PX 3 (payment receipts); see Cullen Tr. 16.
15
O’Connor Tr. 11; Compl. ¶ 34.
16
O’Connor Tr. 11; Compl. ¶ 35.
17
O’Connor Tr. 11; Compl. ¶ 36.
C.A. No. 2024-1345-LWW
March 13, 2025
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D. The Aftermath

Friedrich’s disappearing act exacerbated an already stressful season for the

plaintiffs. They had expedited their plans to move to Wilmington after a home

invader burglarized their Philadelphia apartment. 18 And the Property—with its

historic character and proximity to family—seemed like the ideal place to settle.19

The plaintiffs’ plans went awry when their closing was canceled. When it became

clear that Friedrich “was not going to resurface,” they decided to pursue litigation.20

E. This Action

On December 27, 2024, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in this court seeking

specific performance of the Agreement, among other relief. 21 They moved for

expedited proceedings, which I granted. 22 Despite having notice, Beachy Keen

failed to appear at the motion to expedite hearing.23 It has never appeared in this

case despite being properly served and contacted in multiple ways.24

18
Compl. ¶ 17.
19
Id. ¶¶ 18, 22-26.
20
O’Connor Tr. 11-12; see Compl. ¶ 36.
21
Dkt. 1.
22
Dkt. 2.
23
See Dkt. 6.
24
See supra note 1.
C.A. No. 2024-1345-LWW
March 13, 2025
Page 6 of 14

Trial was held on March 3, 2025.25 The plaintiffs and their real estate agent

testified live at trial.26

II. ANALYSIS

The plaintiffs seek relief under a breach of contract theory. Their primary

request is for specific performance of the Agreement. They also request an award

of incidental damages caused by Beachy Keen’s breach of the Agreement and their

fees and costs in this litigation. They have asked that, if necessary, a special

magistrate be appointed to effectuate the transfer of title to the Property.

The plaintiffs have proved their claim and entitlement to these remedies.

A. Breach of Contract

To prove a breach of contract, the plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) the existence

of a contract, (2) the breach of an obligation imposed by the contract, and

(3) resulting damages.27 Each element is demonstrated here.

1. Contract

A valid contract is formed when “(1) the parties intended that the contract

would bind them, (2) the terms of the contract are sufficiently definite, and (3) the

25
Dkt. 16.
26
Dkt. 22.
27
See Kuroda v. SPJS Hldgs., L.L.C., 971 A.2d 872, 883 (Del. Ch. 2009).
C.A. No. 2024-1345-LWW
March 13, 2025
Page 7 of 14

parties exchange legal consideration.”28

The parties indicated their intention to be bound when they signed the

Agreement. The terms of the Agreement are sufficiently definite and based on a

standard form of contract for the sale of residential real estate in Delaware.29

The parties also exchanged legal consideration. Beachy Keen promised to

transfer the Property to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs promised to pay an initial

deposit and obtain mortgage financing to complete the sale.

The plaintiffs performed their obligations. Beachy Keen did not.

2. Breach

Beachy Keen breached the Agreement on November 26, 2024 when it

neglected to close and deliver title and possession of the Property to the plaintiffs.30

The Agreement obligated Beachy Keen to attend closing as scheduled unless the

parties “expressly agreed” that “a longer time [wa]s necessary” to prepare for

settlement.31 Beachy Keen failed to communicate with the plaintiffs at all—let alone

28
Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153, 1158 (Del. 2010).
29
See PX 1.
30
Compl. ¶ 35; see generally PAMI–LEMB I Inc. v. EMB–NHM, L.L.C., 857 A.2d 998,
1014 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“A repudiation of a contract is an outright refusal by a party to
perform a contract or its conditions.”) (citation omitted).
31
PX 1 at 2.
C.A. No. 2024-1345-LWW
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request an extension. By refusing to transfer the Property by the deadline fixed by

the Agreement, Beachy Keen did not hold up its end of the bargain.

3. Damages

The plaintiffs suffered harm from Beachy Keen’s breach of the Agreement.

