State v. Burns

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State v. Burns

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JEVIN BURNS
(AC 47432)
Elgo, Seeley and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of attempt to commit murder, assault in the first degree and car-
rying a pistol without a permit in connection with the shooting of the victim,
the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court abused
its discretion by permitting the state to impeach a witness, L, through the
testimony of a police detective, D, on a collateral matter regarding L’s pur-
ported inconsistent statements to D about her contact with the defendant
following the shooting. Held:

This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that L’s testimony about
her contact with the defendant following the shooting was not inconsistent
with her statements to D, as the defendant failed to raise that claim before
the trial court, and, therefore, it was not properly preserved.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that D’s testimony
concerning L’s prior inconsistent statements did not involve a collateral mat-
ter, as those statements tended to establish L’s bias toward the defendant.

The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion under the Connecticut Code
of Evidence (§ 6-10 (c)) in admitting for impeachment purposes D’s testimony
concerning L’s prior inconsistent statements even though L had not been
confronted specifically regarding those statements at the time she testified.

Argued October 21, 2025—officially released March 24, 2026

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of attempt to commit murder, assault in
the first degree and carrying a pistol without a permit,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Hartford and tried to the jury before Gold, J.; verdict and
judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
James E. Mortimer, assistant public defender, for the
appellant (defendant).
Madeline Paine, deputy assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott,
state’s attorney, and David Zagaja, former supervisory
assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
State v. Burns

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The defendant, Jevin Burns, appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a
jury trial, of attempt to commit murder in violation of
General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-54a, assault in
the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59
(a) (1), and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation
of General Statutes § 29-35 (a). On appeal, the defendant
claims that the trial court abused its discretion by per-
mitting the state to impeach a witness on a collateral
matter regarding purported inconsistent statements
of the witness and that the admission of the improper
impeachment evidence was harmful, thereby warranting
a new trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. On the morning of April 30, 2018, Sicca Lee was at
a laundromat when Tanea Mills, a cousin of the victim,
Byron Carter, approached her and challenged her to a
fight. Lee is a former girlfriend of the victim and of the
defendant, with whom she has a child. Lee told Mills that
they would fight after she finished her laundry. Mills
subsequently returned to her apartment on Westland
Street in Hartford, where she resided with, among oth-
ers, her mother, Angela Carter, and the victim. Only
Angela Carter was home at the time. Shortly after Mills
returned to her apartment, Mills and Angela Carter heard
a loud bang on a ground level window of the apartment
that faces Westland Street. Both Angela Carter and Mills
went to the window, where Lee was standing outside
with Lakesha Burns, the defendant’s mother; Karima
Burns, the defendant’s aunt and a foster mother to Lee;
and another aunt of the defendant. Angela Carter also
saw a crowd of people forming outside. Lee was there
to follow up on Mills’ earlier challenge to fight. While
they conversed and argued with each other through the
open window, several more cars arrived outside of the
apartment. The defendant was a passenger in one of
those vehicles.
State v. Burns

The defendant exited the vehicle and stood on the side-
walk in front of the building where Mills and Lee were
arguing through the window. Mills and Angela Carter
noticed that the defendant was holding a gun in his hand
while he stood on the sidewalk. Thereafter, the victim
returned home from work and stopped his vehicle in the
street. When he exited the vehicle, he was surrounded
by the group of people who had gathered in the street.
Thereafter, gunshots were fired, and everyone in the
crowd fled. Mills and Angela Carter witnessed the shoot-
ing from the window of their apartment.1
Several officers with the Hartford Police Department
(department) were dispatched to the scene shortly after
the shooting following a report of a serious assault with a
firearm. Upon arrival, the officers discovered the victim
lying in the roadway receiving medical attention from
Hartford firefighters. Mills and Angela Carter informed
the responding officers that they had witnessed the defen-
dant shoot the victim multiple times before fleeing in a
white Chevrolet sedan with a New Jersey license plate.
Officers were then redirected to search for the defendant
and the vehicle at his mother’s residence on Enfield Street
in Hartford. Upon arrival at the Enfield Street residence,
the police discovered a white Chevrolet vehicle matching
the description provided parked in the driveway. The
police also searched the premises for the defendant but
did not find him. The white Chevrolet was removed and
brought to a nearby evidence garage bay at the depart-
ment. Officers searched the vehicle the following day;
however, nothing of evidentiary value was found, and
the vehicle was returned to Lakesha Burns at some point
after April 30, 2018, but before the issuance of an arrest
warrant for the defendant on May 2, 2018.
At the hospital where the victim was treated, physi-
cians determined that he had been shot in the chest and
side, where a bullet pierced his lung, and that his head
had been grazed by a bullet. When one of the bullets
1
On the day of the shooting, Lee, Karima Burns, Angela Carter, Mills,
and Lakesha Burns provided written statements to the police.
State v. Burns

broke apart, it severed his spinal column. As a result,
the victim suffers from permanent paralysis. At trial,
the victim was unable to recall details of the shooting or
to identify his assailant.
A warrant for the defendant’s arrest in connection with
the shooting of the victim was issued on May 2, 2018.
The defendant was arrested on December 5, 2018, and
charged with attempt to commit murder, assault in the
first degree, and carrying a pistol without a permit. The
defendant elected to be tried by a jury, and the trial took
place on various days between August 25 and 30, 2021.
In the state’s case-in-chief, the prosecutor presented
testimony from fifteen witnesses, including six law
enforcement personnel from the department: Officer
Daniel Freeman, Sergeant Valdemar Duarte, Lieutenant
Martin Cunningham, Detective Craig O’Brien, Sergeant
Anthony Rykowski, and Detective Dennis DeMatteo. The
prosecutor also presented testimony from the victim; a
social worker, Lori Annear; and five other witnesses:
Mills, Angela Carter, Karima Burns, Lee, and Lakesha
Burns. Mills testified that she saw a man hit the ground
after hearing the gunshots and realized it was her cousin,
the victim, from the color of his sneakers. According to
Mills, the defendant walked up to the victim while he
was on the ground and shot him three more times in his
back. She saw that it was the defendant because, when
the defendant turned around to go back to his car, he was
facing her and her mother at the window. She described
the sound as “boom, boom, boom,” and saw flashes from
the gun when it was fired. Mills spoke with the police
at the scene and told them what she saw and that the
defendant was the shooter, and she provided a written
statement as well. Angela Carter similarly testified that
she heard the gun go off, saw the victim collapse, and
recognized the victim’s orange sneakers. She also pro-
vided a written statement to the police regarding what
she had witnessed.
On the morning of August 27, 2021, the prosecutor
called Lakesha Burns to testify and questioned her about
State v. Burns

her recollection of the April 30, 2018 shooting, as well as
her interactions and communication with the defendant
following the shooting. Specifically, on direct exami-
nation, Lakesha Burns testified that she had provided
the police with the defendant’s phone number, that she
had made phone contact with the defendant using that
phone number in the days after the shooting, and that
the defendant returned to her apartment a couple of days
after the shooting, at which time she had conversations
with him about what had happened. Lakesha Burns also
testified that she did not recall having contact with detec-
tives after the day of the shooting or being asked, when
she picked up her car, if she had seen the defendant.
When asked if she recalled having a request made of
her by detectives at that time as to where the defendant
was located, she replied, “[n]o.” On cross-examination,
defense counsel did not question Lakesha Burns about
her communications with the defendant after the shoot-
ing, the defendant’s phone number, or her conversations
with detectives.
After the prosecutor concluded his redirect examina-
tion of Lakesha Burns, he called his next witness, DeMat-
teo. The prosecutor first elicited testimony regarding
DeMatteo’s responsibilities with the department and
his role as lead investigator assigned to investigate the
shooting, including the process by which DeMatteo had
obtained the witness statements from Lee and Lakesha
Burns, both of which were admitted into evidence and
read to the jury. Subsequently, the court excused the
jury to hear the prosecutor’s proffer of consciousness
of guilt evidence.
Specifically, the prosecutor elicited testimony from
DeMatteo regarding his attempts to contact the defen-
dant after the shooting. DeMatteo testified that, in the
three day period after the shooting, he tried to contact
the defendant by way of the phone number provided by
Lakesha Burns but that, when he called the number, the
call was immediately disconnected, and he was not able
to reach the defendant. He testified further that, “[e]ven
State v. Burns

