In re Hunter T.

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In re Hunter T.

IN RE HUNTER T.*
(AC 49092)
Elgo, Wilson and Pellegrino, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the trial court’s judgment adjudicat-
ing his minor child neglected and committing the child to the custody of the
petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. The father claimed,
inter alia, that the court improperly determined that the commitment of the
child to the petitioner was in the child’s best interest. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that committing
the child to the custody of the petitioner, rather than the respondent father,
was in the child’s best interest, as the court could have reasonably relied on
its factual findings, including the fact that the father previously had been
convicted of risk of injury to a child in connection with a sexual offense and
was reported to have a moderate risk of reoffending, and those findings were
supported by the evidence in the record.

Argued February 9—officially released May 12, 2026**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Families
to adjudicate the respondents’ minor child neglected,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Hartford, Juvenile Matters, and tried to the court,
Hon. Stephen F. Frazzini, judge trial referee; judgment
adjudicating the minor child neglected and committing
him to the custody of the petitioner, from which the
respondent father appealed to this court. Affirmed.
David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(respondent father).
Timothy J. Holzman, assistant attorney general, with
whom were Elizabeth Lewis, assistant attorney general,
and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, and
*
In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes §§ 46b-
142 (b) and 54-86e and Practice Book § 79a-12, the full names of the
parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers
of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper
interest therein and upon order of the court.
**
May 12, 2026, the date that this decision was released as a slip opin-
ion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
In re Hunter T.

Nisa Khan, former assistant attorney general, for the
appellee (petitioner).
Josh Michtom, assigned counsel, for the minor child.

Opinion

ELGO, J. The respondent father, Sean T., appeals from
the judgment of the trial court adjudicating his minor
child, Hunter T., neglected and committing Hunter to the
custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children
and Families.1 On appeal, the respondent claims that the
court improperly determined that the commitment of
Hunter to the petitioner was in Hunter’s best interest.2
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant
to our resolution of this appeal. In 2017, the respondent
allegedly sexually assaulted his three year old niece.
Per the affidavit filed in support of his arrest warrant
application (arrest warrant affidavit),3 the victim stated
1
The propriety of the court’s adjudication of neglect is not at issue
on appeal.
The petition of neglect and order of temporary custody filed by the
petitioner also named the respondent mother, Tinaza B. She has not
appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and, accordingly, all
references to the respondent in this opinion are to Sean T. only.
2
Although the respondent in his appellate brief cites case law noting the
fundamental constitutional rights of parents to maintain the integrity
of the family and the constitutional limitations that exist whenever the
state interferes with the family, he makes no specific claim of any viola-
tion of his due process rights. We therefore do not consider those general
observations as distinct claims on appeal and decline to review them as
such. See In re Brianna C., 98 Conn. App. 797, 803–804 n.7, 912 A.2d
505 (2006) (declining to review general assertions of family integrity
and liberty interests as protected by due process clause of constitution
as distinct constitutional claim on appeal); see also In re Dynastie D.,
233 Conn. App. 662, 697 n.19, 341 A.3d 331 (“Claims are inadequately
briefed when they are merely mentioned and not briefed beyond a bare
assertion. . . . Claims are also inadequately briefed when they . . . con-
sist of conclusory assertions . . . with no mention of relevant authority
and minimal or no citations from the record . . . .” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)), cert. granted, 353 Conn. 905, 342 A.3d 239 (2025).
3
In his appellate reply brief, the respondent notes that the copy of the
arrest warrant affidavit contained in the petitioner’s appendix to her
appellate brief was not part of the record before the trial court, as the
In re Hunter T.