They have been deprived of the home they chose and contracted to purchase. They

have also been met with unanticipated complications. For example, they were

caused to unnecessarily break the lease on their Philadelphia rental property.32 They

incurred expenses, such as moving supply rentals and the Property’s utility bills.33

This is a non-exhaustive list of the plaintiffs’ damages.

B. Specific Performance

The plaintiffs seek specific performance of the Agreement. They lack an

adequate remedy at law. 34 The Agreement—a contract for the sale of real

property—“is the quintessential contract for which specific performance is

32
Compl. ¶ 27.
33
Id. ¶ 32; see Cullen Tr. 14.
34
See White v. Russell, 2023 WL 3191746, at *7 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2023) (citing Osborn,
991 A.2d at 1158) (“Specific performance is only available if there is no adequate remedy
at law.”).
C.A. No. 2024-1345-LWW
March 13, 2025
Page 9 of 14

available.”35 “[S]pecific performance of a real estate sale contract is often the only

adequate remedy for a breach by the seller, except in rare circumstances.”36

To obtain specific performance, the plaintiffs must demonstrate by clear and

convincing evidence that “(1) a valid contract exists, (2) [they are] ready, willing,

and able to perform, and (3) that the balance of equities tips in favor of [the

movant].”37 Each of these elements was proven by the plaintiffs. The first element

was addressed above. The remainder are considered below.

1. Ready, Willing, and Able to Perform

The plaintiffs stand ready, willing, and able to perform the Agreement. 38

They possess the funds to purchase the Property after placing $10,000 in escrow,

setting aside a down payment, and securing mortgage financing for the balance of

the purchase price.39 They satisfied all contingencies in the Agreement.40 They are

simply waiting for Beachy Keen to execute the necessary documentation and

transfer title and possession of the Property to them as promised.

35
Morabito v. Harris, 2001 WL 1269334, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2001).
36
Szambelak v. Tsipouras, 2007 WL 4179315, at *7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 19, 2007).
37
Osborn, 991 A.2d at 1158.
38
Id. at 1161; see also Morabito, 2001 WL 1269334, at *3 (“The plaintiff currently has a
financing commitment in place and stands ready, willing and able to complete the purchase
of the property.”).
39
Compl. ¶¶ 27, 29.
40
Id. ¶ 30.
C.A. No. 2024-1345-LWW
March 13, 2025
Page 10 of 14

2. Balance of the Equities

“In balancing the equities for specific performance, the Court must consider

whether ‘specific enforcement of a validly formed contract would cause even greater

harm than it would prevent.’”41 “Equitable defenses are available to the breaching

party, including an examination of the benefit which will accrue to the plaintiff upon

consummation of the contract, the detriment to the defendant upon the same

circumstance, and the conditions under which the defaulting party found itself in

breach.”42 This analysis “reflect[s] the traditional concern of a court of equity that

its special processes not be used in a way that unjustifiably increases human

suffering.”43

Here, the equities heavily favor the plaintiffs.

After living through a traumatic home invasion, the plaintiffs were eager to

move back to Wilmington. 44 They found the perfect home in the Highlands

neighborhood.45 The Property is unique and satisfied their wants and needs. They

41
White, 2023 WL 3191746, at *7 (citing Hastings Funeral Home, Inc. v. Hastings, 2022
WL 16921785, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 2022)).
42
Morabito, 2001 WL 1269334, at *3.
43
Morabito v. Harris, 2002 WL 550117, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 26, 2002) (citation omitted);
see also Walton v. Beale, 2006 WL 265489, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2006), aff’d, 913 A.2d
569 (Del. 2006).
44
Compl. ¶ 17.
45
Id. ¶ 18.
C.A. No. 2024-1345-LWW
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reached a binding contract to purchase the Property and satisfied all contingencies

in the Agreement.46 But Beachy Keen jilted them.47

I have no reason to believe that Beachy Keen will be harmed by an order of

specific performance. It appears to be in financial trouble. The Property is the

subject of a pending sheriff’s sale action in Superior Court.48 The plaintiffs’ counsel

represented at trial that other properties associated with defendant are in

foreclosure.49 And Beachy Keen, which is presumably experienced with real estate

contracts given its line of work, chose to put the Property on the market.50 And it

chose to accept the plaintiffs’ offer and sign the Agreement, with the guidance of a

licensed realtor.51 It had ample opportunity to tell its side of the story to this court.