[Lakesha] Burns had indicated that the phone wasn’t
working anymore and she wasn’t able to have contact
with him.” He also testified that, prior to the day of the
release of the vehicle to Lakesha Burns, he spoke with
her and indicated that he needed to talk to the defendant
but had no success in meeting with the defendant, and
that Lakesha Burns told him that she had not had any
contact with the defendant. He also explained that, after
the issuance of the arrest warrant for the defendant on
May 2, 2018, he made no further attempts to contact the
defendant to speak with him.
In addition to proffering the testimony as conscious-
ness of guilt evidence, the prosecutor also explained to the
court that he sought to offer DeMatteo’s testimony about
what Lakesha Burns had said to DeMatteo as impeach-
ment evidence. In particular, the prosecutor sought to
impeach Lakesha Burns’ testimony on two grounds: (1)
DeMatteo’s testimony indicating that Lakesha Burns
told him during each of his visits with her prior to the
issuance of the arrest warrant that she had no contact
with the defendant directly contradicted her testimony
that she had a conversation with the defendant the day
following the shooting, and (2) DeMatteo’s testimony
about Lakesha Burns’ statement to him that she was
not able to contact the defendant by the phone number
that she had provided to DeMatteo contradicted her
testimony that she had spoken with the defendant via
that phone number.
Defense counsel objected to the proffered testimony on
the ground that any alleged statements made by Lakesha
Burns constituted hearsay and because the proffered
testimony was overly prejudicial and did not evince a
consciousness of guilt by the defendant, as there was
no indication that the defendant was aware that the
police had been trying to contact him prior to the issu-
ance of the arrest warrant and everyone in the crowd
had fled the scene following the shooting, not just the
defendant. Following this argument, the court agreed
that, because everyone had fled, it would be unfair for
State v. Burns

the state to argue that the defendant’s flight evinced a
consciousness of guilt.
The court, nevertheless, took a brief recess. After it
returned but prior to making its ruling, the court asked
defense counsel if he wanted to make any comments for
the record, to which defense counsel replied that the
proffered testimony about the statements of Lakesha
Burns was “being offered to impeach prior testimony by
a witness [who is] no longer on the stand as to a collateral
matter [which is] not admissible under State v. Wilson
[158 Conn. 321, 324, 260 A.2d 571 (1969)].2 The matter
of whether or not . . . these statements that are being
offered as to what [Lakesha] Burns may or may not have
said to . . . DeMatteo . . . are not . . . directly in line with
the matter at hand of whether or not [the defendant]
committed the crimes charged.” (Footnote added.) The
court disagreed with defense counsel’s argument that
the proffered testimony concerned a collateral matter,
concluding, instead, that it went to potential bias and,
therefore, had probative value that outweighed any
potential prejudice. The court ruled that it would allow
the prosecutor to question DeMatteo with respect to (1)
whether Lakesha Burns had any contact with the defen-
dant in the time period after the shooting and before
the issuance of the arrest warrant on May 2, 2018, and
(2) Lakesha Burns’ statements to DeMatteo concerning
whether she was able to contact the defendant via the
phone number that she had provided to DeMatteo.3
After issuing its ruling, the court asked defense coun-
sel whether he wanted to supplement the record in any
2
In State v. Wilson, supra, 158 Conn. 324, our Supreme Court recog-
nized the bar on collateral matters, stating that “[a] witness may not be
contradicted on cross-examination as to any answer he may have made
on direct examination with respect to an irrelevant or immaterial fact.”
3
Specifically, the court stated: “[T]he two areas that I’ll permit [the
prosecutor] to question . . . DeMatteo on are first . . . regarding any
contact [Lakesha] Burns may have had with her son, the defendant,
in the days immediately after the shooting. [Lakesha] Burns testified
that she was in touch with [the defendant] either the day of or the
day after the shooting. It is my understanding that . . . DeMatteo is
prepared to testify that, when he questioned [Lakesha] Burns on that
State v. Burns

way, and defense counsel replied by arguing that it was
improper to allow the prosecutor to impeach Lakesha
Burns’ testimony when she was no longer on the wit-
ness stand and that the person who is “being impeached
by [an] inconsistent statement must be the one that’s
testifying.” The court disagreed, stating: “Well, I think
you’re . . . speaking of the need to confront the witness
with that potentially inconsistent statement. I feel that
that falls within the discretion of the court. Under these
circumstances, the witness affirmatively . . . stated, when
she testified, that she did speak to [the defendant]. . . . I
don’t see a real need to confront her with what . . . DeMat-
teo is prepared to testify to today. So, I don’t think that
that failure is a shortcoming in the . . . appropriateness
of the testimony.” Thereafter, the jury returned to the
courtroom, and the prosecutor questioned DeMatteo in
the manner described.
After the prosecutor rested the state’s case-in-chief,
defense counsel orally moved for a judgment of acquit-
tal, arguing that the evidence presented by the state was
insufficient for the jury reasonably to find the defendant
guilty of any of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable
doubt. The court denied the motion. Defense counsel
then called Freeman as his only witness. Defense counsel
rested the defendant’s case on August 30, 2021, and the
very subject in the days shortly after the . . . shooting, [Lakesha] Burns
told . . . DeMatteo that she had not spoken to . . . [the defendant]. . . .
A related matter is the use of the phone as a means by which to reach
the defendant. [Lakesha] Burns, during her testimony this morning,
indicated that she was able to speak to [the defendant] on the phone at
the number that she had provided Hartford police. . . . DeMatteo is . . .
prepared, as I understand it, to testify that, when he tried that number,
he was unable to have the phone connect and, further, that, when he
confronted [Lakesha] Burns about his inability to reach [the defendant]
through the phone [number that she had provided], she told him that
she had experienced the same problem. Now, that to me is diametrically
[opposed] to what she testified to on the . . . [witness] stand in those two
respects. Just so the record, however, is clear . . . the court is intending
to tell the jury that . . . these are prior inconsistent statements offered
to impeach her credibility, not for substantive purposes. And you [the
prosecutor] will be precluded from arguing . . . that the defendant was
in any way eluding capture. All right? That’s the court’s ruling.”
State v. Burns

prosecutor and defense counsel made closing remarks
the same day.
Thereafter, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all
three of the charged offenses. The defendant subse-
quently was sentenced to a total effective term of twenty-
five years of incarceration, execution suspended after
seventeen and one-half years, six of which were a man-
datory minimum, followed by three years of probation.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused
its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to present testi-
mony from DeMatteo to impeach Lakesha Burns regard-
ing the alleged prior inconsistent statements that she had
made. In support of this claim, the defendant contends
that (1) Lakesha Burns’ testimony about her contact with
the defendant following the shooting was not inconsis-
tent with her statements to DeMatteo, (2) the impeach-
ment evidence related to a collateral matter concerning
Lakesha Burns’ purported inconsistent statements to
the police about her communications with the defendant
following the shooting, which was not relevant to her
alleged bias as a witness, (3) the court improperly failed
to require the state to lay a proper foundation for the
alleged inconsistent statements, (4) the court abused its
discretion by permitting the prosecutor to introduce the
impeachment evidence through the testimony of DeMat-
teo, and (5) the court’s admission of the impeachment
evidence was harmful. We are not persuaded that the
court’s admission of the impeachment evidence consti-
tuted an abuse of its discretion.4
We first set forth our standard of review. “It is axiom-
atic that [t]he trial court’s ruling on the admissibility
4
The defendant also claims that the prosecutor used DeMatteo’s testi-
mony to present consciousness of guilt evidence when the court expressly
had denied the prosecutor’s request to do so. The state, in response,
asserts that the defendant failed to brief this issue adequately, and the
defendant did not counter this assertion in his appellate reply brief.
In his principal appellate brief, the defendant did not explain how
the prosecutor attempted to circumvent the trial court’s ruling and
simply cited to the legal principle that “[t]he introduction of the [prior
State v. Burns

of evidence is entitled to great deference. . . . In this
regard, the trial court is vested with wide discretion in
determining the admissibility of evidence, including
issues of relevance and the scope of cross-examination. .
. . Accordingly, [t]he trial court’s ruling on evidentiary
matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a
clear abuse of the court’s discretion. . . . In determining
whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every
reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the
correctness of the trial court’s ruling . . . .” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Calderon-Perez, 234
Conn. App. 228, 236, 342 A.3d 1014 (2025).
I
The defendant first claims that Lakesha Burns’ tes-
timony about her contact with the defendant following
the shooting was not inconsistent with her statements
to DeMatteo.5 This claim is based on the defendant’s
contention that “[t]he trial court erred in accepting the
inconsistent] statement is improper . . . where the primary purpose of
calling the witness is to impeach him and the state’s attorney intro-
duces the prior inconsistent statement in hope that the jury will use it
substantively.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams,
204 Conn. 523, 531, 529 A.3d 653 (1987). The defendant devoted a
few sentences to this issue and did not provide analysis beyond a bare
assertion of the claim. Therefore, we agree with the state and decline
to review this claim.
“[W]e are not required to review claims that are inadequately briefed. .
. . We consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract
assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to
brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently
to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly
and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. We do not reverse the
judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings that
have not been adequately briefed. . . . The parties may not merely cite
a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts
of the case and the law cited. . . . It is not enough merely to mention
a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do
counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on
its bones.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fetscher, 162
Conn. App. 145, 155–56, 130 A.3d 892 (2015), cert. denied, 321 Conn.
904, 138 A.3d 280 (2016).
5
“Our Supreme Court has held that [i]mpeachment of a witness by the
use of a prior inconsistent statement is proper only if the two statements
State v. Burns

