Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

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Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

JUAN CRUZ ET AL. v. SPEC PERSONNEL,
LLC, ET AL.
(AC 46515)
Alvord, Moll and Keller, Js.*

Syllabus

The defendant S Co. appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the plain-
tiffs, J and E, rendered following a jury trial. J sustained serious workplace
injuries when an approximately 1300 pound load of lights, which had been
sold and shipped by S Co. to J’s employer, R Co., fell onto him. Following
delivery to R Co., the lights, which had not been secured by stretch wrap to
the pallet on which they had been delivered, were placed on the top shelf of
a storage rack in a warehouse operated by R Co. The lights subsequently slid
off the pallet onto J after a temporary staffer for R Co., while operating a
reach truck, made contact with the lights. J’s wife, E, claimed an attendant
loss of consortium. S Co. claimed, inter alia, that the court, in denying its
postverdict motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, improperly
concluded that, as a product shipper, it owed a duty of care that extended to J
and the type of harm he suffered in the postdelivery warehouse accident. Held:

The trial court, in denying the defendant’s postverdict motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, improperly determined that S Co. owed a duty
of care to protect against J’s workplace injuries, as J’s workplace injuries
were not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of S Co.’s presumed failure
to secure the lights to the pallet by stretch wrap before they were shipped.

Argued October 10, 2024—officially released June 2, 2026

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defen-
dants’ alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford
and transferred to the judicial district of Waterbury,
where Rexel Holdings USA Corp. intervened as a plain-
tiff; thereafter, Signify North America Corporation et
al. were cited in as defendants; subsequently, the plain-
tiff AdaMaria Medina et al. withdrew from the action;
thereafter, the named plaintiff et al. withdrew the action
*
This appeal originally was argued before a panel of this court con-
sisting of Judges Alvord, Moll, and Flynn. Thereafter, Judge Flynn
recused himself and did not participate in the consideration of the
case. Justice Keller was added to the panel and has read the briefs and
appendices, and listened to a recording of the oral argument prior to
participating in this decision.
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

as against the named defendant et al.; subsequently, the
case was tried to the jury before Rosen, J.; verdict and
judgment for the named plaintiff et al.; thereafter, the
court denied the motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict filed by the defendant Signify North
America Corporation and granted in part its motion for
remittitur, and the defendant Signify North America
Corporation appealed to this court; subsequently, the
court, Rosen, J., awarded offer of compromise interest
and postjudgment interest to the named plaintiff et al.,
and the defendant Signify North America Corporation
filed an amended appeal. Reversed; judgment directed.
Dustin F. Guzior, pro hac vice, with whom were Jeffrey
R. Babbin and Elizabeth A. Rose, pro hac vice, and, on
the brief, Garrard R. Beeney, pro hac vice, and Michael
T. Lemanski, pro hac vice, for the appellant (defendant
Signify North America Corporation).
Michael S. Taylor, with whom were Brendon P.
Levesque and, on the brief, Corinne A. Burlingham,
Andrew P. Garza, Ryan McKeen, Andrew Ranks and
Alexa Mahoney, for the appellees (named plaintiff et al.).

Opinion

MOLL, J. The defendant Signify North America Cor-
poration1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court
1
The following parties either were named as defendants in the original
complaint or were later cited into the present action as defendants: (1)
Spec Personnel, LLC, which also was identified separately as Special
Personnel, LLC; (2) JeanPaul D. Paez; (3) Philips North America, LLC;
(4) Philips Lighting North America Corporation; (5) Signify North
America Corporation; (6) C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.; (7) Venture
Properties, LLC; (8) A. Duie Pyle, Inc.; and (9) Randstad North America,
Inc. The plaintiffs withdrew their claims against all of the defendants,
except for Philips Lighting North America Corporation and Signify
North America Corporation, prior to the conclusion of trial.
The appeal form filed in this appeal identifies both Signify North
America Corporation and Philips Lighting North America Corporation
as the appellants; however, the principal appellate and reply briefs
identify a single appellant named “Signify North America Corporation
[formerly known as] Philips Lighting North America Corporation.”
The plaintiffs’ appellate brief likewise refers to a single appellant
named “Signify North America Corporation (formerly known as Philips
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