It has chosen not to.

In addition, the Property’s lender seems supportive of the sale going forward.

The plaintiffs have an agreement in principle with the lender on satisfaction of the

mortgage that currently encumbers the Property.52

46
Id. ¶¶ 29-30.
47
Id. ¶ 35.
48
See Velocity Com. Cap. v. Beachy Keen, et al, C.A. N24L-09-009-PRW (Del. Super.).
49
Trial Tr. 21-22.
50
See Compl. ¶¶ 41-44.
51
Trial Tr. 19-20.
52
Cullen Tr. 16-17.
C.A. No. 2024-1345-LWW
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Equity must right this wrong. The plaintiffs demonstrated that specific

performance is warranted. That relief is granted.

C. Incidental Damages

The plaintiffs also seek certain incidental damages for costs they have

incurred from the breach of the Agreement. This court may “award damages or

pecuniary compensation along with specific performance when the decree as

awarded does not give complete and full relief.”53 “[E]quity had full jurisdiction, in

addition to decreeing specific performance, to award such legal damages as may

have resulted from the delay in performance.”54

The damages sought are modest. They include the costs of renting moving

equipment ($383.85) and activating utilities ($754.91).55 Both sets of costs stem

from Beachy Keen’s breach. The plaintiffs are entitled to recover these amounts.56

53
Tri State Mall Assocs. v. A. A. R. Realty Corp., 298 A.2d 368, 371 (Del. Ch. 1972) (citing
5 John Norton Pomeroy, Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence § 237(b) (5th ed. 1941)).
54
Id.
55
Compl. ¶ 32; see PX 2, 3.
56
I decline to award incidental damages beyond the moving equipment and utility expenses
identified in the plaintiffs’ pre-trial brief. See Dkt. 21 at 12. No other damages were sought
at trial.
C.A. No. 2024-1345-LWW
March 13, 2025
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D. Attorneys’ Fees

The plaintiffs also seek their attorneys’ fees and expenses from this litigation.

The Agreement includes a prevailing party provision.57 It states that “[i]n the event

any dispute arises under this Agreement between Seller and Buyer[s] resulting in

any litigation, and/or arbitration, Buyer[s] or Seller, whichever is unsuccessful, shall

also be liable for the other parties’ court costs and attorney fees.”58

The plaintiffs have prevailed in this litigation. They are entitled to their

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the Agreement.

III. CONCLUSION

Judgment is entered for the plaintiffs. Specific performance is granted.

Barring any complications with the lender of the current mortgage on the Property,

title and possession must be transferred to the plaintiffs within ten days of this

decision.

Plaintiffs’ counsel must also attempt to serve a copy of this decision on

Beachy Keen and Friedrich immediately so that Beachy Keen has an opportunity to

comply with it. Given Beachy Keen’s absenteeism, however, a special magistrate

57
PX 1 ¶ 27; see Bako Pathology LP v. Bakotic, 288 A.3d 252, 281 (Del. 2022) (discussing
the enforcement of a prevailing party fee shifting provision).
58
PX 1 ¶ 27.
C.A. No. 2024-1345-LWW
March 13, 2025
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will likely need to be appointed to effectuate the sale.59 By March 20, 2025, the

plaintiffs’ counsel is asked to file a status update about (1) his negotiations with

Beachy Keen’s lender on the sale of the Property and (2) whether Beachy Keen has

been responsive. If any remaining issues with the lender are resolved and Beachy

Keen remains absent, counsel is asked to include a proposed order appointing a

special magistrate to complete the sale on Beachy Keen’s behalf.

Incidental damages and attorneys’ fees and costs are also awarded to the

plaintiffs, as outlined above. The plaintiffs’ counsel is to submit an affidavit

detailing these fees and costs after closing, along with a proposed order regarding

the damages and fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

59
10 Del. C. § 373 (“In all cases where the Court of Chancery orders the execution of any
conveyance, assignment, release, acquittance or other instrument and the party against
whom the judgment is made does not comply therewith within the time mentioned in the
judgment, the Court may appoint a Magistrate for such purpose.”).