that the respondent had touched her breasts and genitals
and that the inside of her genitals “ ‘hurt,’ ” which sug-
gested penetration. The victim further indicated that the
sexual assault “occurred in a bedroom of her mother’s
residence,” and the victim stated that the respondent
had assaulted her while he “ ‘played zombies with her
. . . .’ ” At the time of the assault, the respondent was
living with the victim and her family. The respondent
subsequently was arrested and pleaded guilty to a reduced
charge of risk of injury to a child in violation of General
Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1).4 He was sentenced to eight years
of imprisonment, execution suspended, and three years
of probation. The respondent is the subject of a lifetime
protective order due to this incident.
Hunter was born in September 2018. In May 2025,
he lived with his mother, Tinaza B., and two younger
siblings, Riley B. and Noah F.5 On May 29, 2025, Riley
fell from a third-floor window in Tinaza’s home. Emer-
gency services responded and transported Riley to the
Connecticut Children’s Medical Center, where he was
diagnosed with a fractured spine. The Department of
Children and Families (department) received a critical
incident report due to Riley’s fall. Emergency services
record included only a redacted version of that affidavit. Our review of
the record confirms this. We therefore disregard those portions of the
petitioner’s appellate brief and appendix that contain improper mat-
ter. See Practice Book § 60-2 (reviewing court may, “on its own motion
. . . order improper matter stricken from a brief or appendix”); Simms
v. Zucco, 214 Conn. App. 525, 527 n.2, 280 A.3d 1226 (“[b]ecause our
review is confined to the record that was before the trial court, we shall
disregard those portions of the plaintiff’s appendix that do not conform
to the guidelines set forth in the rules of practice” (internal quotation
marks omitted)), cert. denied, 345 Conn. 919, 284 A.3d 982 (2022).
4
General Statutes § 53-21 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any person
who (1) wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the
age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or
limb of such child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to
be injured or the morals of such child are likely to be impaired, or does
any act likely to impair the health or morals of any such child . . . shall
be guilty of (A) a class C felony for a violation of subdivision (1) . . . of
this subsection . . . .”
5
The matters relating to Riley and Noah are not at issue in this appeal.
In re Hunter T.

described the unsafe and unsanitary living situation they
observed in Tinaza’s house to the department.
On June 2, 2025, the petitioner removed Hunter from
Tinaza’s custody on a ninety-six hour hold. On June 6,
2025, the petitioner obtained an ex parte order of tem-
porary custody on behalf of Hunter and filed a neglect
petition alleging that (1) Hunter was being denied proper
care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally
or morally, and (2) he was permitted to live in conditions,
circumstances or associations injurious to his well-being.
At the department’s request, the order of temporary
custody for Hunter was vested in the respondent. Per
the affidavit filed in support of the order of temporary
custody (social worker affidavit), the department initially
recommended that the order of temporary custody on
behalf of Hunter be vested in the respondent because
the department “assessed [the respondent] to be suitable
and worthy of caring for [Hunter]. [The respondent] has
appropriate housing,” and the respondent expressed a
willingness to ensure that Hunter’s immediate and long-
term needs are met. Significantly, although the social
worker affidavit referenced the respondent being the
subject of a lifetime protective order, it did not mention
the respondent’s conviction for risk of injury to a child.6
On June 20, 2025, counsel for Hunter filed an ex parte
emergency motion to transfer the order of temporary
custody from the respondent to the petitioner, based in
part on the arrest warrant affidavit and the respondent’s
subsequent conviction for risk of injury to a child. That
motion “contained information that [the respondent]
had been convicted . . . for risk of injury for a sexual
offense against a minor child; that he had been substan-
tiated by [the department] for sexual abuse; but had
then been successfully discharged after treatment by
the Center for Treatment of Problem Sexual Behavior
6
The social worker affidavit indicated that the respondent reported to
the department that “he was set up by his cousins to be murdered and
almost lost his life. He reported that he was arrested, and he beat the
charges. [The respondent] reported the lifetime order was put in place
because his cousins were concerned that he might retaliate.”
In re Hunter T.

and that his risk of reoffending was regard[ed] to be in
the moderate range.” The court granted the motion to
transfer and vested the order of temporary custody with
the petitioner, stating in relevant part that, “had that
information been disclosed . . . the [court] probably would
have [initially] vested the [order of temporary custody]
for [Hunter] in the [petitioner].”
On July 1, 2025, the department prepared a social
study in support of the neglect petition (social study).
Per the social study, the respondent had been arrested
on various charges relating to the sexual assault of a
minor, which were reduced to a charge of risk of injury to
a child.7 The respondent completed a sex offender evalu-
ation and treatment and successfully was discharged
from care. The respondent’s treatment provider reported
that the respondent’s reoffending risk was “in the mod-
erate range but explained that . . . is quite low.” The
respondent has engaged in individual therapy through
the Wheeler Clinic, where his therapist reported the
respondent has been an active participant and compliant
with attendance. The department, in the social study,
recommended that Hunter be committed to the care and
custody of the petitioner.
The joint hearing on the neglect petition and the
order of temporary custody occurred on July 9, 15 and
23, 2025.8 On the first day of the proceeding, the court
7
In response to the social study questionnaire, the respondent declined
to answer any questions regarding his criminal history because “the
court already has that on file” and “repeating it on a social study is
just a redundancy.”
8
At the preliminary hearing on the order of temporary custody, parent-
age of Hunter was confirmed. The respondent stated he did not intend
to contest the order of temporary custody, as it was at that time vested
in him, and he intended to stand silent on the adjudication of neglect.
Tinaza both contested the order of temporary custody and denied the
allegations of neglect. The court consolidated the hearing on the order
of temporary custody and the adjudication of neglect.
The order of temporary custody for Hunter was initially vested in the
respondent on June 6, 2025. Pursuant to an emergency motion filed
by Hunter’s counsel, the order of temporary custody for Hunter was
vested in the petitioner on June 20, 2025. After the petitioner rested
her case-in-chief in the neglect proceeding, the court ordered temporary
In re Hunter T.