rendered following a jury verdict returned in favor of
the plaintiffs Juan Cruz (Juan) and Emily Cruz (Emily)2
on their respective claims of negligence and loss of con-
sortium in connection with severe workplace injuries
that Juan sustained when an approximately 1300 pound
packaged load of lights, sold and shipped to his employer
by the defendant, fell from a storage rack and onto him.
On appeal, the dispositive claim that the defendant raises
is that the court, in denying its postverdict motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, improperly con-
cluded that it owed, as a product shipper, a duty of care
that extended to Juan and the type of harm he suffered
in a postdelivery warehouse accident. We agree and,
accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.3
Lighting North America Corporation) . . . .” Additionally, (1) the ver-
dict form filed in the present action reflects that the jury returned its
verdict against a single defendant, “Philips Lighting North America
Corporation, now known as Signify North America Corporation,” (2)
postverdict motions filed in the present action were filed by “Signify
North America Corporation (including its predecessor Philips Light-
ing North America Corporation), and (3) the trial court, Rosen, J., in
denying the postverdict motions at issue, referred to the “defendant
Signify North America Corporation (formerly Philips Lighting North
America Corporation) . . . .” Thus, on the basis of the record, there
appears to be no dispute that there is a single entity that formerly
was known as Philips Lighting North America Corporation and now is
known as Signify North America Corporation. For ease of reference,
we (1) treat any references in the record to Philips Lighting North
America Corporation and to Signify North America Corporation to be
one and the same, (2) treat Signify North America Corporation as the
sole appellant in this appeal, and (3) refer to Signify North America
Corporation as the defendant.
2
The following parties commenced the present action as additional
plaintiffs: (1) AdaMaria Medina; and (2) Juan Cruz on behalf of (a)
Nathan Medina and (b) Jonathan Lopez. Those parties withdrew their
claims prior to trial. Additionally, shortly after the present action
had been commenced, Rexel USA Inc., formerly known as Rexel Hold-
ings USA Corp. (Rexel), Juan’s employer, was granted permission to
intervene as an additional plaintiff and to file an intervening complaint
seeking reimbursement for workers’ compensation benefits that it had
paid or would become obligated to pay to Juan. See General Statutes
§ 31-293. The claims involving Rexel are not germane to this appeal,
and Rexel is not participating in this appeal. For ease of reference, we
refer to Juan and Emily collectively as the plaintiffs and individually
by first name.
3
The defendant further claims that the court improperly denied its
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or its separate motion
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could
have found, and procedural history are relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. The defendant is in the busi-
ness of selling lighting products branded under its name.
On September 1, 2017, the defendant received at its
warehouse in Pennsylvania a sealed container holding
packaged loads of lights, which had been manufactured
and purchased in China. Thereafter, the defendant sold
a packaged load of lights weighing approximately 1300
pounds (lights) to Juan’s employer, Rexel USA Inc.,
formerly known as Rexel Holdings USA Corp. (Rexel),
which is a wholesale electrical distributor. On September
13, 2017, the defendant loaded the lights, together with
a pallet upon which the defendant had placed the lights,
onto a tractor trailer for shipment to Rexel’s warehouse
in Hartford. The lights were delivered to Rexel on Sep-
tember 14, 2017, and Rexel accepted the delivery that
same day. Following delivery, Rexel stored the lights,
along with the pallet upon which they sat but to which
they were not secured,4 on the top shelf of a storage rack
in the warehouse.
On September 19, 2017, Juan was working in the
aisle of the warehouse where the storage rack holding
the lights was located. Meanwhile, JeanPaul D. Paez,
who was employed by a temporary staffing agency and
assigned to work at Rexel, was working in an adjacent
aisle. While operating a reach truck to retrieve a product
situated on a storage rack in the adjacent aisle, Paez made
to set aside the verdict and for a new trial because (1) its conduct was
not a substantial factor that caused Juan’s injuries, (2) the court incor-
rectly instructed the jury on the issue of proximate causation, (3) the
court committed several harmful evidentiary errors, and (4) the jury’s
verdict depended on conjecture and was against the great weight of
the evidence. We need not reach these additional claims in light of our
resolution of the defendant’s dispositive duty of care claim on appeal.
4
At trial, the parties disputed whether the defendant had secured the
lights by stretch wrapping them to the pallet before shipping them to
Rexel. The defendant maintains on appeal that there was insufficient
evidence in the record to support a finding that it failed to stretch wrap
the lights to the pallet. As we explain later in this opinion, in resolving
the defendant’s duty of care claim, we will presume that the defendant
did not stretch wrap the lights to the pallet.
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

contact with the lights, whereupon they slid off from the
pallet and fell onto Juan. Juan sustained severe injuries
and became a paraplegic as a result of the incident.
The plaintiffs commenced the present action in 2018.
In the plaintiffs’ third amended complaint dated Sep-
tember 11, 2019, which was their operative complaint,
Juan alleged that his injuries were a direct and proximate
result of the defendant’s negligence and carelessness in
failing (1) to train and to adequately supervise its agents,
servants, apparent agents, and/or employees, and (2)
to ensure that pallets of its products were packed safely
and securely. Additionally, Emily asserted an attendant
claim of loss of consortium. On November 26, 2019, the
defendant filed an answer denying the plaintiffs’ material
allegations or leaving the plaintiffs to their proof. The
defendant also asserted two special defenses, alleging
that (1) Juan’s injuries were caused by Paez’ intervening
conduct and (2) the plaintiffs failed to state claims upon
which relief could be granted.
On September 13, 2021, the defendant filed a motion
for summary judgment claiming that it was not liable for
negligence because, inter alia, Juan’s workplace injuries
were not foreseeable, and, thus, it did not owe a duty
of care to Juan. On December 14, 2021, the trial court,
Budzik, J., denied the motion. In rejecting the defen-
dant’s foreseeability argument, the court reasoned that,
“[w]hile the specific facts of this case may be unusual . .
. the general nature of [Juan’s] injur[ies] [are] entirely
foreseeable. More specifically . . . it is foreseeable that a
pallet of lighting products might fall on someone if they
are not safely and securely packaged for transportation to
the warehouse, or for normal handling when they are in
the warehouse. . . . [I]t [also] is entirely foreseeable that
[the defendant’s] lighting products might be placed on
an upper storage shelf (or any elevated position) in the
warehouse, as opposed to exclusively on the floor of the
warehouse.”
The case was tried to a jury over the course of three
weeks between September 13 and October 5, 2022. The
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

jury heard testimony from various witnesses, including
the plaintiffs and S. Paul Singh, Ph.D., the plaintiffs’
expert witness in packaging, transportation of material,
and handling, and the court, Rosen, J., admitted various
exhibits into the record.
Following the close of evidence, the court charged the
jury in relevant part as follows: “This is a negligence
case. Negligence is the violation of a legal duty to use
reasonable care under the circumstances. Reasonable
care is the care that a reasonably prudent person would
use in the same circumstances. In determining the care
that a reasonably prudent person would use in the same
circumstances, you should consider all of the circum-
stances which were known or should have been known
to the defendant at the time of the conduct in question.
Whether care is reasonable depends upon the dangers
that a reasonable person would perceive in those circum-
stances. It is common sense that the more dangerous
the circumstances, the greater the care that ought to
be exercised. . . .
“Negligence is a proximate cause of an injury if it was a
substantial factor in bringing the injury or harm about.
In other words, if the defendant’s negligence contributed
materially and not just in a trivial or inconsequential
manner to the production of the injury or harm, then
the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor. . . .
“To prove that an injury is a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of negligent conduct, the plaintiffs need not
prove that the defendant actually foresaw or should have
foreseen the extent of the harm suffered or the manner
in which it occurred. Instead, the plaintiffs must prove
that it is a harm of the same general nature as that which
a reasonably prudent person in the defendant’s position
should have anticipated, in view of what the defendant
knew or should have known at the time of the negligent
conduct.”5
5
The court further instructed the jury that the defendant “has denied
that it was negligent and contends that [Rexel] was the sole proximate
cause of [Juan’s] injuries; that is, that Rexel’s alleged negligence was
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