prosecuting authority’s misrepresentation of the timing
of the communications that Lakesha [Burns] had testi-
fied to in order to perceive an inconsistency that did not,
in fact, exist.” According to the defendant, “the state
failed to produce any evidence that Lakesha [Burns]
did, in fact, have communications with the defendant
prior to her conversation with DeMatteo.” (Emphasis in
original.) Thus, he contends that the testimony of Lake-
sha Burns that, in the days after the shooting, she spoke
with the defendant by phone and that he had returned
to her apartment a couple of days after the shooting was
not inconsistent with her statements to DeMatteo at the
time when she retrieved her vehicle. The state counters
that we should decline to review this claim because the
defendant did not preserve it at trial and is raising the
claim for the first time on appeal. In his appellate reply
brief, the defendant asserts that this court should review
his claim because his “trial counsel specifically objected
to the introduction of an inconsistent statement when
that witness is no longer on the stand,” and, thus, “[i]t
is unclear what talismanic utterance the state would
have trial counsel recite to preserve his objection beyond
what was expressly raised before the trial court.” He
also asserts that “the state conflates the nature of the
claim preserved [at trial] with the defendant’s argument
concerning the apparent reason such an error occurred,”
namely, because “the prosecuting authority . . . misrepre-
sented the nature of the evidence to the trial court . . . .”
We agree with the state and decline to review this claim.
Pursuant to Practice Book § 5-5, “[w]henever an objec-
tion to the admission of evidence is made, counsel shall
state the grounds upon which it is claimed or upon which
objection is made, succinctly and in such form as he or
she desires it to go upon the record . . . .” “[T]he standard
for the preservation of a claim alleging an improper evi-
dentiary ruling at trial is well settled. This court is not
are in fact inconsistent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Collymore, 168 Conn. App. 847, 886, 148 A.3d 1059 (2016), aff’d, 334
Conn. 431, 223 A.3d 1 (2020), cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 433,
208 L. Ed. 2d 129 (2020).
State v. Burns

bound to consider claims of law not made at the trial. .
. . In order to preserve an evidentiary ruling for review,
trial counsel must object properly. . . . In objecting to
evidence, counsel must properly articulate the basis of
the objection so as to apprise the trial court of the precise
nature of the objection and its real purpose, in order
to form an adequate basis for a reviewable ruling. . . .
Once counsel states the authority and ground of [the]
objection, any appeal will be limited to the ground
asserted. . . .
“These requirements are not simply formalities. They
serve to alert the trial court to potential error while there
is still time for the court to act. . . . Assigning error to
a court’s evidentiary rulings on the basis of objections
never raised at trial unfairly subjects the court and the
opposing party to trial by ambush. . . . State v. Cabral,
275 Conn. 514, 530–31, 881 A.2d 247, cert. denied, 546
U.S. 1048, 126 S. Ct. 773, 163 L. Ed. 2d 600 (2005).”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pagan, 158
Conn. App. 620, 632–33, 119 A.3d 1259, cert. denied,
319 Conn. 909, 123 A.3d 438 (2015); see also State v.
Valle, 236 Conn. App. 875, 884, 349 A.3d 603 (2025)
(“The requirement that [a] claim be raised distinctly
means that it must be so stated as to bring to the atten-
tion of the court the precise matter on which its decision
is being asked. . . . [It must] alert the trial court to the
specific deficiency now claimed on appeal.” (Emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert.
denied, 354 Conn. 911, A.3d (2026). “This court
reviews rulings solely on the ground on which the party’s
objection is based. . . . [W]e have consistently declined
to review claims based on a ground different from that
raised in the trial court . . . .” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Paul B., 143 Conn. App. 691, 704, 70
A.3d 1123 (2013), aff’d, 315 Conn. 19, 105 A.3d 130
(2014); see also State v. Jones, 210 Conn. App. 249, 277,
269 A.3d 870 (“[W]e conclude that the defendant failed to
object on the ground that the two police officers were tes-
tifying to an ultimate issue of fact, the applicable objec-
tion. We agree with the state that the defendant cannot
now challenge the proffered testimony as constituting
State v. Burns

improper opinion testimony on an ultimate issue where
the only objections raised before the trial court were
on the bases of relevance and foundation. See State v.
Stenner, 281 Conn. 742, 755, 917 A.2d 28 (‘[t]o permit
a party to raise a different ground on appeal than [that]
raised during trial would amount to trial by ambuscade,
unfair both to the trial court and to the opposing party’
. . .), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 883, 128 S. Ct. 290, 169 L.
Ed. 2d 139 (2007).”), cert. denied, 343 Conn. 901, 272
A.3d 199 (2022).
At trial, defense counsel never raised a lack of incon-
sistency as a ground in support of his objection to the
court’s admission of DeMatteo’s testimony concerning
the prior inconsistent statements of Lakesha Burns.
Rather, defense counsel focused his objection on the
grounds that the proffered testimony constituted hear-
say, was overly prejudicial and did not evince a conscious-
ness of guilt by the defendant, and because it was “being
offered to impeach prior testimony by a witness [who
is] no longer on the stand as to a collateral matter . .
. .” Moreover, when the court heard argument from the
prosecutor and defense counsel concerning the proffered
testimony, defense counsel never alerted the court that
“the nature of the evidence” was being mispresented by
the prosecutor. Accordingly, the defendant cannot now
challenge the court’s admission of DeMatteo’s testimony
concerning the inconsistent statements made by Lakesha
Burns on those grounds, which were not raised before the
trial court. We, therefore, decline to review this claim.6
II
The defendant next challenges the court’s admission
of DeMatteo’s testimony regarding the inconsistent
statements made by Lakesha Burns on the ground that
the prior inconsistent statements concerned a collateral
matter and “did not . . . expose any purported bias” of
Lakesha Burns. We disagree.
6
We note that “a determination as to inconsistency lies within the
discretionary authority of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. D’Amato, 163 Conn. App. 536, 556, 137 A.3d 38,
cert. denied, 321 Conn. 909, 136 A.3d 643 (2016).
State v. Burns

“A party may impeach his own witness in the same
manner as an opposing party’s witness and may dem-
onstrate the witness’ bias or bad character for veracity
and may impeach the witness using prior inconsistent
statements.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. McCarthy, 105 Conn. App. 596, 613, 939 A.2d 1195,
cert. denied, 286 Conn. 913, 944 A.2d 983 (2008). It is
well settled that, “[o]rdinarily, extrinsic evidence of prior
inconsistent statements cannot be used to contradict the
testimony of a witness, and this rule is strictly observed
when the witness’ testimony relates to a collateral mat-
ter. . . . A witness may not be impeached by contradict-
ing his or her testimony as to collateral matters, that is,
matters that are not directly relevant and material to the
merits of the case. . . . Thus, the answer of the witness
on cross-examination to a collateral matter is conclusive
and cannot be later contradicted. . . .
“Extrinsic evidence may be admitted, however, if the
subject matter of the testimony is not collateral, that
is, if it is relevant to a material issue in the case apart
from its tendency to contradict the witness. . . . Evi-
dence tending to show the motive, bias or interest of
an important witness is never collateral or irrelevant.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 247–48, 630 A.2d 577
(1993); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 6-5 (“[t]he credibility
of a witness may be impeached by evidence showing bias
for, prejudice against, or interest in any person or matter
that might cause the witness to testify falsely”).
The commentary to § 6-5 of the Connecticut Code of
Evidence provides in relevant part: “The range of mat-
ters potentially giving rise to bias, prejudice or interest
is virtually endless. . . . A witness may be biased by hav-
ing a friendly feeling toward a person or by favoring a
certain position based upon a familial or employment
relationship. . . .
“Because evidence tending to show a witness’ bias,
prejudice or interest is never collateral . . . impeach-
ment of a witness on these matters may be accomplished
State v. Burns