informed the parties that it would proceed to the disposi-
tion of Hunter if there was an adjudication of neglect.
The court heard testimony from Doreen Parmentier,
an investigator with the department; Joseph Mwangi,
a social worker with the department; Chelsea James, a
social worker with the department; Officer Francesco
Barbagiovanni, the officer who prepared the arrest war-
rant affidavit; and Tinaza. In addition, a number of exhib-
its were admitted into evidence, including the redacted
arrest warrant affidavit, the social worker affidavit, and
the social study.
Relevant to this appeal, Tinaza testified, when ques-
tioned about the allegations contained in the arrest war-
rant affidavit, that Hunter currently plays the “zombie
game.” Tinaza’s testimony was admitted into evidence
without objection, and the respondent’s counsel did not
cross-examine Tinaza regarding her comment about
Hunter playing the “zombie game.”
The court noted that, according to Tinaza, Hunter has
“behavioral issues, is diagnosed with [attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder], and is in school based therapy .
. . .” The court also found that Hunter had thirty-seven
unexcused tardies and thirty-three unverified absences
from school during the 2024–2025 school year. The court
noted that three additional absences were not counted,
as they were considered excused absences due to a fam-
ily emergency.
The court first adjudicated Hunter neglected on the
basis of educational neglect, that he was being denied
proper care and attention, and he was being permitted
to live in conditions injurious to his well-being.9 The
court then determined that it would be in Hunter’s best
custody of Hunter to be vested in the respondent on July 9, 2025. After
the close of the neglect proceeding, the petitioner’s counsel and counsel
for Hunter argued that it would be in Hunter’s best interest to be com-
mitted to the care and custody of the petitioner. The respondent argued
that it would be in Hunter’s best interest to be placed with him under
protective supervision.
9
The propriety of the court’s adjudication of neglect is not at issue
on appeal. See footnote 1 of this opinion.
In re Hunter T.

interest to be committed to the custody of the petitioner.
This appeal followed.10
On appeal, the respondent claims that the court improp-
erly determined that the commitment of Hunter to the
custody of the petitioner was in his best interest. Specifi-
cally, the respondent argues that “there is no evidence
nor credible testimony from the entire record to support
the trial court’s decision and judgment.”11 We disagree.
“Neglect proceedings, under . . . [General Statutes]
§ 46b-129, are comprised of two parts, adjudication and
disposition . . . . The standard of proof applicable to
nonpermanent custody proceedings, such as neglect
proceedings, is a fair preponderance of the evidence.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Olivia W.,
223 Conn. App. 173, 183, 308 A.3d 571 (2024). “After
an adjudication of neglect, a court may (1) commit the
child to the [petitioner], (2) vest guardianship in a third
party or (3) permit the parent to retain custody with or
without protective supervision. . . . In determining the
disposition portion of the neglect proceeding, the court
must decide which of the various custody alternatives
are in the best interest of the child.” (Citation omitted.)
In re Brianna C., 98 Conn. App. 797, 804, 912 A.2d 505
(2006); see also General Statutes § 46b-129 (j) (2).
“[W]hen making the determination of what is in the
best interest of the child, [t]he authority to exercise the
judicial discretion under the circumstances revealed by
the finding is not conferred upon this court, but upon the
trial court, and . . . we are not privileged to usurp that
10
The attorney for Hunter has adopted the petitioner’s appellate brief.
11
Although the respondent claims that the court’s decision was “clearly
erroneous,” the respondent substantively argues that there was “no
evidence nor credible testimony from the entire record to support the
trial court’s decision and judgment.” The respondent does not claim
that any specific factual finding made by the court is clearly erroneous;
rather, he attacks the dispositional determination as a whole. As such,
we construe the respondent’s claim as one that challenges the propriety
of the court’s discretionary determination as to which disposition was
in Hunter’s best interest based on its factual findings, not as one that
challenges any of the court’s individual findings.
In re Hunter T.