On October 5, 2022, the jury returned a verdict in favor
of the plaintiffs, which the court accepted the same day.
The jury answered interrogatories as part of the verdict,
finding that (1) the defendant (a) failed to adequately
supervise its agents, servants, or employees and (b) failed
to ensure that pallets of its products were packed safely
and securely, but (c) it did not fail to train its agents, ser-
vants, or employees, (2) the defendant’s negligence was a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries and losses, and
(3) the plaintiffs’ economic and noneconomic damages
totaled $100 million. The jury further found that (1) Paez
was negligent and (2) Paez’ negligence was a proximate
cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries.6 The jury apportioned
90 percent of the total negligence to the defendant and
the remaining 10 percent to Paez, such that the plain-
tiffs were awarded $90 million in damages against the
defendant. Subsequently, in granting in part a motion
for remittitur filed by the defendant, the court reduced
the plaintiffs’ damages to $41,859,072.98, which remit-
titur the plaintiffs accepted. The court later awarded
the plaintiffs (1) $1,844,092.86 in offer of compromise
interest pursuant to General Statutes § 52-192a (c) and
(2) postjudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes
§ 37-3b (a) at a rate of 7 percent per annum.
On November 23, 2022, the defendant filed a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,7 claiming in
relevant part that it did not owe a duty of care to Juan in
connection with Juan’s workplace injuries because (1) the
injuries were “directly caused by numerous unforeseeable
the only substantial factor causing [Juan’s] injuries. . . . If you find that
[the defendant] has shown that Rexel was the sole proximate cause of
[Juan’s] injuries, you must then render a verdict in [the defendant’s]
favor.”
6
Spec Personnel, LLC, the staffing agency that assigned Paez to work
at Rexel, was identified as an apportionment party alongside Paez;
however, the jury found that the defendant had failed to demonstrate
that Spec Personnel, LLC, was negligent and that such negligence was
a proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries and losses.
7
On September 27, 2022, after the plaintiffs had notified the court
on the record that they were resting their case-in-chief, the defendant
orally moved for a directed verdict, inter alia, on the ground that it owed
no duty of care to Juan. The court reserved its decision on the motion.
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

acts of negligence” by Rexel’s employees, including their
failure to inspect and to store the lights properly, as
well as by Paez, and (2) imposing a duty “on product
shippers [like the defendant] . . . to anticipate or to hold
them responsible for accidents in customer warehouses
resulting from the customer’s unforeseeable negligence
or failure to implement and follow safety protocols”
would violate public policy. On December 19, 2022, the
plaintiffs filed an objection, and, on December 30, 2022,
the defendant filed a reply memorandum. The court heard
argument on the motion on January 4, 2023.
On April 26, 2023, the court denied the defendant’s
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.8 The
court rejected the defendant’s contention that it did not
owe a duty of care to Juan with respect to Juan’s work-
place injuries, determining that (1) the harm sustained
by Juan was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
the defendant’s presumed failure to secure the lights to
the pallet9 and (2) imposing a duty of care on the defen-
dant would not be inconsistent with public policy. This
amended appeal followed.10 Additional facts and proce-
dural history will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant’s dispositive claim on appeal is that the
court, in denying its motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict, improperly concluded that it owed a
duty of care to Juan to protect against Juan’s workplace
injuries by stretch wrapping the lights to the pallet before
8
The court also denied the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict
and for a new trial, which it filed alongside its motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
9
Later in its decision, the court rejected the defendant’s claim that
there was insufficient evidence regarding the condition of the lights
when they left the defendant’s custody such that, as the defendant
posited, the jury relied on speculation to conclude that the defendant
did not properly secure the lights to the pallet.
10
The defendant’s original appeal was taken from the judgment
rendered on the jury’s verdict following the court’s rulings on the
defendant’s postverdict motions and the plaintiffs’ acceptance of the
remittitur. The defendant subsequently filed an amended appeal to
encompass the court’s awards of offer of compromise interest and
postjudgment interest.
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

shipping them to Rexel. Assuming that the evidence
was sufficient to demonstrate that it failed to secure
the lights to the pallet, the defendant contends that
it owed no duty of care to Juan with respect to Juan’s
workplace injuries because (1) as a matter of law, Juan’s
workplace injuries were not a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of its presumed failure to secure the lights
to the pallet, and (2) even if Juan’s workplace injuries
were reasonably foreseeable, imposing a duty of care on
it under the circumstances of the present action would
violate public policy. The plaintiffs counter that the
court correctly determined that the defendant owed a
duty of care to Juan because (1) Juan’s workplace injuries
were a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s
presumed conduct and (2) concluding that the defendant
owed a duty of care would not contravene public policy.
For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendant
that it did not owe a duty of care to Juan because Juan’s
injuries were not a reasonably foreseeable result of its
presumed conduct.11
We begin by setting forth the governing standard of
review and applicable legal principles. “The standard for
appellate review of the denial of a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is well settled and mir-
rors the standard applicable to a motion for a directed
verdict. Directed verdicts are not favored. . . . A trial
court should direct a verdict only when a jury could not
reasonably and legally have reached any other conclu-
sion. . . . In reviewing the trial court’s decision [to deny
the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict] we must
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. . . . Although it is the jury’s right to draw
11
Because we agree with the defendant that no duty of care arose on
the basis that Juan’s workplace injuries were not reasonably foreseeable,
we need not address its alternative assertion that imposing a duty of
care would violate public policy. See Dushay v. Southern Connecticut
Hockey League, LLC, 234 Conn. App. 609, 624 n.9, 344 A.3d 175 (2025)
(“[b]ecause we determine that there is no duty of care on the basis of
our conclusion that the harm was not reasonably foreseeable, it is not
necessary to analyze the second prong of the test by undertaking a
public policy analysis”).
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