through the introduction of extrinsic evidence, in addi-
tion to examining the witness directly. . . . The scope and
extent of proof through the use of extrinsic evidence
are subject to the court’s discretion, however . . . and
whether extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show bias,
prejudice or interest without a foundation is also within
the court’s discretion.” (Citations omitted.) Conn. Code
Evid. § 6-5, commentary.
Finally, “evidence is probative of bias if a witness’ hos-
tility to or sympathy for a party is reasonably inferable
from that evidence.” State v. Bova, 240 Conn. 210, 229,
690 A.2d 1370 (1997). Our Supreme Court has held that
the credibility of a defendant’s parents is “questionable
because they are the parents of the defendant and, even
subconsciously, their parental instincts may have led
them to protect their son and [to] offer favorable testi-
mony on his behalf.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Greene,
209 Conn. 458, 473, 551 A.2d 1231 (1988).
In the present case, Lakesha Burns testified that she
had phone conversations with the defendant in the days
following the shooting. When the prosecutor asked her
whether the defendant had returned to her house in “the
couple days afterwards,” she responded, “[y]es,” testify-
ing that, during that time, she had a conversation with
the defendant about the shooting in which he claimed to
not know what had happened. The prosecutor questioned
if she recalled being asked by the police when she picked
up her vehicle whether she had seen the defendant, and
she replied that she could not recall any conversation at
that time. The prosecutor also asked her whether she
had “phone contact with [the defendant] in the days
afterwards,” to which she replied, “[y]es.” The prosecu-
tor then asked, “would he answer the phone number that
you gave the police,” and she replied, “[t]hat was his
phone number,” and that she had conversations with the
defendant. DeMatteo, on the other hand, testified that,
at the time Lakesha Burns picked up her vehicle, he had
asked her if she had been in contact with the defendant
because he needed to talk to the defendant and that “she
State v. Burns

stated [that] she had not seen him yet or heard from him.”
DeMatteo also testified about his unsuccessful attempts
to contact the defendant via the phone number provided
by Lakesha Burns and his discussion with her about the
phone number that she had provided, in which she indi-
cated that she was unable to reach the defendant as well.
The prior inconsistent statements of Lakesha Burns to
which DeMatteo testified related to the state’s theory of
bias in that they showed an interest to protect the defen-
dant, her son, from the efforts of the police to contact
him regarding the shooting, as demonstrated by her
statements to DeMatteo in the days following the shoot-
ing that she had not been in contact with the defendant
and was unable to reach him by phone, as compared to
her trial testimony to the contrary. “Whether a matter
is collateral . . . is a determination that lies within the
trial court’s sound discretion.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Bermudez, 195 Conn. App. 780, 819,
228 A.3d 96 (2020), aff’d, 341 Conn. 233, 267 A.3d 44
(2021). In the present case, making every reasonable
presumption in favor of the trial court’s ruling, we can-
not conclude that the court abused its wide discretion
when it determined that DeMatteo’s testimony about the
prior inconsistent statements of Lakesha Burns did not
involve a collateral matter, as those statements tended
to establish Lakesha Burns’ bias toward the defendant,
which is never collateral. See State v. Colton, supra, 227
Conn. 248; see also State v. Greene, supra, 209 Conn.
473 (“parental instincts may have led [the defendant’s
parents] to protect their son and [to] offer favorable
testimony on his behalf”).7
III
The defendant also claims that the court improperly
failed to require the state to lay a proper foundation for
the admission of the alleged inconsistent statements of
7
The state also argues that the court’s admission of the challenged
testimony from DeMatteo was proper as evidence of the “ ‘completeness
of the investigation’ ” to rebut the defendant’s argument that the police
investigation was inadequate. Because we conclude that the court did
State v. Burns

Lakesha Burns and, thus, abused its discretion by per-
mitting the prosecutor to introduce the impeachment
evidence through the testimony of DeMatteo. According
to the defendant, the court should have allowed Lakesha
Burns to be confronted with the purported inconsis-
tency because “she may have completely resolved any
ambiguity by explaining that she saw or spoke with the
defendant after recovering the vehicle from the police
station.” The defendant concedes that the trial court is
vested with “liberal discretion” concerning “whether to
admit the impeaching statements where no foundation
has been laid.” State v. Saia, 172 Conn. 37, 46, 372 A.2d
144 (1976). The defendant contends, however, that “the
present case evidences the danger of permitting the
introduction of the purportedly inconsistent statements
of a witness absent the requisite foundation.”
The state counters by arguing that it did lay a proper
foundation for the admission of the inconsistent state-
ments and that, in the alternative, the trial court acted
within its discretion by not requiring a foundation to be
laid for the prior inconsistent statements. We conclude
that we need not determine whether the state laid a
proper foundation because the court was within its dis-
cretion to admit the prior inconsistent statements in the
absence of a foundation being laid for their admission.
Pursuant to § 6-10 (a) of the Connecticut Code of Evi-
dence, “[t]he credibility of a witness may be impeached
by evidence of a prior inconsistent statement made by
the witness.” “In examining a witness concerning a prior
inconsistent statement, whether written or not, made
by the witness, the statement should be shown to or
the contents of the statement disclosed to the witness
at that time.” Conn. Code Evid. § 6-10 (b). “If a prior
inconsistent statement made by a witness is shown to or
if the contents of the statement are disclosed to the wit-
ness at the time the witness testifies, and if the witness
admits to making the statement, extrinsic evidence of
not abuse its discretion by admitting that testimony on the issue of
bias for impeachment purposes, we need not address this argument.
State v. Burns

the statement is inadmissible, except in the discretion
of the court. If a prior inconsistent statement made by a
witness is not shown to or if the contents of the statement
are not disclosed to the witness at the time the witness
testifies, extrinsic evidence of the statement is inadmis-
sible, except in the discretion of the court.” (Emphasis
added.) Conn. Code Evid. § 6-10 (c).
Our Supreme Court has stated that, “[i]n this state,
we have no inflexible rule regarding the necessity of
calling the attention of a witness . . . to his alleged prior
inconsistent statements before either questioning him on
the subject or introducing extrinsic evidence tending to
impeach him. From early times, it has consistently been
held that it rests within the judicial discretion of the
trial court whether to admit the impeaching statements
where no foundation has been laid. . . . The trial court
is vested with a liberal discretion as to how the inquiry
should be conducted in any given case.” (Citation omit-
ted.) State v. Saia, supra, 172 Conn. 46; see also Adams
v. Herald Publishing Co., 82 Conn. 448, 452–53, 74 A.
755 (1909) (admitting witness’ out-of-court statements
that contradicted sworn testimony without calling wit-
ness’ attention to inconsistency was not reversible error).
Although, “generally, a foundation for introducing
the [prior inconsistent] statement should be laid [during
the examination] of the witness . . . it rests within the
judicial discretion of the trial court whether to admit the
impeaching statements where no foundation has been
laid. . . . The trial court is vested with a liberal discre-
tion as to how the inquiry should be conducted in any
given case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Gauthier, 140 Conn. App. 69, 76, 57 A.3d 849, cert.
denied, 308 Conn. 907, 61 A.3d 1097 (2013); see also
State v. Collymore, 168 Conn. App. 847, 887, 148 A.3d
1059 (2016) (“trial [c]ourts have wide discretion whether
to admit prior inconsistent statements that have not sat-
isfied the typical foundational requirements in § 6-10 (c)
of the Connecticut Code of Evidence” (internal quotation
marks omitted)), aff’d, 334 Conn. 431, 223 A.3d 1 (2020),
State v. Burns

cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 433, 208 L. Ed. 2d
129 (2020); State v. John M., 87 Conn. App. 301, 309,
865 A.2d 450 (2005) (§ 6-10 (c) of Connecticut Code of
Evidence “clearly indicates that the trial court is vested
with wide discretion in determining whether extrin-
sic evidence of prior inconsistent statements should be
admitted in a trial when no foundation has been laid”),
aff’d, 285 Conn. 822, 942 A.2d 323 (2008).
In the present case, making every reasonable presump-
tion in favor of the trial court’s ruling and in light of
the clear language of § 6-10 of the Connecticut Code of
Evidence, we conclude that the trial court acted within its
broad discretion by admitting into evidence for impeach-
ment purposes DeMatteo’s testimony about the prior
inconsistent statements of Lakesha Burns, even though
she had not been confronted specifically regarding her
inconsistent statements to DeMatteo at the time she
testified.8
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

8  
In light of our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion by admitting DeMatteo’s testimony about the prior inconsistent
statements of Lakesha Burns for impeachment purposes, we need not
address the defendant’s claim that he was harmed by the court’s admis-
sion of that testimony. See State v. Clark, 191 Conn. App. 191, 200 n.7,
213 A.3d 1166 (2019) (“because we conclude that there was no error,
we need not conduct a harmless error analysis”); State v. Dubuisson,
183 Conn. App. 62, 72 n.8, 191 A.3d 229 (“The defendant also argues
that the admittance of the [hearsay] statements was harmful error
of a constitutional magnitude. Because we find no error, we decline
to address the defendant’s claim.”), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 914, 193
A.3d 560 (2018).