authority or to substitute ourselves for the trial court.
. . . A mere difference of opinion or judgment cannot
justify our intervention. Nothing short of a conviction
that the action of the trial court is one which discloses a
clear abuse of discretion can warrant our interference.
. . . In determining whether there has been an abuse of
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could
reasonably conclude as it did. . . . To determine whether a
custodial placement is in the best interest of the child, the
court uses its broad discretion to choose a place that will
foster the child’s interest in sustained growth, develop-
ment, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of
[the child’s] environment.” (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Olivia W., supra, 223
Conn. App. 188–89; see also In re Anthony A., 112 Conn.
App. 643, 654, 963 A.2d 1057 (2009) (“We have stated
that when making the determination of what is in the
best interest of the child, [t]he authority to exercise the
judicial discretion under the circumstances revealed by
the finding is not conferred upon this court, but upon
the trial court, and . . . we are not privileged to usurp
that authority or to substitute ourselves for the trial
court. . . . [G]reat weight is given to the judgment of
the trial court because of [the court’s] opportunity to
observe the parties and the evidence. . . . [Appellate
courts] are not in a position to second-guess the opinions
of witnesses, professional or otherwise, nor the observa-
tions and conclusions of the [trial court] when they are
based on reliable evidence.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)); In re Haley B., 81 Conn. App. 62, 65, 838
A.2d 1006 (2004) (“Generally, questions of custodial
placement are resolved by a determination of what is
in the best interest of the child . . . as shown by a fair
preponderance of the evidence. . . . The trial court is
vested with broad discretion in determining what is in
the child’s best [interest].” (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.)).
During the dispositional phase, the court acknowl-
edged that the department’s witnesses “testified that
[they] saw and found no imminent harm to [Hunter]
In re Hunter T.

from being placed with [the respondent] on the [order of
temporary custody]” and that the social study reported
that “ ‘Hunter and [the respondent] appear to have a
good relationship, and there were never any concerns
observed.’ ” The court nevertheless determined that it
would not be in Hunter’s best interest to be placed with
the respondent in light of the arrest warrant affidavit,
the respondent’s prior conviction for risk of injury to a
child, and Tinaza’s testimony.
Specifically, the court found that the “arrest warrant
affidavit . . . provides additional concerning information
beyond the fact of a prior conviction for a heinous offense,
as the arrest warrant affidavit mentions that the minor
female victim mentioned [that the respondent] play[ed]
zombies with her and touch[ed] her genitalia. From [that]
evidence, it’s not possible to ascertain whether the so-
called zombies game is an aspect of child sexual abuse
or an innocent game.” The court noted the respondent’s
conviction and subsequent therapeutic interventions
and opined that, although the evidence may suggest
the respondent has rehabilitated, it had concerns. Spe-
cifically, the court found it to be “extremely concerning
as [Tinaza] testified on the last day of trial, after [the]
release of the [arrest warrant] affidavit disclosing the
zombie game claim with the victim, that Hunter had told
her that [the respondent] plays zombies with him.” The
court also found that, “[b]ut for [Tinaza’s] testimony on
that last day, the court could and would find that it was
in Hunter’s best interest for protective supervision to be
vested in [the respondent] now. But the court cannot . . .
make that finding now in view of [Tinaza’s] testimony,
which requires further assessment.” The court noted
credibility concerns with Tinaza’s testimony as a whole
and that no evidence existed that Hunter reported being
sexually abused by the respondent. The court neverthe-
less concluded that, “if playing zombie games is incident
to child sexual abuse, as suggested by the arrest warrant
affidavit, such facts would negate [the respondent] as a
safe and suitable placement for Hunter on an ongoing
basis.”
In re Hunter T.

The court further found that Hunter “has behavioral
problems, and he’s been seeing a school based counselor.
. . . It’s clearly in Hunter’s best interest to be enrolled in
regular therapy both to help address his behavior prob-
lems and . . . to provide a safe place where concerns may
be assessed regarding [Tinaza’s] statement about Hunter
disclosing playing zombie games with [the respondent].
The court does not have the professional expertise to
determine whether such an assessment could [or] should
occur in the context of ongoing therapy or in a clinical
forensic interview, nor has evidence been offered on that
question to allow the court to make a decision based on
the evidence. But until such time as the question regard-
ing [Tinaza’s] allegation of Hunter disclosing playing
zombie . . . games with [the respondent] can be assessed
and refuted as an indicator of possible abuse, it cannot
be found to be in Hunter’s best interest being placed with
[the respondent]. Based on this lack of information, the
court cannot find at this time that it’s in Hunter’s best
interest to be placed with [the respondent].” The court
thereafter determined it to be in Hunter’s best interest
to be committed to the care and custody of the petitioner.
Upon our careful review of the record, we conclude
that the court reasonably determined that it was in
Hunter’s best interest to commit him to the custody
of the petitioner. In support of this determination, the
court found that (1) Hunter suffers from behavioral
problems that require counseling, (2) Hunter has been
educationally neglected, and some of his recorded school
absences occurred when in the respondent’s care, (3)
notwithstanding the evidence of the respondent’s reha-
bilitation, the social study recorded him at a “ ‘moderate
risk’ ” of reoffending, which is considered a “low risk for
reoffending,” (4) there existed evidence in the record to
suggest that the “zombies” game is a method for child
sex abuse, (5) Hunter plays the “zombies” game with the
respondent, and (6) the court noted that no party prof-
fered evidence to allow it to fully evaluate whether the
“zombies” game Hunter plays puts him at risk of sexual
abuse. These findings were supported by evidence in the
record, including, but not limited to, the arrest warrant
In re Hunter T.