logical deductions and make reasonable inferences from
the facts proven . . . it may not resort to mere conjecture
and speculation. . . . A directed verdict is justified if . .
. the evidence is so weak that it would be proper for the
court to set aside a verdict rendered for the other party.
. . . The foregoing standard of review also governs the
trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict because that motion
is not a new motion, but [is] the renewal of [the previous]
motion for a directed verdict.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Cockayne v. Bristol Hospital, Inc., 210 Conn.
App. 450, 458, 270 A.3d 713, cert. denied, 343 Conn.
906, 272 A.3d 1128 (2022).
“The essential elements of a cause of action in negli-
gence are well established: duty; breach of that duty;
causation; and actual injury. . . . Contained within the
first element, duty, there are two distinct considerations.
. . . First, it is necessary to determine the existence of
a duty, and [second], if one is found, it is necessary to
evaluate the scope of that duty. . . . We sometimes refer
to the scope of that duty as the requisite standard of
care.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Osborn v.
Waterbury, 333 Conn. 816, 825, 220 A.3d 1 (2019). “A
duty to use care may arise from a contract, from a stat-
ute, or from circumstances under which a reasonable
person, knowing what he knew or should have known,
would anticipate that harm of the general nature of
that suffered was likely to result from his act or failure
to act.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bifolck v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 324 Conn. 402, 443, 152 A.3d 1183
(2016). “Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the
court, and only if the court finds that such a duty exists
does the trier of fact consider whether that duty was
breached. . . . If a court determines, as a matter of law,
that a defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff, the plain-
tiff cannot recover in negligence from the defendant.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Raspberry Junction Holding, LLC v. Southeastern Con-
necticut Water Authority, 340 Conn. 200, 210–11, 263
A.3d 796 (2021).
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

“[T]he test for the existence of a legal duty of care
entails (1) a determination of whether an ordinary person
in the defendant’s position, knowing what the defendant
knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm
of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result,
and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy
analysis, of whether the defendant’s responsibility for its
negligent conduct should extend to the particular conse-
quences or particular plaintiff in the case. . . . The first
part of the test invokes the question of foreseeability, and
the second part invokes the question of policy.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) McFarline v. Mickens, 177
Conn. App. 83, 92, 173 A.3d 417 (2017), cert. denied,
327 Conn. 997, 176 A.3d 557 (2018).
“Duty is a legal conclusion about relationships between
individuals, made after the fact, and imperative to a
negligence cause of action. The nature of the duty, and
the specific persons to whom it is owed, are determined
by the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the
individual. . . . Foreseeability is a critical factor in the
analysis, because no duty exists unless an ordinary person
in the defendant’s position, knowing what the defendant
knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm
of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result
. . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Raspberry
Junction Holding, LLC v. Southeastern Connecticut
Water Authority, supra, 340 Conn. 211. “[O]ur threshold
inquiry has always been whether the specific harm alleged
by the plaintiff was foreseeable to the defendant. . . .
By that is not meant that one charged with negligence
must be found actually to have foreseen the probability
of harm or that the particular injury which resulted was
foreseeable, but the test is, would the ordinary [person]
in the defendant’s position, knowing what he knew or
should have known, anticipate that harm of the general
nature of that suffered was likely to result? . . . The idea
of risk in this context necessarily involves a recognizable
danger, based upon some knowledge of the existing facts,
and some reasonable belief that harm may possibly follow.
. . . Accordingly, the fact finder must consider whether
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

the defendant knew, or should have known, that the
situation at hand would obviously and naturally, even
though not necessarily, expose [the plaintiff] to probable
injury unless preventive measures were taken.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Osborn v. Waterbury, supra,
333 Conn. 825–26.
“[T]he analysis of foreseeability logically cannot be
extended so far that the term general harm incorporates
any accident . . . with no consideration given to the direct
cause of the accident. It is impractical, if not impossible,
to separate the question of duty from an analysis of the
cause of the harm when the duty is asserted against
one who is not the direct cause of the harm. In defining
the limits of duty, we have recognized that [w]hat is
relevant . . . is the . . . attenuation between [the defen-
dant’s] conduct, on the one hand, and the consequences
to and the identity of the plaintiff, on the other hand.
. . . Articulated another way, the attenuation between
[the plaintiff’s] harm and [the defendant’s] conduct is
nothing more than a determination of whether the harm
was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the [defen-
dant’s] conduct. It is a well established tenet of our tort
jurisprudence that [d]ue care does not require that one
guard against eventualities which at best are too remote
to be reasonably foreseeable. . . . [A] defendant [is] not
required to take precautions against hazards [that are]
too remote to be reasonably foreseeable. . . . Due care
is always predicated on the existing circumstances.”12
12
We note that there is an inevitable overlap that exists concerning the
legal principles of duty of care, which is at issue on appeal, and proximate
cause. As our Supreme Court has explained, “when a defendant claims
that an independent intervening force superseded his own negligence,
‘the question of legal causation is practically indistinguishable from
an analysis of the extent of the tortfeasor’s duty to the plaintiff.’ . .
. Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, [315 Conn. 320, 345, 107 A.3d 381
(2015)]. This is so because, in determining whether a duty exists, ‘our
threshold inquiry has always been whether the specific harm alleged
by the plaintiff was foreseeable to the defendant’ . . . Mirjavadi v.
Vakilzadeh, 310 Conn. 176, 191, 74 A.3d 1278 (2013); which is the
same inquiry a jury makes in deciding whether a defendant’s actions
were the proximate cause of the harm. Id., 192. As [our Supreme Court],
quoting Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, has explained: ‘“[T]he
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

(Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., 246
Conn. 563, 574–75, 717 A.2d 215 (1998). “[I]t is well
established [however] that [t]he injury resulting from
the breach of duty need not be the direct or immediate
result of the wrongful act; if it is probable and a natural
result, that is according to the operations of natural laws,
it is enough. . . . The mere fact that the act of another
person concurs, cooperates or contributes, in any degree
whatever in producing the injury, is of no consequence . .
. . [I]n no case is the connection between an original act of
negligence and an injury actually broken if a [person] of
ordinary sagacity and experience, acquainted with all the
circumstances, could have reasonably anticipated that
the [direct cause of the harm] might, not improbably but
in the natural and ordinary course of things, follow his
act of negligence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 315 Conn. 320, 346,
107 A.3d 381 (2015).
“Although, typically, [foreseeability] is a question of
fact for the jury . . . it becomes an issue of law for the
court if no reasonable fact finder could conclude that
the injury was within the foreseeable scope of the risk
such that the defendant should have recognized the risk
and taken precautions to prevent it. . . . In other words,
foreseeability becomes a conclusion of law . . . when . . .
a fair and reasonable [person] could reach only one conclu-
sion . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Brooks v. Powers, 328 Conn. 256, 273, 178
A.3d 366 (2018).
question whether there is a duty has most often seemed helpful in cases
[in which] the only issue is in reality whether the defendant stands in
any such relation to the plaintiff as to create any legally recognized
obligation of conduct for the plaintiff’s benefit. Or, reverting again to
the starting point, whether the interests of the plaintiff are entitled
to legal protection at the defendant’s hands against the invasion [that]
has in fact occurred. Or, again reverting, whether the conduct is the
‘proximate cause’ of the result. The circumlocution is unavoidable, since
all of these questions are, in reality, one and the same.” [W. Keeton et
al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th Ed. 1984)] § 42, p.
274; see also id., § 53, p. 358.’ ” Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc., 332
Conn. 720, 743 n.9, 212 A.3d 646 (2019).
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

In rejecting the defendant’s duty of care claim raised
in its postverdict motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, the court reasoned that “the plaintiffs . . .
presented expert testimony to the effect that the [lights]
would not have fallen had they been stretch wrapped to
the pallet. The defendant knew and understood that its
lighting products were required to be stretch wrapped to
the pallet, that the products that it shipped to [Rexel’s]
warehouse would be stored in the warehouse, includ-
ing on above-ground racking, and that a product that
was not properly secured could fall and injure someone.
Accordingly, the court finds that the harm to Juan . .
. was foreseeable. See Pisel v. Stamford Hospital, 180
Conn. 314, 333, 430 A.2d 1 (1980) (‘so long as harm of
the general nature as that which occurred is foreseeable
there is a basis for liability even though the manner in
which the accident happens is unusual, bizarre or unfore-
seeable’).” (Footnote omitted.) Later in its decision, the
court further stated that “the defendant shipped a 1300
pound pallet of lighting products knowing that it was at
least reasonably foreseeable that they would be stored
in a warehouse and could fall if not properly stretch
wrapped to the pallet.”
The defendant asserts on appeal that, as a matter of
law, Juan’s workplace injuries were not a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of its presumed failure to stretch
wrap the lights to the pallet for two reasons. First, the
defendant concedes that it “had a duty [to secure its prod-
ucts] to protect against accidents that might occur in the
normal course of shipment”; (emphasis in original); such
as injuries caused by an unsecured load to workers dur-
ing loading or to motorists during transit; however, as
the defendant posits, the unsecured lights did not cause
any injuries during the shipping and delivery process,
and “[Juan’s] workplace accident does not come close to
a normal and natural consequence of a shipping error.”
The defendant contends that, following delivery of the
lights, (1) “it was Rexel’s duty to safely inspect, handle,
and store the [lights] and to operate a safe warehouse,”
and (2) the defendant maintained no control over the
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

lights or Rexel’s handling thereof, such that it could
not be expected to foresee new zones of harm created by
Rexel following delivery. Thus, the defendant argues
that “the reasonably foreseeable zone of risk associated
with preparing a package for shipment does not—even
at its outermost bounds—extend to accidents involving
the package several days after delivery. The law does not
allow the [plaintiffs] to extend the zone of risk to a com-
pletely different place, time, and set of circumstances.”
(Emphasis in original.) In short, the defendant maintains
that “[Juan’s] workplace accident, five days after delivery
[of the lights], was not within the zone of risk that [the
defendant’s] supposed shipping error created.”
Second, assuming that its duty of care survived beyond
Rexel’s acceptance of the lights following delivery, the
defendant asserts that its presumed failure to stretch
wrap the lights to the pallet was an “indirect and rela-
tively remote” contribution to Juan’s injuries, whereas
the unforeseeable third-party negligence of Rexel and
Paez after the lights were delivered to and accepted by
Rexel was the “direct cause” of the injuries. The defen-
dant asserts that, notwithstanding testimony adduced
at trial reflecting that Rexel (1) inspected all packages
arriving at its warehouse for damage, (2) had the ability
to rewrap unsecured packages prior to handling and stor-
ing them, and (3) would not place unsecured packages on a
storage rack, Rexel stored the unsecured lights on the top
shelf of a storage rack, which created an “ ‘unexpected’ ”
danger that was not a normal and natural consequence
of the defendant’s conduct. With respect to Paez, the
defendant contends that it was “far from normal” for
Paez to engage in negligent conduct, particularly in
his operation of the reach truck prior to the incident.
Moreover, the defendant maintains that the plaintiffs
failed to adduce evidence at trial reflecting that the
defendant “knew or reasonably should have known of
Rexel’s unsafe workplace and Paez’ unsafe operation of
a reach truck . . . .”
In response, the plaintiffs argue that Juan’s work-
place injuries were a reasonably foreseeable result of the
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