************************************************
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************************************************
State v. Burns

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JEVIN BURNS
(AC 47432)
Elgo, Seeley and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of attempt to commit murder, assault in the first degree and car-
rying a pistol without a permit in connection with the shooting of the victim,
the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court abused
its discretion by permitting the state to impeach a witness, L, through the
testimony of a police detective, D, on a collateral matter regarding L’s pur-
ported inconsistent statements to D about her contact with the defendant
following the shooting. Held:

This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that L’s testimony about
her contact with the defendant following the shooting was not inconsistent
with her statements to D, as the defendant failed to raise that claim before
the trial court, and, therefore, it was not properly preserved.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that D’s testimony
concerning L’s prior inconsistent statements did not involve a collateral mat-
ter, as those statements tended to establish L’s bias toward the defendant.

The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion under the Connecticut Code
of Evidence (§ 6-10 (c)) in admitting for impeachment purposes D’s testimony
concerning L’s prior inconsistent statements even though L had not been
confronted specifically regarding those statements at the time she testified.

Argued October 21, 2025—officially released March 24, 2026

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of attempt to commit murder, assault in
the first degree and carrying a pistol without a permit,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Hartford and tried to the jury before Gold, J.; verdict and
judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
James E. Mortimer, assistant public defender, for the
appellant (defendant).
Madeline Paine, deputy assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott,
state’s attorney, and David Zagaja, former supervisory
assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
State v. Burns

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The defendant, Jevin Burns, appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a
jury trial, of attempt to commit murder in violation of
General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-54a, assault in
the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59
(a) (1), and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation
of General Statutes § 29-35 (a). On appeal, the defendant
claims that the trial court abused its discretion by per-
mitting the state to impeach a witness on a collateral
matter regarding purported inconsistent statements
of the witness and that the admission of the improper
impeachment evidence was harmful, thereby warranting
a new trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. On the morning of April 30, 2018, Sicca Lee was at
a laundromat when Tanea Mills, a cousin of the victim,
Byron Carter, approached her and challenged her to a
fight. Lee is a former girlfriend of the victim and of the
defendant, with whom she has a child. Lee told Mills that
they would fight after she finished her laundry. Mills
subsequently returned to her apartment on Westland
Street in Hartford, where she resided with, among oth-
ers, her mother, Angela Carter, and the victim. Only
Angela Carter was home at the time. Shortly after Mills
returned to her apartment, Mills and Angela Carter heard
a loud bang on a ground level window of the apartment
that faces Westland Street. Both Angela Carter and Mills
went to the window, where Lee was standing outside
with Lakesha Burns, the defendant’s mother; Karima
Burns, the defendant’s aunt and a foster mother to Lee;
and another aunt of the defendant. Angela Carter also
saw a crowd of people forming outside. Lee was there
to follow up on Mills’ earlier challenge to fight. While
they conversed and argued with each other through the
open window, several more cars arrived outside of the
apartment. The defendant was a passenger in one of
those vehicles.
State v. Burns

The defendant exited the vehicle and stood on the side-
walk in front of the building where Mills and Lee were
arguing through the window. Mills and Angela Carter
noticed that the defendant was holding a gun in his hand
while he stood on the sidewalk. Thereafter, the victim
returned home from work and stopped his vehicle in the
street. When he exited the vehicle, he was surrounded
by the group of people who had gathered in the street.
Thereafter, gunshots were fired, and everyone in the
crowd fled. Mills and Angela Carter witnessed the shoot-
ing from the window of their apartment.1
Several officers with the Hartford Police Department
(department) were dispatched to the scene shortly after
the shooting following a report of a serious assault with a
firearm. Upon arrival, the officers discovered the victim
lying in the roadway receiving medical attention from
Hartford firefighters. Mills and Angela Carter informed
the responding officers that they had witnessed the defen-
dant shoot the victim multiple times before fleeing in a
white Chevrolet sedan with a New Jersey license plate.
Officers were then redirected to search for the defendant
and the vehicle at his mother’s residence on Enfield Street
in Hartford. Upon arrival at the Enfield Street residence,
the police discovered a white Chevrolet vehicle matching
the description provided parked in the driveway. The
police also searched the premises for the defendant but
did not find him. The white Chevrolet was removed and
brought to a nearby evidence garage bay at the depart-
ment. Officers searched the vehicle the following day;
however, nothing of evidentiary value was found, and
the vehicle was returned to Lakesha Burns at some point
after April 30, 2018, but before the issuance of an arrest
warrant for the defendant on May 2, 2018.
At the hospital where the victim was treated, physi-
cians determined that he had been shot in the chest and
side, where a bullet pierced his lung, and that his head
had been grazed by a bullet. When one of the bullets
1
On the day of the shooting, Lee, Karima Burns, Angela Carter, Mills,
and Lakesha Burns provided written statements to the police.
State v. Burns

broke apart, it severed his spinal column. As a result,
the victim suffers from permanent paralysis. At trial,
the victim was unable to recall details of the shooting or
to identify his assailant.
A warrant for the defendant’s arrest in connection with
the shooting of the victim was issued on May 2, 2018.
The defendant was arrested on December 5, 2018, and
charged with attempt to commit murder, assault in the
first degree, and carrying a pistol without a permit. The
defendant elected to be tried by a jury, and the trial took
place on various days between August 25 and 30, 2021.
In the state’s case-in-chief, the prosecutor presented
testimony from fifteen witnesses, including six law
enforcement personnel from the department: Officer
Daniel Freeman, Sergeant Valdemar Duarte, Lieutenant
Martin Cunningham, Detective Craig O’Brien, Sergeant
Anthony Rykowski, and Detective Dennis DeMatteo. The
prosecutor also presented testimony from the victim; a
social worker, Lori Annear; and five other witnesses:
Mills, Angela Carter, Karima Burns, Lee, and Lakesha
Burns. Mills testified that she saw a man hit the ground
after hearing the gunshots and realized it was her cousin,
the victim, from the color of his sneakers. According to
Mills, the defendant walked up to the victim while he
was on the ground and shot him three more times in his
back. She saw that it was the defendant because, when
the defendant turned around to go back to his car, he was
facing her and her mother at the window. She described
the sound as “boom, boom, boom,” and saw flashes from
the gun when it was fired. Mills spoke with the police
at the scene and told them what she saw and that the
defendant was the shooter, and she provided a written
statement as well. Angela Carter similarly testified that
she heard the gun go off, saw the victim collapse, and
recognized the victim’s orange sneakers. She also pro-
vided a written statement to the police regarding what
she had witnessed.
On the morning of August 27, 2021, the prosecutor
called Lakesha Burns to testify and questioned her about
State v. Burns

her recollection of the April 30, 2018 shooting, as well as
her interactions and communication with the defendant
following the shooting. Specifically, on direct exami-
nation, Lakesha Burns testified that she had provided
the police with the defendant’s phone number, that she
had made phone contact with the defendant using that
phone number in the days after the shooting, and that
the defendant returned to her apartment a couple of days
after the shooting, at which time she had conversations
with him about what had happened. Lakesha Burns also
testified that she did not recall having contact with detec-
tives after the day of the shooting or being asked, when
she picked up her car, if she had seen the defendant.
When asked if she recalled having a request made of
her by detectives at that time as to where the defendant
was located, she replied, “[n]o.” On cross-examination,
defense counsel did not question Lakesha Burns about
her communications with the defendant after the shoot-
ing, the defendant’s phone number, or her conversations
with detectives.
After the prosecutor concluded his redirect examina-
tion of Lakesha Burns, he called his next witness, DeMat-
teo. The prosecutor first elicited testimony regarding
DeMatteo’s responsibilities with the department and
his role as lead investigator assigned to investigate the
shooting, including the process by which DeMatteo had
obtained the witness statements from Lee and Lakesha
Burns, both of which were admitted into evidence and
read to the jury. Subsequently, the court excused the
jury to hear the prosecutor’s proffer of consciousness
of guilt evidence.
Specifically, the prosecutor elicited testimony from
DeMatteo regarding his attempts to contact the defen-
dant after the shooting. DeMatteo testified that, in the
three day period after the shooting, he tried to contact
the defendant by way of the phone number provided by
Lakesha Burns but that, when he called the number, the
call was immediately disconnected, and he was not able
to reach the defendant. He testified further that, “[e]ven
State v. Burns