affidavit, the respondent’s conviction, the social worker
affidavit, the social study, school attendance records,
Barbagiovanni’s testimony, and Tinaza’s testimony,
and such evidence entered the record uncontroverted.12
Moreover, the court could have reasonably relied on these
findings to determine that committing Hunter to the
petitioner’s custody was in his best interest.13 In sum,
we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion
in committing Hunter to the custody of the petitioner.14
12
Although the respondent proffered various emails, which included
his responses to the social study questionnaire and a video of Hunter and
the respondent together, the court specifically stated that it “does not
necessarily credit or find helpful to its decision” that video. Moreover,
the respondent’s exhibits do not contravene any of the court’s findings
regarding his previous conviction for risk of injury, the statements in
the arrest warrant affidavit, or Tinaza’s testimony.
Although some of the evidence the court relied on in the dispositional
phase entered the record over the respondent’s objection, the respondent
did not challenge the propriety of the court’s evidentiary rulings on
appeal. To the extent that the respondent challenges those rulings, he
does so only in his reply brief to this court. Moreover, to the extent the
respondent raises a challenge to the court’s evidentiary rulings solely
in his reply brief, it is inadequately briefed, and we decline to review
it. See, e.g., In re Christina M., 90 Conn. App. 565, 584, 877 A.2d 941
(2005) (claims not raised in principal brief may not be raised in reply
brief), aff’d, 280 Conn. 474, 908 A.2d 1073 (2006).
13
To the extent the respondent challenges the court’s factual findings
by citing evidence in the record that purportedly contradicts the court’s
findings, “[w]e iterate that [w]e give great deference to the findings
of the trial court because of its function to weigh and interpret the
evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses . . . .
As we conclude in this opinion, the court’s factual findings in support
of its dispositional determination were supported by evidence in the
record, and, therefore, we decline to disturb them.” (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Olivia W., supra, 223 Conn.
App. 194 n.14.
14
We note that Hunter’s commitment pursuant to § 46b-129 (j) “is not
one of permanency, such as a judgment of termination of parental rights,
but one that requires . . . the court to order specific steps which the par-
ent must take to facilitate the return of the child or youth to the custody
of such parent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Brianna C.,
supra, 98 Conn. App. 805. In the present case, in addition to the court’s
conclusion that further assessment of the respondent and Hunter was
warranted, there were several specific steps required of the respondent,
including keeping appointments with the department, participating in
individual counseling, and accepting any in-home services the depart-
ment may offer. Furthermore, Hunter’s commitment “may be revoked . . .
at any time by the court”; General Statutes § 46b-129 (j) (2) (A); or upon
In re Hunter T.

The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

motion by the respondent for the revocation of Hunter’s commitment.
General Statutes § 46b-129 (m); Practice Book § 35a-14A; see also In re
Patricia C., 93 Conn. App. 25, 30, 887 A.2d 929 (revoking commitment
pursuant to § 46b-129 (m) constitutes two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether
proof that no cause for commitment presently exists and (2) whether
continued commitment nonetheless would be in best interest of child),
cert. denied, 277 Conn. 931, 896 A.2d 101 (2006). Finally, we note that
the department has an ongoing duty, unless and until there is a court
finding that reunification efforts are no longer appropriate, to work
toward the reunification of a child with his parent whose rights have
not been terminated. See, e.g., General Statutes § 17a-111b (a) (“[t]he
Commissioner of Children and Families shall make reasonable efforts
to reunify a parent with a child”); In re Amani O., 221 Conn. App. 59,
68, 301 A.3d 565 (2023) (“[t]he plain language of § 17a-111b requires
the department to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parent with
the child unless certain specific conditions are met”).