defendant’s presumed failure to stretch wrap the lights
to the pallet. The plaintiffs maintain that “[Juan’s]
injuries, and [the] harm of the general nature suffered,
were foreseeable because they are an anticipated conse-
quence of defective product packaging and warehouse
operations” and that “[i]t is simply not any great leap to
anticipate that an unsecured product might slip from its
pallet and injure someone.” The plaintiffs also maintain
that, under the applicable law, any third-party negligence
by Rexel “does not eliminate the defendant’s negligent
conduct.”13
Preliminarily, we emphasize that, on the basis of the
parties’ respective appellate briefs, there is no dispute
13
The plaintiffs also maintain that the defendant, in essence, is
attempting to apply the doctrine of superseding cause, which doctrine,
pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in Barry v. Quality Steel
Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 446, 820 A.2d 258 (2003), has been
“abrogated . . . in most tort contexts.” Sapko v. State, 305 Conn. 360,
363, 44 A.3d 827 (2012); see also Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.,
332 Conn. 720, 748–50, 212 A.3d 646 (2019) (“In light of the signifi-
cant changes to our tort system implemented by tort reform . . . [our
Supreme Court] determined in Barry that the doctrine of superseding
cause no longer serves a useful purpose in our jurisprudence when a
defendant claims that a subsequent negligent act by a third party cuts
off its own liability for the plaintiff’s injuries. [In such] circumstances,
superseding cause instructions serve to complicate what is fundamen-
tally a proximate cause analysis. . . . [B]ecause our statutes allow for
apportionment among negligent defendants . . . and because Connecticut
is a comparative negligence jurisdiction . . . the simpler and less confus-
ing approach to cases . . . [in which] the jury must determine which,
among many, causes contributed to the [plaintiff’s] injury, is to couch
the analysis in proximate cause rather than allowing the defendants to
raise a defense of superseding cause. . . .
“
In reaching [its] determination in Barry, [our Supreme Court]
expressly limited [its] holding to cases in which a defendant claims
that its tortious conduct is superseded by a subsequent negligent act
or there are multiple acts of negligence, stating that our decision did
not necessarily affect those cases [in which] the defendant claims that
an unforeseeable intentional tort, force of nature, or criminal event
supersedes its tortious conduct. . . . Later, [our Supreme Court] made
clear that [its] holding in Barry did not affect those types of cases.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)) We do not
construe the defendant as asserting a claim premised on the doctrine
of superseding cause; rather, the defendant properly frames its claim
in terms of foreseeability.
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

that the defendant maintained a duty to stretch wrap
the pallets of products that it shipped to Rexel. Indeed,
the parties executed a stipulation, which was admitted
into evidence, providing in relevant part that, “[p]rior
to September 19, 2017, [the defendant] was aware of
[Rexel’s] shipping requirements, which stated that [the
defendant] was required to ‘palletize and stretch wrap
all shipments’ sent to [Rexel].” The dispositive issue on
appeal, then, is whether the scope of that duty extended
to protect against Juan’s workplace injuries.
In addressing the defendant’s claim regarding fore-
seeability, we consider our Supreme Court’s decision in
Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., supra, 246 Conn. 563, to be
instructive. In Lodge, while responding to a false fire
alarm, several firefighters were injured or killed when
their fire engine crashed into a tree following a brake fail-
ure caused by negligent maintenance. Id., 567–70. Two
injured firefighters, the representatives of the estates of
two deceased firefighters, and three of the firefighters’
spouses (plaintiff firefighters) commenced an action
alleging that the companies that had transmitted the
false alarm (defendant companies) were liable for the
plaintiff firefighters’ injuries as a result of the defendant
companies’ negligent transmission of the false alarm to
which the firefighters had responded. Id., 566–67, 570.
Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff firefighters. Id., 567. The defendant companies
appealed from the judgment rendered on the verdict to
this court, whereupon our Supreme Court transferred
the appeal to itself pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199
(c). Id.
On appeal, our Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s
judgment, concluding that the defendant companies
did not owe the plaintiff firefighters a duty of care to
prevent the harm suffered. Id., 578. Our Supreme Court
determined that, “[n]otwithstanding the retrospective
foreseeability of the possibility of the engine’s brake
failure, we agree with the [defendant companies] that
the harm suffered by the [plaintiff firefighters] qualifies
under the category of an unforeseeable consequence.
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

Liability may not be imposed merely because it might
have been foreseeable that some accident could have
occurred; rather, liability attaches only for reasonably
foreseeable consequences. . . . We conclude that the brake
failure of a negligently maintained fire engine is beyond
the scope of the reasonably foreseeable risks created by
the transmission of a false alarm and that legal responsi-
bility for the resulting accident should not extend to [the
defendant companies].” (Citations omitted; emphasis in
original.) Id., 577. Our Supreme Court observed that “the
analysis of foreseeability logically cannot be extended so
far that the term general harm incorporates any accident
involving a fire engine responding to a false alarm with no
consideration given to the direct cause of the accident.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 574. Although
positing that, in some situations, imposing liability on
the initiator of a negligently transmitted false alarm in
connection with accidents involving emergency respond-
ers might be reasonable, our Supreme Court determined
that “[i]t cannot reasonably be said . . . that liability
for negligently causing a false alarm should include
the risk that the emergency vehicle will be negligently
maintained and utilized, causing it to experience brake
failure. Imposing liability on the [defendant companies]
for a harm that they reasonably could not be expected
to anticipate and over which they had no control would
serve no legitimate objective of the law.” Id., 577–78. As
our Supreme Court concluded: “In every case in which a
defendant’s negligent conduct may be remotely related
to a plaintiff’s harm, the courts must draw a line, beyond
which the law will not impose legal liability. Although
that line is often amorphous and difficult to discern,
we conclude that it has been crossed in this case. The
possibility that a city would so negligently maintain
its vehicles and that firefighters would operate a fire
engine, the mechanical soundness of which was clearly
in doubt, is sufficiently remote that a reasonable person
should not be expected to anticipate such an event. To
hold otherwise would be to convert the imperfect vision
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