[Lakesha] Burns had indicated that the phone wasn’t
working anymore and she wasn’t able to have contact
with him.” He also testified that, prior to the day of the
release of the vehicle to Lakesha Burns, he spoke with
her and indicated that he needed to talk to the defendant
but had no success in meeting with the defendant, and
that Lakesha Burns told him that she had not had any
contact with the defendant. He also explained that, after
the issuance of the arrest warrant for the defendant on
May 2, 2018, he made no further attempts to contact the
defendant to speak with him.
In addition to proffering the testimony as conscious-
ness of guilt evidence, the prosecutor also explained to the
court that he sought to offer DeMatteo’s testimony about
what Lakesha Burns had said to DeMatteo as impeach-
ment evidence. In particular, the prosecutor sought to
impeach Lakesha Burns’ testimony on two grounds: (1)
DeMatteo’s testimony indicating that Lakesha Burns
told him during each of his visits with her prior to the
issuance of the arrest warrant that she had no contact
with the defendant directly contradicted her testimony
that she had a conversation with the defendant the day
following the shooting, and (2) DeMatteo’s testimony
about Lakesha Burns’ statement to him that she was
not able to contact the defendant by the phone number
that she had provided to DeMatteo contradicted her
testimony that she had spoken with the defendant via
that phone number.
Defense counsel objected to the proffered testimony on
the ground that any alleged statements made by Lakesha
Burns constituted hearsay and because the proffered
testimony was overly prejudicial and did not evince a
consciousness of guilt by the defendant, as there was
no indication that the defendant was aware that the
police had been trying to contact him prior to the issu-
ance of the arrest warrant and everyone in the crowd
had fled the scene following the shooting, not just the
defendant. Following this argument, the court agreed
that, because everyone had fled, it would be unfair for
State v. Burns

the state to argue that the defendant’s flight evinced a
consciousness of guilt.
The court, nevertheless, took a brief recess. After it
returned but prior to making its ruling, the court asked
defense counsel if he wanted to make any comments for
the record, to which defense counsel replied that the
proffered testimony about the statements of Lakesha
Burns was “being offered to impeach prior testimony by
a witness [who is] no longer on the stand as to a collateral
matter [which is] not admissible under State v. Wilson
[158 Conn. 321, 324, 260 A.2d 571 (1969)].2 The matter
of whether or not . . . these statements that are being
offered as to what [Lakesha] Burns may or may not have
said to . . . DeMatteo . . . are not . . . directly in line with
the matter at hand of whether or not [the defendant]
committed the crimes charged.” (Footnote added.) The
court disagreed with defense counsel’s argument that
the proffered testimony concerned a collateral matter,
concluding, instead, that it went to potential bias and,
therefore, had probative value that outweighed any
potential prejudice. The court ruled that it would allow
the prosecutor to question DeMatteo with respect to (1)
whether Lakesha Burns had any contact with the defen-
dant in the time period after the shooting and before
the issuance of the arrest warrant on May 2, 2018, and
(2) Lakesha Burns’ statements to DeMatteo concerning
whether she was able to contact the defendant via the
phone number that she had provided to DeMatteo.3
After issuing its ruling, the court asked defense coun-
sel whether he wanted to supplement the record in any
2
In State v. Wilson, supra, 158 Conn. 324, our Supreme Court recog-
nized the bar on collateral matters, stating that “[a] witness may not be
contradicted on cross-examination as to any answer he may have made
on direct examination with respect to an irrelevant or immaterial fact.”
3
Specifically, the court stated: “[T]he two areas that I’ll permit [the
prosecutor] to question . . . DeMatteo on are first . . . regarding any
contact [Lakesha] Burns may have had with her son, the defendant,
in the days immediately after the shooting. [Lakesha] Burns testified
that she was in touch with [the defendant] either the day of or the
day after the shooting. It is my understanding that . . . DeMatteo is
prepared to testify that, when he questioned [Lakesha] Burns on that
State v. Burns

way, and defense counsel replied by arguing that it was
improper to allow the prosecutor to impeach Lakesha
Burns’ testimony when she was no longer on the wit-
ness stand and that the person who is “being impeached
by [an] inconsistent statement must be the one that’s
testifying.” The court disagreed, stating: “Well, I think
you’re . . . speaking of the need to confront the witness
with that potentially inconsistent statement. I feel that
that falls within the discretion of the court. Under these
circumstances, the witness affirmatively . . . stated, when
she testified, that she did speak to [the defendant]. . . . I
don’t see a real need to confront her with what . . . DeMat-
teo is prepared to testify to today. So, I don’t think that
that failure is a shortcoming in the . . . appropriateness
of the testimony.” Thereafter, the jury returned to the
courtroom, and the prosecutor questioned DeMatteo in
the manner described.
After the prosecutor rested the state’s case-in-chief,
defense counsel orally moved for a judgment of acquit-
tal, arguing that the evidence presented by the state was
insufficient for the jury reasonably to find the defendant
guilty of any of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable
doubt. The court denied the motion. Defense counsel
then called Freeman as his only witness. Defense counsel
rested the defendant’s case on August 30, 2021, and the
very subject in the days shortly after the . . . shooting, [Lakesha] Burns
told . . . DeMatteo that she had not spoken to . . . [the defendant]. . . .
A related matter is the use of the phone as a means by which to reach
the defendant. [Lakesha] Burns, during her testimony this morning,
indicated that she was able to speak to [the defendant] on the phone at
the number that she had provided Hartford police. . . . DeMatteo is . . .
prepared, as I understand it, to testify that, when he tried that number,
he was unable to have the phone connect and, further, that, when he
confronted [Lakesha] Burns about his inability to reach [the defendant]
through the phone [number that she had provided], she told him that
she had experienced the same problem. Now, that to me is diametrically
[opposed] to what she testified to on the . . . [witness] stand in those two
respects. Just so the record, however, is clear . . . the court is intending
to tell the jury that . . . these are prior inconsistent statements offered
to impeach her credibility, not for substantive purposes. And you [the
prosecutor] will be precluded from arguing . . . that the defendant was
in any way eluding capture. All right? That’s the court’s ruling.”
State v. Burns

prosecutor and defense counsel made closing remarks
the same day.
Thereafter, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all
three of the charged offenses. The defendant subse-
quently was sentenced to a total effective term of twenty-
five years of incarceration, execution suspended after
seventeen and one-half years, six of which were a man-
datory minimum, followed by three years of probation.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused
its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to present testi-
mony from DeMatteo to impeach Lakesha Burns regard-
ing the alleged prior inconsistent statements that she had
made. In support of this claim, the defendant contends
that (1) Lakesha Burns’ testimony about her contact with
the defendant following the shooting was not inconsis-
tent with her statements to DeMatteo, (2) the impeach-
ment evidence related to a collateral matter concerning
Lakesha Burns’ purported inconsistent statements to
the police about her communications with the defendant
following the shooting, which was not relevant to her
alleged bias as a witness, (3) the court improperly failed
to require the state to lay a proper foundation for the
alleged inconsistent statements, (4) the court abused its
discretion by permitting the prosecutor to introduce the
impeachment evidence through the testimony of DeMat-
teo, and (5) the court’s admission of the impeachment
evidence was harmful. We are not persuaded that the
court’s admission of the impeachment evidence consti-
tuted an abuse of its discretion.4
We first set forth our standard of review. “It is axiom-
atic that [t]he trial court’s ruling on the admissibility
4
The defendant also claims that the prosecutor used DeMatteo’s testi-
mony to present consciousness of guilt evidence when the court expressly
had denied the prosecutor’s request to do so. The state, in response,
asserts that the defendant failed to brief this issue adequately, and the
defendant did not counter this assertion in his appellate reply brief.
In his principal appellate brief, the defendant did not explain how
the prosecutor attempted to circumvent the trial court’s ruling and
simply cited to the legal principle that “[t]he introduction of the [prior
State v. Burns

of evidence is entitled to great deference. . . . In this
regard, the trial court is vested with wide discretion in
determining the admissibility of evidence, including
issues of relevance and the scope of cross-examination. .
. . Accordingly, [t]he trial court’s ruling on evidentiary
matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a
clear abuse of the court’s discretion. . . . In determining
whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every
reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the
correctness of the trial court’s ruling . . . .” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Calderon-Perez, 234
Conn. App. 228, 236, 342 A.3d 1014 (2025).
I
The defendant first claims that Lakesha Burns’ tes-
timony about her contact with the defendant following
the shooting was not inconsistent with her statements
to DeMatteo.5 This claim is based on the defendant’s
contention that “[t]he trial court erred in accepting the
inconsistent] statement is improper . . . where the primary purpose of
calling the witness is to impeach him and the state’s attorney intro-
duces the prior inconsistent statement in hope that the jury will use it
substantively.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams,
204 Conn. 523, 531, 529 A.3d 653 (1987). The defendant devoted a
few sentences to this issue and did not provide analysis beyond a bare
assertion of the claim. Therefore, we agree with the state and decline
to review this claim.
“[W]e are not required to review claims that are inadequately briefed. .
. . We consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract
assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to
brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently
to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly
and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. We do not reverse the
judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings that
have not been adequately briefed. . . . The parties may not merely cite
a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts
of the case and the law cited. . . . It is not enough merely to mention
a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do
counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on
its bones.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fetscher, 162
Conn. App. 145, 155–56, 130 A.3d 892 (2015), cert. denied, 321 Conn.
904, 138 A.3d 280 (2016).
5
“Our Supreme Court has held that [i]mpeachment of a witness by the
use of a prior inconsistent statement is proper only if the two statements
State v. Burns

prosecuting authority’s misrepresentation of the timing
of the communications that Lakesha [Burns] had testi-
fied to in order to perceive an inconsistency that did not,
in fact, exist.” According to the defendant, “the state
failed to produce any evidence that Lakesha [Burns]
did, in fact, have communications with the defendant
prior to her conversation with DeMatteo.” (Emphasis in
original.) Thus, he contends that the testimony of Lake-
sha Burns that, in the days after the shooting, she spoke
with the defendant by phone and that he had returned
to her apartment a couple of days after the shooting was
not inconsistent with her statements to DeMatteo at the
time when she retrieved her vehicle. The state counters
that we should decline to review this claim because the
defendant did not preserve it at trial and is raising the
claim for the first time on appeal. In his appellate reply
brief, the defendant asserts that this court should review
his claim because his “trial counsel specifically objected
to the introduction of an inconsistent statement when
that witness is no longer on the stand,” and, thus, “[i]t
is unclear what talismanic utterance the state would
have trial counsel recite to preserve his objection beyond
what was expressly raised before the trial court.” He
also asserts that “the state conflates the nature of the
claim preserved [at trial] with the defendant’s argument
concerning the apparent reason such an error occurred,”
namely, because “the prosecuting authority . . . misrepre-
sented the nature of the evidence to the trial court . . . .”
We agree with the state and decline to review this claim.
Pursuant to Practice Book § 5-5, “[w]henever an objec-
tion to the admission of evidence is made, counsel shall
state the grounds upon which it is claimed or upon which
objection is made, succinctly and in such form as he or
she desires it to go upon the record . . . .” “[T]he standard
for the preservation of a claim alleging an improper evi-
dentiary ruling at trial is well settled. This court is not
are in fact inconsistent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Collymore, 168 Conn. App. 847, 886, 148 A.3d 1059 (2016), aff’d, 334
Conn. 431, 223 A.3d 1 (2020), cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 433,
208 L. Ed. 2d 129 (2020).
State v. Burns

bound to consider claims of law not made at the trial. .
. . In order to preserve an evidentiary ruling for review,
trial counsel must object properly. . . . In objecting to
evidence, counsel must properly articulate the basis of
the objection so as to apprise the trial court of the precise
nature of the objection and its real purpose, in order
to form an adequate basis for a reviewable ruling. . . .
Once counsel states the authority and ground of [the]
objection, any appeal will be limited to the ground
asserted. . . .
“These requirements are not simply formalities. They
serve to alert the trial court to potential error while there
is still time for the court to act. . . . Assigning error to
a court’s evidentiary rulings on the basis of objections
never raised at trial unfairly subjects the court and the
opposing party to trial by ambush. . . . State v. Cabral,
275 Conn. 514, 530–31, 881 A.2d 247, cert. denied, 546
U.S. 1048, 126 S. Ct. 773, 163 L. Ed. 2d 600 (2005).”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pagan, 158
Conn. App. 620, 632–33, 119 A.3d 1259, cert. denied,
319 Conn. 909, 123 A.3d 438 (2015); see also State v.
Valle, 236 Conn. App. 875, 884, 349 A.3d 603 (2025)
(“The requirement that [a] claim be raised distinctly
means that it must be so stated as to bring to the atten-
tion of the court the precise matter on which its decision
is being asked. . . . [It must] alert the trial court to the
specific deficiency now claimed on appeal.” (Emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert.
denied, 354 Conn. 911, A.3d (2026). “This court
reviews rulings solely on the ground on which the party’s
objection is based. . . . [W]e have consistently declined
to review claims based on a ground different from that
raised in the trial court . . . .” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Paul B., 143 Conn. App. 691, 704, 70
A.3d 1123 (2013), aff’d, 315 Conn. 19, 105 A.3d 130
(2014); see also State v. Jones, 210 Conn. App. 249, 277,
269 A.3d 870 (“[W]e conclude that the defendant failed to
object on the ground that the two police officers were tes-
tifying to an ultimate issue of fact, the applicable objec-
tion. We agree with the state that the defendant cannot
now challenge the proffered testimony as constituting
State v. Burns

improper opinion testimony on an ultimate issue where
the only objections raised before the trial court were
on the bases of relevance and foundation. See State v.
Stenner, 281 Conn. 742, 755, 917 A.2d 28 (‘[t]o permit
a party to raise a different ground on appeal than [that]
raised during trial would amount to trial by ambuscade,
unfair both to the trial court and to the opposing party’
. . .), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 883, 128 S. Ct. 290, 169 L.
Ed. 2d 139 (2007).”), cert. denied, 343 Conn. 901, 272
A.3d 199 (2022).
At trial, defense counsel never raised a lack of incon-
sistency as a ground in support of his objection to the
court’s admission of DeMatteo’s testimony concerning
the prior inconsistent statements of Lakesha Burns.
Rather, defense counsel focused his objection on the
grounds that the proffered testimony constituted hear-
say, was overly prejudicial and did not evince a conscious-
ness of guilt by the defendant, and because it was “being
offered to impeach prior testimony by a witness [who
is] no longer on the stand as to a collateral matter . .
. .” Moreover, when the court heard argument from the
prosecutor and defense counsel concerning the proffered
testimony, defense counsel never alerted the court that
“the nature of the evidence” was being mispresented by
the prosecutor. Accordingly, the defendant cannot now
challenge the court’s admission of DeMatteo’s testimony
concerning the inconsistent statements made by Lakesha
Burns on those grounds, which were not raised before the
trial court. We, therefore, decline to review this claim.6
II
The defendant next challenges the court’s admission
of DeMatteo’s testimony regarding the inconsistent
statements made by Lakesha Burns on the ground that
the prior inconsistent statements concerned a collateral
matter and “did not . . . expose any purported bias” of
Lakesha Burns. We disagree.
6
We note that “a determination as to inconsistency lies within the
discretionary authority of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. D’Amato, 163 Conn. App. 536, 556, 137 A.3d 38,
cert. denied, 321 Conn. 909, 136 A.3d 643 (2016).
State v. Burns

“A party may impeach his own witness in the same
manner as an opposing party’s witness and may dem-
onstrate the witness’ bias or bad character for veracity
and may impeach the witness using prior inconsistent
statements.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. McCarthy, 105 Conn. App. 596, 613, 939 A.2d 1195,
cert. denied, 286 Conn. 913, 944 A.2d 983 (2008). It is
well settled that, “[o]rdinarily, extrinsic evidence of prior
inconsistent statements cannot be used to contradict the
testimony of a witness, and this rule is strictly observed
when the witness’ testimony relates to a collateral mat-
ter. . . . A witness may not be impeached by contradict-
ing his or her testimony as to collateral matters, that is,
matters that are not directly relevant and material to the
merits of the case. . . . Thus, the answer of the witness
on cross-examination to a collateral matter is conclusive
and cannot be later contradicted. . . .
“Extrinsic evidence may be admitted, however, if the
subject matter of the testimony is not collateral, that
is, if it is relevant to a material issue in the case apart
from its tendency to contradict the witness. . . . Evi-
dence tending to show the motive, bias or interest of
an important witness is never collateral or irrelevant.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Colton, 227 Conn. 231, 247–48, 630 A.2d 577
(1993); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 6-5 (“[t]he credibility
of a witness may be impeached by evidence showing bias
for, prejudice against, or interest in any person or matter
that might cause the witness to testify falsely”).
The commentary to § 6-5 of the Connecticut Code of
Evidence provides in relevant part: “The range of mat-
ters potentially giving rise to bias, prejudice or interest
is virtually endless. . . . A witness may be biased by hav-
ing a friendly feeling toward a person or by favoring a
certain position based upon a familial or employment
relationship. . . .
“Because evidence tending to show a witness’ bias,
prejudice or interest is never collateral . . . impeach-
ment of a witness on these matters may be accomplished
State v. Burns