of reasonable foreseeability into the perfect vision of
hindsight.”14 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 578.
Guided by the rationale of Lodge,15 we conclude that no
reasonable fact finder could find that Juan’s workplace
injuries were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
the defendant’s presumed failure to secure the lights
to the pallet, such that, as a matter of law, we resolve
the issue of foreseeability in the defendant’s favor. See
Brooks v. Powers, supra, 328 Conn. 273. In a vacuum,
failing to secure the lights to the pallet unquestionably
increased the foreseeable risk that the lights could fall
from the pallet and injure someone; however, as Lodge
instructs, “the analysis of foreseeability logically cannot
14
Our Supreme Court further determined that public policy did not
support the imposition of a duty of care on the defendant companies.
Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., supra, 246 Conn. 578–86.
15
In concluding that Juan’s workplace injuries were foreseeable, the
trial court addressed, and distinguished, Lodge. The trial court observed
that, in Munn v. Hotchkiss School, 24 F. Supp. 3d 155 (D. Conn. 2014),
aff’d, 724 Fed. Appx. 25 (2d Cir. 2018), the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut interpreted Lodge’s holding to
be “fundamentally concerned with cause in fact, not the scope of duty.
. . . Although [our Supreme] Court framed the [plaintiff firefighters’]
harm as ‘too remote’ from the [defendant companies’] conduct to require
liability, ‘remote’ was used to describe the closeness of the relationship
between the [plaintiff firefighters’] harm and the [defendant compa-
nies’] conduct, not to refer to the probability, or improbability, of that
harm occurring. . . . Ultimately, [our Supreme] Court indicated that
the [plaintiff firefighters] had sued the wrong defendant, not that the
anticipated harm was unforeseeable if liability were asserted against
another defendant under the same circumstances.” (Citations omitted.)
Id., 175–76. The trial court, in turn, stated that “Lodge . . . involved
[firefighters] performing an act that they would not have performed but
for the [defendant companies’] negligence, during which [the firefight-
ers] sustained injuries. . . . [T]he injury [in Lodge] would have occurred
if the [firefighters] were performing the action regardless of the reason;
the fire [engine’s] brakes would have failed even if the firefighters were
responding to a real emergency . . . . Thus, the injuries in Lodge . . .
were not foreseeable.” On the basis of our reading of Lodge, however,
Lodge plainly and expressly addressed the issue of duty and whether,
under the circumstances of that case, the plaintiff firefighters’ injuries
were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant companies’
negligent transmission of the false fire alarm. Thus, we disagree with
the trial court’s determination that Lodge does not support the defen-
dant’s duty of care claim.
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

be extended so far that the term ‘general harm’ incor-
porates any accident . . . with no consideration given to
the direct cause of the accident.” Lodge v. Arett Sales
Corp., supra, 246 Conn. 574. In the present case, we can-
not reasonably conclude that the risk stemming from the
defendant’s presumed failure to secure the lights to the
pallet encompassed (1) Rexel accepting the delivery of the
unsecured lights and—notwithstanding uncontroverted
testimony in the record that Rexel would (a) inspect
delivered products and (b) not store products that were
“dangerous” or “not safe” on their storage racks16—plac-
ing the unsecured lights on the top shelf of a storage
rack, and (2) Paez, several days after the lights had been
delivered to and accepted by Rexel, engaging in negligent
conduct that contributed to the lights falling onto Juan,
as found by the jury.17 Under these circumstances, “a
[person] of ordinary sagacity and experience, acquainted
with all the circumstances”; (internal quotation marks
omitted) Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, supra, 315
Conn. 346; could not “have reasonably anticipated that
the [direct cause of the harm, namely, the conduct of
Rexel and Paez] might, not improbably but in the natu-
16
Robert Kelly, the warehouse manager of Rexel’s warehouse in Hart-
ford at the time of the incident, testified that Rexel would not place
anything “dangerous” on a storage rack but, rather, “[Rexel would] fix
it.” Claudio Solano, a receiving supervisor for Rexel’s warehouse at the
time of the incident, testified that, if a product delivered and placed
on the loading dock was “not safe, [then] it [would not] get put up on
[a storage] rack.” Kelly and Solano further testified that Rexel had a
stretch wrap machine at the warehouse that, if needed, could be used
to add additional stretch wrap to products.
17
The court’s charge to the jury included the following instructions:
“[The defendant] claims that the plaintiffs’ injuries were a direct and
proximate result of the negligence and carelessness of . . . Paez, in one
or more of the following ways in that he, one, failed to clear adjacent
aisles of Rexel or Spec [Personnel, LLC] employees prior to lifting the
pallet; two, did not ensure that adjacent aisles were clear of Rexel or
Spec [Personnel, LLC] employees before he operated the forklift; and,
three, failed to inspect the pallet of lighting products to ensure that the
load was properly secured to the pallet.” In the interrogatory responses
accompanying the jury’s verdict, the jury found that (1) Paez was neg-
ligent and (2) Paez’ negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs’
injuries and losses.
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

ral and ordinary course of things, follow [the] act of
negligence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In
short, we conclude that the possibility that Rexel and
Paez would engage in the aforementioned conduct after
the lights had been delivered to and accepted by Rexel “is
sufficiently remote that a reasonable person should not be
expected to anticipate such an event. To hold otherwise
would be to convert the imperfect vision of reasonable
foreseeability into the perfect vision of hindsight.”18
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lodge v. Arett Sales
Corp., supra, 246 Conn. 578; cf. Ruiz v. Victory Proper-
ties, LLC, supra, 336 (injuries to child caused by another
child dropping piece of concrete taken from backyard
of defendant landlord’s apartment building were “suf-
ficiently foreseeable that it was inappropriate for the
trial court to foreclose the foreseeability question as a
matter of law” when defendant landlord did “not dispute
that the risk of harm created by its failure to remove the
buckets, trash, broken concrete pieces and other debris
from the backyard was that children playing in the area
might trip on them or throw them at other children,”
and “unusual manner” in which injuries were sustained
did not “alter [the] fundamental fact” that the injuries
“[fell] squarely along the [expected] continuum of harm”).
We briefly note that Pisel v. Stamford Hospital, supra,
180 Conn. 314, which the court cited in determining that
Juan’s workplace injuries were foreseeable, does not mili-
tate against our conclusion that the defendant owed no
duty of care to protect against Juan’s workplace injuries.
In Pisel, while admitted as a patient in the defendant
hospital’s psychiatric unit, the decedent was found in
her room, unconscious, with no pulse, blood pressure, or
respiratory function, with her head wedged between the
side rail and the mattress of her bed. Id., 316–17. The
conservator of the decedent’s estate brought an action
18
We agree, in essence, with the defendant’s second subclaim in sup-
port of its assertion that Juan’s workplace injuries were not reasonably
foreseeable. As such, we need not delve into the merits of the defendant’s
first subclaim predicated on its contention that its presumed failure to
secure the lights to the pallet was a “shipping error” that could not form
the basis of liability for Juan’s workplace injuries.
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