through the introduction of extrinsic evidence, in addi-
tion to examining the witness directly. . . . The scope and
extent of proof through the use of extrinsic evidence
are subject to the court’s discretion, however . . . and
whether extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show bias,
prejudice or interest without a foundation is also within
the court’s discretion.” (Citations omitted.) Conn. Code
Evid. § 6-5, commentary.
Finally, “evidence is probative of bias if a witness’ hos-
tility to or sympathy for a party is reasonably inferable
from that evidence.” State v. Bova, 240 Conn. 210, 229,
690 A.2d 1370 (1997). Our Supreme Court has held that
the credibility of a defendant’s parents is “questionable
because they are the parents of the defendant and, even
subconsciously, their parental instincts may have led
them to protect their son and [to] offer favorable testi-
mony on his behalf.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Greene,
209 Conn. 458, 473, 551 A.2d 1231 (1988).
In the present case, Lakesha Burns testified that she
had phone conversations with the defendant in the days
following the shooting. When the prosecutor asked her
whether the defendant had returned to her house in “the
couple days afterwards,” she responded, “[y]es,” testify-
ing that, during that time, she had a conversation with
the defendant about the shooting in which he claimed to
not know what had happened. The prosecutor questioned
if she recalled being asked by the police when she picked
up her vehicle whether she had seen the defendant, and
she replied that she could not recall any conversation at
that time. The prosecutor also asked her whether she
had “phone contact with [the defendant] in the days
afterwards,” to which she replied, “[y]es.” The prosecu-
tor then asked, “would he answer the phone number that
you gave the police,” and she replied, “[t]hat was his
phone number,” and that she had conversations with the
defendant. DeMatteo, on the other hand, testified that,
at the time Lakesha Burns picked up her vehicle, he had
asked her if she had been in contact with the defendant
because he needed to talk to the defendant and that “she
State v. Burns

stated [that] she had not seen him yet or heard from him.”
DeMatteo also testified about his unsuccessful attempts
to contact the defendant via the phone number provided
by Lakesha Burns and his discussion with her about the
phone number that she had provided, in which she indi-
cated that she was unable to reach the defendant as well.
The prior inconsistent statements of Lakesha Burns to
which DeMatteo testified related to the state’s theory of
bias in that they showed an interest to protect the defen-
dant, her son, from the efforts of the police to contact
him regarding the shooting, as demonstrated by her
statements to DeMatteo in the days following the shoot-
ing that she had not been in contact with the defendant
and was unable to reach him by phone, as compared to
her trial testimony to the contrary. “Whether a matter
is collateral . . . is a determination that lies within the
trial court’s sound discretion.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Bermudez, 195 Conn. App. 780, 819,
228 A.3d 96 (2020), aff’d, 341 Conn. 233, 267 A.3d 44
(2021). In the present case, making every reasonable
presumption in favor of the trial court’s ruling, we can-
not conclude that the court abused its wide discretion
when it determined that DeMatteo’s testimony about the
prior inconsistent statements of Lakesha Burns did not
involve a collateral matter, as those statements tended
to establish Lakesha Burns’ bias toward the defendant,
which is never collateral. See State v. Colton, supra, 227
Conn. 248; see also State v. Greene, supra, 209 Conn.
473 (“parental instincts may have led [the defendant’s
parents] to protect their son and [to] offer favorable
testimony on his behalf”).7
III
The defendant also claims that the court improperly
failed to require the state to lay a proper foundation for
the admission of the alleged inconsistent statements of
7
The state also argues that the court’s admission of the challenged
testimony from DeMatteo was proper as evidence of the “ ‘completeness
of the investigation’ ” to rebut the defendant’s argument that the police
investigation was inadequate. Because we conclude that the court did
State v. Burns

Lakesha Burns and, thus, abused its discretion by per-
mitting the prosecutor to introduce the impeachment
evidence through the testimony of DeMatteo. According
to the defendant, the court should have allowed Lakesha
Burns to be confronted with the purported inconsis-
tency because “she may have completely resolved any
ambiguity by explaining that she saw or spoke with the
defendant after recovering the vehicle from the police
station.” The defendant concedes that the trial court is
vested with “liberal discretion” concerning “whether to
admit the impeaching statements where no foundation
has been laid.” State v. Saia, 172 Conn. 37, 46, 372 A.2d
144 (1976). The defendant contends, however, that “the
present case evidences the danger of permitting the
introduction of the purportedly inconsistent statements
of a witness absent the requisite foundation.”
The state counters by arguing that it did lay a proper
foundation for the admission of the inconsistent state-
ments and that, in the alternative, the trial court acted
within its discretion by not requiring a foundation to be
laid for the prior inconsistent statements. We conclude
that we need not determine whether the state laid a
proper foundation because the court was within its dis-
cretion to admit the prior inconsistent statements in the
absence of a foundation being laid for their admission.
Pursuant to § 6-10 (a) of the Connecticut Code of Evi-
dence, “[t]he credibility of a witness may be impeached
by evidence of a prior inconsistent statement made by
the witness.” “In examining a witness concerning a prior
inconsistent statement, whether written or not, made
by the witness, the statement should be shown to or
the contents of the statement disclosed to the witness
at that time.” Conn. Code Evid. § 6-10 (b). “If a prior
inconsistent statement made by a witness is shown to or
if the contents of the statement are disclosed to the wit-
ness at the time the witness testifies, and if the witness
admits to making the statement, extrinsic evidence of
not abuse its discretion by admitting that testimony on the issue of
bias for impeachment purposes, we need not address this argument.
State v. Burns

the statement is inadmissible, except in the discretion
of the court. If a prior inconsistent statement made by a
witness is not shown to or if the contents of the statement
are not disclosed to the witness at the time the witness
testifies, extrinsic evidence of the statement is inadmis-
sible, except in the discretion of the court.” (Emphasis
added.) Conn. Code Evid. § 6-10 (c).
Our Supreme Court has stated that, “[i]n this state,
we have no inflexible rule regarding the necessity of
calling the attention of a witness . . . to his alleged prior
inconsistent statements before either questioning him on
the subject or introducing extrinsic evidence tending to
impeach him. From early times, it has consistently been
held that it rests within the judicial discretion of the
trial court whether to admit the impeaching statements
where no foundation has been laid. . . . The trial court
is vested with a liberal discretion as to how the inquiry
should be conducted in any given case.” (Citation omit-
ted.) State v. Saia, supra, 172 Conn. 46; see also Adams
v. Herald Publishing Co., 82 Conn. 448, 452–53, 74 A.
755 (1909) (admitting witness’ out-of-court statements
that contradicted sworn testimony without calling wit-
ness’ attention to inconsistency was not reversible error).
Although, “generally, a foundation for introducing
the [prior inconsistent] statement should be laid [during
the examination] of the witness . . . it rests within the
judicial discretion of the trial court whether to admit the
impeaching statements where no foundation has been
laid. . . . The trial court is vested with a liberal discre-
tion as to how the inquiry should be conducted in any
given case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Gauthier, 140 Conn. App. 69, 76, 57 A.3d 849, cert.
denied, 308 Conn. 907, 61 A.3d 1097 (2013); see also
State v. Collymore, 168 Conn. App. 847, 887, 148 A.3d
1059 (2016) (“trial [c]ourts have wide discretion whether
to admit prior inconsistent statements that have not sat-
isfied the typical foundational requirements in § 6-10 (c)
of the Connecticut Code of Evidence” (internal quotation
marks omitted)), aff’d, 334 Conn. 431, 223 A.3d 1 (2020),
State v. Burns

cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 433, 208 L. Ed. 2d
129 (2020); State v. John M., 87 Conn. App. 301, 309,
865 A.2d 450 (2005) (§ 6-10 (c) of Connecticut Code of
Evidence “clearly indicates that the trial court is vested
with wide discretion in determining whether extrin-
sic evidence of prior inconsistent statements should be
admitted in a trial when no foundation has been laid”),
aff’d, 285 Conn. 822, 942 A.2d 323 (2008).
In the present case, making every reasonable presump-
tion in favor of the trial court’s ruling and in light of
the clear language of § 6-10 of the Connecticut Code of
Evidence, we conclude that the trial court acted within its
broad discretion by admitting into evidence for impeach-
ment purposes DeMatteo’s testimony about the prior
inconsistent statements of Lakesha Burns, even though
she had not been confronted specifically regarding her
inconsistent statements to DeMatteo at the time she
testified.8
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

8  
In light of our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion by admitting DeMatteo’s testimony about the prior inconsistent
statements of Lakesha Burns for impeachment purposes, we need not
address the defendant’s claim that he was harmed by the court’s admis-
sion of that testimony. See State v. Clark, 191 Conn. App. 191, 200 n.7,
213 A.3d 1166 (2019) (“because we conclude that there was no error,
we need not conduct a harmless error analysis”); State v. Dubuisson,
183 Conn. App. 62, 72 n.8, 191 A.3d 229 (“The defendant also argues
that the admittance of the [hearsay] statements was harmful error
of a constitutional magnitude. Because we find no error, we decline
to address the defendant’s claim.”), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 914, 193
A.3d 560 (2018).