against the defendant hospital for malpractice.19 Id.,
316. The jury returned a verdict against the defendant
hospital, which thereafter filed an appeal. Id. One of
the defendant hospital’s claims on appeal was that the
trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury that
the defendant hospital “could not be held liable for a
bizarre or unusual occurrence which it had no reason to
foresee . . . .” Id., 332. Our Supreme Court rejected this
claim, determining that “so long as harm of the general
nature as that which occurred is foreseeable there is a
basis for liability even though the manner in which the
accident happens is unusual, bizarre or unforeseeable.
. . . The foreseeability issue, put in proper perspective,
is not very complex. It was a jury question whether the
defendant [hospital] could have anticipated that harm
would come to the [decedent] from the steel frame bed
given all the factors which the defendant [hospital] knew
or should have known. The jury’s affirmative answer can-
not be disturbed.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 333. Later in
its decision, in addressing the issue of proximate cause,
our Supreme Court rejected the defendant hospital’s
separate argument that “it should not be liable for the
[decedent’s] injuries . . . because the injuries came about
in an unusual, unforeseeable manner”; id., 341; deter-
mining that “[u]nusual or bizarre results can become
a factor on the question of proximate cause, but only
when with the benefit of hindsight it appears highly
extraordinary that the actor’s negligent conduct should
have brought about the plaintiff’s injury. . . . Applying
that test to this case we do not find it extraordinary that
a psychotic patient who is delusional and whose view
of space and distance is distorted might wedge herself
between a mattress and a side rail in attempting either
to hurt herself or to extricate herself from what may
have appeared to her to be her place of confinement.”
(Citations omitted.) Id., 341–42.
Unlike in Pisel, the issue in this appeal is not whether
Juan’s workplace injuries came about in an “unusual,
19
The conservator also asserted a claim of malpractice against a doc-
tor, in favor of whom the jury returned a verdict. Pisel v. Stamford
Hospital, supra, 180 Conn. 316.
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

bizarre or unforeseeable” manner; id., 333; rather, the
issue before us is whether Juan’s workplace injuries were
a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s
presumed failure to secure the lights to the pallet when
taking into account the conduct of Rexel and Paez after
the lights had been delivered to and accepted by Rexel.
Put simply, Pisel does not undermine our resolution of
the defendant’s duty of care claim.
The plaintiffs advance three additional reasons to
support the imposition of a duty on the defendant. First,
the plaintiffs contend that, pursuant to the testimony of
their expert witness, Singh, the defendant’s presumed
failure to stretch wrap the lights to the pallet violated the
industry standard of care20 and “it was the defendant’s
responsibility to make sure that the design of the pack-
aging extended to the point of sale and down the supply
chain.” Assuming that Singh’s testimony, in fact, sup-
ports the plaintiffs’ proposition, such testimony has no
bearing on our conclusion that Juan’s workplace injuries
were not reasonably foreseeable in light of the conduct
of Rexel and Paez.
Second, the plaintiffs argue that the defendant owed
a duty of care to Juan on the basis of “the ongoing com-
mercial and business relationship between the defendant
and Rexel, [counterclaims that were filed in the present
action], and the standard terms and conditions between
Rexel and the defendant [in contracts that they executed]
. . . .” As the defendant notes in its reply brief and as the
parties recognized during argument on the defendant’s
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, no
contracts setting forth such terms and conditions were
20
“[E]vidence of custom in the trade may be admitted on the issue of
the standard of care, but it is not conclusive. . . . [I]n most cases rea-
sonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never
its measure . . . . Courts must in the end say what is required; there are
precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not
excuse their omission. . . . The trier of fact is not bound by the industry
standard, but rather should consider it in light of the totality of the
evidence presented in the case.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) McDermott v. State, 316 Conn. 601, 614–15, 113 A.3d
419 (2015).
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

entered into the evidentiary record during trial. In any
event, insofar as the plaintiffs advance their argument
by relying on contracts executed by the defendant and
Rexel, their “ongoing commercial and business relation-
ship,” or counterclaims filed in the present action, the
plaintiffs’ analysis is limited to two paragraphs with no
record citations or substantive legal analysis. In other
words, we conclude that the plaintiffs have abandoned
this issue as inadequately briefed. See Handsome, Inc. v.
Planning & Zoning Commission, 317 Conn. 515, 534 n.7,
119 A.3d 541 (2015) (“It is well established that [w]e are
not obligated to consider issues that are not adequately
briefed. . . . Issues are deemed inadequately briefed when
they are merely mentioned and not briefed beyond a bare
assertion . . . [and] when they . . . consist of conclusory
assertions . . . with no mention of relevant authority and
minimal or no citations from the record . . . .” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)).
Third, the plaintiffs claim that the defendant’s own
policies and procedures, as testified to by its warehouse
manager, Damian Fritz, support imposing a duty of care
on the defendant. At trial, Fritz testified that (1) it was
the defendant’s policy to secure outbound products to
shipping pallets, (2) products “need[ed] to be secured to a
pallet to secure in transportation,” and (3) people loading
and unloading products could get hurt if the products
were unsecured. We perceive nothing in Fritz’ testimony
that cuts against our conclusion that Juan’s workplace
injuries were not a reasonably foreseeable consequence
of the defendant’s presumed failure to stretch wrap the
lights to the pallet before it was shipped.
In sum, we conclude that, as a matter of law, Juan’s
workplace injuries were not a reasonably foreseeable con-
sequence of the defendant’s presumed failure to secure
the lights to the pallet. Accordingly, we further conclude
that the court, in denying the defendant’s postverdict
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
improperly determined that the defendant owed a duty
of care to protect against Juan’s workplace injuries.
Cruz v. Spec Personnel, LLC

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with
direction to grant the defendant’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and to render judgment for
the defendant.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.